scholarly journals Cross-cultural Reading the Mind in the Eyes: An fMRI Investigation

2010 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 97-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
Reginald B. Adams ◽  
Nicholas O. Rule ◽  
Robert G. Franklin ◽  
Elsie Wang ◽  
Michael T. Stevenson ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Group Membership ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Neural Correlates ◽  
Cross Cultural ◽  
Cultural Groups ◽  
White American ◽  
High Level ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Preliminary Support

The ability to infer others' thoughts, intentions, and feelings is regarded as uniquely human. Over the last few decades, this remarkable ability has captivated the attention of philosophers, primatologists, clinical and developmental psychologists, anthropologists, social psychologists, and cognitive neuroscientists. Most would agree that the capacity to reason about others' mental states is innately prepared, essential for successful human social interaction. Whether this ability is culturally tuned, however, remains entirely uncharted on both the behavioral and neural levels. Here we provide the first behavioral and neural evidence for an intracultural advantage (better performance for same- vs. other-culture) in mental state decoding in a sample of native Japanese and white American participants. We examined the neural correlates of this intracultural advantage using fMRI, revealing greater bilateral posterior superior temporal sulci recruitment during same- versus other-culture mental state decoding in both cultural groups. These findings offer preliminary support for cultural consistency in the neurological architecture subserving high-level mental state reasoning, as well as its differential recruitment based on cultural group membership.

Luminosity and the KK Thesis

2019 ◽  
pp. 31-48
Author(s):  
Robert C. Stalnaker
Keyword(s):  
Information Theory ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Mental States ◽  
The State ◽  
Simplified Model ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Margin Of Error ◽  
The Mind

A mental state is luminous if and only if being in a state of that kind always puts one in a position to know that one is in the state. This chapter is a critique of Timothy Williamson’s margin-of-error argument that no nontrivial states are luminous in this sense. While I agree with Williamson’s rejection of a Cartesian internalist conception of the mind, I argue that an externalist conception (one based on information theory) can be reconciled with the luminosity of intentional mental states such as knowledge. My argument, which uses an artificial and simplified model of knowledge, is not a direct rebuttal to his argument, as applied to a more realistic notion of the knowledge of human beings, but I argue that it shows that a luminosity assumption is compatible with externalism about knowledge, and it suggest an intuitively plausible strategy for resisting his argument.

Neural Correlates of Mental State Decoding in Human Adults: An Event-related Potential Study

2004 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 415-426 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark A. Sabbagh ◽  
Margaret C. Moulson ◽  
Kate L. Harkness
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Right Hemisphere ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Neural Correlates ◽  
Event Related Potential ◽  
Neural Systems ◽  
Core Theory ◽  
Human Adults ◽  
The Right

Successful negotiation of human social interactions rests on having a theory of mind—an understanding of how others' behaviors can be understood in terms of internal mental states, such as beliefs, desires, intentions, and emotions. A core theory-of-mind skill is the ability to decode others' mental states on the basis of observable information, such as facial expressions. Although several recent studies have focused on the neural correlates of reasoning about mental states, no research has addressed the question of what neural systems underlie mental state decoding. We used dense-array eventrelated potentials (ERP) to show that decoding mental states from pictures of eyes is associated with an N270–400 component over inferior frontal and anterior temporal regions of the right hemisphere. Source estimation procedures suggest that orbitofrontal and medial temporal regions may underlie this ERP effect. These findings suggest that different components of everyday theory-of-mind skills may rely on dissociable neural mechanisms.

scholarly journals Music Composition from the Brain Signal: Representing the Mental State by Music

2010 ◽  
Vol 2010 ◽  
pp. 1-6 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Wu ◽  
Chaoyi Li ◽  
Yu Yin ◽  
Changzheng Zhou ◽  
Dezhong Yao
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Music Composition ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Arousal Level ◽  
Sleep Stages ◽  
Biofeedback Therapy ◽  
Significant Difference ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Potential Tool

This paper proposes a method to translate human EEG into music, so as to represent mental state by music. The arousal levels of the brain mental state and music emotion are implicitly used as the bridge between the mind world and the music. The arousal level of the brain is based on the EEG features extracted mainly by wavelet analysis, and the music arousal level is related to the musical parameters such as pitch, tempo, rhythm, and tonality. While composing, some music principles (harmonics and structure) were taken into consideration. With EEGs during various sleep stages as an example, the music generated from them had different patterns of pitch, rhythm, and tonality. 35 volunteers listened to the music pieces, and significant difference in music arousal levels was found. It implied that different mental states may be identified by the corresponding music, and so the music from EEG may be a potential tool for EEG monitoring, biofeedback therapy, and so forth.

scholarly journals The Effect of the Glossary on the Reliability and Performance of the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET)

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
José Toloza-Muñoz ◽  
Jean González-Mendoza ◽  
Ramón D. Castillo ◽  
Diego Morales-Bader
Keyword(s):  
Undergraduate Students ◽  
Secondary Task ◽  
Temporal Stability ◽  
Mental States ◽  
The Self ◽  
Validity And Reliability ◽  
Before And After ◽  
And Performance ◽  
High Level ◽  
The Mind

