Televangelizing Muslims

2021 ◽  
pp. 191-218
Author(s):  
Jordan Denari Duffner

In the first two decades of the twenty-first century, Arabic-language Christian television channels have proliferated rapidly, broadcasting their message across the airwaves of the Middle East. One such channel is al-Hayat, which attempts to evangelize Muslim viewers and educate Christians through numerous programs about Islam. Interviews conducted with Jordanian Christians and Muslims indicate that al-Hayat has played a significant role in elevating distrust and suspicion between the two religious communities in Amman, which previously enjoyed more positive and friendly relationships, as well as contributing to a heightened sense of religious affiliation as a part of Jordanians’ personal and communal identities. Al-Hayat is not alone in this; other Christian channels, as well as Muslim ones, have also played a part in heightening security concerns and religious identification. Al-Hayat and some of its counterparts also maintain connections with what is often termed the “Islamophobia industry,” as well as American Christian Zionism—factors that shed light on the channels’ influence and often ambiguous intent. On television sets across the Arab world, Al-Hayat reproduces Western Islamophobic discourse and—whether intentionally or not—serves to enact part of the political mission and eschatological vision for the Middle East espoused by some Christian Zionists.

1970 ◽  
Vol 21 (282) ◽  
pp. 110-122
Author(s):  
Karolina Adamska-Płocic

The objective of the article is to analyze the anti-American sentiment in international relations. A chronological systematization of particular stages of the development of anti-Americanism aims to illustrate its evolution and the constantly changing perception of the United States by representatives of different cultural circles. It is worth emphasizing that while European anti-Americanism is based mainly on the philosophical foundations, the Islamic anti-Americanism has its roots mainly in the negative assessment of US foreign policy towards the Middle East region. The first strong wave of anti-Americanism flooded the Middle East in 1967 when the US supported Jews during the six-day war. Each subsequent conflict in the Arab world with US involvement only deepens the antagonisms that have persisted since then. Followers of Islam also have objections towards the culture of the United States, which is to be shallow and expansive. It is worth emphasizing, however, that the anti-American sentiment grew and evolved simultaneously with the state that was being formed, which is why it is not possible to recall only one specific reason that causes the country to have as many opponents. While nineteenth century polemics consisted of almost purely theoretical considerations about the superiority of the Old World over the New World, the reality of twenty-first century terror based on hatred for the US, requires serious actions from American diplomacy.


Author(s):  
Stephen Rippon

In his review of South East Britain in the later Iron Age, Hill (2007, 16) observed that ‘Since the 1980s, little attention has been given to large-scale social explanations and narratives in British Iron Age archaeology. Debates over core–periphery models, the interpretation of hillforts, and the nature of social organization, were—for good reason—eclipsed by a focus on the symbolic meanings of space, structured deposition, and ritual.’ He goes on to argue that British archaeology is in need of more ‘straightforward storyboards’ around which data can be arranged (Hill 2007, 16), and Brudenell (2012, 52) has similarly noted how ‘close-grained understandings have often been won at the expense of broader pictures . . . [and that] with a few exceptions, recent approaches have atomized the study of later prehistoric society, focussing on the specifics of the local social milieu at the expense of broader scales of social analysis’. There have been some ‘big picture’ studies—most notably Cunliffe’s (1974; 1978; 1991; 2005) Iron Age Communities in Britain—but all too often studies of this period have focused on specific counties, types of site, or artefact, and it is noticeable how little systematic mapping of data there was in three recent collections of papers (Gwilt and Haselgrove 1997; Haselgrove and Moore 2007; Haselgrove and Pope 2007). This study, in contrast, aims to shed light on one important ‘storyboard’: the territorial structures within which communities built their landscapes. The written history of Britain begins in the first century BC when we first get insights into its political and territorial arrangements, although as this was a period when the island was becoming embroiled in the political instability caused by the expansion of the Roman world, the trends seen then may not reflect the longer-term patterns of territorial stability or instability that preceded it. In 54 BC, for example, Caesar describes how his major opponents were a civitas (usually translated as ‘tribe’) who had recently surpassed the neighbouring Trinovantes as the paramount group in South East Britain (Gallic War, 20–1; Dunnett 1975, 8; Moore 2011).


