Civil-Military Relations

Democratic Regimes ◽

Military Relations ◽

The literature encompassed within the area of civil-military relations (CMR) is extremely broad. The focus in this bibliography is primarily on CMR as a subfield of comparative politics in that it deals with the power relations between the military and civilians. This bibliography is concerned with the classic question, raised in the 1st century ce by Juvenal: Who will guard the guardians? From this perspective, CMR is generally about power and politics of an organization with a monopoly in arms to exercise political power. While foreign states and international organizations may influence CMR, particularly during democratic transitions, it is essentially a national phenomenon. International law does, however, pertain in most of the roles and missions the military are tasked with. Not included in this bibliography are the following topics: military history, strategy and doctrine, sociology of the armed forces including recruitment, gender, race, and health. Thus, important authors such as Morris Janowitz and Charles Moskos will not be included. This bibliography will break new ground in four ways: First, in giving attention to military effectiveness as well as the traditional focus on civilian control; second, in giving attention to roles and missions currently executed by the military; third, in including non-democracies, democracies, and those in transition; and fourth, in including the roles of private contractors in the mix of civil-military relations. The six primary sections in this bibliography are the following: Democratic Civilian Control is mainly about the United States and its emphasis is on the military taking political power, even though the American military has never sought to take power. CMR in Contemporary Non-Democratic Regimes focuses on China, Russia, and Egypt as they are all globally important non-democratic regimes, with varied relationships between the military and civilians. CMR in Democratic Transitions is included as the military is a key actor in virtually every transition from the beginning of Third Wave of democratization, starting in Lisbon, Portugal, on April 25, 1974. CMR in the Context of Roles and Missions is included as it details that the military mainly implements roles and missions not involving conflict with other militaries, and includes the role of international law. The section on CMR Including Democratic Civilian Control and Military Effectiveness is included as attention must be paid to effectiveness in the different roles and missions for military organizations. And, finally military roles and missions assumed by Non-Military For-Profit Private Enterprises are included as involvement of private enterprise raises questions regarding the state’s putative monopoly of power and roles of the military.

Conclusion

Reconsidering American Civil-Military Relations ◽

10.1093/oso/9780197535493.003.0016 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. 283-298

Author(s):

Risa Brooks

Keyword(s):

Future Research ◽

Civilian Control ◽

Military Effectiveness ◽

Us Military ◽

The Individual ◽

Military Relations ◽

Military Activity ◽

The Military ◽

The Relationship

The concluding chapter synthesizes insights from the individual chapters, identifying six overarching lessons: civilian control of the US military is complex and understudied; norms are essential for healthy civil-military relations; the relationship between society and the military is less than healthy; partisanship is corroding civil-military relations; public scrutiny of the military is essential to military effectiveness; and the fundamental character of civil-military relations is changing. In turn, it proposes several questions for future research, suggesting that more could be known about public accountability of military activity; the nature and measurement of military politicization; and changing actors and roles in civil-military relations.

US Civil-Military Relations in the Gray Zone

Reconsidering American Civil-Military Relations ◽

10.1093/oso/9780197535493.003.0015 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. 263-282

Author(s):

Sarah Sewall

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

Armed Forces ◽

The United States ◽

Civilian Control ◽

Gray Zone ◽

Civilian Leaders ◽

The Face ◽

Military Relations ◽

This chapter argues that the changing character of conflict demands rethinking U S civil-military relations. The United States has long relied on a nuclear deterrent and conventional military superiority to defend itself, but its adversaries have changed the rules of the game to exploit civilian vulnerabilities in the U S homeland using non kinetic tools. To ensure continued civilian control of the military use of force and effective management of competition below the threshold of war, civilian leaders must assume greater responsibility for the political and operational management of hostilities in the Gray Zone. Because civilian leaders are underprepared for this new global competition, they will be tempted to default to conventional military solutions. Traditional civil-military frameworks did not envision permanent conflict or the centrality of civilian terrain, capabilities, and operational responsibilities. The United States needs civilian-led tools and approaches to effectively avoid the dual extremes of national immobilization in the face of non kinetic threats and inadvertent escalation of conflict without civilian authorization or intent. Civilian adaptation could also diminish the traditional role of the armed forces in defending the nation. The United States must rewire the relationship of the military and civilians through its decisions about how to manage Gray Zone competition.

