John Stuart Mill

2020 ◽  
pp. 105-129
Author(s):  
W. J. Mander

This chapter begins with a discussion of Mill’s empiricism and his attitude towards the unknowable which considers in detail the nature of his disagreement with Hamilton and which discusses the various senses in which his position might be described as one of ‘radical empiricism’. Moving on to more specific points, the chapter then discusses Mill’s views regarding space and time, his phenomenalism, his failed attempt to explain our idea of the self, his centre-staging the puzzle of other minds, and his positions respecting causation, free will, and natural law. The chapter concludes with a discussion of his posthumously published views about religion.

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iris Berent ◽  
Melanie Platt

Recent results suggest that people hold a notion of the true self, distinct from the self. Here, we seek to further elucidate the “true me”—whether it is good or bad, material or immaterial. Critically, we ask whether the true self is unitary. To address these questions, we invited participants to reason about John—a character who simultaneously exhibits both positive and negative moral behaviors. John’s character was gauged via two tests--a brain scan and a behavioral test, whose results invariably diverged (i.e., one test indicated that John’s moral core is positive and another negative). Participants assessed John’s true self along two questions: (a) Did John commit his acts (positive and negative) freely? and (b) What is John’s essence really? Responses to the two questions diverged. When asked to evaluate John’s moral core explicitly (by reasoning about his free will), people invariably descried John’s true self as good. But when John’s moral core was assessed implicitly (by considering his essence), people sided with the outcomes of the brain test. These results demonstrate that people hold conflicting notions of the true self. We formally support this proposal by presenting a grammar of the true self, couched within Optimality Theory. We show that the constraint ranking necessary to capture explicit and implicit view of the true self are distinct. Our intuitive belief in a true unitary “me” is thus illusory.


Author(s):  
Evan Osborne

The question of how much free expression to tolerate hardly came up until the modern era. The creation in Europe of the printing press changed that and made expression a threat to long-standing social institutions. The nature of the new technology made it impossible to fully control the flow of books, pamphlets, and other printed material, but European governments tried. The argument in favor of a free press ultimately emerged, and the practice itself was institutionalized, mostly in Great Britain and northwestern Europe. The chapter emphasizes the self-regulating argument for free communication, that ideas beyond science would be improved if they must be subject to readers’ scrutiny. Particular attention is paid to Milton, Struensee and John Stuart Mill. The arguments made in favor of the broad protection of freedom of speech that prevail in much of the world are shown to have significant self-regulating components.


2018 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 560-585
Author(s):  
Sinja Graf

This essay theorizes how the enforcement of universal norms contributes to the solidification of sovereign rule. It does so by analyzing John Locke’s argument for the founding of the commonwealth as it emerges from his notion of universal crime in the Second Treatise of Government. Previous studies of punishment in the state of nature have not accounted for Locke’s notion of universal crime which pivots on the role of mankind as the subject of natural law. I argue that the dilemmas specific to enforcing the natural law against “trespasses against the whole species” drive the founding of sovereign government. Reconstructing Locke’s argument on private property in light of universal criminality, the essay shows how the introduction of money in the state of nature destabilizes the normative relationship between the self and humanity. Accordingly, the failures of enforcing the natural law require the partitioning of mankind into separate peoples under distinct sovereign governments. This analysis theorizes the creation of sovereign rule as part of the political productivity of Locke’s notion of universal crime and reflects on an explicitly political, rather than normative, theory of “humanity.”


1984 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 27-49
Author(s):  
Lyle D. Campbell