Author(s):  
Laura Robson

This chapter introduces the main question of the book: how did mass violence come to be a primary—perhaps the primary—mode of making political claims in the twentieth and twenty-first century Middle East? It asks when mass violence became a constitutive aspect of the political landscape of the region, why it took precedence over other strategies of state building and establishing political authority, and how governments, armies, and civilians alike came to think of mass violence as a viable and legitimate mode of claiming political space and national rights. Drawing on several different and largely separate historiographies, this introduction argues, makes it possible to produce a synthetic account of violence in the twentieth century Eastern Mediterranean that takes account of regional developments as much as individual national histories.


Author(s):  
Nada Shabout

The perception of the Arabic letter in art has gone through many changes from the Islamic civilization to the modern age. Following the political and socio-cultural changes of the 19th and 20th century, the Arabic script lost its sacredness. After decades of limited existence in traditional craft, the Arabic letter reappeared in modern Arab art around the middle of the 20th century on nationalistic bases. The Arabic language had acquired a high value during the age of colonialism as a symbol of national identity, a unifier; this value only grew stronger with time. The letter was also a signifier that aided twentieth-century Arab artists in their artistic identity crisis. A number of art groups—such as the Baghdad Group of Modern Art, formed in 1951—were established with their focus on a search for a local or national art style through ‘istilham al-turath,’ seeking inspiration from tradition. The Arabic letter became the means for connecting artists’ present with their past and allowing for the invention of tradition. Huroufiyah (Arabic for Letterism), a highly contested term initiated by a newspaper journalist, became a term popularly used to signify all experiments with the Arabic letter in the modern Arab art. Nevertheless, the term is surrounded by controversy in the contemporary Arab world and rejected by a number of scholars and artists. The term al-Madrassa al-Khattiya Fil-Fann (Calligraphic School of Art), has been alternatively proposed, expressing specifically a perceived continuation with Islamic calligraphy.


Author(s):  
Eyal Zisser

This article describes how in the middle of the winter of 2010 the “Spring of the Arab Nations” suddenly erupted without any warning all over the Middle East. However, the momentum of the uprisings was impeded rather quickly, and the hopes held out for the “Spring of the Arab Nations” turned into frustration and disappointment. While many Israelis were focusing their attention in surprise, and some, with doubt and concern as well about what was happening in the region around them; suddenly, in Israel itself, at the height of the steamy summer of 2011, an “Israeli Spring” broke out. The protesters were young Israelis belonging to the Israeli middle class. Their demands revolved around the slogan, “Let us live in our land.” However, similar to what happened in the Arab world, the Israeli protest subsided little by little. The hassles of daily life and security and foreign affairs concerns once more became the focus of the public's attention. Therefore, the protesters' hopes were disappointed, and Israel's political, economic, and social order remained unshaken. Thus, towards the end of 2017, the memory of the “Israeli spring” was becoming faded and forgotten. However, while the Arab world was sinking into chaos marked by an ever deepening economic and social crisis that deprived its citizens of any sense of security and stability, Israel, by contrast, was experiencing years of stability in both political and security spheres, as well as economic growth and prosperity. This stability enabled Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his Likud party to remain in power and to maintain the political and social status-quo in Israel.


1997 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 250-281 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Tessler ◽  
Ina Warriner

In an effort to contribute to the dialogue between gender studies and international studies, this report presents findings from an empirical investigation based on the integrated secondary analysis of survey data from Israel, Egypt, Palestine, and Kuwait. The goal is to assess the utility of both gender and attitudes pertaining to the circumstances of women in accounting for variance in views about war and peace, and thereafter to examine the degree to which political system attributes constitute conditionalities associated with important variable relationships. Major findings include the absence of gender-linked differences in attitudes toward international conflict in all four of the societies studied and a significant relationship in each of these societies between attitudes toward gender equality and attitudes toward international conflict. Based on data from the Arab world and Israel, with attitudes about a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict treated as the dependent variable, the research also aspires to shed light on more practical considerations pertaining to the international relations of the Middle East.


