The Kurdish Movement in Turkey

Author(s):  
Dilan Okcuoglu

The prolonged conflict between the Turkish state and Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), spanning four decades, has resulted in 4,000 villages evacuated, and more than 3 million people displaced. Despite this profound impact on people’s everyday lives, studies on people’s perceptions of the Kurdish movement are still limited. Drawing on qualitative interviews with Kurdish participants in Turkey, this chapter explores how Kurds from different backgrounds, of different ages, and politicized to different degrees, perceive the Kurdish movement and what motivates their commitment to it. Guided by an interpretivist methodology and drawing on findings from fieldwork, the chapter proposes that everyday experiences and understandings of the Kurdish movement are embedded and salient in a political sense. It concludes that by mobilizing people’s everyday perceptions and experiences and translating them into political engagement, the Kurdish movement shifts the scale of politics from a national to transnational and local levels. This shift implies that conducting extensive qualitative research among ordinary people brings a novel understanding of political movements and ethnic conflict in terms of both people’s motivations and movements’ strategic choices.

2018 ◽  
Vol 75 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 40-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joost Jongerden

This article will argue that the meetings between Turkey and the Kurdistan Workers Party PKK between 2006-2015 were employed by the Turkish state to gain advantage in the conflict they were supposed to be aimed at resolving. This appraisal of the PKK-Turkey talks thus helps to explain the escalation in the summer of 2015 - as the result, that is, not of a failed process of negotiations but of a failed intelligence operation.


2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 163 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jim Crowther

<p class="Body1">In 2014 the issue of constitutional change in the UK brought about by an agreement between the UK and Scottish Government, for a referendum on Scottish independence, created the motivation for widespread political engagement with the formal political process. Scottish citizens – including newly enfranchised 16 and 17 year olds – were debating, discussing and disagreeing about opting out of one of the world’s richest countries. This was an unusual situation and one that nearly happened despite a hostile corporate, political and mainstream media response to the demand for independence. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that this movement for change was the result of narrow-minded nationalism. Although the Referendum result was that Scotland should remain in the UK the process also produced widespread politicization of ordinary people. The cultural politics of communities had engaged with the political culture of the state and the dialectic between the two generated educational experiences and opened up new political possibilities.</p><div><p class="Body1"> </p></div>


1970 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 178-201
Author(s):  
Suresh Dhakal ◽  
Sanjeev Pokharel

The people of Nepal have witnessed a number of political shifts within a comparatively short period of the country's history. The political revolution of 1950, which precedes all important political movements, eliminated the century-long Rana oligarchy and established the multiparty system. In 1960, late King Mahendra abolished the newly established multi-party system and implemented his own model of governance called the Panchayat system. The Panchayat system was designed to allow the King to rule the country according to his will, and the system alienated ordinary people from political processes. This system, too, came to an end after the popular movement of 1990 (widely known as jana andolan) which re-established the multi-party system in the country. DOI: 10.3126/opsa.v11i0.3036 Occasional Papers in Sociology and Anthropology Vol.11 2009 178-201


1999 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 631-656 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicole F. Watts

Preventing the development of an ethnic Kurdish cultural and political movement has been a priority of the Turkish state since the Kurdish-led Shaykh Said Rebellion of 1925.' Nevertheless, beginning around 1959 this effort was steadily if slowly undermined, and events of the past ten years suggest that it has indeed failed. Not only have Kurdish activists gained some measure of international recognition for themselves and for the concept of Kurdish ethnic rights,2 but promoting the notion of specifically Kurdish cultural rights has almost become a standard litany for a wide array of Turkish civic and state actors, from Islamist political parties to business organizations, human-rights groups, prime ministers, and mainstream newspaper columnists. Although the separatist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and its insurgency against Turkey have claimed a great deal of academic and popular attention, it is these diffuse but public re-considerations of minority rights taking place within legitimate Turkish institutions have contributed the most to the sense that past policies of coping with the “Kurdish reality” are ultimately unsustainable, and that it may be difficult, if not impossible, to return to the climate of earlier years, when discussions of ethnic difference were suppressed, limited to the private realm, or confined to the fringes of radical politics.


Author(s):  
Bas van Bavel ◽  
Marten Scheffer

AbstractInequality of wealth and its associated power has varied greatly over human history. It is often thought that the main levelers of inequality were natural disasters such as epidemics or earthquakes, and social turmoil such as wars and revolutions. Here we critically review evidence of the effects of such events on inequality from medieval times till the present. We show that in spite of the marked differences in character and direct impact of the shocks we consider, most historical disasters were rather followed by a widening of wealth gaps. This can be understood from the wealth distribution and institutional outlay of these societies at the moment of the shock, which to a large extent shaped both the impact and the institutional measures chosen in response to the crisis. As most societies were characterized by economic and political skewness, the result mostly was a further widening of disparities. Over the centuries, exceptions to this rule have occurred in situations where the ordinary people had strong leverage in shaping the response to the crisis through organizations such as guilds, fraternities, trade unions, cooperatives, and political movements. Our results provide empirical support for the view that in nations where such leverage of ordinary people is weak, the responses to novel crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic may boost inequality.


