The Citizenship Status of Criminal Offenders

2018 ◽  
pp. 88-125
Author(s):  
Milena Tripkovic

This chapter aims to translate the three models into tangible citizenship conditions, allowing us to establish whether criminal offenders ought to retain their citizenship rights post-conviction. It is argued that—under the first model—most criminals remain citizens since episodic violations do not signal a lack of capacity for a “sense of justice.” Similarly, most criminal offenders are not without “civic virtue”—they remain self-governing subjects whose civic qualities can be enhanced. Finally, while criminals certainly act against the “common good,” most remain valuable members of the community who bring forward a specific vision of the good life, which prevents the community from excluding them. All three models, however, equally point toward the existence of a small number of individuals who are without crucial citizenship requirements, and the chapter concludes that—regardless of differences between the three models—all of them similarly permit exclusions of persons with strong, incorrigible anti-social inclinations.

2014 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ann Margaret Sharp

Life comes from physical or biological survival. But the good life comes from what we care about, what we value, what we think truly important, as distinguished from what we think merely trivial. What we care about is the source of the criteria we use to evaluate ideas, ideals, persons, events, things, and their importance in our lives. And it is these criteria that determine the judgments we make in our everyday lives. In the second edition of Thinking in Education, Matthew Lipman (2002) has indicated the importance of fostering critical, creative and caring thinking in children, if one is to prepare them to make better judgments and live qualitatively better lives. He tells us that caring thinking is appreciative thinking, active thinking, normative thinking, affective thinking and empathetic thinking and then goes on to list a number of mental acts under each of these categories. Maybe it is because ‘caring thinking’ is not as common a term as ‘critical thinking’ and ‘creative thinking’ in everyday educational language that we stop for pause when we hear it. However when we read what Lipman says about caring thinking, we find ourselves nodding and saying to ourselves, ‘Yes, that makes sense. To think caringly means to think ethically, affectively, normatively, appreciatively and to actively participate in society with a concern for the common good’ (Lipman 2002, p. 271). In a real sense what we care about is manifest in how we perform, participate, build, contribute and how we relate to others. It is thinking that reveals our ideals as well as what we think is valuable, what we are willing to fight and suffer for.


Political society is established for the provision of the good life for the citizens of the society. But to ensure that the task is carried out, political societies elect or appoint leaders saddled with the responsibility of guiding, directing, leading and organizing the society. Capable and efficient political leaders help their societies to develop economically and help the citizens to have access to the good life. They are concerned about the common good of the society. Inept and inefficient leaders often are concerned about their own selfish interests and bring miseries and suffering to their peoples. In spite of the ideals of good leadership and the positive values of working for the public interest and common good of their societies, there are still many political leaders who are in power for their own sakes. Because of this there are many underdeveloped and poor societies especially in the Global South. This paper uses a critical analytic and hermeneutic method to examine and appraise the concept of the common good and its implications for political leaders. The value of the common good is applicable to every society. Political leaders everywhere are to strive for the common good. The paper finds that bad and corrupt political leaders are still prevalent in many societies in the world. The presented research will also help to designate the feature of the articulation of «common good» in the modern philosophical conceptions. The paper concludes that there is need to highlight the value of the common good that political leaders should strive for and help their societies obtain. This done there will be a higher level of peace and harmonies in political societies.


