A Neurobiological Account of False Memories

Author(s):  
Vincent van de Ven ◽  
Henry Otgaar ◽  
Mark L. Howe

This chapter discusses human functional neuroimaging findings about how the brain creates true and false memories. These studies have shown that different brain systems contribute to the creation and retrieval of false memories, including systems for sensory perception, executive functioning and cognitive control, and the medial temporal lobe, which has long been associated with episodic and autobiographical memory formation. Many neuroimaging findings provide support for an associative account of false memories, which proposes that false memories arise from associating unrelated mental experiences in memory. At the same time, other neuroimaging findings suggest that false memory creation may depend on states of brain activity during memory encoding. Finally, the chapter briefly provides cautionary notes about using functional neuroimaging as a tool to assess private mental states in individual cases in the courtroom.

2021 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Domilė Tautvydaitė ◽  
Alexandra Adam-Darqué ◽  
Aurélie L. Manuel ◽  
Radek Ptak ◽  
Armin Schnider

The medial temporal lobe (MTL) is crucial for memory encoding and recognition. The time course of these processes is unknown. The present study juxtaposed encoding and recognition in a single paradigm. Twenty healthy subjects performed a continuous recognition task as brain activity was monitored with a high-density electroencephalography. The task presented New pictures thought to evoke encoding. The stimuli were then repeated up to 4 consecutive times to produce over-familiarity. These repeated stimuli served as “baseline” for comparison with the other stimuli. Stimuli later reappeared after 9–15 intervening items, presumably associated with new encoding and recognition. Encoding-related differences in evoked response potential amplitudes and in spatiotemporal analysis were observed at 145–300 ms, whereby source estimation indicated MTL and orbitofrontal activity from 145 to 205 ms. Recognition-related activity evoked by late repetitions occurred at 405–470 ms, implicating the MTL and neocortical structures. These findings indicate that encoding of information is initiated before it is recognized. The result helps to explain modifications of memories over time, including false memories, confabulation, and consolidation.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Allen Thornton ◽  
Miriam E. Weaverdyck ◽  
Diana Tamir

Social life requires us to treat each person according to their unique disposition: habitually enthusiastic friends need occasional grounding, whereas pessimistic colleagues require cheering-up. To tailor our behavior to specific individuals, we must represent their idiosyncrasies. Here we advance a hypothesis about how the brain achieves this goal: our representations of other people reflect the mental states we perceive those people to habitually experience. That is, rather than representing other people via traits, our brains represent people as the sums of their states. For example, if a perceiver observes that another person is frequently cheerful, sometimes thoughtful, and rarely grumpy, the perceiver’s representation of that person will be comprised of their representations of the mental states cheerfulness, thoughtfulness, and grumpiness, combined in a corresponding ratio. We tested this hypothesis by measuring whether neural representations of people could be accurately reconstructed by summing state representations. Separate participants underwent functional neuroimaging while considering famous individuals and individual mental states. Online participants rated how often each famous person experiences each state. Results supported the summed state hypothesis: frequency-weighted sums of state-specific brain activity patterns accurately reconstructed person-specific patterns. Moreover, the summed state account outperformed the established alternative – that people represent others using trait dimensions – in explaining interpersonal similarity, as measured through neural patterns, explicit ratings, binary choices, reaction times, and the semantics of biographical text. Together these findings demonstrate that the brain represents other people as the sums of the mental states they are perceived to experience.


2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 277-293 ◽  
Author(s):  
Selen Atasoy ◽  
Gustavo Deco ◽  
Morten L. Kringelbach ◽  
Joel Pearson

A fundamental characteristic of spontaneous brain activity is coherent oscillations covering a wide range of frequencies. Interestingly, these temporal oscillations are highly correlated among spatially distributed cortical areas forming structured correlation patterns known as the resting state networks, although the brain is never truly at “rest.” Here, we introduce the concept of harmonic brain modes—fundamental building blocks of complex spatiotemporal patterns of neural activity. We define these elementary harmonic brain modes as harmonic modes of structural connectivity; that is, connectome harmonics, yielding fully synchronous neural activity patterns with different frequency oscillations emerging on and constrained by the particular structure of the brain. Hence, this particular definition implicitly links the hitherto poorly understood dimensions of space and time in brain dynamics and its underlying anatomy. Further we show how harmonic brain modes can explain the relationship between neurophysiological, temporal, and network-level changes in the brain across different mental states ( wakefulness, sleep, anesthesia, psychedelic). Notably, when decoded as activation of connectome harmonics, spatial and temporal characteristics of neural activity naturally emerge from the interplay between excitation and inhibition and this critical relation fits the spatial, temporal, and neurophysiological changes associated with different mental states. Thus, the introduced framework of harmonic brain modes not only establishes a relation between the spatial structure of correlation patterns and temporal oscillations (linking space and time in brain dynamics), but also enables a new dimension of tools for understanding fundamental principles underlying brain dynamics in different states of consciousness.


