Simone de Beauvoir

Philosophy ◽  
2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward Fullbrook ◽  
Margaret Simons

Simone de Beauvoir (b. 9 January 1908–d. 14 April 1986) contributed to shaping the philosophical movement of French existential phenomenology. But recognition of her importance as a philosopher has come mostly since her death. The delay resulted from the convergence of two factors. One was the sexism that ruled Western intellectual culture; the other was Beauvoir’s close half-century working relationship with the philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre, which meant that all the ideas that they publicly shared could, given the dominance of sexism, automatically be attributed to him. By the time of Beauvoir’s death sexism’s grip on intellectual culture was, thanks in part to her book The Second Sex, beginning to weaken. Also beginning in 1983 the voluminous diaries and letters of Beauvoir and Sartre were published, which revealed in chronological detail the her/him origins of the philosophical ideas that they so famously shared. These developments led to an increasing proportion of Beauvoir scholarship focused on her work and role as a philosopher. Continental philosophy tends to be more inclusive with regard to literary form than does the analytical tradition. This is especially true of its phenomenological branch, which includes existentialism, the school to which Beauvoir belonged and helped develop. This inclusiveness stems directly from the method of discovery employed by phenomenological philosophers. One of Beauvoir’s foundational ideas was that the universal point of view is, as with everyone else, not available to the philosopher. Instead, thought begins from individual points of view and then proceeds on the basis of inductive generalization. This emphasis on the particular and the concrete, from which philosophical propositions may be drawn, invites the use of fiction as a medium for philosophical discovery, especially at the ontological level. For this reason and because traditional publishing platforms for philosophers were not generally open to women, Beauvoir used this method extensively. Beauvoir’s primary focus in the earliest stage of her philosophical work was on the structure of human consciousness: how it relates to itself, how it relates to the physical world, and, most especially, on the problem of the existence of other human consciousnesses. She developed her theory of the Other from the experience of finding oneself the object of the other’s gaze. The second stage of Beauvoir’s philosophical work, reflecting her experience of living under the Nazi occupation, moves from the metaphysical and moral solipsism of She Came to Stay to focus on the ethical implications of relationships with the Other. In the third and final stage, Beauvoir returned to her earlier focus on the structure of human consciousness to work on the problem of ontological commonalities among individuals who share social and historical situations. In The Second Sex she originated a theory of the structural variability of pre-reflective consciousness to describe women’s experience as the Other in a sexist society. Later, she applied a similar approach to condemn the treatment of the aged poor in Old Age.

Author(s):  
Laura Hengehold

Most studies of Simone de Beauvoir situate her with respect to Hegel and the tradition of 20th-century phenomenology begun by Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty. This book analyzes The Second Sex in light of the concepts of becoming, problematization, and the Other found in Gilles Deleuze. Reading Beauvoir through a Deleuzian lens allows more emphasis to be placed on Beauvoir's early interest in Bergson and Leibniz, and on the individuation of consciousness, a puzzle of continuing interest to both phenomenologists and Deleuzians. By engaging with the philosophical issues in her novels and student diaries, this book rethinks Beauvoir’s focus on recognition in The Second Sex in terms of women’s struggle to individuate themselves despite sexist forms of representation. It shows how specific forms of women’s “lived experience” can be understood as the result of habits conforming to and resisting this sexist “sense.” Later feminists put forward important criticisms regarding Beauvoir’s claims not to be a philosopher, as well as the value of sexual difference and the supposedly Eurocentric universalism of her thought. Deleuzians, on the other hand, might well object to her ideas about recognition. This book attempts to address those criticisms, while challenging the historicist assumptions behind many efforts to establish Beauvoir’s significance as a philosopher and feminist thinker. As a result, readers can establish a productive relationship between Beauvoir’s “problems” and those of women around the world who read her work under very different circumstances.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 11
Author(s):  
Fatima Sahrish ◽  
Dr. Amna Shamim

The present paper aims to study Charmayne D'Souza's one and only volume of poetry, A Spelling Guide to Woman. Her poetry shows texture of western feminism where she expresses the radical self of a reformist kind with the strong belief of an iconoclast. Poetry is a two-way process for D'Souza. She uses poetry for not only verbalizing 'personal as political' but also for making the public as personal and as a medium to resist codification of patriarchal discourses. Simone de Beauvoir in The Second Sex has stated that each consciousness defines itself as subject by defining the other consciousness as object. A woman is a paragon of oppressed consciousness, an object in the male psyche. Patriarchy controls the lives of women. Germaine Greer, in this context, has said that patriarchy makes women eunuch. It castrates women making them deprived of subjection and treat them as a mere object.


Hypatia ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Veltman

Comparing the typologies of human activities developed by Beauvoir and Arendt, I argue that these philosophers share the same concept of labor as well as a similar insight that labor cannot provide a justification or evaluative measure for human life. But Beauvoir and Arendt think differently about work (as contrasted with labor), and Arendt alone illuminates the inability of constructive work to provide non-utilitarian value for human existence. Beauvoir, on the other hand, exceeds Arendt in examining the ethical implications of our existential need for a plurality of free peers in a public realm.