2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuiza Martínez Rivera

ABSTRACTIn Aristotelian political philosophy, the biological definition of man as a “political animal” functions as the premise upon which the polis can be created. According to Aristotle, man is an animal characterized by rational and communicative abilities that drive him to build communities in pursuit of the “good life.” This definition of human nature presupposes the creation of the polis as the only space where man can fully develop his virtues and live a full and happy life. However, Aristotle’s conception of the polis, only grants political participation within it to individuals that fit this description. This restriction begets the question of who remains beyond the margins of the polis? Beyond the boundaries of this political space remain all those who make life possible in the polis: women, workers, and slaves. Further yet, beyond all economic and social networks, lies the concept that will be the purpose of this article, the “beast,” a human characterized by a lack of political disposition, both in developed instances (like the polis) and the more primitive ones (like a tribe or the home). Following Aristotle’s logic, bestial men are not useful members of the community because they do not fulfill the role of the political animal, as their actions are not guided by the pursuit of the common good. We will argue that as a result, the beast suffers a triple exclusion: political, because he is denied citizenship; social, since he is barred from participating in the community that supports the polis economically; and, biologically for he is excluded from the conceptual group of human.RESUMENEn la filosofía política aristotélica, la definición biológica del hombre como “animal político” funciona como justificación para la creación de la polis. Aristóteles clasifica al hombre como un animal caracterizado por su habilidad racional y comunicativa, capacidades que lo determinan a formar comunidades con miras a la “vida buena”. Esta definición de la naturaleza humana supone la creación de la polis; el único espacio donde el hombre puede desarrollar sus virtudes y vivir una vida plena y feliz. Dentro de esta polis, Aristóteles le otorga participación política solo a los individuos que cum-plen con esta descripción. A partir de esto surge la pregunta: ¿Quiénes quedan al margen de la polis? Fuera de este espacio político quedan todos los que hacen posible la vida en la polis: las mujeres, los trabajadores y  los esclavos. Más allá de estas redes económicas y sociales queda el propósito de este artículo, la “bestia”: los seres humanos caracterizados por su carencia de disposición política tanto en instancias desarrolladas como la polis y las más primitivas como la aldea o el hogar. De esta manera, los hombres bestiales son inútiles para la vida en comunidad ya que no cumplen con su función como animales políticos y sus acciones no están guiadas por un bien común. Se argumentará que a partir de esto que la bestia padece una triple exclusión: la política, al negársele la posibilidad de ciudadanía; la social, al prohibirle la partici-pación en la comunidad que sustenta económicamente a la polis y, por último, la biológica al ser excluido del conjunto conceptual de los hombres.


Author(s):  
Paul Spicker

The model of civic republicanism is associated with a range of principles: a concept of the common good, citizenship, a presumption of civic virtue and freedom. The idea of radical democracy is strongly associated with a sense of active citizenship, engagement in a political community and collective action. At times, however, it tips into populism, which claims to pit a virtuous people against a corrupt elite, but risks bringing radical democracy into disrepute.


2020 ◽  
Vol 63 (5) ◽  
pp. 1257-1280
Author(s):  
SEÁN DONNELLY

AbstractRepublicanism has been one of the most influential political ideologies in modern Irish history; however, it remains conspicuously undertheorized by historians of the revolutionary period. While recent historiography has challenged representations of anti-Treaty Sinn Féin as a mindlessly destructive, anti-democratic force, the extent of ideological and rhetorical continuity linking the Provisional Government formed to assume control of the Free State on 7 January 1922 with the pre-Treaty republican tradition has not been understood. This article rejects the historiographical thesis that the Provisional Government abandoned republican ideas. Drawing from the Cambridge School's contextualist account of republicanism as a polysemic and contingent political language, it highlights the vigorously contested nature of republican thought in the intellectual firmament of revolutionary Sinn Féin and argues that the Free State leadership articulated its vision of politics and society through classical republican concepts of ‘civic virtue’ and the ‘common good’. It is suggested additionally that the colonial dynamics of the Anglo-Irish relationship helped to shape the vision of republican citizenship promoted by an administration possessed of a deep-seated determination to refute historical perceptions of the Irish people as congenitally ‘unfit’ for sovereignty.


2016 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-127 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert A. Sparling

AbstractPartisanship inspires a degree of ambivalence. There is a widespread tendency—which has a long history in republican political thought—to decry division and partisanship as corrupting, undermining individual judgment, and promoting clientelism, dependencies and loyalties antithetical to the common good. Yet there is an equally widespread intuition that excessive unity is corrupting, undermining the vigour of civic life. Contemporary political theory remains divided on the normative implications of division and unity—witness the battles between agonistic and consensus-oriented schools of democratic theory. In this article I examine the thought of two eighteenth-century writers who, while often treated as contributing to a common intellectual project of reinvigorating classical civic virtue, took opposite positions on the desirability of division. Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Adam Ferguson offered competing accounts of what corrupts civic virtue, one decrying party divisions and the other lauding them. The article examines the underlying philosophical presuppositions of Rousseau and Ferguson's competing claims and suggests, ultimately, that both positions suffer from neglecting to attend to an important distinction between salutary and harmful divisions.


