Faith in Numbers

Author(s):  
Michael Hoffman

Why does religion sometimes promote democracy and sometimes do just the opposite? Theology alone cannot explain the wide variety of influences religion has on democratic attitudes and behaviours. This book presents a theory of religion, group interest, and democracy. Focusing on communal religion, it demonstrates that the effect of communal prayer on support for democracy depends on the interests of the religious group in question. For members of groups who would benefit from democracy, communal prayer increases support for democratic institutions; for citizens whose groups would lose privileges in the event of democratic reforms, the opposite effect is present. Evidence from Lebanon, Iraq, and elsewhere supports these claims. Communal religion increases the salience of sectarian identity, and therefore pushes respondents' regime attitudes into closer alignment with the interests of their sect.

2021 ◽  
pp. 11-34
Author(s):  
Michael Hoffman

This chapter presents a new theory of religion, sectarian interests, and regime preferences. Religious behaviors shape regime preferences, and do so through a sectarian lens. Communal religious practice heightens the intensity of sectarian identity, and in doing so, frames regime politics as a group issue. Depending on the interests of the group with respect to democracy (namely, the rights and privileges that a group would gain or lose in the event of democratization), communal prayer may have pro- or anti-democratic effects. A number of potential benefits and threats may accompany democracy; certain groups may gain or lose political voice, while others may benefit or suffer due to economic redistribution. In either case, group interests help to predict when religion will enhance support for democracy---and when it will do just the opposite.


Author(s):  
Steven V. Miller ◽  
Nicholas T. Davis

Abstract Social prejudice constitutes an unwillingness to associate with individuals whose cultural or racial background differs from one's own group. Such prejudice is a particularly thorny problem in the context of democracy, which requires citizens to minimally respect such differences. In this paper, we assess the relationships between these attitudes and support for democratic institutions. Using World Values Survey data from 1995 to 2011, we find that prejudice toward cultural, ethnic, or racial “others” reduces the value that white Americans assign to democracy. We also find white Americans who exhibit these attitudes are more likely to dismiss the value of separation of powers and are more likely to support army rule. These findings imply that exclusionary rhetoric targeted toward non-white groups is accompanied by lower baseline support for democracy. We close with a discussion of how our analyses inform the study of Americans' attitudes toward democracy


2020 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 390-406 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Stoycheff

Individuals’ political internet use has been identified as a determinant of democratic attitudes. But awareness of online government surveillance and content restrictions may prohibit citizens from freely using the internet for democratic socialization. Using a comparative survey in the United States and Russia, this study explores how perceived internet freedom influences support for democracy by relatively constraining or expanding citizens’ worldviews. Implications for global democratic backsliding are discussed.


2019 ◽  
Vol 52 (11) ◽  
pp. 1610-1647 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Houle ◽  
Michael K. Miller

How does intergenerational social mobility affect support for democracy? Although a large literature examines how personal income and inequality influence regime change and democratic attitudes, there has been little work on social mobility. We employ individual level data from the Afrobarometer and Latinobarometer, covering 33 democracies and nondemocracies, to provide the first analysis of how personal experiences of intergenerational mobility influence support for democracy. We find that mobility predicts democratic attitudes, even controlling for education and current economic situation. We also show that the effect does not run through preferences for redistribution. We instead propose two alternative mechanisms. First, individuals living in democracies credit (or blame) the regime when they experience mobility. Second, upward mobility transforms a range of values, such as personal autonomy and trust, that render individuals more supportive of democracy. Our results present a warning for democracies facing steadily declining social mobility, including the United States.


2014 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 706-733 ◽  
Author(s):  
Niels Spierings

AbstractConclusions from empirical analyses on how Islam influences democratic attitudes in Arab countries differ widely, and the field suffers from conceptual ambiguity and largely focuses on “superficial” democratic support. Based on the non-Middle Eastern literature, this study provides a more systematic theoretical and empirical assessment of the linkages between Islamic attitudes and the popular support for democracy. I link belonging (affiliation), commitment (religiosity), orthodoxy, Muslim political attitudes, and individual-level political Islamism to the support for democracy and politico-religious tolerance. Statistical analyses on seven WVS surveys for Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia show that tolerance levels are remarkably lower than “democratic support”; the influence of being (committed or orthodox) Muslim and Muslim political attitudes are negligible however. Political Islamist views strongly affect tolerance negatively. They also influence “support for democracy,” but if the opposition in an authoritarian country is Islamic, these attitudes actually strengthen this support.


2021 ◽  
pp. 117-144
Author(s):  
Michael Hoffman

This chapter considers Iraq, a case in which majoritarian and redistributive understandings of democracy imply very different preferences for the main sects. When democracy is believed to be a fundamentally political arrangement (elections, freedom to criticize government, etc.), Shi`a (the majority group) have reason to favor democracy, while the formerly powerful Sunni minority have reason to oppose it. Communal prayer pushes individuals' regime preferences further in the direction of these sectarian interests; i.e., mosque attendance increases support for democracy among Shi`a but decreases such support among Sunnis. However, when democracy is considered in economic terms, namely, narrowing the gap between the rich and the poor, the interests of each sect change. Sunnis, now poorer than Shi`a on average, have an incentive to support redistributive democracy, while Shi`a have reason to fear democratic redistribution. The effect of communal prayer follows these same patterns: in this case, mosque attendances enhances support for democracy among Sunnis but has the opposite effect among Shi`a. Evidence from the second wave of the Arab Barometer, conducted in 2011, is used to support each of these claims.


2012 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 375-397 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pazit Ben-Nun Bloom ◽  
Gizem Arikan

Religion can be a source of undemocratic attitudes but also a contributor to democratic norms. This article argues that different dimensions of religiosity generate contrasting effects on democratic attitudes through different mechanisms. The private aspect of religious belief is associated with traditional and survival values, which in turn decrease both overt and intrinsic support for democracy. The communal aspect of religious social behaviour increases political interest and trust in institutions, which in turn typically lead to more support for democracy. Results from multilevel path analyses using data from fifty-four countries from Waves 4 and 5 of the World Values Survey suggest there is some regularity in mechanisms responsible for the effect of religiosity on democratic support that extend beyond religious denomination.


2021 ◽  
pp. 145-158
Author(s):  
Michael Hoffman

This chapter concludes, placing these findings in the context of religion and political behavior broadly considered. It tests my theory in a large sample of countries using the World Values Survey. Cross-national tests indicate that the pattern described in the above cases is evident in much of the world: the general trend is that for small sects, communal prayer decreases support for democracy, while the opposite is true for large groups. Larger groups can expect to benefit from free elections due to their sheer size, so increased salience of sectarian identity---such as that created by communal worship---should promote democratic attitudes; the reverse logic holds for smaller groups, who would be unlikely to win elections. Finally, the chapter uses the suggestive evidence from the World Values Survey to describe some of the conditions under which this theory should---and should not---apply.


2005 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 211-231 ◽  
Author(s):  
RUSSELL J. DALTON ◽  
NHU-NGOC T. ONG

The Singaporean patriarch Lee Kuan Yew popularized the argument that ‘Asian values’ derived from Confucian cultural traditions are inconsistent with the development of democracy in East Asia. There is an active scholarly debate over whether the hierarchic and deferential social authority relations of Confucian traditions are incompatible with support for democracy. Drawing upon the newest wave of the World Values Survey, we analyze public opinion in six East Asian nations and four Western democracies. We first assess orientations toward authority, and then link these sentiments to support for democracy. The results contradict the core tenets of the ‘culture is destiny’ argument in the Asian values literature, and offer a more positive view of the prospects for political development in the region.


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