‘Hokclyff’ and the Will of William Hoton

Author(s):  
Peter Brown

Abstract There are two surviving copies of La Male Regle by Thomas Hoccleve, a lively account of his dissolute life as a clerk of the Privy Seal. One is part of an autograph manuscript of Hoccleve’s works in the Huntington Library, the other an incomplete version in Canterbury Cathedral Archives. Reference to a third copy survives in the will of William Hoton, proved in 1447. As well as La Male Regle, Hoton bequeathed a letter of Pharaoh, a chronicle and statutes, together with a mazer and pious donations. This information, coupled with records of Hoton’s family members, his burial place and associates, produces a profile of William Hoton linking him with the law and the book trade, and possibly with Neville’s Inn, the London town house used by a noble family to whose members Hoccleve addressed some of his poems. Hoton’s will also leads to a second individual who owned La Male Regle—the person who received it as a bequest, the common attorney and citizen, John Mordon. Neither Hoton nor Mordon has hitherto featured in discussions of the reception of the poem, which enjoyed a wider circulation than previously thought.

Pólemos ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Biet

AbstractTheatre and law are not so different. Generally, researchers work on the art of theatre, the rhetoric of the actors, or the dramaturgy built from law cases or from the questions that the law does not completely resolve. Trials, tragedies, even comedies are close: everybody can see the interpenetration of them on stage and in the courts. We know that, and we know that the dramas are made with/from/of law, we know that the art the actors are developing is not so far from the art of the lawyers, and conversely. In this paper, I would like to have a look at the action of the audience, at the session itself and at the way the spectators are here to evaluate and judge not only the dramatic action, not only the art of the actors, not only the text of the author, but also the other spectators, and themselves too. In particular, I will focus on the “common judgment” of the audience and on its judicial, aesthetic and social relationship. The spectators have been undisciplined, noisy, unruled, during such a long period that theatre still retains some prints of this behaviour, even if nowadays, the social and aesthetic rule is to be silent. But uncertainty, inattention, distraction, contradiction, heterogeneity are the notions which characterise the session, and the judgments of the spectators still depend on them. So, what was and what is the voice of the audience? And with what sort of voice do spectators give their judgments?


Author(s):  
Bothe Michael

This chapter focuses on rules of the law of neutrality concerning the protection of the victims of armed conflicts, which must be considered as part of international humanitarian law. ‘Neutrality’ describes the particular status, as defined by international law, of a state not party to an armed conflict. This status entails specific rights and duties in the relationship between the neutral and the belligerent states. On one hand, there is the right of the neutral state to remain apart from, and not to be adversely affected by, the conflict. On the other hand, there is the duty of non-participation and impartiality. The right not to be adversely affected means that the relationship between the neutral and belligerent States is governed by the law of peace, which is modified only in certain respects by the law of neutrality. In particular, the neutral State must tolerate certain controls in the area of maritime commerce. The duty of non-participation means, above all, that the state must abstain from supporting a party to the conflict. This duty not to support also means that the neutral state is under a duty not to allow one party to the conflict to use the resources of the neutral state against the will of the opponent.


1949 ◽  
Vol 43 (5) ◽  
pp. 1001-1009
Author(s):  
Arnold Brecht

After the North Atlantic Treaty. The North Atlantic treaty, with its incorporation of the principle that attack on any one of the signatory powers will be considered an attack on all, has done more than any previous measure to strengthen the morale of Western Europe. No longer need any of the participating European countries, whether big or small, be afraid that it might be left alone in the hour of attack. Against that hour, if it should have to come, all will prepare in common.On the other hand, it is obvious that this firm expression of the “will to defend” has gravely accentuated the dividing line between East and West. More definitely than ever, outside of the two World Wars, Europe has now realigned herself in two antagonistic camps, both heavily armed. This fact will receive further emphasis in the process of implementing the treaty. Each one of the many particular measures that will now be taken to organize and strengthen the common defense, and the concomitant increase in expenditures for armament—much more noticeable in democracies with their public discussion of all military and budgetary issues than in the silent realms of dictatorial censorship—will have the effect of a showing of teeth and rattling of sabers.


