scholarly journals The Arab Spring

The Arab world’s resilient autocracies are a central puzzle in the comparative politics of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). But just as the Arab Spring was a critical juncture for MENA regimes, the popular uprisings that began in 2010 and 2011 also reoriented the study of MENA politics toward questions of social justice, redistribution, and inequality. Protesters, activists, and opposition groups articulated clear demands that aimed to dismantle systemic inequalities of political and economic opportunity after decades of failed neoliberal policies and cronyism. Identity groups and geographies conventionally considered peripheral to the study of MENA politics now featured as prime movers and arenas of contestation. This annotated bibliography focuses explicitly on these themes and their application to the study of the Arab Spring in comparative political science. The resources included in this guide fall under three main categories. The first grouping includes general and case-specific accounts of the Arab Spring. This includes not only zeitgeist cases like Tunisia and Egypt, but also those where the rapid spread of the Arab Spring forced changes to politics “as usual.” This includes second-wave cases like Sudan and Algeria, where protest movements coalesced several years following the Jasmine Revolution. The second category considers how structure and agency factor into analyses of regime strategy, contentious politics, political economy, the military, and political Islam. Third, the bibliography highlights the identity politics of the Arab Spring, including youth, minority populations, and gender.

Author(s):  
Raid Khan ◽  
Amna Mahmood ◽  
Asif Salim

The Arab Spring was assumed to reform the prevailing regime pattern and to bring socio-economic reforms. However, it failed to get its intended outcomes at large. The objectives of the revolution that are to bring a positive transformation in the social, economic, and political domains were not attained effectively and was considered a failed revolution in the case of Egypt and Syria. The present paper focuses on exploring the reasons and factors behind its failure in the particular context of Egypt and Syria. Although Egypt observed regime transition from dictatorship to democracy, yet within one and a half year, a military coup overthrew the democratically elected government of Mohammad Morsi, and the military regime was reinstalled. In the case of Syria, since 2011, a civil war is going on where Bashar-ul-Asad still holds dictatorial powers. The study reveals that the lack of stable political institutions, weak democratic norms, and the absence of a vibrant civil society paved the way for state authorities to rule out the attempts of protestors. Excluding a few of the countries, the rest of the Middle Eastern countries are still ruled by the powerful elites. The successes of the Arab Spring are still to be awaited.


Author(s):  
Derek Lutterbeck

Coup-proofing—that is, measures aimed at preventing military coups and ensuring military loyalty—has been a key feature of civil–military relations in Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) states. Just as the MENA region has been one of the most coup-prone regions in the world, coup-proofing has been an essential instrument of regime survival in Arab countries. The most commonly found coup-proofing strategies in the region include (a) so-called “communal coup-proofing,” involving the appointment of individuals to key positions within the military based on family, ethnic, or religious ties; (b) providing the military with corporate and/or private benefits in order to ensure its loyalty; (c) creating parallel military forces in addition to the regular military, so as to “counter-balance” the latter; (d) monitoring of the military through a vast internal security and intelligence apparatus; and (e) promoting professionalism, and thus political neutrality, within the military. The experiences of the “Arab Spring,” however, have shown that not all of these strategies are equally effective in ensuring military loyalty during times of popular upheavals and regime crises. A common finding in this context has been that communal coup-proofing (or militaries based on “patrimonialism”) creates the strongest bonds been the armed forces and their regimes, as evidenced by the forceful suppression of the popular uprising by the military in countries such as Syria, or by parts of the military in Libya and Yemen. By contrast, where coup-proofing has been based on the provision of material benefits to the military or on counterbalancing, as in Tunisia or Egypt, the armed forces have refrained from suppressing the popular uprising, ultimately leading to the downfall of these countries’ long-standing leaders. A further lesson that can be drawn from the Arab Spring in terms of coup-proofing is that students of both military coups and coup-proofing should dedicate (much) more attention to the increasingly important role played by the internal security apparatus in MENA countries.


2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 38-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Holger Albrecht ◽  
Dorothy Ohl

A few years into the most recent wave of popular uprisings—the Arab Spring—studying regime trajectories in countries such as Syria, Egypt, and Yemen still seems like shooting at a moving target. Yet what has not escaped notice is the central role military actors have played during these uprisings. We describe how soldiers have three options when ordered to suppress mass unrest. They mayexitthe regime by remaining in the barracks or going into exile,resistby fighting for the challenger or initiating a coup d’état, or remainloyaland use force to defend the regime. We argue that existing accounts of civil-military relations are ill equipped to explain the diverse patterns in exit, resistance, and loyalty during unrest because they often ignore the effects of military hierarchy. Disaggregating the military and parsing the interests and constraints of different agents in that apparatus is crucial for explaining military cohesion during such crises. Drawing on extensive fieldwork we apply our principal-agent framework to explain varying degrees and types of military cohesion in three Arab Spring cases: Bahrain, Yemen, and Syria. Studying military hierarchy elucidates decision-making within authoritarian regimes amid mass mobilization and allows us to better explain regime re-stabilization, civil war onset, or swift regime change in the wake of domestic unrest.


