Climate Politics and Policies

Author(s):  
Joseph Romm

This chapter will explain the most commonly used or discussed climate policies around the world. It will also explore some of the issues involving climate politics. What climate policies are governments around the world using to fight climate change? The major policies used by...

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 9-28
Author(s):  
Markus Lederer

The idea of a green deal transforming industrialized societies’ climate policies in a sustainable manner has become highly popular in various countries. The study takes up this notion focusing on climate policy initiatives in Canada and the EU, raising three interrelated issues: (i) on a descriptive level, the study asks where we stand and what has so far been achieved regarding climate policy; (ii) analytically, the study provides a theoretical explanation of why progress has been slow in the EU and hardly visible in Canada, making use of the concept of carbon democracy; (iii) on a prescriptive level, the study explores what will be needed to make a green deal successful, arguing that one has to accept that a green deal is a deeply political project that will create winners and losers and that not all losers can be compensated under the label of a “just transition”. The argument advanced is that the EU and Canada represent a form of carbon democracy in which the extensive use of carbon laid the foundation for establishing democratic institutions and strongly shaped them. The paper shows that the extensive influence of carbon-related activities not only empowers specific non-state agents but is rather deeply enmeshed in the societal and political genome of both regions’ polities. The claim that follows is that climate politics in Canada and the EU will have to be deeply transformative and therefore disruptive in order to be successful.  


Author(s):  
Daniel Yuichi Kono

Both trade and climate change policies affect the international competitiveness of carbon-intensive industries. This suggests that policy changes in one area may affect politics in the other. Does openness to international trade affect climate change politics? Do climate change policies affect the politics of trade? Does formally linking trade and climate policies via trade sanctions affect the prospects for cooperation in each domain? There are good theoretical reasons to believe that the answer to these questions is yes. Theoretically, each set of policies should affect the other, but these interactions could either encourage or discourage trade and climate cooperation. How trade and climate politics interact is thus an empirical question. Empirically, the overall picture is of a nascent but promising field of research. Extant studies provide indirect tests and suggestive evidence, but little in the way of firm conclusions. Only one point emerges clearly: progress in this area will require more and better data on national climate policies.


Subject Climate politics in Europe. Significance In Europe, climate change has shifted from being a peripheral to a central electoral issue; now mainstream parties are committing themselves to ambitious climate policies. However, overtime division will likely grow between those parties whose support is underpinned by business and conservative interests, and those who appeal strongly to younger voters. Climate change will also be a source of further competition between mainstream and national populist parties. Impacts Governing parties at the local, national and EU-levels will be judged increasingly on their environmental track-records. Most major infrastructure and non-renewable energy projects will face opposition from civil society through petitions and protests. Support for green parties could decline if traditional parties hiijack climate change policies.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-25
Author(s):  
Jeff D. Colgan ◽  
Jessica F. Green ◽  
Thomas N. Hale

Abstract Whereas scholars have typically modeled climate change as a global collective action challenge, we offer a dynamic theory of climate politics based on the present and future revaluation of assets. Climate politics can be understood as a contest between owners of assets that accelerate climate change, such as fossil fuel plants, and owners of assets vulnerable to climate change, such as coastal property. To date, obstruction by “climate-forcing” asset holders has been a large barrier to effective climate policy. But as climate change and decarbonization policies proceed, holders of both climate-forcing and “climate-vulnerable” assets stand to lose some or even all of their assets' value over time, and with them, the basis of their political power. This dynamic contest between opposing interests is likely to intensify in many sites of political contestation, from the subnational to transnational levels. As it does so, climate politics will become increasingly existential, potentially reshaping political alignments within and across countries. Such shifts may further undermine the Liberal International Order (LIO); as countries develop pro-climate policies at different speeds and magnitudes, they will have incentives to diverge from existing arrangements over trade and economic integration.