Author(s):  
S.S. Pertsov ◽  
E.A. Yumatov ◽  
N.A. Karatygin ◽  
E.N. Dudnik ◽  
A.E. Khramov ◽  
...  

It is a well-known fact that mental activity of the brain can be presented by two different states, i.e., the true state and the false state. A promising method of the electroencephalogram (EEG) wavelet transform has been developed over recent years. Using this method, we evaluated the principle possibility for direct objective registration of mental activity in the human brain. Previously we developed and described (published) a new experimental model and software for recognizing the true and false mental responses of a person with the EEG wavelet transform. The developed experimental model and software-and-data support allowed us to compare (by EEG parameters) two mental states of brain activity, one of which is the false state, while another is the true state. The goal of this study is to develop an absolutely new information technology for recognizing the true and false states in mental activity of the brain by means of the EEG wavelet transform. Our study showed that the true and false states of the brain can be distinguished using the method of continuous wavelet transform and calculation of the EEG wavelet energy. It was revealed that the main differences between truthful and false mental responses are observed in the delta and alpha ranges of the EEG. In the EEG delta rhythm, the wavelet energy is much higher under conditions of the false response as compared to that in the true response. In the EEG alpha rhythm, the wavelet energy is significantly higher with the true answer than in the false one. These data open a new principal possibility of revealing the true and false mental state of the brain by means of continuous wavelet transform and calculation of the EEG wavelet energy.


Author(s):  
Frank Jackson

We know that the brain is intimately connected with mental activity. Indeed, doctors now define death in terms of the cessation of the relevant brain activity. The identity theory of mind holds that the intimate connection is identity: the mind is the brain, or, more precisely, mental states are states of the brain. The theory goes directly against a long tradition according to which mental and material belong to quite distinct ontological categories – the mental being essentially conscious, the material essentially unconscious. This tradition has been bedevilled by the problem of how essentially immaterial states could be caused by the material world, as would happen when we see a tree, and how they could cause material states, as would happen when we decide to make an omelette. A great merit of the identity theory is that it avoids this problem: interaction between mental and material becomes simply interaction between one subset of material states, namely certain states of a sophisticated central nervous system, and other material states. The theory also brings the mind within the scope of modern science. More and more phenomena are turning out to be explicable in the physical terms of modern science: phenomena once explained in terms of spells, possession by devils, Thor’s thunderbolts, and so on, are now explained in more mundane, physical terms. If the identity theory is right, the same goes for the mind. Neuroscience will in time reveal the secrets of the mind in the same general way that the theory of electricity reveals the secrets of lightning. This possibility has received enormous support from advances in computing. We now have at least the glimmerings of an idea of how a purely material or physical system could do some of the things minds can do. Nevertheless, there are many questions to be asked of the identity theory. How could states that seem so different turn out to be one and the same? Would neurophysiologists actually see my thoughts and feelings if they looked at my brain? When we report on our mental states what are we reporting on – our brains?


Author(s):  
Soomi Lee ◽  
Susan T Charles ◽  
David M Almeida

Abstract Objectives Participating in a variety of daily activities (i.e., activity diversity) requires people to adjust to a variety of situations and engage in a greater diversity of behaviors. These experiences may, in turn, enhance cognitive functioning. This study examined associations between activity diversity and cognitive functioning across adulthood. Method Activity diversity was defined as the breadth and evenness of participation in seven common daily activity domains (e.g., paid work, time with children, leisure, physical activities, volunteering). Participants from the National Survey of Daily Experiences (NSDE: N = 732, Mage = 56) provided activity data during eight consecutive days at Wave 1 (W1) and Wave 2 (W2) 10 years apart. They also provided cognitive data at W2. Results Greater activity diversity at W2 was associated with higher overall cognitive functioning and higher executive functioning at W2. Individuals who increased activity diversity from W1 to W2 also exhibited higher scores in overall cognitive functioning and executive functioning at W2. Overall cognitive functioning, executive functioning, and episodic memory were better in those who had higher activity diversity at both waves, or increased activity diversity from W1 to W2, compared to those who had lower activity diversity or decreased activity diversity over time. Discussion Activity diversity is important for cognitive health in adulthood. Future work can study the directionality between activity diversity and cognitive functioning and underlying social and neurological mechanisms for these associations.


