Places Close to Our Hearts

Near Abroad ◽  
2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerard Toal
Keyword(s):  
Eastern Europe ◽  
Foreign Minister ◽  
Council Meeting ◽  
The North ◽  
Russian President ◽  
The North Atlantic ◽  
Munich Security Conference ◽  
Sphere Of Influence ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Vladimir Putin

When U.S. President George W. Bush first met Russian president Vladimir Putin, he praised him as “an honest, straightforward man who loves his country.” Bush indicated that, more than a decade after the Cold War ended, it was “time to move beyond suspicion and towards straight talk.” Thereafter, both presidents established a good working relationship based, in part, on candor and frankness. Putin’s speech at the Munich security conference did not please his hosts, but it had the virtue of clarifying important differences. Similarly, his speech to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)–Russia Council meeting in Bucharest was forthright and blunt. The compromise language of the Bucharest Declaration—Georgia and Ukraine “will become members of NATO”—was a personal rebuke to the Russian leader, for he had made it clear that NATO expansion to these countries was a “red line” for Russia. Two years earlier Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov warned publicly that Georgia and Ukraine joining NATO could lead to “a collossal shift in global geopolitics.” But those promoting NATO membership for both believed the Russian position amounted to anachronistic sphere-of-influence thinking, and they were determined to prevent what they described as a “Russian veto” on NATO expansion. Putin’s remarks on Georgia in Bucharest—discussed in chapter 4—attracted few headlines. His alleged comments on Ukraine, however, were viewed with alarm at the time by some and considered ominously prophetic by many after 2008, and especially so in the spring of 2014. According to an unnamed NATO country official, an irate Putin turned to Bush and said: “George, you do realize that Ukraine is not even a state. What is Ukraine? Part of its territory is Eastern Europe but the greater part is a gift from us!” Putin reportedly then indicated that should Ukraine join NATO, the state may cease to exist. Russia would then tear off Crimea and eastern Ukraine from the rest of the country. Six years later it appeared Russia was doing precisely this.

Allied High Commission for Germany

1951 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 825-832
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
North Atlantic ◽  
Foreign Minister ◽  
The United States ◽  
Scrap Metal ◽  
German Federal Republic ◽  
The North ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
The North Atlantic ◽  
Contractual Agreements

With the development of certain administrative frictions (concerning coal quotas, occupation costs, and the scrap metal treaty) between the western occupying powers and the German Federal Republic, early indications were that if the talk of “contractual agreements” did materialize it would reserve, for the occupying powers, wide controls over important areas of west Germany's internal and external affairs. In Washington, however, a general modification of approach was noted during the September discussions between the United States Secretary of State (Acheson), the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary (Morrison), and the French Foreign Minister (Schuman), preparatory to the Ottawa meetings of the North Atlantic Council.

Soviet Atomic Blackmail and the North Atlantic Alliance

1957 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 307-328 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans Speier
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
North Atlantic ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Atomic Weapons ◽  
The North ◽  
The North Atlantic ◽  
Future War ◽  
The Cold War

The uncertainty about whether atomic weapons will be used in future war, whether local or general, lends itself to political exploitation in the cold war. The efficiency of nuclear weapons in wartime, and their resulting threat-value in either war- or peacetime, constitute their political-military worth. In peacetime, the threat-value of weapons can be exploited in many ways: by an ultimatum, by authoritative or inspired statements on capabilities or intentions, by studied disclosures of new weapons at ceremonial occasions, by means of maneuvers, redeployments of forces, or by so-called demonstrations.

Fits and Starts

2020 ◽  
pp. 36-59
Author(s):  
Mary Ann Heiss
Keyword(s):  
Ad Hoc ◽  
Soviet Bloc ◽  
Marshall Plan ◽  
General Assembly ◽  
The North ◽  
Truman Doctrine ◽  
Transmission Of Information ◽  
The North Atlantic ◽  
State Domination ◽  
The Cold War

This chapter deals with the term of the Committee of Information from 1947 to 1949, which introduced a variety of proposals for accountability. It points out how solid Western state domination of the General Assembly and the states' manipulation of UN procedure prevented much of the proposals for accountability from being accomplished. It details the importance of the Cold War in shaping discussion of the UN role in the nontrust dependent territories as the Soviet bloc worked to use colonialism as a propaganda weapon against the West across UN forums. The chapter outlines proponents of an activist UN role in the Chapter XI territories built on the creation of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Transmission of Information to advance a variety of proposals for accountability. It looks at the Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, Berlin Blockade, creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and other international developments that marked the superpower confrontation in Europe.

