The Tractatus’ Philosophy of Logic and Carnap

Author(s):  
Oskari Kuusela

This chapter discusses the relation between the Tractatus’ and Carnap’s philosophies of logic, arguing that Carnap’s position in The Logical Syntax of Language is in certain respects much closer to the Tractatus than has been recognized. Explained in Carnapian terms, the goal of the Tractatus is to introduce, by means of quasi-syntactical sentences, logical principles and concepts of a logical language to be used in philosophical clarification in the formal mode. A distinction between the material and formal mode is therefore part of the Tractatus’ view, and contrary to Carnap’s criticism, the sentences of the Tractatus can be clearly distinguished from nonsensical metaphysical statements. Moreover, despite the Tractatus’ rejection of syntactical statements, there is a correspondence between Wittgenstein’s saying–showing distinction and Carnap’s object-language/syntax-language distinction. Both constitute ways to clarify the logical distinction between the logico-syntactical determinations concerning language and the use of language according to such determinations, a distinction absent in Frege and Russell. Wittgenstein’s distinction thus constitutes a precursor of the object-language/syntax-language distinction which the latter in a certain sense affirms. The saying–showing distinction agrees with Carnap’s position also in marking logic as something that is not true/false about either language or reality, a view that underlies Carnap’s principle of tolerance. The standard view that Carnap overcame the philosophy of logic of the Tractatus in the 1930s must therefore be regarded as problematic and misleading.

2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-27
Author(s):  
Ja. O. Petik

The connection of the modern psychology and formal systems remains an important direction of research. This paper is centered on philosophical problems surrounding relations between mental and logic. Main attention is given to philosophy of logic but certain ideas are introduced that can be incorporated into the practical philosophical logic. The definition and properties of basic modal logic and descending ones which are used in study of mental activity are in view. The defining role of philosophical interpretation of modality for the particular formal system used for research in the field of psychological states of agents is postulated. Different semantics of modal logic are studied. The hypothesis about the connection of research in cognitive psychology (semantics of brain activity) and formal systems connected to research of psychological states is stated.


2012 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ricardo SOTO ◽  
Broderick CRAWFORD ◽  
Eric MONFROY ◽  
Fernando PAREDES
Keyword(s):  

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gilian T. Thomas ◽  
Landon MacGillivray ◽  
Natalie L. Dean ◽  
Rhonda L. Stoddard ◽  
Lars Yunker ◽  
...  

<p>Reactions carried out in the presence of rubber septa run the risk of additives being leached out by the solvent. Normally, such species are present at low enough levels that they do not interfere with the reaction significantly. However, when studying reactions using sensitive methods such as mass spectrometry, the appearance of even trace amounts of material can confuse dynamic analyses of reactions. A wide variety of additives are present in rubber along with the polymer: antioxidants, dyes, detergent, and vulcanization agents, and these are all especially problematic in negative ion mode. A redesigned Schlenk flask for pressurized sample infusion (PSI) is presented as a means of practically eliminating the presence of contaminants during reaction analyses.</p>


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Francois Danvers ◽  
Michelle N. Shiota

People often filter their experience of new events through knowledge they already have, e.g., encoding new events by relying on prototypical event “scripts” at the expense of actual details. Previous research suggests that positive affect often increases this tendency. Three studies assessed whether awe—an emotion elicited by perceived vastness, and thought to promote cognitive accommodation—has the opposite effect, reducing rather than increasing reliance on event scripts. True/false questions on details of a short story about a romantic dinner were used to determine whether awe (1) reduces the tendency to impute script-consistent but false details into memory, and/or (2) promotes memory of unexpected details. Across studies we consistently found support for the first effect; evidence for the second was less consistent. Effects were partially mediated by subjective awe, and independent of other aspects of subjective affect. Results suggest that awe reduces reliance on internal knowledge in processing new events.©American Psychological Association, 2017. This paper is not the copy of record and may not exactly replicate the authoritative document published in the APA journal. Please do not copy or cite without author's permission. The final article is available, upon publication, at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/emo0000277


Author(s):  
B.A. Voronin ◽  
◽  
I.P. Chupina ◽  
Ya.V. Voronina ◽  
◽  
...  

The article discusses a non-standard view of the formation of human capital for work in organizations of the agricultural sector of the economy, in the context of modern socio-economic transformations. In the classical sense, human capital for agriculture should be formed and developed in rural areas. But in real life, this is not always the case, because there are many factors that prevent the classical solution of this problem. First, the demographic factor affects, second, social and household factors, and third, in many rural areas there are no working agricultural organizations where qualified agricultural specialists can work. All these and other circumstances actualize the problem of the quality of human capital in rural areas in relation to the development of agricultural production.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chen-Jian Liu ◽  
Xiao Liang ◽  
Zhao-Yi Niu ◽  
Qing Jin ◽  
Xue-Qin Zeng ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
Huaping Lu-Adler

This book is both a history of philosophy of logic told from the Kantian viewpoint and a reconstruction of Kant’s theory of logic from a historical perspective. Kant’s theory represents a turning point in a history of philosophical debates over the following questions: (1) Is logic a science, instrument, standard of assessment, or mixture of these? (2) If logic is a science, what is the subject matter that differentiates it from other sciences, particularly metaphysics? (3) If logic is a necessary instrument to all philosophical inquiries, how is it so entitled? (4) If logic is both a science and an instrument, how are these two roles related? Kant’s answer to these questions centers on three distinctions: general versus particular logic, pure versus applied logic, pure general logic versus transcendental logic. The true meaning and significance of each distinction becomes clear, this book argues, only if we consider two factors. First, Kant was mindful of various historical views on how logic relates to other branches of philosophy (viz. metaphysics and physics) and to the workings of common human understanding. Second, he first coined “transcendental logic” while struggling to secure metaphysics as a proper “science,” and this conceptual innovation would in turn have profound implications for his mature theory of logic. Against this backdrop, the book reassesses the place of Kant’s theory in the history of philosophy of logic and highlights certain issues that are still debated today, such as normativity of logic and the challenges posed by logical pluralism.


Author(s):  
David Owens

This chapter develops an intellectualist view of practical freedom according to which practical freedom is a capacity to act on our view of what we ought to do. This view is embodied in a judgement rather than in a belief about what we ought to do. Practical judgement is to be distinguished both from other truth-directed phenomena like believing and guessing and also from non-truth-directed states like imagining and intending. We make practical judgements where we are ignorant of what to do. We also make and act on such judgements where we think we know what to do. This fact suggests a non-standard view of the value of knowledge. It also enables us to defend an intellectualist account of freedom against voluntaristic alternatives.


Author(s):  
Tim Button ◽  
Sean Walsh

This chapter considers whether internal categoricity can be used to leverage any claims about mathematical truth. We begin by noting that internal categoricity allows us to introduce a truth-operator which gives an object-language expression to the supervaluationist semantics. In this way, the univocity discussed in previous chapters might seem to secure an object-language expression of determinacy of truth-value; but this hope falls short, because such truth-operators must be carefully distinguished from truth-predicates. To introduce these truth-predicates, we outline an internalist attitude towards model theory itself. We then use this to illuminate the cryptic conclusions of Putnam's justly-famous paper ‘Models and Reality’. We close this chapter by presenting Tarski’s famous result that truth for lower-order languages can be defined in higher-order languages.


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