scholarly journals Obedient rebellion: conceiving the African nuclear weapon-free zone

2022 ◽  
Vol 98 (1) ◽  
pp. 145-163
Author(s):  
Sizwe Mpofu-Walsh

Abstract Why do nuclear weapon-free zones (NWFZs)—areas which prohibit nuclear weapons—emerge in some contexts, and not others? Focusing on the African case, this article introduces the concept of ‘obedient rebellion’ to explain the African NWFZ's early conception. ‘Obedient rebellion’ is an attitude of ambivalence toward global nuclear order. To newly-decolonizing African states, the African NWFZ symbolized both postcolonial anti-nuclear solidarity and nuclear responsibility; it represented both ‘obedience’ to—and ‘rebellion’ against—global nuclear order. This ambivalence, between ‘obedience’ and ‘rebellion’, paradoxically accommodated multiple conflicting audiences simultaneously, thereby stabilising the zone. The African NWFZ's ambiguous meanings made it viable, even though those meanings conflicted. The zone's early conception offers insight into the complex, contending forces that continue to bind the world's NWFZs—and indeed nuclear order itself—to the present. NWFZs epitomize the tensions which stabilize nuclear order: between sovereign equality and nuclear inequality; between local solidarities and global loyalties; and between contestation and compromise. At first, these tensions seem to imperil NWFZs; in fact, these tensions stabilize NWFZs. The African zone also poses challenges to the African blind spot that continues to exist in International Relations theory.

1988 ◽  
Vol 44 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 253-269 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ramesh Thakur

The pursuit of nuclear non-proliferation has been a major international concern of our times. The Antarctic Treaty of 1959 is of great historical significance for having created the world's first nuclear-free zone (NFZ). Article 5 of the Treaty prohibits any nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive waste in the Antarctica. The Treaty of Tlatelolco of 1967 established the first internationally recognised Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (NWFZ) in a populated region of the world, namely Latin America. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 was an attempt to bring in a global regime to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). States in the latter category can adhere to the NPT while accepting a stationing of nuclear weapons on their territories, as long as they do not exercise jurisdiction and control over the weapons. West Germany is an obvious example of such a country. A NWFZ, however, prohibits such stationing of nuclear weapons. The three essential characteristics of a NWFZ are non-possession, non-deployment and non-use of nuclear weapons. NWFZs can help to strengthen and promote non-proliferation by providing a means of extending and reinforcing the NPT. In fact Article 7 of the latter accepts that, “Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of states to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.” The article merely acknowledged that one such treaty had been negotiated more or less simultaneously with the NPT. The second NFWZ in an inhabited region was not to be established for another eighteen years. At the Sixteenth South Pacific Forum meeting held in Rarotonga, Cook Islands, Forum countries adopted the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty on 6 August 1985 (Hiroshima Day). The Preamble to the treaty expresses the commitment to world peace, a grave concern at the continuing nuclear arms race, the conviction that every country bears an obligation to strive for the elimination of nuclear weapons, a belief in the efficacy of regional arms control measures, and a reaffirmation of the NPT for halting nucleor proliferation. The core NFZ obligations are contained in Articles 3–7. Each party agrees not to manufacture or otherwise acquire, possess or have control—or seek to do so—over any nuclear device; not to assist or encourage others to make or acquire nuclear weapons; to prevent the stationing or testing of nuclear weapons on its territory; not to dump radioactive wastes at sea anywhere in the zone, and to prevent such dumping by others in its territorial sea. Discussions at the United Nations had, by the mid-1970s, identified nine major principles as the guiding elements of a NWFZ: (1) the initiative should come from the countries of the region; (2) the specific provisions of the NWFZ treaty should be negotiated between the regional member states in the form of a multilateral treaty establishing the zone in perpetuity; (5) while adherence to the treaty should be voluntary, the NWFZ must nevertheless embrace all militarily significant states in the region: (4) existing treaty relationships within the zone should not be disturbed; (5) there should be an effective verification system: (6) peaceful nuclear development should be allowed; (7) the zone should hare clearly defined and recognised boundaries; (8) in defining the territory of the zone, members must respect international law, including freedom of the seas and straits used for international navigation and of international airspace; and (9) the NWFZ should have the support of the nuclear-weapon states. Thus the NWFZ concept in established United Nations vocabulary does not prohibit the temporary presence of nuclear vessels during transit or on port calls, and it does not necessarily preclude the acquisition of sensitive nuclear facilities and materials tantamount to having a nuclear-weapon capability or producing untested nuclear bomb components. Nevertheless, it will be useful to follow the UN criteria in order to examine the nature and implications of the South Pacific zone.