1992 ◽  
Vol 86 (2) ◽  
pp. 432-443 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yoav Peled

The citizenship status of its Arab citizens is the key to Israel's ability to function as anethnic democracy, that is, a political system combining democratic institutions with the dominance of one ethnic group. The confluence of republicanism and ethnonationalism with liberalism, as principles of legitimation, has resulted in two types of citizenship: republican for Jews and liberal for Arabs. Thus, Arab citizens enjoy civil and political rights but are barred from attending to the common good.The Arab citizenship status, while much more restricted than the Jewish, has both induced and enabled Arabs to conduct their political struggles within the framework of the law, in sharp contrast to the noncitizen Arabs of the occupied territories. It may thus serve as a model for other dominant ethnic groups seeking to maintain both their dominance and a democratic system of government.


2018 ◽  
Vol 67 (1) ◽  
pp. 191-206 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gabriella Slomp

Recent decades have witnessed a revival of interest in ancient friendship both as a normative and as an explanatory concept. The literature concurs in holding Hobbes responsible for the marginalisation of friendship in political science and suggests that Hobbes devalued friendship because of his understanding of man. This article argues that although Hobbes’ appraisal of friendship hinges on his assumption that man is self-interested, his critique of normative friendship does not rest on that notion. Hobbes’ challenge to us is this: without foundation in the ‘truth’ (i.e. the ‘Good Life’) that underpinned ancient friendship, modern friendship, whether self-interested or selfless, cannot be assumed to be a civic virtue, nor an index of the health of a political association, nor a facilitator of domestic or global peace. Hobbes’ critique is especially relevant for writers who maintain that a resurgence of friendship can nurture concord and foster reconciliation within contemporary liberal democracies.


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-35
Author(s):  
Romano Deluque Júnior ◽  
Cristiane Maluf Rodrigues Correia

À luz de uma reflexão jusfilosófica, a pessoa humana ascende enquanto sujeito de maior relevância para a ciência do Direito, nesse mesmo sentido, se faz relevante citar que o Direito possuiria, em todas as suas instâncias, a seguinte preocupação: de caminhar paralelamente a um verdadeiro senso de justiça, que se volte à solidariedade e ao bem comum. O presente artigo possui como objetivo fazer emergir uma reflexão ética acerca da função social dos contratos, por sua vez aqui percebida tal como um instituto norteador das relações jurídicas contratuais relacionando-a  com a questão da dignidade da pessoa humana enquanto basilar princípio constitucional. A discussão proposta decorrer-se-á de modo a defender a premissa de que a manutenção e a defesa dessa dignidade ocorreriam  dentro de uma perspectiva contratualista, a partir da observância e do respeito pelos limites impostos pela própria função social dos contratos, na figura da probidade contratual, da boa-fé objetiva, e da defesa dos interesses difusos e institucionais. Propõe-se, ainda, discutir a respeito de uma ética contratual contemporânea, que a partir dos conceitos aqui em análise, possuiria o intento de superar o ciclo histórico de individualismo exacerbado, e substituí-lo pelo ideal da coexistencialidade. Nessa nova perspectiva ter-se-á em pauta o instituto da boa-fé objetiva, através da qual a relação negocial passaria a ser vislumbrada a partir de uma ética do comum proveito, que caminharia, não obstante, à harmonia jurídico-contratual em prol da coletividade e dos interesses difusos. Palavras-chave: Função Social do Contrato. Contratos. Direito Civil. AbstractOn the  light of a jus-philosophical reflection, the human being ascends as a subject of greater relevance to the science of Law, in the same sense, it is relevant to mention that Law would have, in all its instances, the following concern: to walk in parallel to a true sense of justice, to return, to solidarity and to the common good. The purpose of this article is to make an ethical reflection about the social function of contracts, in turn perceived here as an institute guiding contractual legal relationships  regarding the issue of the dignity of the human person as a basis for constitutional principle. The proposed discussion will be carried out in such a way as to defend the premise that the maintenance and defense of this dignity would take place, from a contractual perspective, from the observance and respect for the limits imposed by the social function of the contracts themselves, figure of contractual probity, objective good faith, and defense of diffuse and institutional interests. It is also proposed to discuss a contemporary contractual ethic that, based on the concepts analyzed here, would attempt to overcome the historical cycle of exacerbated individualism and replace it with the ideal of coexistentiality. In this new perspective, the institute of objective good faith, through which the negotiating relationship would be perceived from an ethic of common advantage, would nevertheless follow the legal-contractual harmony in collective and diffuse interests. Keywords: Social Function of Contract. Contracts. Civil Law.


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