In Christian faith, the Bible stands equally true with nature as coexpressions of God's self-revelation. Literalism means the acceptance of that record as true, whether of rocks, fossils, or scriptures. “Biblical literalism” as used by many fundamental sects additionally requires very restricted interpretations formulated more for countering natural and theological “heresies” than for conformity with the Bible. Yet Genesis, in Hebrew, uses phenomenological language and idiom to describe the Creator and creation, leaving great latitude on the questions of how and when. Prominent among “conflicts” which have influenced Judeo-Western thought are: Babylonian and Alexandrian conquests, Greek logic and paganism, Islamic scholarship, the Renaissance and Reformation, and the Age of Reason, including the atheistic materialism of David Hume. James Hutton, Hume's protege, developed the idea of sufficiency of natural causes in the absence of a creator. Lyell and Darwin then extended this substantive uniformitarianism to inorganic and organic evolution. Both Creationism and Darwinism are predicated on a dualistic cosmological model of an instant, miraculous creation versus a self-existent, evolving, Time-Energy-Matter universe. Darwinism draws from the earth evidence for change over eons of time, and assumes self-existence and chance causation. Creationism insists on an earth created young with the appearance or illusion of age, denying time and therefore chance. As debate rages, neither side seems willing to reexamine the Bible, which plainly teaches that God's purposes are normally worked out through natural law which has no existence apart from His sustaining will. The material Universe is, according to the Bible, the self-expression of a God who cannot lie.


Author(s):  
Tony Pitson

This chapter aims to relate Hume’s discussion of liberty and necessity to central themes in his philosophy, including causation, the self, the distinction between virtue and vice, and naturalism as a response to skepticism. From this perspective, many points of contact with contemporary discussions of free will and moral responsibility emerge. Hume’s account of moral responsibility, with its implications for the conditions under which ascriptions of responsibility are withheld or qualified, is considered in detail. The notion of agent autonomy is linked to Hume’s distinction between the calm and violent passions. The kind of self-determination for which Hume allows here is distinguished from that of the libertarian and is also contrasted with the problematic notion of responsibility for self that leads to skepticism about the very possibility of moral responsibility. Hume’s appeal to “common life” provides a naturalistic response to skepticism in this, as well as in other philosophical contexts.


2014 ◽  
Vol 22 (S1) ◽  
pp. S145-S162
Author(s):  
Alexander Reutlinger

Several philosophers of biology have argued for the claim that the generalizations of biology are historical and contingent.1–5 This claim divides into the following sub-claims, each of which I will contest: first, biological generalizations are restricted to a particular space-time region. I argue that biological generalizations are universal with respect to space and time. Secondly, biological generalizations are restricted to specific kinds of entities, i.e. these generalizations do not quantify over an unrestricted domain. I will challenge this second claim by providing an interpretation of biological generalizations that do quantify over an unrestricted domain of objects. Thirdly, biological generalizations are contingent in the sense that their truth depends on special (physically contingent) initial and background conditions. I will argue that the contingent character of biological generalizations does not diminish their explanatory power nor is it the case that this sort of contingency is exclusively characteristic of biological generalizations.


2015 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 131-147 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pieter Vos

In response to Alasdair MacIntyre’s and Brad Gregory’s claim—that the Reformation’s concept of morality in terms of obedience to divine commandments has been a major factor in a catastrophic breakdown in modernity of the teleological view of life and the virtues—this essay aims both to correct this criticism and to reread Calvin from the perspective of virtue ethics. Calvin’s utterances about the nature of the law, virtue, the self before God, one’s calling in the world, natural law and reason appear to be much more in alliance with a teleological, virtue ethical view than MacIntyre suggests. This opens up the possibility of a fruitful interplay between a Reformed account of law and Christian virtue ethics.


2006 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gavin Byrne

This essay concerns the question of whether it is possible to have an account of what judges ought to do when they decide cases if one accepts Stanley Fish’s thesis that man is a socially constructed creature, who can only see the world around him in terms of the practice that he is involved in. It puts forward the view that such a position is defensible, provided that one makes different metaphysical commitments to the ones made by Fish. It is argued that Fish is best understood as a metaphysical idealist. The essay seeks to demonstrate that Martin Heidegger’s conception of the self and interpretation are similar to those of Fish, but that, when understood as involving a commitment to metaphysical realism, Heidegger’s philosophy can hold the possibility of strong legal theory open in a way that Fish’s cannot. Michael S. Moore’s natural law position is used in order to articulate what such a position might be. Moore’s example of what a judge ought to do if called upon to define ‘death’ as a concept is used to illustrate the difference between Fish and Heidegger when it comes to metaphysics and strong legal theory, despite their similarities when it comes to an account of interpretation and of the self.


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