2013 ◽  
Vol 12 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 114-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leila DeVriese

AbstractBecause social media is playing an irrefutable role in the Arab Spring uprisings the central question in this article is to what extent Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) in general, and social media in specific, are contributing to the democratization of the public sphere and shifting the monopoly on agenda setting in the Arab Gulf, particularly in the case of Bahrain? How will these technologies continue to shape contentious politics in the Middle East and will their utility for democratizing and expanding the public sphere persist in the aftermath of the Arab Spring? Or will the increasing liberalization of media and freedom of expression that had preceded the Arab Spring experience a repressive backlash as authoritarian states attempt to clamp down on social and traditional media—or even harness them for their own purposes as seen by Facebook intimidation campaigns against activists in Bahrain last Spring. Finally—using the lens of social movement theory—what repertoires of contention and political opportunity structures will pro-democracy activists use to keep their campaigns alive? Activists in the Gulf have not only incorporated the ICTs into their repertoire, but have also changed substantially what counts as activism, what counts as community, collective identity, democratic space, public sphere, and political strategy. Ironically this new technology has succeeded in reviving and expanding the practice of discursive dialog that had once characterized traditional tribal politics in the Arabian Peninsula.


2020 ◽  
Vol 70 (2) ◽  
pp. 107-115
Author(s):  
A. Sh. Abhari ◽  

The debate between political scientists about the "Arab Spring" revolutions is still escalating. Especially regarding the forces operating at the scene. Attempts by the military elite to retain power and try to maintain the status quo at any cost, leaving the doors wide open for foreign intervention The foreign interventions of countries that are trying to use the wave of the Arab spring to achieve their goals have especially complicated the situation in the Arab world. In this article I will try to shed light on some factors influencing the results of the “Arab Spring” revolutions.


2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (11) ◽  
pp. 41-50
Author(s):  
Antonіі Palamar

Following the 2013 coup that toppled Egypt’s democratically elected president, Mohammed Morsi, from power, the country has been led by military general Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. Eight years on, he retains the president’s office, and Egyptian parliament has decided to actually extend his term until 2030, ignoring the revolutionary demands that prompted millions of Egyptians to bring Hosni Mubarak's 29-year rule to an end in January 2011. Despite the hopes of the Arab Spring, Egypt has not only stopped democratic transit, but has begun to move toward authoritarianism. Tens of thousands of people are kept in overcrowded prisons. Freedom of speech, media independence, and opposition movements are being suppressed in the name of the stability of the state. Tortures, unjustified detentions, police attacks, and death sentences have become a strategic tool in the hands of Egypt’s military leadership to combat possible escalation of protest movements.This article reviews history of the military leadership's influence on Egyptian public policy, outlines basic principles and methods of this influence, investigates the army's participation in the state transformation during the Arab Spring, and examines the policy of post-revolutionary military power in the country.The paper sheds light on the military elite, as a significant interest group, which until 2011 had no influence on the formation of the political agenda in Egypt. This study has confirmed that the Muslim Brotherhood's seizure of power in 2012 and the subsequent desire to quickly Islamize the country under the guise of democratic slogans forced the military to oppose not only Islamization but also the democratization of the country. After the revolution, the military became the only force that could keep control and rule the country, using undemocratic methods to secure its own regime and suppress opposition movements. Finally, Egypt's transformation is still ongoing, as the demands of the 2011 revolution for democratization and liberalization of socio-political life remain unfulfilled, and the current military rule is largely reminiscent of Hosni Mubarak’s regime, which was overthrown during the Arab Spring.


Hawwa ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (1-3) ◽  
pp. 266-308
Author(s):  
Sophia Pandya

AbstractIf political activities (demonstration, revolution, war) can be understood as forms of ritual performance in which temporary social hegemonic inversions typically are followed by competing efforts to restore structure or define a new structure, then under what conditions would they offer potential for changes in family dynamics and gender roles? The past few years in Yemen have witnessed extraordinary political and socioeconomic turbulence, from the 2011 Arab Spring revolution to the 2015 brutal war. Yemeni families have been significantly impacted in myriad ways, including displacement, family separation, poverty, violence, unemployment, sectarian strife, disruption of education, and mental illness. Men and women have demonstrated a high level of public activism during the Arab Spring and the war, further altering family dynamics and the gendered social tapestry, in a highly patriarchal country. Social “disorder,” including modification of gender roles, is often challenged by those desiring to restore “order,” the “traditional” family structure, and patriarchy. This study analyzes gendered dimensions of the “Yemen Spring” and the subsequent war, with a particular focus on the link between gendered family dynamics and the sociopolitical landscape, also considering the role religion and religious groups play.


2019 ◽  
Vol 62 (1) ◽  
pp. 8-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alcinda Manuel Honwana

Abstract:The majority of young people in Africa are today living in “waithood,” a prolonged, difficult, and dynamic transition into adult life. This experience is shared with an increasing number of young people in the developed North who are also grappling with issues of joblessness and political exclusion. This waithood generation is increasingly losing faith in the ability of its leaders to address young people’s needs and expectations, and it is rebelling against the status quo. From the youth uprisings that led to the Arab Spring and the ousting of Abdoulaye Wade in Senegal and Campaore in Burkina Faso, to political protest movements such as Occupy Wall Street and Black Lives Matter in the U.S. and Los Indignados in Spain, young people have been at the forefront of political change. However, they have not yet been able to effect systemic change. While profound social transformation takes time, this generation is still wrestling with how to move beyond street protest and have a lasting impact on politics and governance.


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