The New Civil-Military Relations

American Political Science Review ◽

10.1017/s0003055400124177 ◽

1961 ◽

Vol 55 (1) ◽

pp. 53-63 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

Gene M. Lyons

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

Minimum Cost ◽

The United States ◽

Fundamental Principle ◽

Civilian Control ◽

Military Establishment ◽

Military Leaders ◽

Military Relations ◽

Historically the character of civil-military relations in the United States has been dominated by the concept of civilian control of the military. This has largely been a response to the fear of praetorianism. As recently as 1949, for example, the first Hoover Commission asserted that one of the major reasons for strengthening the “means of exercising civilian control” over the defense establishment was to “safeguard our democratic traditions against militarism.” This same warning was raised in the report of the Rockefeller Committee on defense organization in 1953. While the overriding purpose of the committee's recommendations was to provide “the Nation with maximum security at minimum cost,” the report made it clear that this had to be achieved “without danger to our free institutions, based on the fundamental principle of civilian control of the Military Establishment.” Finally, during the debate on the reorganization proposals of 1958, senators and congressmen used the theme of a “Prussianized” military staff to attempt to slow down the trend towards centralization in the military establishment.Despite this imposing support, the concept of civilian control of the military has little significance for contemporary problems of national security in the United States. In the first place, military leaders are divided among themselves, although their differences cannot be reduced to a crass contrast between dichomatic doctrines. Air Force leaders who are gravely concerned over the need to maintain a decisive nuclear retaliatory force are by now acknowledging the need to develop a limited war capability.

The Absent Dialogue

10.1093/oso/9780190905903.001.0001 ◽

2019 ◽

Author(s):

Anit Mukherjee

Keyword(s):

Institutional Design ◽

Civilian Control ◽

Military Effectiveness ◽

Deep Dive ◽

Promotion Policies ◽

Weapons Procurement ◽

Military Relations ◽

Postcolonial States ◽

Civilian control over the military is widely hailed as among the biggest successes of India’s democracy. This is a rarity, especially among postcolonial states, and is rightfully celebrated. But has this come at a cost? The Absent Dialogue argues that the pattern of civil–military relations in India has hampered its military effectiveness. Indian politicians and bureaucrats have long been content with the formal and ritualistic exercise of civilian control, while the military continues to operate in institutional silos, with little substantive engagement between the two. In making this claim, the book closely examines the variables most associated with military effectiveness—weapons procurement, jointness (the ability of separate military services to operate together), officer education, promotion policies, and defense planning. India’s pattern of civil–military relations—best characterized as an absent dialogue—adversely affects each of these processes. Theoretically, the book adopts the “unequal dialogue” framework proposed by Eliot Cohen but also argues that, under some conditions, patterns of civil–military relations may more closely resemble an “absent dialogue.” Informed by more than a hundred and fifty interviews and recently available archival material, the book represents a deep dive into understanding the power and the limitations of the Indian military. It sheds new light on India’s military history and is essential reading for understanding contemporary civil–military relations and recurring problems therein. While the book focuses on India, it also highlights the importance of civilian expertise and institutional design in enhancing civilian control and military effectiveness in other democracies.

