Becoming Bad

2020 ◽  
pp. 273-308
Author(s):  
Rachel Barney
Keyword(s):  
Motivated Reasoning ◽  
Plausible Account

Aristotle says little about moral badness [kakia], but his four central claims about it suffice to entail a rich and plausible account. Badness is the disposition opposed to virtue, and so symmetrical with it in various ways; it is acquired by habituation; it is unlike akrasia in that the bad person’s reason endorses his wrong actions; and this endorsement involves the exercise of a corrupted reason. The activity of corrupted reason must be a kind of (as we now say) motivated reasoning—rationalization, denial and the like—which serves to conceal the correct ends of action from the corrupt person and to sustain their habitual bad behaviour. Although badness is located in the non-rational soul, it is this corruption of reason which turns it into a stable disposition.

Acting on Knowledge

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy Williamson
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reasoning ◽  
Philosophy Of Action ◽  
Plausible Account ◽  
Direction Of Fit ◽  
General Schema ◽  
Action Intention ◽  
Knowledge Norms

This chapter develops and refines the analogy between knowledge and action in Knowledge and its Limits. The general schema is: knowledge is to belief as action is to intention. The analogy reverses direction of fit between mind and world. The knowledge/belief side corresponds to the inputs to practical reasoning, the action/intention side to its outputs. Since desires are inputs to practical reasoning, the desire-as-belief thesis is considered sympathetically. When all goes well with practical reasoning, one acts on what one knows. Belief plays the same local role as knowledge, and intention as action, in practical reasoning. This is the appropriate setting to understand knowledge norms for belief and practical reasoning. Marginalizing knowledge in epistemology is as perverse as marginalizing action in the philosophy of action. Opponents of knowledge-first epistemology are challenged to produce an equally systematic and plausible account of the relation between the cognitive and the practical.

Against Aesthetic Exceptionalism

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jon Robson
Keyword(s):  
Fundamental Difference ◽  
Aesthetic Value ◽  
Plausible Account

This chapter discusses a position it terms ‘belief pessimism concerning aesthetic testimony’ (BP). According to BP (i) judgements of aesthetic value are beliefs and (ii) aesthetic judgements are subject to some additional norm not active with respect to judgements concerning more mundane matters which (inter alia) prevents such judgements from legitimately being formed on the basis of testimony. The chapter argues that BP should be rejected since it faces a number of pressing objections relating to the nature of belief. First, it proposes a fundamental difference between aesthetic beliefs and beliefs of other kinds without properly motivating this distinction. Secondly, BP is in tension with any plausible account of the nature of belief. The chapter concludes, then, that at least one of (i) or (ii) should be rejected.

The Motivational Power of Moral Beliefs

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua May
Keyword(s):  
Moral Identity ◽  
Motivated Reasoning ◽  
Difficult Case ◽  
Moral Integrity ◽  
Normative Judgment ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Moral Hypocrisy ◽  
Moral Licensing ◽  
Self Interest

Even if we can rise above self-interest, we may just be slaves of our passions. But the motivational power of reason, via moral beliefs, has been understated, even in the difficult case of temptation. Experiments show that often when we succumb, it is due in part to a change in moral (or normative) judgment. We can see this by carefully examining a range of experiments on motivated reasoning, moral licensing, moral hypocrisy, and moral identity. Rationalization, perhaps paradoxically, reveals a deep regard for reason, to act in ways we can justify to ourselves and to others. The result is that we are very often morally motivated or exhibit moral integrity. Even when behaving badly, actions that often seem motivated by self-interest are actually ultimately driven by a concern to do what’s right.

scholarly journals Grounding Personal Persistence

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Harriet E. Baber
Keyword(s):  
Counterpart Theory ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Ordinary Objects ◽  
Plausible Account ◽  
Temporal Properties ◽  
What Matters In Survival ◽  
What Matters

Abstract Modal counterpart theory identifies a thing’s possibly being F with its having a counterpart that is F at another possible world; temporal counterpart theory identifies a thing’s having been F or going to be F, with its having a counterpart that is F at another time. Benovsky, J. 2015. “Alethic Modalities, Temporal Modalities, and Representation.” Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 29: 18–34 in this journal endorses modal counterpart theory but holds that temporal counterpart theory is untenable because it does not license the ascription of the intuitively correct temporal properties to ordinary objects, and hence that we should understand ordinary objects, including persons, as transtemporal ‘worms’. I argue that the worm theory is problematic when it comes to accounting for what matters in survival and that temporal counterpart theory provides a plausible account of personal persistence.

