scholarly journals Eco-evolutionary dynamics of a population with randomly switching carrying capacity

2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (145) ◽  
pp. 20180343 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karl Wienand ◽  
Erwin Frey ◽  
Mauro Mobilia

Environmental variability greatly influences the eco-evolutionary dynamics of a population, i.e. it affects how its size and composition evolve. Here, we study a well-mixed population of finite and fluctuating size whose growth is limited by a randomly switching carrying capacity. This models the environmental fluctuations between states of resources abundance and scarcity. The population consists of two strains, one growing slightly faster than the other, competing under two scenarios: one in which competition is solely for resources, and one in which the slow (cooperating) strain produces a public good (PG) that benefits also the fast (free-riding) strain. We investigate how the coupling of demographic and environmental (external) noise affects the population's eco-evolutionary dynamics. By analytical and computational means, we study the correlations between the population size and its composition, and discuss the social-dilemma-like ‘eco-evolutionary game’ characterizing the PG production. We determine in what conditions it is best to produce a PG; when cooperating is beneficial but outcompeted by free riding, and when the PG production is detrimental for cooperators. Within a linear noise approximation to populations of varying size, we also accurately analyse the coupled effects of demographic and environmental noise on the size distribution.

2012 ◽  
Vol 23 (02) ◽  
pp. 501-521 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARCIN SEREDYNSKI ◽  
PASCAL BOUVRY

A distributed nature of a wireless mobile ad hoc network, lack of a single authority, and limited battery resources of participating devices may lead its users to be reluctant to packet relaying duties. This paper investigates potential networking conditions that could lead to a direct reciprocity-based cooperation on packet relaying. Simulation of behaviour of the network is carried out using an evolutionary game-theoretical approach. A game-based model of nodes' interactions coupled with a genetic algorithm is used to find successful relaying strategies for various networking conditions. Computational experiments demonstrate that the reciprocity-based packet relaying is an efficient way to overcome the social dilemma present in such a network. However, in the presence of a large number of unconditionally cooperatives nodes a selfish permanent defection strategy is more efficient than a reciprocal tit-for-tat strategy. Nevertheless the switch from cooperative to selfish behaviour among some users does not change significantly the overall performance of the network as the negative consequences of the switch are compensated by the generous packet relaying contribution of unconditionally cooperative nodes.


Games ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Isamu Okada

Despite the accumulation of research on indirect reciprocity over the past 30 years and the publication of over 100,000 related papers, there are still many issues to be addressed. Here, we look back on the research that has been done on indirect reciprocity and identify the issues that have been resolved and the ones that remain to be resolved. This manuscript introduces indirect reciprocity in the context of the evolution of cooperation, basic models of social dilemma situations, the path taken in the elaboration of mathematical analysis using evolutionary game theory, the discovery of image scoring norms, and the breakthroughs brought about by the analysis of the evolutionary instability of the norms. Moreover, it presents key results obtained by refining the assessment function, resolving the punishment dilemma, and presenting a complete solution to the social dilemma problem. Finally, it discusses the application of indirect reciprocity in various disciplines.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jose C. Yong ◽  
Bryan K. C. