Ignoring the Messenger? Limits of Populist Rhetoric on Public Support for Foreign Development Aid

Author(s):  
A Burcu Bayram ◽  
Catarina P Thomson

Abstract The negative impact of populist anti-aid rhetoric on public opinion has been based on anecdotal reports to date. Here, we take a systematic and empirical look at this inquiry. We hypothesize that even though populist rhetoric decreases support for foreign development aid in donor publics, this effect is conditioned by individuals’ preexisting beliefs about populist leaders. Using data from original survey experiments conducted with representative samples of American and British adults, we find that exposure to different variants of populist frames decreases individuals’ willingness to support their government providing development aid through an international organization. However, this effect is moderated by whether people think populist leaders stand up for the little guy or scapegoat out-groups. Connecting foreign aid and populism literatures, our results suggest that the future of global development might not be as bleak as previously feared in the age of populism.

2021 ◽  
pp. 003232172098089
Author(s):  
Niheer Dasandi ◽  
Jonathan Fisher ◽  
David Hudson ◽  
Jennifer vanHeerde-Hudson

There has been much criticism of donor governments who give aid to states that violate human rights. This has fuelled concerns about how such coverage affects public support for foreign aid. In response, donors increasingly use aid suspensions to signal to domestic audiences that a regime has been sanctioned and aid is not misspent. This article examines how reports of rights violations affect attitudes to aid and what, if any, impact donor responses have on public perceptions. We conduct survey experiments using nationally representative samples of the British public. Our findings demonstrate that reports of rights abuses reduce public support for aid. However, contrary to conventional wisdom, any response from donors, whether it be to justify continuing aid or to cut aid, prevents a decline in support. In policy terms, the findings demonstrate the importance of government responsiveness in maintaining public support for a frequently contested aspect of foreign policy.


2005 ◽  
Vol 4 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 261-284 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Andersen ◽  
Anthony Heath ◽  
David Weakliem

AbstractThis paper examines the relationship between public support for wage differentials and actual income inequality using data from the World Values Surveys. The distribution of income is more equal in nations where public opinion is more egalitarian. There is some evidence that the opinions of people with higher incomes are more influential than those of people with low incomes. Although the estimated relationship is stronger in democracies, it is present even under non-democratic governments, and the hypothesis that effects are equal cannot be rejected. We consider the possibility of reciprocal causation by means of an instrumental variables analysis, which yields no evidence that income distribution affects opinion.


2010 ◽  
Vol 64 (3) ◽  
pp. 443-479 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew A. Baum ◽  
Tim Groeling

AbstractPrevailing theories hold that U.S. public support for a war depends primarily on its degree of success, U.S. casualties, or conflict goals. Yet, research into the framing of foreign policy shows that public perceptions concerning each of these factors are often endogenous and malleable by elites. In this article, we argue that both elite rhetoric and the situation on the ground in the conflict affect public opinion, but the qualities that make such information persuasive vary over time and with circumstances. Early in a conflict, elites (especially the president) have an informational advantage that renders public perceptions of “reality” very elastic. As events unfold and as the public gathers more information, this elasticity recedes, allowing alternative frames to challenge the administration's preferred frame. We predict that over time the marginal impact of elite rhetoric and reality will decrease, although a sustained change in events may eventually restore their influence. We test our argument through a content analysis of news coverage of the Iraq war from 2003 through 2007, an original survey of public attitudes regarding Iraq, and partially disaggregated data from more than 200 surveys of public opinion on the war.


Author(s):  
Douglas L. Kriner ◽  
Eric Schickler

This chapter proposes and empirically tests a general mechanism through which congressional investigative activity could affect presidential behavior and policy making more broadly: by influencing the president’s well of support among the American people. It proceeds in four parts. First, it describes two mechanisms through which committee investigations of executive misconduct are well positioned to shape levels of public support for the president. The empirical analysis then begins by asking a basic, but essential pre-cursor question: does the public generally support Congress employing its investigative powers to uncover and pursue allegations of abuse of power by the executive branch? Having answered this question in the affirmative, the analysis continues by merging the database of congressional investigative activity described in Chapter 2 with more than sixty years of public opinion data measuring support for the president. The chapter then presents the results of several original survey experiments that isolate the influence of congressional investigations on public opinion independent of potential confounding factors.


Author(s):  
Stan Hok-Wui Wong

From the start, the Umbrella Movement failed to win overwhelming public support. Why would many Hong Kong people not endorse a civil disobedience movement aimed at dismantling the exclusionary political order and bringing forth democracy? Based on an original public opinion survey collected during the movement, this article provides preliminary answers to these questions. I find that those who disapproved of the movement are no less politically informed. Instead, three factors were strong predictors of disapproval of the movement: (1) satisfaction with the performance of the chief executive; (2) distrust of democracy as a solution to Hong Kong’s problems; and (3) concern about the negative impact of the protest on the rule of law.


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 643-653
Author(s):  
Timothy Hildebrandt ◽  
Leticia Bode ◽  
Jessica S. C. Ng

Abstract Introduction Under austerity, governments shift responsibilities for social welfare to individuals. Such responsibilization can be intertwined with pre-existing social stigmas, with sexually stigmatized individuals blamed more for health problems due to “irresponsible” sexual behavior. To understand how sexual stigma affects attitudes on government healthcare expenditures, we examine public support for government-provisioned PrEP in England at a time when media narratives cast the drug as an expensive benefit for a small, irresponsible social group and the National Health Service’s long-term sustainability was in doubt. Methods This paper uses data from an original survey (N = 738) conducted in September 2016, when public opinion should be most sensitive to sexual stigma. A survey experiment tests how the way beneficiaries of PrEP were described affected support for NHS provision of it. Contrary to expectations, we found that support was high (mean = 3.86 on a scale of 1 to 5) irrespective of language used or beneficiary group mentioned. Differences between conditions were negligible. Discussion Sexual stigma does not diminish support for government-funded PrEP, which may be due to reverence for the NHS; resistance to responsibilization generally; or just to HIV, with the public influenced by sympathy and counter-messaging. Social policy implications Having misjudged public attitudes, it may be difficult for the government to continue to justify not funding PrEP; the political rationale for contracting out its provision is unnecessary and flawed. With public opinion resilient to responsibilization narratives and sexual stigma even under austerity, welfare retrenchment may be more difficult than social policymakers presume.


2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 317-345
Author(s):  
Aneta Pinková ◽  
Jakub Jusko

Abstract This article is a contribution to the ‘know your data’ approach to the issue of measuring corruption, in two specific areas: the impact of the way questions are formulated on the results of surveys on corruption perception; and the potential pitfalls of using businesspeople as expert respondents in surveys measuring corruption. The article first presents and analyses the sources of two most frequently used indicators to measure corruption perceptions – the Corruption Perception Index and the Control of Corruption, one of the Worldwide Governance Indicators. Based on this analysis, hypotheses are posed on how the formulation of the questions will influence the out-comes of surveys, and what differences there will be between studies conducted on the general public and businesspeople. These are tested using data obtained from two original survey experiments conducted concurrently, one on a representative sample of the public and another on businesspeople.


World Affairs ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 182 (3) ◽  
pp. 273-295
Author(s):  
Hak-Seon Lee

I investigate how the level of inequality affects American public opinion on foreign aid. As the level of inequality increases across the United States, the majority of the public will be more likely to demand the government implement policies that should ameliorate severe inequality in society. Assuming that government resources are limited, a greater level of inequality in American society may weaken public support for foreign aid because the public may prioritize providing social safety nets and welfare programs in domestic milieu over granting foreign aid to developing countries. In addition, as inequality widens, the public may perceive economic globalization as one of the main causes of inequality; thus, their overall support for globalization will decline. As a result, American support for global engagement will be negatively affected, and public support for foreign aid may decrease. An empirical test using public opinion data in 50 U.S. states since the 1980s confirms my theory: widening inequality both across states and within a given state does weaken public support for U.S. foreign aid.


Author(s):  
Justin J. Gengler ◽  
Kien T. Le ◽  
Jill Wittrock

AbstractMore research than ever before uses public opinion data to investigate society and politics in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Ethnic identities are widely theorized to mediate many of the political attitudes and behaviors that MENA surveys commonly seek to measure, but, to date, no research has systematically investigated how the observable ethnic category(s) of the interviewer may influence participation and answers given in Middle East surveys. Here we measure the impact of one highly salient and outwardly observable ascriptive attribute of interviewers—nationality—using data from an original survey experiment conducted in the Arab Gulf state of Qatar. Applying the total survey error (TSE) framework and utilizing an innovative nonparametric matching technique, we estimate treatment effects on both nonresponse error and measurement error. We find that Qatari nationals are more likely to begin and finish a survey, and respond to questions, when interviewed by a fellow national. Qataris also edit their answers to sensitive questions relating to the unequal status of citizens and noncitizens, reporting views that are more exclusionary and less positive toward out-group members, when the interviewer is a conational. The findings have direct implications for consumers and producers of a growing number of surveys conducted inside and outside the Arab world, where migration and conflict have made respondent-interviewer mismatches along national and other ethnic dimensions more salient and more common.


Author(s):  
Edana Beauvais

Abstract Understanding the legacy of settler colonialism requires understanding the nature and scope of anti-Indigenous attitudes. But what, exactly, are the political consequences of anti-Indigenous attitudes? Answering this question requires recognizing that attitudes toward Indigenous peoples are distinct from White racial attitudes toward other disempowered groups. In this paper, I introduce a novel measure of Indigenous resentment. I then show that Indigenous resentment is an important predictor of policy attitudes using data collected from an original survey of White settlers. I estimate the effect of both Indigenous resentment and negative affect on policy attitudes—opposition to welfare and support for pipeline developments—to make the case that Indigenous resentment is a better measure of anti-Indigenous attitudes than affective prejudice, and that Indigenous resentment is an important omitted variable in the study of public opinion in settler societies.


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