Is the Religious Left Resurgent?

2020 ◽  
Vol 81 (2) ◽  
pp. 131-141 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph O Baker ◽  
Gerardo Martí

Abstract Journalistic sources seem to suggest that there has been a resurgence of the American Religious Left (i.e., politically liberal Christians who support progressive agendas) in the wake of the strong support from the conservative Christian right in the 2016 presidential election of Donald J. Trump. Using quantitative analysis, we draw on survey data from the General Social Survey, the Public Religion Research Institute, and the National Congregations Study to assess the possibility of a resurgence among the Religious Left. In comparison with a speculated rise, our analysis indicates a notable decline in both the prevalence and engagement of Americans who self-identify as both religious and politically liberal. Not only is the constituency of the Religious Left shrinking, they have also been steadily disengaging from political activity in the last decade. Especially when looking at more recent elections, it has been those among the Secular Left who have been the most politically engaged. We summarize these empirical patterns in relation to the Religious Right and consider the potential for influence among the Religious Left aside from electoral politics. We also briefly consider other possibilities for their political impact and reflect on the inadequacy of the label “Religious Left” for capturing important dynamics. In the end, we urge greater attention to politics among sociologists of religion, providing a set of research questions to consider in light of the upcoming American 2020 national election.

2021 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-97
Author(s):  
Lim Jae Young ◽  
Woo Harin

The arts in the United States, for a long time received strong support from both sides of the political aisle. However, in recent years, the arts have been transformed into a partisan issue that pits conservatives against liberals. The article points to the importance of political trust as a means of helping conservatives overcome their ideological inclinations and support the arts. Scholars argue that political trust influences more strongly individuals who perceive a given policy to be one that imposes ideological risks for them compared with those without such risks. Focusing on the moderating role of political trust, the article examines whether political trust can help alleviate the conservatives’ hostility to the arts. Relying on the 2016 General Social Survey, the article finds that conservatives have no direct relationship with arts spending, but they will be more likely to support arts spending when this is contingent upon political trust.


2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 349-373
Author(s):  
George Wilson ◽  
Vincent J. Roscigno

AbstractHas the adoption of “new governance” reforms over the last two decades eroded the public sector as a long-standing occupational niche for African Americans? Utilizing data from the General Social Survey, we address this issue in the context of earnings “returns” to three levels of job authority for African American men and women relative to their White counterparts. Findings, derived from analyses of three waves of the General Social Survey, indicate that the acceleration of this “business model” of work organization in the public sector has had relatively profound and negative consequences for African American income. Specifically, racial parity in earnings returns at all levels of authority in the “pre-reform” period (1992–1994) progressively eroded during “early reform” (2000–2002) and then even more so during the “late reform” (2010–2012) period. Much of this growing public sector disadvantage—a disadvantage that is approaching that seen in the private sector—is driven largely by income gaps between White and African American men, although a similar (though smaller) racial gap is witnessed among women. We conclude by discussing the occupational niche status of public sector work for African Americans, calling for further analyses of the growing inequality patterns identified in our analyses, and drawing attention to the implications for contemporary racial disadvantages.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 82
Author(s):  
Sandra L. Hanson ◽  
John K. White

This paper examines the cooperation and influences between Poland and the U.S on their respective dreams, including the influence of the American Dream on Polish Americans and their potential distinctness from those who remain in Poland. Attitudes involving the American Dream that are examined include beliefs about freedom, liberty, democracy, getting ahead, status/mobility, and inequality. Although scholars have compared these belief systems across countries, there has been no distinct focus on Poland and the U.S., and those who immigrate between these countries. A conceptual framework that combines the American Dream, American exceptionalism, and beliefs about inequality guides the research. Data from the General Social Survey and the World Values Survey are used to answer the research questions. Findings show that Polish Americans agree with other Americans on a majority of items measuring elements of the American Dream. However, Americans and Poles have significantly different opinions on each of the American Dream items. Usually, (but not always) it is Americans who are more supportive of the American Dream. When considering the three groups, Polish Americans, Americans, and Poles, our conclusions suggest a trend where Polish Americans are a hybrid of other Americans and Poles when it comes to their views on the Dream. However, the differences often run in the direction that Polish Americans’ views are more like other Americans and distinct from Poles. Conclusions and implications are provided within the historical context of the long history of cooperation between the U.S. and Poland in fights for freedom and democracy.


2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 22-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Deva Woodly

There have been many retrospective analyses written about the marriage-equality movement since the Supreme Court’s 2015 ruling that made marriages between people of the same sex legal in all 50 states. Most attribute that triumph to a stunningly swift turnaround in public comfort with and approval of same-sex relationships. However, public opinion data indicates that this narrative is inaccurate. In 2015, 51% of General Social Survey respondents declared that they found sexual relationships between people of the same sex to be “wrong” at least “some of the time.” Nevertheless, at the same time, 56% of respondents affirmed that people of the same sex ought to have the legal right to marry. This dissonance suggests that the most common narrative about the success of the movement misses something crucial about how political persuasion happened in this case, as well as the way that political persuasion happens in general. In this article, I show that the massive shift in support for same-sex marriage was likely not the result of large majorities changing their underlying attitudes regarding gay sexual relationships, but was instead the result of activists inserting new criteria for evaluating same-sex marriage into popular political discourse by consistently using resonant arguments. These arguments reframed the political stakes, changed the public meaning of the marriage debate, and altered the decisional context in which people determine their policy preferences.