2016 ◽  
Vol 07 (02) ◽  
pp. 1650002 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARSHALL BURKE ◽  
MELANIE CRAXTON ◽  
CHARLES D. KOLSTAD ◽  
CHIKARA ONDA

The paper reviews progress in understanding the economics of climate change with an emphasis on identifying promising advances that are both significant and nonmarginal, as well as areas in which there are key gaps in our knowledge. We highlight several important areas in which important policy-relevant research questions remain: improving estimates of climate damage used for determining the social cost of carbon, refining integrated assessment models, and designing better climate policies. As the world moves to understand and implement country emissions reduction pledges in the context of the UNFCCC, understanding the economics of the problem will become even more important. The hope is that the paper is not only informative for existing economists already working in climate change economics, but that it also serves as an inspiration for economists in other areas, or even those in other disciplines, on ways in which to contribute to solving the problem at hand.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-31
Author(s):  
Kai Schulze

Domestic policies are the cornerstone of the new global climate governance architecture. However, what motivates vote-seeking politicians to pursue climate policies remains remarkably unclear, as the climate politics literature suggests that climate policies are usually not perceived as a vote winner. The present article revisits this issue and argues that a better understanding of the relationship between electoral competition and climate policy making requires taking into account differences both in party ideologies and in policy characteristics. Studying twenty-nine democracies between 1990 and 2016, the analysis finds that climate policy production overall tends to increase as the election approaches due to increases in “soft” policies, such as subsidies, research grants, and information instruments, and relatively stable production rates of “hard” policies like taxes and regulations over the electoral term. Regarding partisan politics, left governments are found to produce more hard, but not more soft, climate policies than center and right governments, especially before elections. This suggests that partisan and electoral incentives are important reference points in the fight against climate change.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-29
Author(s):  
Lena Maria Schaffer ◽  
Bianca Oehl ◽  
Thomas Bernauer

Abstract Normative theories of democracy agree that public demand should be the main guide in policymaking. But positive theories and related empirical research disagree about the extent to which this holds true in reality. We address this debate with an empirical focus on climate change policy. Specifically, we are interested in whether observable variation in public demand for climate change mitigation can help explain variation in adopted national climate policies. Using our own data to approximate public demand, we estimate the responsiveness of policymakers to changes in public demand in six OECD countries from 1995 to 2010. We find that policymakers are responsive and react in predicted ways to variation in our opinion component of measured public demand, rather than to the mere salience of the climate issue. The effect of issue salience is strongest in combination with our opinion measure as this creates a scope for action. The results underscore the importance and usefulness of our concept and empirical measures for public demand, as well as of our disaggregated analysis of climate policy outputs in this area.


2018 ◽  
pp. 76-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
I. A. Makarov ◽  
C. Henry ◽  
V. P. Sergey

The paper applies multiregional CGE Economic Policy Projection and Analysis (EPPA) model to analyze major risks the Paris Agreement on climate change adopted in 2015 brings to Russia. The authors come to the conclusion that if parties of the Agreement meet their targets that were set for 2030 it may lead to the decrease of average annual GDP growth rates by 0.2-0.3 p. p. Stricter climate policies beyond this year would bring GDP growth rates reduction in2035-2050 by additional 0.5 p. p. If Russia doesn’t ratify Paris Agreement, these losses may increase. In order to mitigate these risks, diversification of Russian economy is required.


Author(s):  
Sabrina Bruno

Climate change is a financial factor that carries with it risks and opportunities for companies. To support boards of directors of companies belonging to all jurisdictions, the World Economic Forum issued in January 2019 eight Principlescontaining both theoretical and practical provisions on: climate accountability, competence, governance, management, disclosure and dialogue. The paper analyses each Principle to understand scope and managerial consequences for boards and to evaluate whether the legal distinctions, among the various jurisdictions, may undermine the application of the Principles or, by contrast, despite the differences the Principles may be a useful and effective guidance to drive boards' of directors' conduct around the world in handling climate change challenges. Five jurisdictions are taken into consideration for this comparative analysis: Europe (and UK), US, Australia, South Africa and Canada. The conclusion is that the WEF Principles, as soft law, is the best possible instrument to address boards of directors of worldwide companies, harmonise their conduct and effectively help facing such global emergency.


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