1999 ◽  
Vol 354 (1387) ◽  
pp. 1307-1324 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony D. Wagner ◽  
Wilma Koutstaal ◽  
Daniel L. Schacter

To understand human memory, it is important to determine why some experiences are remembered whereas others are forgotten. Until recently, insights into the neural bases of human memory encoding, the processes by which information is transformed into an enduring memory trace, have primarily been derived from neuropsychological studies of humans with select brain lesions. The advent of functional neuroimaging methods, such as positron emission tomography (PET) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), has provided a new opportunity to gain additional understanding of how the brain supports memory formation. Importantly, the recent development of event–related fMRI methods now allows for examination of trial–by–trial differences in neural activity during encoding and of the consequences of these differences for later remembering. In this review, we consider the contributions of PET and fMRI studies to the understanding of memory encoding, placing a particular emphasis on recent event–related fMRI studies of the Dm effect: that is, differences in neural activity during encoding that are related to differences in subsequent memory. We then turn our attention to the rich literature on the Dm effect that has emerged from studies using event–related potentials (ERPs). It is hoped that the integration of findings from ERP studies, which offer higher temporal resolution, with those from event–related fMRI studies, which offer higher spatial resolution, will shed new light on when and why encoding yields subsequent remembering.


2018 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 239821281775272 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nitin Williams ◽  
Richard N. Henson

Functional magnetic resonance imaging and electro-/magneto-encephalography are some of the main neuroimaging technologies used by cognitive neuroscientists to study how the brain works. However, the methods for analysing the rich spatial and temporal data they provide are constantly evolving, and these new methods in turn allow new scientific questions to be asked about the brain. In this brief review, we highlight a handful of recent analysis developments that promise to further advance our knowledge about the working of the brain. These include (1) multivariate approaches to decoding the content of brain activity, (2) time-varying approaches to characterising states of brain connectivity, (3) neurobiological modelling of neuroimaging data, and (4) standardisation and big data initiatives.


2005 ◽  
Vol 187 (6) ◽  
pp. 500-509 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amélie M. Achim ◽  
Martin Lepage

BackgroundNumerous studies have examined the neural correlates of episodic memory deficits in schizophrenia, yielding both consistencies and discrepancies in the reported patterns of results.AimsTo identify in schizophrenia the brain regions in which activity is consistently abnormal across imaging studies of memory.MethodData from 18 studies meeting the inclusion criteria were combined using a recently developed quantitative meta-analytic approach.ResultsRegions of consistent differential activation between groups were observed in the left inferior prefrontal cortex, medial temporal cortex bilaterally, left cerebellum, and in other prefrontal and temporal lobe regions. Subsequent analyses explored memory encoding and retrieval separately and identified between-group differences in specific prefrontal and medial temporal lobe regions.ConclusionsBeneath the apparent heterogeneity of published findings on schizophrenia and memory, a consistent and robust pattern of group differences is observed as a function of memory processes.


2011 ◽  
Vol 23 (11) ◽  
pp. 3228-3240 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manuela Friedrich ◽  
Angela D. Friederici

There has been general consensus that initial word learning during early infancy is a slow and time-consuming process that requires very frequent exposure, whereas later in development, infants are able to quickly learn a novel word for a novel meaning. From the perspective of memory maturation, this shift in behavioral development might represent a shift from slow procedural to fast declarative memory formation. Alternatively, it might be caused by the maturation of specific brain structures within the declarative memory system that may support lexical mapping from the very first. Here, we used the neurophysiological method of ERPs to watch the brain activity of 6-month-old infants, when repeatedly presented with object–word pairs in a cross-modal learning paradigm. We report first evidence that infants as young as 6 months are able to associate objects and words after only very few exposures. A memory test 1 day later showed that infants did not fully forget this newly acquired knowledge, although the ERP effects indicated it to be less stable than immediately after encoding. The combined results suggest that already at 6 months the encoding process of word learning is based on fast declarative memory formation, but limitations in the consolidation of declarative memory diminish the long lasting effect in lexical-semantic memory at that age.


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