Against the Construction of Animal Ethical Standing
This chapter argues against ‘standing egalitarianism’, the idea that there is a unique locus of ethical standing or status, and urges also that we should resist the idea that all entities who have ethical standing have it equally. It does so by engaging with Korsgaard’s recent work on animals and challenging its distinctive grounds for resisting standing egalitarianism. Drawing on the work of Tyler Burge, it argues for a different theory of the origin of value: values that matter came into the world with the first conscious beings; reasons were first possessed by the first judging beings; and moral obligations were first possessed by the first critically rational beings.
Keyword(s):
Keyword(s):
2005 ◽
Vol 23
(3)
◽
pp. 351-371
◽
Keyword(s):
Keyword(s):
Keyword(s):