2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 263
Author(s):  
Dian Dharmayanti ◽  
Rr Asfarina Izazi Razan ◽  
Nahdlotul Fadilah

<em>Notary is a general officer authorized to create an authentic deed of all actions, agreements, and statutes required by the laws and/or regulations required by the interested to be expressed in the deed Authentically, guaranteeing the certainty of the date of the deed, storing the deed, giving Grosee, copies and quotations of the deed, all of them throughout the making of the deed were not also assigned or excluded to the other officers stipulated by the law. Thus, it is described in article 1 number 1 of Law No. 2 of 2014 concerning the amendment to law Number 30 year 2004 concerning the Notary Regulation (Hereinafter called UUJN). A notary public is a noble, independent and high integrity position, so it is only natural to take all actions in their position seriously referring to the laws and regulations and the code of ethics. The law actions of the parties as described in the notarial deed is purely wishes of the parties and the notary is limited to providing law counseling related to the contents of the deed and the law actions of the parties, without imposing the will of the parties. party or in favor of one party. After the deed is made and then read out in front of the parties and witnesses, it must be signed when it is signed by all parties present and witnesses as well, it becomes one of the notary obligations stipulated in UUJN.</em>


Author(s):  
Robin Danzak ◽  
Christina Gunther ◽  
Michelle Cole

Through a framework of reconciling the other, this collaborative autoethnographic performance co-constructs the adoption experience from three perspectives in three different families: a mother struggling with the ethical and emotional implications of the transnational adoption of her daughter; an adult reflecting on her childhood as an adoptee feeling loved, but different; and a woman who met her biological sister at age 28 after her parents revealed a lifelong secret. To develop individual adoption narratives, we applied autoethnographic tools of interactive interviews with family members, reflective writing, and document review (Ellis, 2004) of photos, letters, emails, and calendars. During one school year, we met monthly to discuss relevant literature, share and critique each other’s methods and writing, and identify the common themes in our three, diverse experiences. The result of the iteration of the individual and group processes is a script that weaves together our adoption stories, the discoveries of ourselves, and how, after negotiating feelings and identities, we reconciled the other through positive, loving relationships.


1990 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 80-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
C.J.W. Allen

Among rules of law Karl Llewellyn noted at one extreme the “rule-of-thumb, in which the flat result is articulated, leaving behind and unexpressed all indication of its reason”. At the other extreme was “the way of principle, in which the reason is clearly and effectively articulated, and that articulation is made part of the very rule”. The vice of principle, he observed, “can be a vaporish vagueness, and the techniques of its effective formulation are not easy to isolate for communication and use”. Partly for this reason, partly perhaps because of its origin in a last-minute political compromise, section 78(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 at first confounded attempts to predict the manner of its application. One commentary suggested that it was “of no practical use”; there were dicta in the Court of Appeal to the effect that it did “no more than to re-state the power which judges had at common law before the Act of 1984 was passed”. A leading work on the law of evidence expressed the view that the sub-section was “cast in terms of such vagueness and generality as to furnish little guidance to the court”. There has been some development since those early days. It now seems clear that the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 is to be regarded as a codifying Act which has to be looked at on its own wording. Section 78(1), therefore, does not merely re-state the position at common law. It is also clear that in its operation it overlaps section 76 and, through section 82(3), some of the common law. Section 78(1) may be applied in a variety of situations, with or without the presence of some element of impropriety in the way in which the evidence was obtained. Basic questions about its operation nevertheless remain.


