Cyberwarfare and Cybersecurity

2021 ◽  
pp. 173-187
Author(s):  
Charles Weiss

Information warfare is part of the technology-based challenge by China and Russia to the post–World War II liberal order. Russia uses traditional and social media in a long-range, systematic, worldwide disinformation campaign to undermine Western democracies and alliances and the idea of objective truth. China seeks to dominate the technology, management, and policy of the future Internet through its competitive 5G technology, so as to surpass the United States politically and technologically. It exports the techno-authoritarian system of mass surveillance and artificial intelligence that it developed to control its Uyghur minority. Like a nuclear attack, a large-scale cyberattack could spiral out of control into a cyber-apocalypse in the absence of agreed guidelines. But to authoritarian governments, the free flow of information is also a form of cyberattack, complicating negotiations. It is critically important to develop internationally agreed norms for cyberwarfare, building on the Tallinn Manual and similar efforts. This will take time.

Author(s):  
Colin F. Baxter

One of the epic industrial and scientific achievements of the United States during World War II was accomplished at the Wexler Bend Pilot Plant, Kingsport, Tennessee, where fifty hand-picked (their finances were investigated, and all the operators were married with at least one child) Tennessee Eastman employees, working at a phenomenal pace, developed a process for large-scale production of the world’s most powerful explosive, RDX. The success at Wexler Bend opened the door to the next phase: the mass production of RDX.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-41
Author(s):  
Risa Kitagawa ◽  
Jonathan A. Chu

ABSTRACT Apology diplomacy promises to assuage historical grievances held by foreign publics, yet in practice appears to ignite domestic backlash, raising questions about its efficacy. This article develops a theory of how political apologies affect public approval of an apologizing government across domestic and foreign contexts. The authors test its implications using large-scale survey experiments in Japan and the United States. In the surveys, the authors present vignettes about World War II grievances and randomize the nature of a government apology. They find that apology-making, both as statements acknowledging wrongdoing and as expressions of remorse, boosts approval in the recipient state. But in the apologizing state, backlash is likely among individuals with strong hierarchical group dispositions—manifested as nationalism, social-dominance orientation, and conservatism—and among those who do not consider the recipient a strategically important partner. This microlevel evidence reveals how leaders face a crucial trade-off between improving support abroad and risking backlash at home, with implications for the study of diplomatic communication and transitional justice.


Author(s):  
Michael J. Bazyler ◽  
Kathryn Lee Boyd ◽  
Kristen L. Nelson ◽  
Rajika L. Shah

The United States entered World War II on the side of the Allied forces in 1941. While no immovable property located in the United States was confiscated during the war, the United States was involved with armistice agreements and the 1947 Paris Peace Treaties, which included clauses requiring the protection, return, and/or compensation of property. The United States was also involved in bilateral claims settlement agreements with several European countries, to address compensation for confiscated or nationalized property during and after the war. In the 1990s, the United States was a facilitator in large-scale Holocaust restitution. Several lawsuits against sovereigns and private parties involving stolen Jewish property were filed in American courts and continue today. The political branches of the U.S. government were involved in the settlement of Holocaust restitution lawsuits. The United States endorsed the Terezin Declaration in 2009 and the Guidelines and Best Practices in 2010.


1957 ◽  
Vol 30 (5) ◽  
pp. 1387-1399 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. R. Haws

Abstract Interest in vinylpyridine and vinylpyridine derivatives as monomers for production of synthetic rubber was evidenced immediately prior to World War II. In 1939 and 1940, European patents were issued on polymerization of vinylpyridines and their copolymerization with other monomers. Research in the United States on vinylpyridines and their derivatives as comonomers began in the early 1940's. Much of the early work was conducted under the Government synthetic rubber program with work carried out by several of the participating universities and rubber companies. At that time, vinylpyridine rubbers created a considerable amount of interest in the rubber industry. Compared to the 122° F butadiene/styrene copolymer then in use, butadiene/vinylpyridine copolymers displayed a superiority in several properties, notably tensile strength, tear resistance and resistance to cut growth. A number of terpolymers containing vinylpyridine type monomers were also investigated and these, with some exceptions, exhibited the same general advantages and disadvantages as the two-component copolymers. Some difficulty was encountered in early polymerization of vinylpyridine copolymers on a large scale, chiefly in preflocculation and lack of proper control over polymer viscosity and conversion rates. These problems were lessened somewhat in the polymerization of three-monomer systems. Processing difficulties were also encountered arising from incompatibility of vinylpyridine copolymers with other rubbers and a high rate of cure resulting in scorching tendencies. Treadwear results of tires made with these rubbers were encouraging but again complications appeared in the form of tread separations and an excessive increase in hardness after use. Because of the above-mentioned problems, together with the introduction of improved 41° F butadiene/styrene rubber, interest in these rubbers waned somewhat after World War II. More recently, however, interest in vinylpyridine rubbers has risen due to commercial availability of new monomers and the possibility of utilizing the reactivity of vinylpyridine polymers through new compounding techniques.


