The Ecology of Mental Disease

1952 ◽  
Vol 98 (413) ◽  
pp. 579-594 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. H. Hare

The word “oecology “was coined by Hacckel in 1869, and the study of the complex interactions between organisms and their environment led to fruitful results first in botany (at the beginning of the twentieth century) and later in zoology. In 1935 Bews formulated the principles of human ecology, but the precise boundaries of this discipline (as Banks (1905a) calls it, since it cannot be called a science) are still not the subject of any general agreement. Its dictionary definition as “that branch of biology which deals with the relations of human beings to their surroundings, their habits and modes of life,” although simple for the purposes of formulation, is probably too diffuse in practice. On the other hand, Miller (1950), in suggesting that the ecological study of disorders should be confined to their distribution in the purely demographic sense, seems unduly to restrict its application. There is a tendency among American ecologists (who have been the pioneers of this subject) to take a middle course. Park (1936) conceives of human ecology as the study of the community in terms of the competitive forces which mould it, as opposed to the cultural forces which make for social co-operation. Similarly, Faris (1944) distinguishes the ecological order, which arises automatically and unintentionally out of the struggle for survival, from the cultural order, which is based on mutual affection and sentiment.

Author(s):  
Christine M. Korsgaard

According to the marginal cases argument, there is no property that might justify making a moral difference between human beings and the other animals that is both uniquely and universally human. It is therefore “speciesist” to treat human beings differently just because we are human beings. While not challenging the conclusion, this chapter argues that the marginal cases argument is metaphysically misguided. It ignores the differences between a life stage and a kind, and between lacking a property and having it in a defective form. The chapter then argues for a view of moral standing that attributes it to the subject of a life conceived as an atemporal being, and shows how this view can resolve some familiar puzzles such as how death can be a loss to the person who has died, how we can wrong the dead, the “procreation asymmetry,” and the “non-identity problem.”


1902 ◽  
Vol 48 (202) ◽  
pp. 434-450 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. S. Clouston

Dr. Clouston said that when he suggested toxæmia to the secretary as a suitable subject for a discussion at this meeting he had not intended to be the first speaker, because his object was to bring out more fully the views of the younger members who had recently committed themselves so strongly to the toxæmic and bacterial etiology of insanity, and so to get light thrown on some of the difficulties which he and others had felt in applying this theory to many of their cases in practice. It was not that he did not believe in the toxic theory as explaining the onset of many cases, or that he under-rated its importance, but that he could not see how it applied so universally or generally as some of the modern pathological school were now inclined to insist on. He knew that it was difficult for those of the older psychological and clinical school to approach the subject with that full knowledge of recent bacteriological and pathological doctrine which the younger men possessed, or to breathe that all-pervading pathological atmosphere which they seemed to inhale. He desired to conduct this discussion in an absolutely non-controversial and purely scientific spirit. To do so he thought it best to put his facts, objections, and difficulties in a series of propositions which could be answered and explained by the other side. He thought it important to define toxæmia, but should be willing to accept Dr. Ford Robertson's definition of toxines, viz., “Substances which are taken up by the (cortical nerve) cell and then disorder its metabolism.” He took the following extracts from his address at the Cheltenham meeting of the British Association (1) as representing Dr. Ford Robertson's views and the general trend of much investigation and hypothesis on the Continent.


Human Affairs ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Krzysztof Skowroński

AbstractIn the present paper, the author looks at the political dimension of some trends in the visual arts within twentieth-century avant-garde groups (cubism, expressionism, fauvism, Dada, abstractionism, surrealism) through George Santayana’s idea of vital liberty. Santayana accused the avant-gardists of social and political escapism, and of becoming unintentionally involved in secondary issues. In his view, the emphasis they placed on the medium (or diverse media) and on treating it as an aim in itself, not, as it should be, as a transmitter through which a stimulating relationship with the environment can be had, was accompanied by a focus on fragments of life and on parts of existence, and, on the other hand, by a de facto rejection of ontology and cosmology as being crucial to understanding life and the place of human beings in the universe. The avant-gardists became involved in political life by responding excessively to the events of the time, instead of to the everlasting problems that are the human lot.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Erin Keenan