2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (6) ◽  
pp. 1953-1957
Author(s):  
Aleksandra Patoska

Every agreement of the wills among two or more persons who make mutual law relation or changes or calls of the existing law relation is named as a contrast in the theory of law. According its characteristics, the law relations may be different - obligatorious, familliarious, hereditorious, administrativ, merchanditorious etc., because of what the contracts as instruments of law regulations of that relationships are published in different law branches, like: familly law, heretige law, administrative law, merchandise law etc. Regarding its theoretical structure and frequent use and meaning in the law practice, the obligatory contracts are separated - those which may make obligatory relationships.The obligatory relationships are law connection among two or more parties from which one of them has the right to ask for, and the other is obligated to give the asked or to do, or not to do, or to bear it. The essence of the obligatory relation is in the right of the creditor to ak from the debtor to fulfille his obligation, which means - basicly - they are in creditor - debtor's relationships. Therefore, the obligatory contracts are double law acts according to which, in the agreement of the wills between two parties, the one part obeys to give something, to do or not to do something, or to bear something in the benefit of the other part, the part which takes that obligation as its right.The agreement of the wills of the contractual parties is one of the four common conditions of the genezes of a contract. It is realized by equality of the different whishes and different aims which the parties like to reach by making an agreement. There are the questions which I am trying to answer in my written text: about law relevant will, the atributes which the will should possesse, the ways of giving the will and, at the end, coordinating the wills of the two parts which goes to make the contact. The coordinating of the wills should be done on a legalized or usual way, frequently or usually by giving an offer from the first part and reaching the offer from the other one. That is the most usual mode of implementation the reunification of the wills between the contractual parts.


2010 ◽  
Vol 74 (2) ◽  
pp. 163-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catherine Elliott

By removing the common law rules on a duty to act from liability for manslaughter by omission, the law would more accurately reflect the intention of the House of Lords in R v Adomako (1995). The current duplicitous requirement of both a duty to act and a duty of care appears to be confusing both the trial judge and the jury. The causing of a harm by an omission does not automatically mean the conduct was less morally reprehensible than where harm is caused by an act and this reform would therefore potentially bring the law more closely into line with society's moral values. The law would be rendered clearer and simpler and injustices would be avoided due to the other requirements of the Law Commission's proposed offence of killing by gross carelessness, including causation and gross carelessness. Through this reform justice could at last be offered should a stranger choose to walk by a drowning baby.


Author(s):  
Hein Kötz

This chapter examines how the law deals with contracts that a party entered into by mistake. After a brief discussion of the historical background of the rules in the civil law and the common law, the question is raised whether there is a relevant mistake if a party’s ‘motive’ for entering into the contract turns out to be incorrect, if the party’s mistake refers to the value of what it promised or was to receive under the contract, or if the party’s mistake is due to its carelessness. Should the relevance of a mistake not depend on whether it was caused or shared by the other party? Finally, the chapter outlines some common threads in the development of a European law on mistake.


2020 ◽  
pp. 740-776
Author(s):  
Kenneth G C Reid ◽  
Marius J de Waal ◽  
Reinhard Zimmermann

Today freedom of testation is qualified, in most countries of the world, by a degree of mandatory family protection. Broadly speaking, that protection can be delivered either by a system of fixed shares (such as forced heirship or compulsory portion), or by the court-based discretionary system which is often known as ‘family provision’. In fixed-share systems, certain family members (especially the surviving spouse and children) are protected merely because they are family members; in discretionary systems there is often an additional requirement of financial need. Fixed-share systems dominate in the civil law countries of Europe, South America, and the Far East as well as in Islamic countries and the Nordic countries; discretionary systems are found mainly in England and in the common law world more generally. The range of potential beneficiaries varies from system to system and country to country, but today includes the surviving spouse and children as well as, often, civil partners, cohabitants and even dependants. Each system has opposing strengths and weaknesses: fixed-share systems are predictable but inflexible; discretionary systems are flexible but unpredictable. Each system has sought various means to temper its weakness. Amidst general satisfaction with mandatory family provision, there have also been reforms and calls for more reform. In fixed-share systems there is support for moving, in whole or in part, to a system of judicial discretion. There is little demand, in discretionary systems, for a move in the other direction.


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