Hypatia ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 394-411 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sally J. Scholz

Simone de Beauvoir offers one of the most interesting philosophical accounts of childhood, and, as numerous scholars have argued, it is one of the most important contributions that she made to existentialism. Beauvoir stressed the importance of childhood on one's ability to assume one's freedom. This radically changed how freedom was construed for existentialism. Rather than positing an adult subjectivity that tries to flee freedom through bad faith, Beauvoir's account forces a recognition of a situated freedom that itself is also developmentally achieved. In this article, I explore the influence of Jean-Jacques Rousseau on Beauvoir's discussion of childhood. By reading Beauvoir through Rousseau—who was one of her favorite authors—we see not just one but two accounts of childhood in Beauvoir's philosophical work. On the one hand is the idealistic childhood wherein the child is an apprentice to freedom. On the other is the constrained childhood whose product is apprenticed to the serious. I begin with a brief summary of Rousseau's Emile. Next, I offer some justification for reading Beauvoir alongside Rousseau before offering an account of Beauvoir's discussion of childhood. I end by exploring some of the implications of my reading for freedom.


Author(s):  
Eva Lundgren-Gothlin

Simone de Beauvoir, a French novelist and philosopher belonging to the existentialist-phenomenological tradition, elaborated an anthropology and ethics inspired by Kierkegaard, Husserl, Heidegger and Sartre in Pyrrhus et Cinéas (1944) and Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté (The Ethics of Ambiguity) (1947). In her comprehensive study of the situation of women, Le deuxième sexe (The Second Sex) (1949), this anthropology and ethics was developed and combined with a philosophy of history inspired by Hegel and Marx. The most prominent feature of Beauvoir’s philosophy is its ethical orientation, together with an analysis of the subordination of women. Her concept of woman as the Other is central to twentieth-century feminist theory.


Hypatia ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 461-477
Author(s):  
Bronwyn Singleton

Reading Beauvoir's “Must We Burn Sade?” alongside the chapter called “Sexual Initiation” in The Second Sex, I argue that the problem with Sade is not his perversity, but his perpetual virginity. In The Second Sex, Beauvoir advances a new understanding of sexual initiation as a physical and spiritual movement toward the other, disqualifying any purely physical machination as sufficient to initiate one into “authentic erotic reality.” Sade's refusal of Eros as described in “Must We Burn Sade?” demonstrates that the Marquis's commitment to his characteristic Sadism in fact condemned him to a barren promiscuity, a trenchant and joyless virginity that he elected to perpetuate. Finally, I argue that we should reread Sadism not as a perversion but as based on the Greek model of the “virgin ailment.” As such, Sadism may turn out to be a more genuine and widespread threat than we ordinarily acknowledge.


Author(s):  
Elizabeth R. Wheelock

Although primarily known as a feminist scholar and author of such works as She Came to Stay and The Second Sex, Simone de Beauvoir contributed heavily to French existential thought. The two writings upon which this paper focuses, The Ethics of Ambiguity and The Woman Destroyed, deal with the existential issues involved in human interactions and personal relationships. The Ethics of Ambiguity, famous as an exploration of the ethical code created by existential theory, begins with a criticism of Marxism and the ways in which it deviates from existentialism. Similarly, the first of the three short stories that make up de Beauvoir’s fictional work The Woman Destroyed follows the French intelligentsia and their similarities and digressions from Marxist and existential thought. In this paper, I seek to analyze Simone de Beauvoir’s criticism of Marxist theory in The Ethics of Ambiguity and its transformation into the critique of intellectualism found twenty years later in The Woman Destroyed. I will investigate Marxism’s alleged attempts to constrain the group it wishes to lead and the motivation behind these actions. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of the efficacy of fiction as a medium for de Beauvoir’s philosophy.


2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-14
Author(s):  
Carlos Alvaréz Teijeiro

Emmanuel Lévinas, the philosopher of ethics par excellence in the twentieth century, and by own merit one of the most important ethical philosophers in the history of western philosophy, is also the philosopher of the Other. Thereby, it can be said that no thought has deepened like his in the ups and downs of the ethical relationship between subject and otherness. The general objective of this work is to expose in a simple and understandable way some ideas that tend to be quite dark in the philosophical work of the author, since his profuse religious production will not be analyzed here. It is expected to show that his ideas about the being and the Other are relevant to better understand interpersonal relationships in times of 4.0 (re)evolution. As specific objectives, this work aims to expose in chronological order the main works of the thinker, with special emphasis on his ethical implications: Of the evasion (1935), The time and the Other (1947), From the existence to the existent (1947), Totality and infinity: An essay on exteriority (1961) and, last, Otherwise than being, or beyond essence (1974). In the judgment of Lévinas, history of western philosophy starting with Greece, has shown an unusual concern for the Being, this is, it has basically been an ontology and, accordingly, it has relegated ethics to a second or third plane. On the other hand and in a clear going against the tide movement, our author supports that ethics should be considered the first philosophy and more, even previous to the proper philosophize. This novel approach implies, as it is supposed, that the essential question of the philosophy slows down its origin around the Being in order to inquire about the Other: it is a philosophy in first person. Such a radical change of perspective generates an underlying change in how we conceive interpersonal relationships, the complex framework of meanings around the relationship Me and You, which also philosopher Martin Buber had already spoken of. As Lévinas postulates that ethics is the first philosophy, this involves that the Other claims all our attention, intellectual and emotional, to the point of considering that the relationship with the Other is one of the measures of our identity. Thus, “natural” attitude –husserlian word not used by Lévinas- would be to be in permanent disposition regarding to the meeting with the Other, to be in permanent opening state to let ourselves be questioned by him. Ontology, as the author says, being worried about the Being, has been likewise concerned about the Existence, when the matter is to concern about the particular Existent that every otherness supposes for us. In conclusion it can be affirmed that levinasian ethics of the meeting with the Other, particular Face, irreducible to the assumption, can contribute with an innovative looking to (re)evolving the interpersonal relationships in a 4.0 context.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document