God’s Marshall Plan

2021 ◽  
pp. 184-211
Author(s):  
James D. Strasburg
Keyword(s):  
The United States ◽  
Marshall Plan ◽  
American Democracy ◽  
Third Way ◽  
The North ◽  
The World ◽  
Soviet Communism ◽  
The North Atlantic ◽  
To Come ◽  
The Cold War

This chapter examines how ecumenical American Protestants sought to come to Europe’s “spiritual aid” through carrying out a “Marshall Plan for the Churches.” By the summer of 1947, these Protestant ecumenists were preparing to rebuild European churches, distribute material aid across the continent, and promote theological exchange across the Atlantic. All the while, they also sought to strengthen the standing of democracy and capitalism in Europe and, in particular, to bolster European spiritual defenses against communism. While German and European Protestants welcomed ecumenical aid, they also protested the Cold War interests of the United States. In particular, they challenged American ecumenists for contributing to the spread of what they deemed a new kind of American imperial order in the world. In response, a growing number of Europeans called on ecumenical Protestants across the North Atlantic to become a “third way” spiritual force between American democracy and Soviet communism.

14. US foreign policy in Russia

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Rutland ◽  
Gregory Dubinsky
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
World Order ◽  
The United States ◽  
Bill Clinton ◽  
The North ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Vladimir Putin

This chapter examines U.S. foreign policy in Russia. The end of the Cold War lifted the threat of nuclear annihilation and transformed the international security landscape. The United States interpreted the collapse of the Soviet Union as evidence that it had ‘won’ the Cold War, and that its values and interests would prevail in the future world order. The chapter first provides an overview of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 before discussing U.S.–Russian relations under Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin, respectively. It then turns to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its enlargement, the Kosovo crisis, and the ‘Great Game’ in Eurasia. It also analyses the rise of Vladimir Putin as president of Russia and the deterioration of U.S.–Russian relations and concludes with an assessment of the cautious partnership between the two countries.

Beyond the Cold War Chessboard

Worldview ◽  
1974 ◽  
Vol 17 (6) ◽  
pp. 21-22
Author(s):  
John W. Holmes
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cold War ◽  
North Atlantic ◽  
North American ◽  
The Other ◽  
The North ◽  
Common Interests ◽  
The North Atlantic ◽  
The Cold War

The problem in judging M. Servan-Schreiber's message is that he reaches some sound conclusions on the basis of dubious premises, from which he derives recommendations which could be disastrous.There may be some satisfaction in seeing a Frenchman concerned with le défi, russe instead of le défi américain, but his interpretation of one is as crude as was his interpretation of the other. The shock of revelation that there are common interests of the Atlantic countries in economic as well as strategic matters is understandably more startling to a Frenchman than to others. It was all set out in 1949 in Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty and was restated eloquently in 1973 by Mr. Kissinger. But last spring European leaders were included to see the latter as a self-interested plea from a weak United States to a prosperous Europe. The North American countries were reminded that their role in Europe was simply to defend it on request.

RETHINKING THE COLD WAR AND DECOLONIZATION: THE GRAND STRATEGY OF THE ALGERIAN WAR FOR INDEPENDENCE

2001 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 221-245 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Connelly
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Foreign Minister ◽  
The United States ◽  
Algerian War ◽  
Charles De Gaulle ◽  
The North ◽  
To Come ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
First Time