AbstractThe Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET) is used to measure high-level Theory of Mind. RMET consists of images of the regions surrounding the eyes and a glossary of terms that defines words associated with the gazes depicted in the images. People must identify the meaning associated with each gaze and can consult the glossary as they respond. The results indicate that typically developed adults perform better than adults with neurodevelopmental disorders. However, the evidence regarding the validity and reliability of the test is contradictory. This study evaluated the effect of the glossary on the performance, internal consistency, and temporal stability of the test. A total of 89 undergraduate students were randomly assigned to three conditions. The first group used the original glossary (Ori-G). The second group developed a self-generated glossary of gazes (Self-G). Finally, the third group developed a glossary that did not define gazes, but unrelated words instead (No-G). The test was administered before and after participants drew a randomly assigned image as a secondary task. The findings show that the number of correct answers was similar among the three conditions before and after the secondary task. However, the Self-G and No-G groups took less time to finish the test. The type of glossary affected the consistency and stability of the test. In our case, the Self-G condition made the responses faster, more consistent, and more stable. The results are discussed in terms of levels of processing and the detection of mental states based on gazes.

scholarly journals The relation between language and mental state reasoning

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ercenur Ünal ◽  
Anna Papafragou
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Cognitive Abilities ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Linguistic Differences ◽  
Conceptual Representations ◽  
The Mind

This chapter discusses how children’s conceptual representations of the mind make contact with language. It focuses on two domains: the understanding of the conditions that lead to knowledge, and the ability to attribute knowledge to oneself and others. Specifically, it asks whether language provides the representational resources necessary for representing mental states and whether cross-linguistic differences in encoding of mental states influence sensitivity to the features that distinguish the conditions that allow people to gain knowledge. Empirical findings in these domains strongly suggest that language scaffolds the development of these cognitive abilities without altering the underlying conceptual representations of mental states.

The Sociocultural Brain

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shihui Han
Keyword(s):  
Human Brain ◽  
Brain Imaging ◽  
Functional Organization ◽  
Causal Attribution ◽  
Brain Activity ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Neural Correlates ◽  
Cross Cultural ◽  
Cultural Neuroscience ◽  
Sociocultural Experiences

Is the human brain shaped by our sociocultural experiences, and if so, how? What are the neural correlates of cultural diversity of human behavior? Do genes interact with sociocultural experiences to moderate human brain functional organization and behavior? The Sociocultural Brain examines the relationship between human sociocultural experience and brain functional organization. It introduces brain imaging studies that identify neural correlates of culturally familiar gesture, music, brand, and more. It reviews cultural neuroscience findings of cross-cultural differences in human brain activity underlying multiple cognitive and affective processes (e.g., visual perception and attention, memory, causal attribution, inference of others’ mental states, self-reflection, and empathy). Further, it reviews studies that integrate brain imaging and cultural priming to explore a causal relationship between culture and brain functional organization. It also examines empirical findings of genetic influences on the coupling between brain activity and cultural values. The book aims to provide a new perspective on human brain functional organization by highlighting the role of human sociocultural experience and its interaction with genes in shaping the human brain and our behavior. Finally, the book discusses the implications of cultural neuroscience findings for understanding the nature of the human brain and culture, as well as implications for education, cross-cultural communication and conflict, and clinical treatment of mental disorders.

Transparency and Self-Knowledge

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex Byrne
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Mental States ◽  
First Person ◽  
Unified Theory ◽  
Gareth Evans ◽  
Weak Evidence ◽  
The World ◽  
Self Knowledge ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Emotion Memory

T&SK sets out and defends a theory of self-knowledge—knowledge of one’s mental states. Inspired by Gareth Evans’ discussion of self-knowledge in his The Varieties of Reference, the basic idea is that one comes to know that one is in a mental state M by an inference from a worldly or environmental premise to the conclusion that one is in M. (Typically the worldly premise will not be about anything mental.) The mind, on this account, is “transparent”: self-knowledge is achieved by an “outward glance” at the corresponding tract of the world, not by an “inward glance” at one’s own mind. Belief is the clearest case, with the inference being from ‘p’ to ‘I believe that p.’ One serious problem with this idea is that the inference seems terrible, because ‘p’ is at best very weak evidence that one believes that p. Another is that the idea seems not to generalize. For example, what is the worldly premise corresponding to ‘I intend to ϕ‎,’ or ‘I feel a pain’? T&SK argues that both problems can be solved, and explains how the account covers perception, sensation, desire, intention, emotion, memory, imagination, and thought. The result is a unified theory of self-knowledge that explains the epistemic security of beliefs about one’s mental states (privileged access), as well as the fact that one has a special first-person way of knowing about one’s mental states (peculiar access).

