Cognitive dynamics
This chapter offers an elaboration and defense of the mental-file approach to singular thought. Mental files are supposed to account for both cognitive significance and coreference de jure. But these two roles generate conflicting constraints: files must be fine-grained to play the first role and coarse-grained to play the second role. To reconcile the constraints, we need to distinguish two sorts of file (static files and dynamic files), and two forms of coreference de jure (strong and weak). Dynamic files are sequences of file-stages united by the weak coreference de jure relation. It is at the synchronic level, that of file-stages, that the stronger coreference de jure is to be found. The resulting view is compared to that of Papineau, according to whom only dynamic files are needed, and to that of Ninan, according to whom there are proper dynamic files that exhibit strong coreference de jure.