Neurointerventions, Crime, and Punishment
Can it be justified to use neuroscientific technologies for influencing the functioning of human brain as a means of preventing offenders from engaging in future criminal conduct? This is indeed a highly controversial question and one which has a dark prehistory. Moreover, it is also a question that has attracted recent optimistic attention from researchers across different scientific fields. The purpose of this book is to consider various ethical challenges surrounding this question. More precisely, the author discusses issues such as, Is it morally acceptable to offer more lenient sentences to offenders in return for participation in neuroscientific treatment programmes? Would such offers be unacceptably coercive? Can it ever be morally justified to use compulsory neurointerventions as a means of preventing crime? Is it possible to administer neurointerventions as a type of punishment? Would it be acceptable for physicians to participate in the administration of neurointerventions on offenders? What is the moral significance of the sordid history of brain interventions for the present or future use of such treatment options? The author argues, on the one hand, that many of the in-principle objections to neuroscientific treatment are premature but also, on the other, that—given the way criminal justice systems currently function—we are well-advised not to put such treatment methods into practice.