Author(s):  
الجمعي بولعراس (al-Jamie Boulares) ◽  
ناصـر الغالي (Nasser al-Ghaliy)

ملخص البحثكثُر الكلام عن اللغة السياسية والدعائية بعد أحداث 11 سبتمبر، وطرأت مصطلحات وتعبيرات وأنماط لغوية جديدة تصادمت فيها مع خلفيات متلقي الخطاب وما تحمله  ذاكرتهم من مدلولات سابقة، ومن ثم، نُسجت خيوط اللغة الجديدة المعاصرة، وظلت بعيدة تراوح ردحا من الزمن محاريب السياسة والإعلام والدعاية، ثم إن  الماسك بزمام التوجه اللغوي المعاصر هو الذي أفلح في احتواء الشارع العربي بحثا عن المفاهيم المختلفة، وفي غياب تنمية لغوية حركية وتبرز هوية قائلها في الزمن، وتتحدى عوائق القواميس الانتقائية والنخبوية والمهمشة للأنا والذات، وبحثا عن مستقبل تتحكم فيه عوامل البقاء اللساني في ظل الصراع الحضاري والفكري والسياسي والاقتصادي وذلك كما نتصور بغربلة الزخم اللغوي العربي لاحتواء الواقع الحضاري للأمة ومستحثات الهزات الاجتماعية لتتأقلم بالمستجدات، ويحتاج هذا جهدا لامتلاك ناصية اللغة الجديدة التي توصف بالتمرد على الماضي، وفي الوقت نفسه تريد أن لا تتجرد منه واللغة الجديدة هي نتاج الحراك اللساني المعاصر، وهي لغة التداول اللغوي ولغة المصطلحات المعاصرة، وهي لغة الدعاية والتعبيرات الاصطلاحية الجديدة ولغة الخطاب السياسي المعاصر. وصل البحث إلى بعض النتائج ومن أهمها: وجوب إعادة قواعد وأنظمة سيميائية للغة الخطاب السياسي، توغل الإعلاميين في المصطلحات والتعابير مثل السياسيين.الكلمات المفتاحية: اللغة العربية-العبارة الاصطلاحية- تلقي العبارة السياسية-سياسة العبارة-لعبة السياسةAbstractThere have been a lot of talks about political language and propaganda after the 11 September incident that had led to the application of new terminologies, expressions and language variations in contrast with what were associated with these words previously in the minds of the recipient. Hence,  new strings of language were woven but nonetheless they remained far from being acquainted with the political and propaganda discourses. The one who is responsible in language policy is the one who is successful in including the language of the streets to explore its various concepts. This is in the absence of the growth of language movements, language personalities, and the challenges of  discovering self-identity and in the efforts to search of the future that is characterized by the elements of language survival in the face of the clashes of civilization, thinking, political and economy. In addition to that, the inner conflicts that are witnessed by the Arab world to adapt to the arising matters and issues. This effort will entail to overcome the new direction in language that is vicious toward the past and at the time try to accommodative to the new and contemporary. The research has concluded that: semiotic rules and regulations of political speech should be reviewed, so as for mass media to penetrate deeply in the technical meanings and expression like the politicians.Keywords: Arabic Language – Terminological phrases –reception of political expressions - politics of phrases – politics games.AbstrakTerdapat banyak perbincangan tentang bahasa politik dan propaganda selepas kejadian 11 September, dan telah timbul pelbagai istilah, pernyataan dan bentuk bahasa baru yang bercanggah dengan pengetahuan latarbelakang pendengar serta apa yang telah mereka fahami sebelum ini.  Ia seperti menenunbah asabaru dan terkini, meninggalkan jarak untuk begitu lama yang mencorakkan pembentukan dasar, perjalanan media dan propaganda. Namun, pihak yang menguasai retraktororientasi linguistic terkini itulah yang akan menentukan kandungan perjalanan bahasa Arab dalam pencarian konsep yang berbeza dengan ketiadaan mobility perkembangan liguistik, seterusnya memartabatkan identity pengguna bahasa tersebut.  Sementara beberapa kamus tertentu yang bersifat elitism dan terpinggir pula mencabar keegoan dan diri. Dalam mencari masa depan, factor lisan bersifat mampu saing memainkan peranan penting dalam aruskonflik tamadun, pemikiran, politik dan ekonomi ini dalam menapis momentum bahasa agar mencaku pirealiti tamadun semasa serta kejutan sosial yang teraruh supaya bersesuaian dengan keadaan semasa. Ini memerlukan kesungguhan penguasaan bahasa baru yang tersimpang dari pada yang dulu, dan pada masa yang sama ia tidak terpisah dari pada yang lama.  Bahasa baru ialah hasil pergerakan bahasa semasa, bahasa perundingan dan bahasa istilah semasa.  Ia adalah bahasa propaganda, pernyataan beristilah yang baru dan bahasa wacana politik semasa.  Antara dapatan penting kajian ialah: semakan semula nahu dan prosidur semantic bagi bahasa wacana politik, pihak media mendalami penggunaan istilah serta pernyataan dalam politik.Kata kunci: Bahasa Arab – pernyataan beristilah – pemahaman pernyataan politik – politik pernyataan – permainan politik