Civil-Military Relations and the Demise of Turkish Democracy

The Oxford Handbook of Turkish Politics ◽

10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190064891.013.15 ◽

2020 ◽

Author(s):

Nil S. Satana ◽

Burak Bilgehan Özpek

Keyword(s):

Political Power ◽

Political Competition ◽

Political Islam ◽

Democratic Consolidation ◽

Civilian Control ◽

Justice And Development Party ◽

Growing Body ◽

Military Relations ◽

A growing body of scholarship shows that Turkey has been part of a broader trend toward authoritarianism in the 2010s. As democratization scholars explore a myriad of factors underlying this, including but not limited to institutional misuse such as holding unfair elections to consolidate authoritarian power, this chapter examines how and why the end of military tutelage resulted in the civilian control of the Turkish military but not democratic consolidation. What factors explain the rise and eventual demise of the Turkish army as a major political power in Turkey? How has civilian control of the military gradually taken place in Turkey? What are the reasons why Turkish democracy failed to consolidate despite civilian control? The chapter argues and demonstrates that two internal threats, namely Kurdish nationalism and political Islam, were strategically used by both the military and the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government to subdue rival actors and consolidate power. In other words, both the military and the AKP government have limited political competition while depending on distinct sources of legitimacy: the military’s legitimacy was predicated primarily on its coercive capabilities, that of the AKP on electoral victories.

NEUČINKOVITOST VOJSKE KOT POKAZATELJ NEUSTREZNOSTI CIVILNEGA NADZORA (2)

CONTEMPORARY MILITARY CHALLENGES ◽

10.33179//bsv.99.svi.11.cmc.17.3.1 ◽

2015 ◽

pp. 11-23

Author(s):

BRANIMIR FURLAN

Keyword(s):

First Generation ◽

Armed Forces ◽

Civilian Control ◽

Methodological Framework ◽

Military Effectiveness ◽

The Republic ◽

Military Relations ◽

The Military ◽

The Impact

Prispevek je nadaljevanje analize o vzročno-posledični povezavi med civilnim nadzorom in učinkovitostjo vojske. V prvem delu je bil predstavljen teoretično- metodološki okvir analize, v tem delu pa avtor predstavlja rezultate raziskave o stanju civilno-vojaških odnosov v Republiki Sloveniji ter vplivih civilnega nadzora na učinkovitost Slovenske vojske. Raziskava je pokazala, da se v Sloveniji uveljavlja praksa civilnega nadzora nad oboroženimi silami po vzoru drugih demokratičnih držav, vendar problematika prve generacije civilno-vojaških odnosov še ni končana. Uveljavljanje nadzora v praksi zagotavlja podrejenost vojske civilnim oblastem, pri čemer mehanizmi nadzora ne krepijo sposobnosti Slovenske vojske, da učinkovito izpolni svoje poslanstvo. Posledično lahko povzročijo nezadovoljstvo vojske ali izgubo kredibilnosti v javnosti. This article is a continuation of the analysis of cause-effect relations between civilian control and military effectiveness. The first part presented the theoretical and methodological framework, while in the second part, the author presents the results of the study of civil-military relations in the Republic of Slovenia, focusing on the impact of civilian control on the effectiveness of the Slovenian Armed Forces. The study showed that the practice of civilian control over the armed forces in Slovenia follows the example of those in other democratic states. However, the issue of the first-generation civil-military relations has not yet been completed. The enforcement of civilian control in practice provides for a complete subordination of the military to civilian authorities; however, it does not contribute to the ability of the military to effectively execute its missions. Rather, civilian control can cause military dissatisfaction and reluctance, as well as loss of credibility with the society.

Paradoxes of Professionalism: Rethinking Civil-Military Relations in the United States

International Security ◽

10.1162/isec_a_00374 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 44 (4) ◽

pp. 7-44 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Risa Brooks

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

Armed Conflict ◽

Use Of Force ◽

The United States ◽

Civilian Control ◽

Delegation Of Authority ◽

Civilian Leaders ◽

Military Relations ◽

The U.S. military's prevailing norms of professionalism exhibit three paradoxes that render the organization poorly suited to meet contemporary challenges to its nonpartisan ethic, and that undermine its relations with civilian leaders. These norms, based on Samuel Huntington's objective civilian control model, argue that the military should operate in a sphere separate from the civilian domain of policymaking and decisions about the use of force. The first paradox is that Huntingtonian norms, though intended to prevent partisan and political behavior by military personnel, can also enable these activities. Second, the norms promote civilian leaders’ authority in decisionmaking related to the use of force, yet undermine their practical control and oversight of military activity. Third, they contribute to the military's operational and tactical effectiveness, while corroding the United States’ strategic effectiveness in armed conflict. These tensions in Huntington's norms matter today because of intensifying partisanship in society and in the military, the embrace by civilian leaders of objective control and their concomitant delegation of authority in armed conflict to the military, and growing questions about the causes of the inconclusive outcomes of the United States’ recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is time to develop a new framework for military professionalism.