Author(s):  
Kei Koizumi

Large-scale U.S. government support of scientific research began in World War II with physics, and rapidly expanded in the postwar era to contribute strongly to the United States’ emergence as the world’s leading scientific and economic superpower in the latter half of the 20th century. Vannevar Bush, who directed President Franklin Roosevelt’s World War II science efforts, in the closing days of the War advocated forcefully for U.S. government funding of scientific research to continue even in peacetime to support three important government missions of national security, health, and the economy. He also argued forcefully for the importance of basic research supported by the federal government but steered and guided by the scientific community. This vision guided an expanding role for the U.S. government in supporting research not only at government laboratories but also in non-government institutions, especially universities. Although internationally comparable data are difficult to obtain, the U.S. government appears to be the single largest national funder of physics research. The U.S. government support of physics research comes from many different federal departments and agencies. Federal agencies also invest in experimental development based on research discoveries of physics. The Department of Energy’s (DOE) Office of Science is by far the dominant supporter of physics research in the United States, and DOE’s national laboratories are the dominant performers of U.S. government-supported physics research. Since the 1970s, U.S. government support of physics research has been stagnant with the greatest growth in U.S. government research support having shifted since the 1990s to the life sciences and computer sciences.


Author(s):  
Eve Loh Kazuhara

Kawabata Ryûshi was one of few artists who were adept at both Nihonga (Japanese-style painting) and Yôga (Western-style painting). Originally trained in the latter, Ryûshi’s successful pointillist impressionist works were exhibited at the Tokyo Industrial Exposition and the Bunten (a government-sponsored exhibition) in 1907. In 1912, Ryûshi traveled to the United States where his encounter with the collection of Japanese art at the Boston Museum inspired a turn towards Nihonga. Ryûshi’s subsequent works were accepted for the Taishô Exposition in 1914, as well as for the Japan Art Institute’s second annual exhibition. After Ryûshi was made a full member of the Institute, he left his illustration job to become a full-time artist. Following his departure from the Institute in 1929, Ryûshi established the Blue Dragon Society (Seiryû-sha). There, he advocated painting large-scale works meant for exhibition purposes. This was a radical departure from traditional Nihonga works which were conventionally designed for smaller spaces, such as the interiors of Japanese homes. Some of Ryûshi’s better-known works are paintings created during Japan’s participation in World War II, and include narrative paintings based on the Japanese mythical creature known as the kappa. In 1956, Ryûshi painted dragons on the ceilings at the Asakusa Sensôji Temple. In 1959, he was awarded the Order of Culture by the Japanese government.


1980 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 31-35
Author(s):  
Alvin R. Schupp ◽  
Thomas D. Bidner ◽  
Nancy C. Clark

Much of the beef produced and sold in the United States before World War II was from grass- or limited grain-fed cattle. However, development of the modern large-scale cattle feeding industry in the 1950s and 1960s greatly increased supplies of grain-fed beef and, by the early 1970s, many American consumers found only USDA Choice beef from heavy, grain-fed cattle in supermarkets. Consumers soon became conditioned to the flavor, juiciness, and tenderness of high quality, well-marbled beef. Proponents of forage or limited grain finishing systems found little support at any marketing level.


