The Morality of Defensive Force

Author(s):  
Jonathan Quong

This book provides an account of the central moral principles that regulate the permissible use of defensive force. The book argues that we cannot understand the morality of defensive force until we ask and answer deeper questions about how the use of defensive force fits with a more general account of justice and moral rights. In developing this view the book offers original accounts of liability, proportionality, and necessity. It also argues, contra the dominant view in the literature, that self-defence can sometimes be justified on the basis of an agent-relative prerogative to give greater weight to one’s own life and interests. The book also provides a novel conception of individual rights against harm. Unlike some, who believe that our rights against harm are fact-relative, Quong argues that our rights against being harmed by others must, in certain respects, be sensitive to the evidence that others can reasonably be expected to possess. The final chapter provides an extended defence of the means principle, a principle that prohibits harmfully using other persons’ bodies or other rightful property unless those persons are duty bound to permit this use or have otherwise waived their claims against such use.

Dialogue ◽  
1984 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 669-676 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hugh Lehman

In his previous papers written on the topic of animal rights, Tom Regan argued that on the assumption that certain human beings have moral rights then so do certain animals. Here the argument is carried a stage further; Regan argues that some animals have certain moral rights. For the most part the book is taken up with criticizing alternative views concerning our moral obligations to animals and explaining and defending “The Rights View”. In the final chapter, Regan draws out the implications ofthe rights view. These include arguing for an obligation to be a vegetarian, moral condemnation of hunting and trapping of wild animals as well as of most of the uses of animals for scientific purposes. Animals are not to be used for toxicity tests, in education contexts or in scientific research even though this may produce beneficial consequences for humans and other animals. The book is very clearly written and well argued. It covers all important positions and arguments related t o the question of our moral obligations to animals. It is, I believe, the best book to appear on this subject to date.


Author(s):  
Vasil Gluchman

The priority and absoluteness of rights is often gist for ethical debates. I consider these issues from the perspective of my ethical theory, which I call the "ethics of social consequences." The ethics of social consequences is one means of satisfying non-utilitarian consequentialism. It is characterized by the principles of positive social consequences, humanity, human dignity, legality, justice, responsibility, tolerance as well as moral obligation. I analyze Gewirth’s position regarding the absoluteness of rights as well as Nagel’s opinion that rights enjoy priority forever. However, I also concentrate on Williams’s critique of utilitarianism. I contend that the priority of the protection and respect of individual rights in ordinary situations is acceptable. However, the individual must respect the rights and justified interests of other concerned people. Nevertheless, in extraordinary situations one must accept that consequences are more significant than rights.


2005 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 255-285 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard J. Arneson

In chapter four of Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Robert Nozick raised interesting questions about whether or not it is ever morally acceptable to act against what are agreed to be an individual's natural moral rights. The pursuit of these questions opens up issues concerning the specific content of these individual rights. This essay explores Nozick's questions by posing examples and using our considered responses to them to specify the shape of individual rights. The exploration provisionally concludes that a conception of individual moral rights quite different from Nozick's looks attractive and merits further development.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (9) ◽  
pp. 1483
Author(s):  
I Putu Dianda Ega Dinanda ◽  
I Wayan Wiryawan