<p>Māori urbanisation and urban migrations have been the subject of much discussion and research, especially following World War Two when Māori individuals, whānau and communities increasingly became residents of towns and cities that were overwhelmingly Pākehā populated. However, Māori urbanisation experiences and urban migrations are difficult topics to address because kaumātua are reluctant to discuss ‘urban Māori’, especially considering its implications for Māori identities. The original contribution this thesis makes to histories of Māori urban migrations is that it explores these and other understandings of urbanisations to discover some of their historical influences. By discussing urbanisations directly with kaumātua and exploring historical sources of Māori living in, and moving to, the urban spaces of Wellington and the Hutt Valley through the twentieth century, this thesis is a ‘meeting place’ for a range of perspectives on the meanings of urbanisations from the past and the present. Although urbanisation was an incredible time of material change for the individuals and whānau who chose to move into cities such as Wellington, the histories of urban migration experiences exist within a scope of Māori and iwi worldviews that gave rise to multiple experiences and understandings of urbanisations. The Wellington region is used to show that Māori in towns and cities used Māori social and cultural forms in urban areas so that they could, through the many challenges of becoming urban-dwelling, ensure the persistence of their Māoritanga. Urbanisations also allowed Māori to both use traditional identities in urban areas, as well as develop new relationships modelled on kinship. The Ngāti Pōneke community is used as an example of the complex interactions between these identities and how many Māori became active residents in but not conceptually ‘of’ cities. As a result, the multiple and layered Māori identities that permeate throughout Māori experiences of the present and the past are important considerations in approaching and discussing urbanisations. Urban Māori communities have emphasised the significance of varied and layered Māori identities, and this became particularly pronounced through the Māori urban migrations of the twentieth century.</p>


2005 ◽  
Vol 77 (4) ◽  
pp. 343-352
Author(s):  
Brian S. Rosner

Whereas knowing God is central to every version of Christian theology, little attention has been paid to the other side of the divine-human relationship. This introductory essay approaches the subject via the brief but poignant remarks of two twentieth-century authors appearing in a work of fiction and in a poem. If C. S. Lewis recognizes the primacy of being known by God, Dietrich Bonhoeffer helps define it and underscores its pastoral value. Both authors accurately reflect the main contours of the Bible’s own treatment. Calvin’s view of the image of God, which T. F. Torrance defines as ‘God’s gracious beholding of man as his child,’ may be of assistance in defining what it means to be known by God.


Author(s):  
James Gouinlock

The philosophy of John Dewey is original and comprehensive. His extensive writings contend systematically with problems in metaphysics, epistemology, logic, aesthetics, ethics, social and political philosophy, philosophy and education, and philosophical anthropology. Although his work is widely read, it is not widely understood. Dewey had a distinctive conception of philosophy, and the key to understanding and benefiting from his work is to keep this conception in mind. A worthwhile philosophy, he urged, must be practical. Philosophic inquiry, that is, ought to take its point of departure from the aspirations and problems characteristic of the various sorts of human activity, and an effective philosophy would develop ideas responsive to those conditions. Any system of ideas that has the effect of making common experience less intelligible than we find it to be is on that account a failure. Dewey’s theory of inquiry, for example, does not entertain a conception of knowledge that makes it problematic whether we can know anything at all. Inasmuch as scientists have made extraordinary advances in knowledge, it behoves the philosopher to find out exactly what scientists do, rather than to question whether they do anything of real consequence. Moral philosophy, likewise, should not address the consternations of philosophers as such, but the characteristic urgencies and aspirations of common life; and it should attempt to identify the resources and limitations of human nature and the environment with which it interacts. Human beings might then contend effectively with the typical perplexities and promises of mortal existence. To this end, Dewey formulated an exceptionally innovative and far-reaching philosophy of morality and democracy. The subject matter of philosophy is not philosophy, Dewey liked to say, but ‘problems of men’. All too often, he found, the theories of philosophers made the primary subject matter more obscure rather than less so. The tendency of thinkers is to become bewitched by inherited philosophic puzzles, when the persistence of the puzzle is a consequence of failing to consider the assumptions that created it. Dewey was gifted in discerning and discarding the philosophic premises that create needless mysteries. Rather than fret, for instance, about the question of how immaterial mental substance can possibly interact with material substance, he went to the root of the problem by challenging the notion of substance itself. Indeed, Dewey’s dissatisfaction with the so-called classic tradition in philosophy, stemming at least from Plato if not from Parmenides, led him to reconstruct the entire inheritance of the Western tradition in philosophy. The result is one of the most seminal and fruitful philosophies of the twentieth century.


1968 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-6 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ch. Perelman

That the question what is legal logic should still arise today appears paradoxical, for law is after all one of the oldest of human disciplines and logic has in the twentieth century become one of the most developed of the disciplines of contemporary philosophy. Yet comparison of a number of recent works dealing with the subject, all of which, not being without merit, have enjoyed a measure of success, is enough to show that the problem exists and is even strongly disputed.Of four such works, two—those by E. Levi and K. Engisch—do not use the word “logic” in their titles, though they deal with legal reasoning and legal thought. The other two, on the contrary, expressly purport to deal with legal logic. Strangely enough, however, their authors explicitly deny the specific existence of such a discipline, whereas Levi and Engisch underscore, without any hesitation, the specific nature of legal reasoning and the existence of a particular logic, legal logic.Thus in the first paragraph of his work, where Klug attempts to define the concept of legal logic, he states that it comprises the study of the rules of formal logic as used in the judicial application of rules of law (p. 6); that legal logic is therefore practical logic, consisting of the application to law of the rules of pure or theoretical logic which is general logic (p. 7).