2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 124-139
Author(s):  
Abdelrahman Fakida

Abstract This study examines the news selection processes followed by fact-checking organizations in the Middle East, specifically Egypt, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates, and gatekeeping such organizations face while working under authoritarian rule. By reviewing fact-checked news posted on the Facebook pages of six Arabic language organizations: Da Begad, HereszTruth, Fatabyyano, Matsad2sh, MisbarFC, and Saheeh Masr, this study manually analyzes about 5,000 fact-checked news stories to understand the extent of political fact-checking performed on Arab presidents, heads of government, and rulers, along with the most verified news topics. Results show that organizations in the Middle East rarely fact-check Arab rulers or refute their claims, while their news selection process prioritizes human interest topics. The study suggests that Arab fact-checkers resort to self-censorship due to gatekeeping influences that impact the region’s media climate.


Author(s):  
Tareq Mohammed Dhannoon Al Taie

The retreat of Iraq after US occupation, the decline of the Arab states after Arab political changes, and the chaos in which following the change after 2011, led to the emergence of a strategic vacuum and absence of a unified response, thus forming an incentive for Iran and Turkey to activate their strategic performance in the Middle East. As an expression of the accumulation of the historical aspects of both powers, as well as the growing abilities, each state try to  increasing of its role, but the central question, where the signs of symmetry and asymmetry?, and why?.        Turkey and Iran are  a regional players in the Middle East. The strategic thinking of the two countries is based on ideology and interest. However, the interest occupies the most important place in the strategic performance, especially in addressing the political issues of Middle East. The symmetry and asymmetry are regarded the basic pillars of the Turkish and Iranian strategic thinking. The research attempts to prove that the interest occupies a more important position than ideology in Turkey and Iran, especially after the political change in the Arab world by clarifying all the characteristics of Iran and Turkey strategic thinking and conduct compares among them.


FUTURIBILI ◽  
2009 ◽  
pp. 106-118
Author(s):  
Ilaria Siggia

- Arabic has always played a strategically important role in the Islamic Umma, a composite and variegated entity in geographical, political and theological terms. On one dimension, the borders of the Islamic world do not coincide with those of the Arab world or the geographical borders of the Middle East. On another, Islam is characterised by the absence of a monopoly on the interpretation of the divine precepts, which is the cause of divisions and internecine conflicts. Within this context there hasbeen a deliberate exploitation of the Arabic language and its centuries-old association with the Koran by the Al Sau'ud dynasty since the 1970s.


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