Patterns of Law and Order Policies in 20 Western Industrialized Countries

Author(s):  
Georg Wenzelburger

Chapter 3 provides a quantitative analysis of the politics of law and order. It is presented in three steps. First, it is tested whether party competition affects how much parties emphasize law and order issues in their programs and whether this is different for issue owners. The study reveals that high public salience of security-related issues pushes all parties to emphasize law and order more strongly and that issue owners react strongly to the pressure of right-wing populist parties by emphasizing law and order in their manifestos. Second, the quantitative analysis tests whether these different programmatic stances translate into more spending on law and order. This is indeed the case, but only if constitutional courts are weak. Third, the analysis takes a closer look at legislation in France, Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom and finds the main results of the analysis on public spending corroborated.

2021 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 163-185
Author(s):  
Sung Min Han ◽  
Mi Jeong Shin

AbstractIn this article, we argue that rising housing prices increase voter approval of incumbent governments because such a rise increases personal wealth, which leads to greater voter satisfaction. This effect is strongest under right-wing governments because those who benefit from rising prices—homeowners—are more likely to be right-leaning. Non-homeowners, who are more likely to vote for left-leaning parties, will view rising housing prices as a disadvantage and therefore feel the government does not serve them well, which will mitigate the advantage to left-wing governments. We find support for our arguments using both macro-level data (housing prices and government approval ratings in 16 industrialized countries between 1960 and 2017) and micro-level data (housing prices and individuals’ vote choices in the United Kingdom using the British Household Panel Survey). The findings imply that housing booms benefit incumbent governments generally and right-wing ones in particular.


1980 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 337-357 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Gould ◽  
Barbara Roweth

ABSTRACTThis article, in which we examine developments in public expenditure on social policy in relation to total public spending in the United Kingdom (UK) in the period after the Second World War, is part of a larger international study on developments in social welfare spending on which we are currently engaged.In Section 1 we briefly sketch in the theoretical background to the study of public expenditure growth in general and social welfare spending in particular. We shall not in this article attempt to evaluate the validity of the competing hypotheses – this exercise is in hand as part of the international study, and we shall report the findings at a later date. Section 2 examines the growth of public expenditure in the UK at the aggregate level. In Section 3 we analyse public expenditure at the individual programme level and in Section 4 we summarize the conclusions.


2021 ◽  
pp. 147377952198934
Author(s):  
Lucia Zedner

The growth of right-wing extremism, especially where it segues into hate crime and terrorism, poses new challenges for governments, not least because its perpetrators are typically lone actors, often radicalized online. The United Kingdom has struggled to define, tackle or legitimate against extremism, though it already has an extensive array of terrorism-related offences that target expression, encouragement, publication and possession of terrorist material. In 2019, the United Kingdom went further to make viewing terrorist-related material online on a single occasion a crime carrying a 15-year maximum sentence. This article considers whether UK responses to extremism, particularly those that target non-violent extremism, are necessary, proportionate, effective and compliant with fundamental rights. It explores whether criminalizing the curiosity of those who explore radical political ideas constitutes legitimate criminalization or overextends state power and risks chilling effects on freedom of speech, association, academic freedom, journalistic enquiry and informed public debate—all of which are the lifeblood of a liberal democracy.


2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 446-462
Author(s):  
Mikhail S. Golovin

This article examines the update of ideological foundations of the largest right-wing radical party in Britain (and in the whole of Europe) - the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). The subject of the research is the partys programmatic text, Manifesto for Brexit and Beyond, a document that is not limited to the discussion of Brexit alone. This document appeared at the end of 2019 and, despite the frequent change of leadership in the party during 2020, remained the ideological foundation of the organization after Brexit. The aim of the article is to analyze how the ideological base of the right-wing British radical party was formed in the socio-political realities of the initial period after the states exit from the European Union. The paper presents a discursive analysis of the main ideological document of one of UKIP, as well as identifies the ideological positions of British right-wing radicals at the present stage. Since the research is mainly practice-oriented, the main results are presented the data obtained through discourse analysis using to the method of R. Wodak. The data testify the changes that have been taking place in the discourse of the extreme right in Britain in recent years, as well as the prospects for its evolution in the coming years after Brexit. Studying UKIPs discourse, the author concludes that it forms depending on the political, social and cultural conditions that prevail in modern British society, as well as on the general European context. The article also shows how a modern right-wing radical party constructs its discourse using the most painful issues for the society within the framework of political struggle.