2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 7-51
Author(s):  
M. Yu. Myagkov

The article offers an overview of modern historical data on the origins, causes of World War II, the decisive role of the USSR in its victorious end, and also records the main results and lessons of World War II.Hitler's Germany was the main cause of World War II. Nazism, racial theory, mixed with far-reaching geopolitical designs, became the combustible mixture that ignited the fire of glob­al conflict. The war with the Soviet Union was planned to be waged with particular cruelty.The preconditions for the outbreak of World War II were the humiliating provisions of the Versailles Peace Treaty for the German people, as well as the attitude of the "Western de­mocracies" to Russia after 1917 and the Soviet Union as an outcast of world development. Great Britain, France, the United States chose for themselves a policy of ignoring Moscow's interests, they were more likely to cooperate with Hitler's Germany than with Soviet Russia. It was the "Munich Agreement" that became the point of no return to the beginning of the Second World War. Under these conditions, for the USSR, its own security and the conclusion of a non-aggression pact with Germany began to come to the fore, defining the "spheres of interests" of the parties in order to limit the advance of German troops towards the Soviet borders in the event of German aggression against Poland. The non-aggression pact gave the USSR just under two years to rebuild the army and consolidate its defensive potential and pushed the Soviet borders hundreds of kilometers westward. The signing of the Pact was preceded by the failure in August 1939 of the negotiations between the military mis­sions of Britain, France and the USSR, although Moscow took the Anglo-French-Soviet nego­tiations with all seriousness.The huge losses of the USSR in the summer of 1941 are explained by the following circum­stances: before the war, a large-scale modernization of the Red Army was launched, a gradu­ate of a military school did not have sufficient experience in managing an entrusted unit by June 22, 1941; the Red Army was going to bleed the enemy in border battles, stop it with short counterattacks by covering units, carry out defensive operations, and then strike a de­cisive blow into the depths of the enemy's territory, so the importance of a multi-echeloned long-term defense in 1941 was underestimated by the command of the Red Army and it was not ready for it; significant groupings of the Western Special Military District were drawn into potential salients, which was used by the Germans at the initial stage of the war; Stalin's fear of provoking Hitler to start a war led to slowness in making the most urgent and necessary decisions to bring troops to combat readiness.The Allies delayed the opening of the second front for an unreasonably long time. They, of course, achieved outstanding success in the landing operation in France, however, the en­emy's losses in only one Soviet strategic operation in the summer of 1944 ("Bagration") are not inferior, and even exceed, the enemy’s losses on the second front. One of the goals of "Bagration" was to help the Allies.Soviet soldiers liberated Europe at the cost of their lives. At the same time, Moscow could not afford to re-establish a cordon sanitaire around its borders after the war, so that anti- Soviet forces would come to power in the border states. The United States and Great Britain took all measures available to them to quickly remove from the governments of Italy, France and other Western states all the left-wing forces that in 1944-1945 had a serious impact on the politics of their countries.


2019 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 231-254
Author(s):  
Andreu Espasa

De forma un tanto paradójica, a finales de los años treinta, las relaciones entre México y Estados Unidos sufrieron uno de los momentos de máxima tensión, para pasar, a continuación, a experimentar una notable mejoría, alcanzando el cénit en la alianza política y militar sellada durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial. El episodio catalizador de la tensión y posterior reconciliación fue, sin duda, el conflicto diplomático planteado tras la nacionalización petrolera de 1938. De entre los factores que propiciaron la solución pacífica y negociada al conflicto petrolero, el presente artículo se centra en analizar dos fenómenos del momento. En primer lugar, siguiendo un orden de relevancia, se examina el papel que tuvo la Guerra Civil Española. Aunque las posturas de ambos gobiernos ante el conflicto español fueron sustancialmente distintas, las interpretaciones y las lecciones sobre sus posibles consecuencias permitieron un mayor entendimiento entre los dos países vecinos. En segundo lugar, también se analizarán las afinidades ideológicas entre el New Deal y el cardenismo en el contexto de la crisis mundial económica y política de los años treinta, con el fin de entender su papel lubricante en las relaciones bilaterales de la época. Somewhat paradoxically, at the end of the 1930s, the relationship between Mexico and the United States experienced one of its tensest moments, after which it dramatically improved, reaching its zenith in the political and military alliance cemented during World War II. The catalyst for this tension and subsequent reconciliation was, without doubt, the diplomatic conflict that arose after the oil nationalization of 1938. Of the various factors that led to a peaceful negotiated solution to the oil conflict, this article focuses on analyzing two phenomena. Firstly—in order of importance—this article examines the role that the Spanish Civil War played. Although the positions of both governments in relation to the Spanish war were significantly different, the interpretations and lessons concerning potential consequences enabled a greater understanding between the two neighboring countries. Secondly, this article also analyzes the ideological affinities between the New Deal and Cardenismo in the context of the global economic and political crisis of the thirties, seeking to understand their role in facilitating bilateral relations during that period.


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