2007 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-128
Author(s):  
Matthew Woods

International relations theory overdetermines proliferation but few states possess nuclear arms. This article maintains the linguistic construction of ‘proliferation’ accounts for the international nonnuclear order. Following an overview of its approach, the article begins with a review of earlier works and notes the inability of ‘nuclear language studies’ to account for the order of rejection rather than acquisition of nuclear arms. The article traces that limitation to a practical assumption about the world that animates scholars to attend to how words distort rather than create reality. The article then introduces a version of constructivism that claims speech acts produce constitutive rules that create what ‘is’ and oblige order (as ‘same use’) to suggest how language accounts for the order that turns on rejection of nuclear weapons. Finally, the article illustrates how states, following this constructivist process, often used discursive practices that emphasized the ‘unnatural’ to create ‘proliferation’ between 1958 and 1968.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Татьяна Вербицкая ◽  
Tatyana Verbitskaya

The monograph is devoted to nuclear safety in the context of modern realities of international relations. Can it be argued that the nuclear non-proliferation regime will be replaced by a nuclear-weapon-ban regime? In what direction will the nuclear-weapon-ban regime develop? The study of these issues seems to be very relevant after the adoption of the text of the Treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons in 2017. For students and teachers, as well as anyone interested in disarmament issues.


Author(s):  
Vipin Narang

This chapter lays out the volume's main arguments in brief. Contrary to the usual focus on superpowers and Cold War nuclear competition, the chapter proposes a different dynamic. It asks what strategies and choices certain states will make about their nuclear weapons and how those decisions about nuclear strategy can affect international relations and conflict. Examining the decisions that regional nuclear powers—such as China, India, Pakistan, Israel, France, and South Africa—have made about their arsenals thus far, and their resulting behavior, helps address these questions. Regional nuclear powers, for systematic and predictable reasons, choose clearly identifiable nuclear postures and these postures matter to a regional power's ability to deter conflict. These countries' nuclear choices, therefore, provide valuable insight into the crucial challenges of contemporary nuclear proliferation and international stability.


Author(s):  
Keir A. Lieber ◽  
Daryl G. Press

This chapter explains the central anomaly of the nuclear age. It talks about the continuation of great power competition under the shadow of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons are the most effective instruments of deterrence ever invented, but they have not eliminated the incentives for countries to compete intensely with each other for greater security, power, and strategic advantage. The chapter focuses on understanding why power politics endure in the nuclear age, which not only solve a puzzle for international relations theory but also provides vital insights into the requirements of nuclear deterrence. It also explains the trends that may undermine nuclear deterrence in the coming decades.


2011 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 209-224 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel H Joyner

This article examines a number of major developments in international law and State policy regarding nuclear weapons which have occurred over the past two years.However, in order to understand the context and significance of these developments, I must first very briefly address what has gone on previously in this area of international relations.I have argued elsewhere that over the course of the decade ending in 2008 the original balance of principles underlying the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which comprises the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation legal regime, has been distorted, particularly by nuclear-weapon-possessing governments, led by the United States, in favor of a disproportionate prioritization of non-proliferation principles, and an unwarranted under-prioritization of peaceful use and disarmament principles.1 I also argue that this distortion of principled balance by nuclear weapon states has resulted in a number of erroneous legal interpretations of the NPT's provisions.


2005 ◽  
Vol 59 (2) ◽  
pp. 187-208
Author(s):  
Richard L. Russell

Iraq's experience with chemical weapons provides ample lessons for nation-states looking to redress their conventional military shortcomings. Nation-states are likely to learn from Saddam that chemical weapons are useful for waging war against nation-states ill-prepared to fight on a chemical battlefield as well as against internal insurgents and rebellious civilians. Most significantly, nation-states studying Iraq's experience are likely to conclude that chemical weapons are not a “poor man's nuclear weapon” and that only nuclear weapons can deter potential adversaries including the United States.


2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (14) ◽  
Author(s):  
Renato Somberg Pfeffer (IBMEC/MG)

Desde a década de 1980, o campo teórico das Relações Internacionais tem passado por uma crise profunda. Na nova sociedade da informação marcada pela globalização, o conceito fundamental das teorias tradicionais – a soberania do Estado – é desafiado. Em diálogo com outras áreas das Ciências Sociais e da Filosofia, a teoria das Relações Internacionais busca, então, refundar sua identidade. Essa refundação tem passado por uma reflexão crítica acerca de sua história e uma reavaliação de seus pressupostos. A defesa da emancipação humana passa a ser o mote orientador dessa nova tendência entre os críticos reflexivistas. Esse artigo busca resgatar algumas influências de outros campos do saber que estão na origem ao pensamento reflexivista.


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