2020 ◽  
Vol 51 ◽  
pp. 243-268
Author(s):  
Julie M. Johnson

AbstractThis article positions multidisciplinary artist Friedl Dicker-Brandeis at the center of a web that spans Vienna 1900, the Weimar Bauhaus, and interwar Vienna. Using a network metaphor to read her work, she is understood here as specialist of the ars combinatoria, in which she recombines genre and media in unexpected ways. She translates the language of photograms into painting, ecclesiastical subject matter into a machine aesthetic, adds found objects to abstract paintings, and paints allegories and scenes of distortion in the idiom of New Objectivity, all the while designing stage sets, costumes, modular furniture, toys, and interiors. While she has been the subject of renewed attention, particularly in the design world, much of her fine art has yet to be assessed. She used the idioms of twentieth-century art movements in unusual contexts, some of these very brave: in interwar Vienna, where she created Dadaistic posters to warn of fascism, she was imprisoned and interrogated. Always politically engaged, her interdisciplinary and multimedia approach to art bridged the conceptual divide between the utopian and critical responses to war during the interwar years. Such engagement with both political strains of twentieth-century modernism is rare. After integrating the interdisciplinary lessons of Vienna and the Weimar Bauhaus into her life's work, she shared these lessons with children at Terezín.


2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 66-73
Author(s):  
Agapov Oleg D. ◽  

The joy of being is connected with one’s activities aimed at responding to the challenges of the elemental forces and the boundlessness of being, which are independent of human subjectivity. In the context of rising to the challenges of being, one settles to acquire a certain power of being in themselves and in the world. Thus, the joy of being is tied to achieving the level of the “miraculous fecundity” (E. Levinas), “an internal necessity of one’s life” (F. Vasilyuk), magnanimity (M. Mamardashvili). The ontological duty of any human being is to succeed at being human. The joy of being is closely connected to experiencing one’s involvement in the endless/eternity and realizing one’s subjective temporality/finitude, which attunes him to the absolute seriousness in relation to one’s complete realization in life. Joy is a foundational anthropological phenomenon in the structure of ways of experiencing the human condition. The joy of being as an anthropological practice can appear as a constantly expanding sphere of human subjectivity where the transfiguration of the powers of being occurs under the sign of the Height (Levinas) / the Good. Without the possibility of transfiguration human beings get tired of living, immerse themselves in the dejected state of laziness and the hopelessness of vanity. The joy of being is connected to unity, gathering the multiplicity of human life under the aegis of meaning that allows us to see the other and the alien in heteronomous being, and understand the nature of co-participation and responsibility before the forces of being, and also act in synergy with them.The joy of being stands before a human being as the joy of fatherhood/ motherhood, the joy of being a witness to the world in creative acts (the subject as a means to retreat before the world and let the world shine), the joy of every day that was saved from absurdity, darkness and the impersonal existence of the total. Keywords: joy, higher reality, anthropological practices, “the height”, subject, transcendence, practice of coping


Perception ◽  
1996 ◽  
Vol 25 (1_suppl) ◽  
pp. 15-15
Author(s):  
B Blum ◽  
O Barnes

Perceptual performance schema are consistently prepared by human beings. Minimal ‘experience’ with pertinent stimulus attributes seem necessary. We presume that with new stimuli, a ‘linkage’ is formed with inner representations on the basis of commonly shared stimulus components. To investigate this hypothesis, we used ‘confusion stimuli’, ie degradations of five-corner and six-corner stars. These were presented within each of four paradigms: upright (u), rotated (10°; r), foveal/local viewing (A) or eccentric/global viewing (B), that is uA, uB, rA, and rB paradigms. Random presentation of stimuli prototypes preceded the stimulus so that in comparing the presented stimulus to one and the other prototype, the subject faced a 2AFC task. Series (4 to 6) each of 32 randomised paradigms were run on each of six subjects. The subjects keyed 5 or 6 on identifying one or the other stimulus. On the assumption that exposure time and/or acuity grades impose stimulus intensities, psychometric curves were derived by plotting probability of correct choice against either parameter. The results indicate that in hybrid paradigms such as the present uA and uB, or rA and rB subjects may use shared component strategy: ‘u strategy’ with uA and uB, ‘r strategy’ with rA and rB, shared A and B in generating viewpoint invariance. Similar log-linear psychometric curves and slopes for pairs of paradigms were obtained, and ‘transfer’ of learning presumably also based on shared stimulus properties was observed.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document