Protection of Personal Information Act 2013 and data protection for health research in South Africa

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 160-179
Author(s):  
Ciara Staunton ◽  
Rachel Adams ◽  
Dominique Anderson ◽  
Talishiea Croxton ◽  
Dorcas Kamuya ◽  
...  

Abstract The Protection of Personal Information Act (POPIA) [No.4 of 2013] is the first comprehensive data protection regulation to be passed in South Africa and it gives effect to the right to informational privacy derived from the constitutional right to privacy It is due to come into force in 2020, and seeks to regulate the processing of personal information in South Africa, regulate the flow of personal information across South Africa’s borders, and ensure that any limitations on the right to privacy are justified and aimed at protecting other important rights and interests. Although it was not drafted with health research in mind, POPIA will have an impact on the sharing of health data for research, in particular biorepositories. It is now timely to consider the impact of POPIA on biorepositories, and the necessary changes to their access and sharing arrangements prior to POPIA coming into force.

Obiter ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Melody Musoni

The focus of this note is to analyze whether the Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill provides a harmonization between search and seizure and the constitutional right to privacy. This will be achieved by discussing the State powers of search and seizure in cyberspace vis-à-vis the right to privacy as envisaged in the Protection of Personal Information Act. Further, this note investigates whether the Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill achieves the purpose of combatting cybercrimes without the infringement of the right to privacy. Subsequently, the article provides plausible recommendations on how the State should lawfully conduct searches and seizures of articles related to cybercrimes.


2013 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-78
Author(s):  
Maria Inês de Oliveira Martins

Abstract The need of private insurers for information on the candidate’s health risks is recognized by the law, which places pre-contractual duties of disclosure upon the candidates. When the risks are influenced by health factors, e.g. in the case of life- and health insurances, it implies the provision of health information by the candidates, who thus voluntarily limit their right to privacy. This consent, however, often happens in a context of factual coercion to contract. Next to this, from a legal standpoint, the collection of personal information must respond to the principle of proportionality. Against this background, this article assesses the compatibility of questionnaire techniques that rely on open-ended health related questions with the right to privacy, as protected by Portuguese and international law. It then analyses the extent of pre-contractual duties of disclosure as defined by the Portuguese Insurance Act, which requires the candidate to volunteer all the relevant information independently of being asked for it. In doing so, the article also refers to some other European countries. It concludes that the relevant Portuguese legislation is incompatible both with Portuguese constitutional law and with international law.


2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 73-85
Author(s):  
Yohanes Firmansyah ◽  
Imam Haryanto

The Covid-19 case has had a huge influence on all aspects of human life, starting from health, economy, sosial, law, and many more. The COVID-19 pandemic has caused various frictions between various interests, one of which is a clash between individual interests and community interests. One of the obvious things about this problem is regarding the impact of COVID-19 in the field of sociology, especially the relationship between individuals, especially the issue of community stigmatization regarding infectious diseases, the dilemma between the privacy rights of the identity of COVID-19 patients and the disclosure of publik data on COVID-19 patients with various risks will injure and cause multiple material and immaterial losses. On the other hand, Covid-19 also raises various sosial-psychological problems and legal problems that still do not regulate all aspects of human life. This paper describes the sociological elements of COVID-19, the right to privacy, publik information disclosure, and the sosial-psychological impact of COVID-19, along with a juridical review of the right to privacy and publik disclosure of information regarding the transparency of COVID-19.


Author(s):  
Agnese Reine-Vītiņa

Mūsdienās tiesības uz privāto dzīvi nepieciešamas ikvienā demokrātiskā sabiedrībā, un šo tiesību iekļaušana konstitūcijā juridiski garantē fiziskas personas rīcības brīvību un vienlaikus arī citu – valsts pamatlikumā noteikto – cilvēka tiesību īstenošanu [5]. Personas datu aizsardzības institūts tika izveidots, izpratnes par tiesību uz personas privātās dzīves neaizskaramību saturu paplašinot 20. gadsimta 70. gados, kad vairāku Eiropas valstu valdības uzsāka informācijas apstrādes projektus, piemēram, tautas skaitīšanu u. c. Informācijas tehnoloģiju attīstība ļāva arvien vairāk informācijas par personām glabāt un apstrādāt elektroniski. Viena no tiesību problēmām bija informācijas vākšana par fizisku personu un tiesību uz privātās dzīves neaizskaramību ievērošana. Lai nodrošinātu privātās dzīves aizsardzību, atsevišķas Eiropas valstis pēc savas iniciatīvas pieņēma likumus par datu aizsardzību. Pirmie likumi par personas datu aizsardzību Eiropā tika pieņemti Vācijas Federatīvajā Republikā, tad Zviedrijā (1973), Norvēģijā (1978) un citur [8, 10]. Ne visas valstis pieņēma likumus par datu aizsardzību vienlaikus, tāpēc Eiropas Padome nolēma izstrādāt konvenciju, lai unificētu datu aizsardzības noteikumus un principus. Nowadays, the right to privacy is indispensable in every democratic society and inclusion of such rights in the constitution, guarantees legally freedom of action of a natural person and, simultaneously, implementation of other human rights established in the fundamental law of the state. The institute of personal data protection was established by expanding the understanding of the content of the right to privacy in the 70’s of the 19th century, when the government of several European countries initiated information processing projects, such as population census etc. For the development of information technology, more and more information on persons was kept and processed in electronic form. One of the legal problems was gathering of information on natural persons and the right to privacy. In order to ensure the protection of privacy, separate European countries, on their own initiative, established a law on data protection. The first laws on the protection of personal data in Europe were established in the Federal Republic of Germany, then in Sweden (1973), Norway (1978) and elsewhere. Not all countries adopted laws on data protection at the same time, so the Council of Europe decided to elaborate a convention to unify data protection rules and principles.