scholarly journals Redistribution Preferences, Inequality Information, and Partisan Motivated Reasoning in the United States

Societies ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 65
Author(s):  
Clem Brooks ◽  
Elijah Harter
Keyword(s):  
Party Identification ◽  
Motivated Reasoning ◽  
The United States ◽  
Quality Data ◽  
Historical Time ◽  
High Quality Data ◽  
Redistributive Policies ◽  
Election Studies ◽  
New Evidence ◽  
The U.S

In an era of rising inequality, the U.S. public’s relatively modest support for redistributive policies has been a puzzle for scholars. Deepening the paradox is recent evidence that presenting information about inequality increases subjects’ support for redistributive policies by only a small amount. What explains inequality information’s limited effects? We extend partisan motivated reasoning scholarship to investigate whether political party identification confounds individuals’ processing of inequality information. Our study considers a much larger number of redistribution preference measures (12) than past scholarship. We offer a second novelty by bringing the dimension of historical time into hypothesis testing. Analyzing high-quality data from four American National Election Studies surveys, we find new evidence that partisanship confounds the interrelationship of inequality information and redistribution preferences. Further, our analyses find the effects of partisanship on redistribution preferences grew in magnitude from 2004 through 2016. We discuss implications for scholarship on information, motivated reasoning, and attitudes towards redistribution.

Sorting the File Drawer: A Typology for Describing Unpublished Studies

2021 ◽  
pp. 174569162097983
Author(s):  
David A. Lishner
Keyword(s):  
Decision Process ◽  
Motivated Reasoning ◽  
Psychology Research ◽  
Research Dissemination ◽  
Unpublished Studies ◽  
Study Results ◽  
Publication Decision ◽  
Research Domains ◽  
File Drawer ◽  
Insight Into

A typology of unpublished studies is presented to describe various types of unpublished studies and the reasons for their nonpublication. Reasons for nonpublication are classified by whether they stem from an awareness of the study results (result-dependent reasons) or not (result-independent reasons) and whether the reasons affect the publication decisions of individual researchers or reviewers/editors. I argue that result-independent reasons for nonpublication are less likely to introduce motivated reasoning into the publication decision process than are result-dependent reasons. I also argue that some reasons for nonpublication would produce beneficial as opposed to problematic publication bias. The typology of unpublished studies provides a descriptive scheme that can facilitate understanding of the population of study results across the field of psychology, within subdisciplines of psychology, or within specific psychology research domains. The typology also offers insight into different publication biases and research-dissemination practices and can guide individual researchers in organizing their own file drawers of unpublished studies.

The Comic Stance

2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-72
Author(s):  
Lauren Olin
Keyword(s):  
Systems Theory ◽  
Social Life ◽  
Cognitive Architectures ◽  
General Acceptance ◽  
Plausible Account ◽  
The Future ◽  
Intentional Systems

Abstract Despite sustained philosophical attention, no theory of humor claims general acceptance. Drawing on the resources provided by intentional systems theory, this article first outlines an approach to investigating humor based on the idea of a comic stance, then sketches the Dismissal Theory of Humor (DTH) that has resulted from pursuing that approach. According to the DTH, humor manifests in cases where the future-directed significance of anticipatory failures is dismissed. Mirth, on this view, is the reward people get for declining to update predictive representational schemata in ways that maximize their futureoriented value. The theory aims to provide a plausible account of the role of humor in human mental and social life, but it also aims to be empirically vulnerable, and to generate testable predictions about how the comic stance may actually be undergirded by cognitive architectures.

scholarly journals Winning, Losing, and the Quality of Democracy

2021 ◽  
pp. 003232172110261
Author(s):  
Richard Nadeau ◽  
Jean-François Daoust ◽  
Ruth Dassonneville
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Study ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Motivated Reasoning ◽  
Quality Of Democracy ◽  
Electoral Democracy ◽  
Democratic Systems ◽  
The Comparative Study

Citizens who voted for a party that won the election are more satisfied with democracy than those who did not. This winner–loser gap has recently been found to vary with the quality of electoral democracy: the higher the quality of democracy, the smaller the gap. However, we do not know what drives this relationship. Is it driven by losers, winners, or both? And Why? Linking our work to the literature on motivated reasoning and macro salience and benefiting from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems project—covering 163 elections in 51 countries between 1996 and 2018, our results show that the narrower winner–loser gap in well-established electoral democracies is not only a result of losers being more satisfied with democracy, but also of winners being less satisfied with their victory. Our findings carry important implications since a narrow winner–loser gap appears as a key feature of healthy democratic systems.

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