Author(s):  
Karla Perez Portilla

This article is a theoretical analysis aimed at articulating the harm caused by media (mis)representation, and at showing existing ways in which this harm can be contested. The approaches analysed are largely from the United Kingdom. However, the issues they raise are not unique and the models explored are potentially transferable. The examples cover a range of media, including British right-wing press, television and Facebook; and characteristics protected by equality legislation in the UK such as sex, sexual orientation, race, religion and mental health stigma. Crucially, all the initiatives presented demonstrate the group-based nature of media (mis)representations, which cannot be understood and, therefore, cannot be addressed through individualistic approaches. Therefore, the article concludes that the role of groups as the targets of media (mis)representation and as potential claimants should be fully acknowledged and enabled.


1998 ◽  
Vol 31 (5) ◽  
pp. 602-632 ◽  
Author(s):  
NOBUHIRO HIWATARI

This article explains why the stagflation and neoliberal reforms that reinforced party polarization in the United Kingdom and the United States instead led to party convergence in Japan. In Japan, industry-centered adjustment and bureaucratic coordination distributed the costs of policy changes across societal groups and facilitated party convergence, whereas the lack of such societal and state institutions in the United Kingdom and the United States led to policy changes with polarizing consequences. Focusing on industry-centered adjustment brings the unions back into Japanese politics and provides an alternative to the pluralism-neocorporatism dichotomy of organizing societal interests. Bureaucratic coordination not only includes the opposition in the framework but also provides a more nuanced view than is assumed in the debate over whether the ruling party of the bureaucracy dominates the Japanese state. When combined, these conceptualizations of market and state go a long way toward explaining the dynamics of party competition.


Author(s):  
James Loughlin

This chapter assesses comparatively the attitude to Northern Ireland of Oswald Mosley and Enoch Powell, both seen as right wing politicians, if of varying degrees of extremism. For Mosley Powell was seen as a threat to his own position as a public figure, one whose controversial speech on immigration at Birmingham in 1968 attracted the kind of public support long unavailable to him, a pariah figure in British politics. Yet both were authoritarian figures, convinced of the certitude of their own opinions and with little time for dissentient views. On Northern Ireland, however, they exhibited significant differences. Mosley’s experience of British policy during the Irish War of Independence gave him an informed outlook on the kind of repressive and morally reprehensible measures it was necessary to avoid, and that a solution to the problem would require some kind of constitutional modification. Powell, in contrast, developed a paranoid conspiracy mindset, seeing the United Kingdom under threat from enemies within and without and with Northern Ireland just the latest site of conflict; and like the extreme Right offering a limited ‘law and order’ solution to the Troubles.


2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 282-303 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luke March

This article represents one of the few systematic comparisons of left-wing populism with other populisms. Focussing on the manifestos of six British parties in 1999–2015, the findings confirm that left-wing populists are more socio-economically focussed, more inclusionary but less populist than right-wing populists. The article makes four main substantive contributions. First, empirically, it shows that the much-touted populist Zeitgeist in the United Kingdom barely exists. Second, methodologically, it provides a nuanced disaggregated populism scale that has advantages over existing methods because it can effectively distinguish populist from non-populist parties and analyse degrees of populism. Third, theoretically, it shows that host ideology is more important than populism per se in explaining differences between left and right populisms. Fourth is a broader theoretical point: what is often called ‘thin’ or ‘mainstream’ populism’ is not populism but demoticism (closeness to ordinary people). Therefore, analysts should not label parties ‘populist’ just because their rhetoric is demotic.


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