2013 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 618-645 ◽  
Author(s):  
David D. Blouin ◽  
Robert V. Robinson ◽  
Brian Starks

AbstractAnalyzing a unique module of the General Social Survey, we test hypotheses that three religion dimensions — affiliation with specific religious traditions (belonging), service attendance (behaving), and religious orthodoxy (believing) are associated with compassionate feelings, and that these feelings carry over into support for government efforts to help the poor, blacks, and the sick. The religiously orthodox report more compassionate feelings toward others than do modernists and, partly because of this, are more supportive of government intervention to help the poor. Yet attending religious services frequently does not increase compassionate feelings and makes people less supportive of government efforts to help the poor. There are no differences among religious traditions in compassionate feelings, and the only difference on economic policy preferences is for Black Protestants to support government assistance to blacks. Compassionate feelings have comparable effects to political ideology and party identification on support for government assistance to the disadvantaged and misfortunate. We conclude that people of faith, variously defined, do not constitute a monolithic “Religious Right” and are potentially open to policy appeals from both political parties.


Author(s):  
Nian Liu ◽  
Zekai Lu ◽  
Ying Xie

There is a lack of quantitative studies on the acceptance of extramarital sex in China. Based on data from the Chinese General Social Survey 2013 (CGSS2013), this paper used a zero-inflated Poisson regression model to analyze the factors influencing the public’s attitudes toward extramarital sex. When other variables were controlled, groups of younger ages, higher educational levels, and stronger tendencies toward “liberalization” and non-Islamic beliefs were more tolerant toward extramarital sex, whereas gender and Christian beliefs had no significant influence. In this regard, family and marriage counseling, and society’s moral tolerance and social control of religion are discussed, and further research on cross-cultural verification is needed.


2019 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 327-340 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cassandra R Henson

As the realm of public service and its relative partnerships (both social and economic) continues to change, so must the leadership charged with managing it. Gone are the days when a single government purview was sufficient for managing public service delivery, focused on preconceived notions of what citizens supposedly want. Public value and the lens of the public service professional must be wide enough to encompass the public–private sector partnerships that foster routine service delivery as well as concepts that help move it forward. A well-rounded public service professional needs a well-rounded educational foundation, creating the ability to operate in any economic sector. In this article, we discuss public value co-creation in the context of public trust, the value-based agenda and participatory governance. We then present findings from the General Social Survey and suggest a pedagogical approach to preparing future public administrators for the public value co-creation process.


2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Felicia F. Tian

AbstractGuanxi is a fundamental, but controversial, feature of Chinese society. This article examines public attitudes about the fairness of guanxi and how Chinese market reform is affecting these attitudes. The reciprocity-laden and tie-sensitive nature of guanxi conflicts with the efficiency-oriented goal of a market economy. Disapproval of guanxi is thus increasing as marketization progresses. Results from the 2008 Chinese General Social Survey show that guanxi is more likely to be viewed as unfair in places with higher levels of marketization. The educational gradient decreases with marketization, and change is more pronounced among people working in the market sector than it is among people working in the state sector. My findings suggest that Chinese market reform increases public disapproval of guanxi.


2021 ◽  
pp. 239965442110361
Author(s):  
Wei Hong ◽  
Yimeng Wei ◽  
Shuyan Wang

In recent years, the smog problem has aroused wide concern in China. However, people have different perceptions of the severity of air pollution, even in similarly polluted environments. Based on a quantitative analysis of Chinese General Social Survey data, air quality index data, news reports in 2013, and multi-site anthropological observations, this paper demonstrates that the public perception of air pollution is not determined by physiological feelings and the external environment, but rather by the media, social networks, and other sociocultural factors, which are highly localized. This creates a hidden form of spatial injustice—people living in regions that lack a social milieu of smog awareness are less likely to sense smog and to take precautions; they are therefore left behind in the perception of air pollution and in their chances of preventing illnesses associated with air pollution.


2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 296-308 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura R. Olson

AbstractIn this article, I compare progressive and conservative religio-political activists' commitment to their movements (the religious left and right, respectively). I rely on data from the Public Religion Research Institute's 2009 surveys of individuals they identified as religious left activists and religious right activists. Do these activists actually say they identify with the movement with which pollsters assume them to affiliate? How potentially influential do they perceive their movements to be? Third, to what extent do activists support their movement's core social movement organizations? I conclude by arguing that the evidence is mixed that the American religious left lacks influence because its activists tend not to be unified.


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