October and November 1960 were two of the coldest months of the Cold War. Continuing tensions over Berlin and the nuclear balance were exacerbated by crises in Laos, Congo, and—for the first time—France's rebellious départements in Algeria. During Nikita Khrushchev's table-pounding visit to the United Nations, he embraced Belkacem Krim, the foreign minister of the Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne (GPRA). After mugging for the cameras at the Soviet estate in Glen Cove, New York, Khrushchev confirmed that this constituted de facto recognition of the provisional government and pledged all possible aid. Meanwhile, in Beijing, President Ferhat Abbas delivered the GPRA's first formal request for Chinese “volunteers.” U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower asked his National Security Council “whether such intervention would not mean war.” The council agreed that if communist regulars infiltrated Algeria, the United States would be bound by the North Atlantic Treaty to come to the aid of French President Charles de Gaulle and his beleaguered government. After six years of insurgency, Algeria appeared to be on the brink of becoming a Cold War battleground.1

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

1955 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 184-186
Keyword(s):  
North Africa ◽  
North Atlantic ◽  
Foreign Minister ◽  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization ◽  
Annual Review ◽  
The North ◽  
Percent Increase ◽  
The North Atlantic ◽  
The Military ◽  
Of Greece

CouncilThe Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization met in regular ministerial session in Paris on December 17 and 18, 1954, under the chairmanship of Stephanos Stephanopoulos, Foreign Minister of Greece. One of the principal items considered by the Council was the annual review of the military position of NATO, which had been prepared by the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR, Gruenther) and by the Military Committee at its meetings in Washington in November and in Paris immediately preceding the Council meeting. According to press reports, the review showed that defensive rearmament of NATO was virtually completed so far as conventional armaments were concerned. It was reported that SACEUR and the Military Committee recommended that only the air arm of NATO defenses be substantially augmented in 1955, and that even the increases recommended in this regard represented a realization in 1955 of the goals set for 1954 which had not been met. Ground forces in 1954 were said to have been reduced by the equivalent of two divisions by the reduction in periods of conscription in Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands, the failure of Norway to increase its conscription period and the transfer of French units to north Africa; a reported two percent increase in NATO naval forces was recommended for 1955. Total defense expenditures of European NATO members in 1954 were reported to have fallen 2.4 percent below the 1953 level; the eleven European members were reported to have spent $10,865 million in 1954 as compared with $11,133 million in 1953.

TurkStream will need Russian gas discount deal

2016 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Natural Gas ◽  
Eastern Europe ◽  
Black Sea ◽  
New Deal ◽  
The Black Sea ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Central Eastern Europe ◽  
Russian President ◽  
Vladimir Putin ◽  
European Markets

Subject The Russo-Turkish intergovernmental TurkStream agreement. Significance An agreement signed by Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan on October 10 envisages a 31.5-billion-cubic-metres/year (bcm/y) natural gas transit line under the Black Sea and through Turkey to the Turkish-Greek border. One of two parallel pipes would supply 15.75 bcm/y gas to Turkey, replacing an existing pipeline. The second would export the same volume to European markets via a planned border 'hub' and export route yet to be announced. Impacts TurkStream's extra volume will increase Turkish dependence on Russian gas but allow more supply flexibility during peak winter demand. Delivering more Russian gas to Central-Eastern Europe will make it more difficult for other potential gas suppliers to secure market share. The agreement will bring Ankara and Moscow closer and may be followed by a new deal to restart the frozen Akkuyu nuclear plant.

Multipartner military exercises may become flashpoints

2015 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Minister ◽  
The United States ◽  
Policy Changes ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Past ◽  
External Threats ◽  
Military Exercises ◽  
Russian President ◽  
Vladimir Putin ◽  
Do So

Significance The exercise was described by NATO as a "show of force", while the Dutch foreign minister referred to it as "a warning" to Russian President Vladimir Putin. Multinational military exercises have become more frequent over the past 25 years. The United States participates in dozens of exercises annually and spends billions of dollars to do so. However, there are significant questions over the utility and purpose of such multinational exercises, which serve both a practical function for the militaries involved, as well as a diplomatic signaling effect. Impacts Like BALTOPS, regular exercises will assume greater salience when their regional focus sees new external threats. This could prompt policy changes from adversaries, as they attempt to respond to the exercises. As a result, exercises designed to deter may risk escalating tensions.

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