The Dynamics of the Mental State of Students in the Process of Transformation of the Chess Training System

2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 104-112
Author(s):  
I.V. Mikhaylova ◽  
◽  
S.N. Fomina ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Training System ◽  
Physical Culture ◽  
Subjective Feeling ◽  
Russian State ◽  
Motivation For Learning ◽  
High Level ◽  
Level Of Motivation ◽  
The University

the urgency of the problem is due to the need to find a model for the qualitative growth of training of specialists, to create a socio-cultural environment at the university that allows not only to form professional competencies, but also to influence the mental state of students, organizing comfortable activities with a high level of motivation for learning. In this aspect, the transformation of the chess system of training students can have a positive effect not only on the development of intellectual properties and personality traits, but also on the mental state of students. The aim of the research was to study the changes in the mental state of students in the process of chess training on the basis of the developed author’s concept of the international grandmaster I.V. Mikhailova. The study involved 3–4 year students of the Russian State Social University, studying the discipline “Elective courses in physical culture and sports” with a total number of 168 people. Students learned using a variety of technologies and resources, including Chess Planet, chess. com and chessKing.com platforms. To study the mental states of students, standard tests were used: SAN (Feelings, Activity, Mood), a test for loneliness by the method of subjective feeling of loneliness by D. Russell and M. Ferguson and a test by the method of Ch.D. Spielberger in Y.L. Khanin’s adaptation to identify personal and situational anxiety. The results showed that the teachers, based on the author’s concept developed by I. V. Mikhailova, generally note an increase in the comfort of the mental state, a decrease in anxiety, and an improvement in the psychoemotional state.

Introspection, epistemology of

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hilary Kornblith
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Physical World ◽  
Complete Picture ◽  
States Of Mind ◽  
Special Mode ◽  
Direct Knowledge ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Complete Access ◽  
Adequate Evidence

If we wish to know what is going on in someone else’s mind, we must observe their behaviour; on the basis of what we observe, we may sometimes reasonably draw a conclusion about the person’s mental state. Thus, for example, on seeing someone smile, we infer that they are happy; on seeing someone scowl, we infer that they are upset. But this is not, at least typically, the way in which we come to know our own mental states. We do not need to examine our own behaviour in order to know how we feel, what we believe, what we want and so on. Our understanding of these things is more direct than our understanding of the mental states of others, it seems. The term used to describe this special mode of access which we seem to have to our own mental states is ‘introspection’. A view which takes its inspiration from Descartes holds that introspection provides us with infallible and complete access to our states of mind. On this view, introspection provides us with a foundation for our knowledge of the physical world. On this view we come to know the physical world by first coming to recognize certain features of our mind, namely, the sensations which physical objects excite in us, and then drawing conclusions about the likely source of these mental states. Our knowledge of the physical world is thus indirect; it is grounded in the direct knowledge we have of our own minds. The view that introspection provides an infallible and complete picture of the mind, however, is no longer widely accepted. Introspection has also been called upon to support various metaphysical conclusions. Descartes argued for dualism on the basis of introspective evidence, and certain contemporary philosophers have argued in much the same spirit. Hume noted that introspection does not reveal the presence of an enduring self, but only a series of fleeting perceptions; some have concluded, therefore, that there is no enduring self. Philosophers concerned with self-improvement, whether epistemological or moral, have frequently called upon introspection. Introspection has been thought to aid in forming beliefs on the basis of adequate evidence, and it has been used as a tool of self-scrutiny by those concerned to understand and refine their motivations and characters.

scholarly journals Cross-Cultural Mental State Reading Ability in Antillean Dutch, Moroccan Dutch, and Dutch Young Adults

2019 ◽  
Vol 50 (3) ◽  
pp. 419-440 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna van der Meulen ◽  
Doret de Ruyter ◽  
Arjan Blokland ◽  
Lydia Krabbendam
Keyword(s):  
Young Adults ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Cognitive Abilities ◽  
Reading Ability ◽  
Social Cognitive ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Cross Cultural ◽  
Group Effect ◽  
Psychological Acculturation

Understanding how bicultural and monocultural individuals are oriented toward the cultures they come into frequent contact with can increase insights into their adaptation and well-being. Previous research has shown a relation between culture and mental state reading in the form of the cultural in-group effect, which is defined as the advantage in reading mental states from the own cultural group compared with other groups. Thus, orientation toward cultures can be assessed not only in self-reported behavioral and psychological acculturation but also in the domain of social–cognitive abilities. The aim of the current research is to gain insight into acculturation in the social–cognitive ability of mental state reading. In addition, it explores how this facet of acculturation is related to the more traditionally studied behavioral and psychological acculturation. Cross-cultural mental state reading, language and possession of friends (behavioral acculturation), and cultural identification (psychological acculturation) were assessed in Antillean Dutch ( n = 128), Moroccan Dutch ( n = 204), and Dutch ( n = 349) young adults between 19 and 24 years old ( M = 21.57 years, SD = 1.38 years). For cross-cultural mental state reading, the in-group effect was confirmed for the Dutch but not for the Antillean Dutch and Moroccan Dutch participants. Furthermore, there were no consistent associations between mental state reading and behavioral and psychological acculturation in the three groups. The present results extend fundamental research on cross-cultural mental state reading and also help to further understand the orientation of these specific cultural groups.

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