Author(s):  
Ceren Lord

This chapter examines the emergence and dynamics of the transnational Alevi movement since the 1990s in both Turkey and Western Europe. As a social movement, it asserts the distinction of Alevi identity from Sunni Islam and seeks official recognition and equal citizenship rights in Turkey and Europe where a large number of Alevis live. Accordingly, the chapter first provides an overview of the debates on who the Alevis are and what Alevism is, as the contestation around definition shapes the factions and alignments within the Alevi movement. It then outlines the institutional context within which the Alevi movement emerged, tracing the influence of the Ottoman legacy on nation-state building and how these dynamics shaped the strategies adopted by competing factions within the state together with their evolution over time. Finally, it discusses the mobilization of the Alevi movement from the 1990s onward, its politics of recognition, factionalism, party political engagement, and key challenges. While prospects for gaining recognition and equal citizenship rights will grow more elusive with deepening authoritarianism of the Turkish state and sectarianism in the AKP era, the achievements of the transnational movement in Western Europe stand to shape the future of Alevism.


Significance They were responding to increasingly serious attacks on Turkish soldiers and police by Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) guerrillas in eastern Turkey. With President Recep Tayyip Erdogan vowing fierce retribution, and conflicts between the authorities and the local population growing in the Kurdish-dominated south-east, the country is braced for full-scale war, just as it prepares for fresh parliamentary elections on November 1. Impacts Business and the economy face a sharp downturn with the lira growing steadily weaker. The conflict with the Kurds will intensify and Kurdish demands for full-scale independence will increase. The government will not seek a compromise with the Kurds and will be prepared to allocate any resources needed for a military solution. A more authoritarian style of government is likely to emerge after November. Turkey looks increasingly vulnerable to serious Islamic State group (ISG) attacks in urban centres, though probably not before the election.


2009 ◽  
Vol 103 (2) ◽  
pp. 231-247 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHRISTOPHER BLATTMAN

What is the political legacy of violent conflict? I present evidence for a link from past violence to increased political engagement among excombatants. The evidence comes from northern Uganda, where rebel recruitment generated quasiexperimental variation in who was conscripted by abduction. Survey data suggest that abduction leads to substantial increases in voting and community leadership, largely due to elevated levels of violence witnessed. Meanwhile, abduction and violence do not appear to affect nonpolitical participation. These patterns are not easily explained by conventional theories of participation, including mobilization by elites, differential costs, and altruistic preferences. Qualitative interviews suggest that violence may lead to personal growth and political activation, a possibility supported by psychological research on the positive effects of traumatic events. Although the generalizability of these results requires more evidence to judge, the findings challenge our understanding of political behavior and point to important new avenues of research.


2021 ◽  
pp. 147-192
Author(s):  
Kristen Hill Maher ◽  
David Carruthers

This chapter uses photographs to analyze how ordinary people in San Diego visualized the neighboring city of Tijuana in relation to their own. In qualitative interviews, forty-five people sorted a set of photographs from the Tijuana–San Diego borderlands, evaluating them according to how much they thought the images resembled Tijuana and discussing which visual cues led to their conclusions. This process brought to the surface dimensions of a bordered geographic imaginary that reflected implicit, mundane forms of social knowledge that they may not have thought to articulate otherwise. Three overarching and interrelated themes arose inductively from the interviews: dirt, disorder, and economic deprivation. Each of these themes reinforces the border as a marker of inequality, either in terms of class distinction or as part of a neocolonial imaginary about a socially distant “Third World.”


2021 ◽  
pp. 002234332110194
Author(s):  
Shelley Liu

How does civil war affect citizen engagement with democracy? Civilians who live through warfare face numerous disruptions to everyday life that can have permanent effects on political engagement even after peace is achieved. This article analyzes the role of depressed living standards resulting from education loss during the Liberia Civil War as a case study of war-related deprivation. I argue that the negative effects of war on education and economic outcomes clash with the expectations that citizens have for postwar democracy, with adverse consequences for political participation. I demonstrate support for this argument using a mixed methods approach, combining qualitative interviews with census, voting, and Afrobarometer survey data. I leverage a difference-in-differences identification strategy to causally identify the negative impact of conflict on human capital for a generation of young adults, and on the downstream consequences of disruptions in education on political participation. Results indicate that children who were of school age during the civil war are differentially less likely to have any formal schooling by the end of the war. I further find that educational deficiencies disproportionately decrease postwar job prospects, breeding resentment against the newly elected government. This extends to political participation: those who lost out on educational opportunities due to war exhibit lower political engagement and less desire to engage with democratic processes.


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