Ogoh-ogoh merupakan budaya masyarakat Bali yang pada umumnya berhubungan dengan upacara agama umat hindu. Seiring dengan perkembangan ogoh-ogoh bukan hanya digunakan di dalam upacara agama atau acara adat saja. Pemerintah maupun kelompok masyarakat sering mengadakan lomba ogoh-ogoh dengan berbagai kriteria sebagai dasar penilaiannya. Hal tersebut menyebabkan munculnya nama-nama baik perseorangan maupun kelompok masyarakat yang menjadi terkenal dengan bentuk ogoh-ogohnya yang dinilai sebagai yang terbaik oleh masyarakat Bali. Penelitian ini memiliki tujuan untuk menganalisis perlindungan hukum atas sketsa dan bentuk ogoh-ogoh sebagai hak cipta guna melindungi sketsa dan bentuk ogoh-ogoh yang diciptakan oleh perseorangan atau kelompok agar tidak digunakan secara tidak bertanggung jawab oleh kelompok atau orang lainnya. Hal ini juga ditekankan pada penghargaan bagi pencipta sketsa dan bentuk ogoh-ogoh tersebut. Tulisan ini menggunakan metode penelitian hukum normatif. Hasil yang didapatkan dari penelitian ini bahwa menurut Undang-undang Nomor 28 Tahun 2014 Tentang Hak Cipta, sketsa dan bentuk ogoh-ogoh dapat dikatagorikan sebagai modifikasi ekspresi budaya tradisional dan bisa dijadikan individual right. Sketa ogoh-ogoh sebaiknya dapat didaftarkan sebagai hak cipta bagi orang ataupun kelompok yang menciptakannya sehingga terhindar dari pencurian ide serta dapat melindungi hak moral dan hak ekonomi penciptanya. Ogoh-ogoh is a Balinese culture that is generally associated with Hindu religious ceremonies. Along with the development of ogoh-ogoh not only used in religious ceremonies or traditional events. The government and community groups often hold ogoh-ogoh competitions with various criteria as the basis for their assessment. This has led to the emergence of the names of individuals and community groups who have become famous for their ogoh-ogoh forms which are considered the best by the Balinese. The purpose of this study is to analyze the legal protection of sketches and forms of ogoh-ogoh as copyright in order to protect the sketches and forms of ogoh-ogoh created by individuals or groups from being used irresponsibly by groups or other people. It also emphasized the appreciation for the creators of the sketches and forms of the ogoh-ogoh. This paper uses normative legal research methods. The results of this study are that according to Law No. 28 of 2014 concerning Copyright, sketches and forms of ogoh-ogoh can be categorized as modification of traditional cultural expressions and can be used as individual rights. Sketa ogoh-ogoh should be registered as a copyright for the person or group that created it so as to avoid the theft of ideas and can protect the moral rights and economic rights of their creators.


2019 ◽  
pp. 201-224
Author(s):  
Matthew H. Birkhold

The final chapter shows that fan fiction was treated as raising legal issues separate from piracy. This chapter argues that, because authors were newly vested with the legal capacity to hold rights in their literary creations, literary characters were not free to be appropriated however readers wished. Rather, literary characters constituted a distinctive form of communal property, the use of which was subject to conditions. Chapter 6 thus redefines the “literary commons” of eighteenth-century Germany, providing a new perspective on the rise of intellectual property rights. This chapter proposes a reevaluation of the concept of literary property, the history of moral rights, and the tradition of free culture.


Author(s):  
Jonathan Quong
Keyword(s):  

Chapter 1 provides an overview of the book’s main arguments and ideas, and situates the morality of defensive force in the wider literature. The chapter contains a discussion of the book’s scope and method. The chapter also sets out one of the main themes of the book; that we cannot understand the morality of defensive force until we ask and answer deeper questions about how the use of defensive force fits with a more general account of justice and moral rights. By closely studying the morality of defensive force, the chapter concludes, we also reach a deeper understanding of the way moral rights work, and their role in securing just relations between persons.


2021 ◽  
pp. 73-82
Author(s):  
Seumas Miller

This chapter addresses predictive policing, which is a term that refers to a range of crime-fighting approaches that use crime mapping data and analysis, and, more recently, social network analysis, big data, and predictive algorithms. The rise of predictive policing, especially in many police jurisdictions in large cities in the USA, has raised the spectre of the surveillance society in which citizens can be arrested by police for crimes they have not yet committed on the basis of evidence that they will commit them. Speaking generally, predictive policing faces several problems. Some of these are problems for predictive policing even in its own terms of contributing to crime reduction. Others are moral problems, about whether predictive policing violates moral rights or is unjust. These two types of problems are interconnected. Ultimately, the expanding use of biometric facial recognition databases and other emerging technologies in law enforcement as part of predictive policing should be clearly and demonstrably justified in terms of efficiency and effectiveness in the service of specific law enforcement purposes rather than by general appeals to community security or safety. Moreover, it should comply with moral principles constitutive of liberal democracy, such as the principle that individuals have a moral right to freedom from state interference absent prior evidence of violation of its laws.


1992 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 284-307
Author(s):  
Joseph Zuber
Keyword(s):  

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