Erosion of Civilian Control in Democracies: A Comprehensive Framework for Comparative Analysis

Comparative Political Studies ◽

10.1177/0010414021989757 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 001041402198975

Author(s):

Polina Beliakova

Keyword(s):

Comparative Analysis ◽

Civilian Control ◽

Intrastate Conflict ◽

Large N ◽

Military Relations ◽

Comprehensive Framework ◽

The Military ◽

New Framework

Civilian control of the military is a fundamental attribute of democracy. While democracies are less coup-prone, studies treating civilian control as a dependent variable mostly focus on coups. In this paper, I argue that the factors predicting coups in autocracies, weaken civilian control of the military in democracies in different ways. To capture this difference, I advance a new comprehensive framework that includes the erosion of civilian control by competition, insubordination, and deference. I test the argument under conditions of an intrastate conflict—a conducive environment for the erosion of civilian control. A large-N analysis confirms that while intrastate conflict does not lead to coups in democracies, it increases the military’s involvement in government, pointing to alternative forms of erosion taking place. Further case study—Russia’s First Chechen War—demonstrates the causal logic behind the new framework, contributing to the nuanced comparative analysis of civil-military relations across regimes.

The Degree of Military Political Autonomy during the Spanish, Argentine and Brazilian Transitions

Journal of Latin American Studies ◽

10.1017/s0022216x0000465x ◽

1993 ◽

Vol 25 (2) ◽

pp. 283-299 ◽

Cited By ~ 11

Author(s):

Jorge Zaverucha

Keyword(s):

Third World ◽

Armed Forces ◽

The Political ◽

Civilian Control ◽

Political Autonomy ◽

Military Relations ◽

The Third World ◽

The Military ◽

Democratic Country

The state of civil–military relations in the world, especially in the Third World, is very well summed up by Mosca's statement that civilian control over the military ‘is a most fortunate exception in human history’.All over the globe, the armed forces have frequently preserved their autonomous power vis-à-vis civilians. They have also succeeded in maintaining their tutelage over some of the political regimes that have arisen from the process of transition from military to democratic governments, as in Argentina and Brazil. Spain is a remarkable exception. Today, Spain, despite its authoritarian legacy, is a democratic country. The constituted civil hierarchy has been institutionalised, military áutonomy weakened, and civilian control over the military has emerged. Spain's newly founded democracy now appears quite similar to the older European democracies.

The Control-Effectiveness Framework of Civil–Military Relations

Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics ◽

10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1874 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Florina Cristiana Matei ◽

Carolyn Halladay

Keyword(s):

Law Enforcement ◽

Democratic Governance ◽

Civilian Control ◽

Century Model ◽

Security Sector ◽

Control Effectiveness ◽

Law Enforcement Officials ◽

Military Relations ◽

Civil–military relations—particularly the principles and practices of civilian control of the security sector—have changed significantly since the 1990s as more and more states around the world seek to consolidate democracy. The scholarly focus and the policy that it informs remain stuck in a mid-20th-century model, however. While civilian control remains central, this civilian oversight must, itself, uphold the requirements of democratic governance, ensuring that the uniformed forces are well integrated into the democracy that they are sworn to protect. Moreover, this democratic civilian control also must ensure the effectiveness of the security sector in the sense that soldiers, law enforcement officials, and intelligence agencies can fulfill the range of their missions. Thus, democratic civilian control requires ongoing attention from both the civilian and the military sides.