2021 ◽  
pp. 125
Author(s):  
GULNAZ AYDIN RZAYEVA ◽  
AYTAKIN NAZIM IBRAHIMOVA

The development of new technologies also has an impact on human rights. In the previous “epochs” of global information society, it was stated that that traditional rights can be exercised online. For instance, in 2012 (and again in 2014 and 2016), the UN Human Rights Council emphasized that ‘the same rights granted to people, so to speak, in an “offline” manner, must be protected online as well’. This, in its turn, implicitly brought to the reality that the new technetronic society did not create new rights. Though, we should take into consideration that in the digital world national legislative norms that guarantee the confidentiality of personal data often do not catch up with the technological development and, thus, can’t ensure confidentiality online. Therefore, the impact of digitalization on human rights within the frames of international and national laws should be broadly analysed and studied. The article’s objective is to analyze the impact of new technologies on human rights in the context of the right to be forgotten and right to privacy. Because the development of new technologies is more closely linked to the security of personal data. With the formation of the right to be forgotten, it is the issue of ensuring the confidentiality of certain contents of personal data as a result of the influence of the time factor. The authors conclude that, the right to be forgotten was previously defended more in the context of the right to privacy. However, they cannot be considered equal rights. The right to be forgotten stems from a person’s desire to develop and continue his or her life independently without being the object of criticism for any negative actions he or she has committed in the past. If the right to privacy contains generally confidential information, the right to be forgotten is understood as the deletion of known information at a certain time and the denial of access to third parties. Thus, the right to be forgotten is not included in the right to privacy, and can be considered an independent right. The point is that the norms of the international and national documents, which establish fundamental human rights and freedoms, do not regulate issues related to the right to be forgotten. The right to be forgotten should be limited to the deletion of information from the media and Internet information resources. This is not about the complete destruction of information available in state information systems. Another conclusion of authors is that the media and Internet information resources sometimes spread false information. In this case, there will be no content of the right to be forgotten. Because the main thing is that the information that constitutes the content of the right to be forgotten must be legal, but after some time it has lost its significance. The scope of information included in the content of the right to be forgotten should not only be related to the conviction, but also to other special personal data (for example, the fact of divorce).


Author(s):  
William Bülow ◽  
Misse Wester

As information technology is becoming an integral part of modern society, there is a growing concern that too much data containing personal information is stored by different actors in society and that this could potentially be harmful for the individual. The aim of this contribution is to show how the extended use of ICT can affect the individual’s right to privacy and how the public perceives risks to privacy. Three points are raised in this chapter: first, if privacy is important from a philosophical perspective, how is this demonstrated by empirical evidence? Do individuals trust the different actors that control their personal information, and is there a consensus that privacy can and should be compromised in order to reach another value? Second, if compromises in privacy are warranted by increased safety, is this increased security supported by empirical evidence? Third, the authors will argue that privacy can indeed be a means to increase the safety of citizens and that the moral burden of ensuring and protecting privacy is a matter for policy makers, not individuals. In conclusion, the authors suggest that more nuanced discussion on the concepts of privacy and safety should be acknowledged and the importance of privacy must be seen as an important objective in the development and structure of ICT uses.


Author(s):  
María Nieves Saldaña

Although the federal Constitution of the United States does not expressly recognize a «right to privacy», however, the Supreme Court, over a long and gradual case law, has considered it implicit in the guarantees of the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments. Therefore, in the American constitutional system the right to privacy is a broad concept, which is set along more than a century to progressively delimit those areas of the private sphere which tend to preserve those interests of solitude, sanctuary, autonomy, individuality, personal development, freedom of choice in personal matters, control of personal information, as well as the essential substrate of the inviolable human dignity. These essential individual interests contribute to the formation of an active and participatory citizenship, constituting thus the right to privacy a fundamental legal interest for the very existence of the democratic system.Aunque la Constitución federal de los Estados Unidos no reconoce expresamente un «derecho a la privacidad », sin embargo, el Tribunal Supremo, a lo largo de una extensa y gradual jurisprudencia, lo ha considerado implícito en las garantías de la Primera, Cuarta, Quinta, Novena y Decimocuarta Enmiendas. Por tanto, en el sistema constitucional norteamericano el derecho a la privacidad es un concepto amplio, que se ha configurado a lo largo de más de un siglo al delimitarse progresivamente aquellos ámbitos de la esfera privada que tienden a preservar esos intereses de soledad, secreto, autonomía, individualidad, desarrollo de la personalidad, libertad de elección en asuntos personales, control de la información personal, así como del sustrato esencial de la inviolable dignidad humana. Intereses individuales de carácter esencial que coadyuvan a la formación de una ciudadanía activa y participativa, constituyendo así el derecho a la privacidad un bien jurídico fundamental para la existencia misma del sistema democrático.


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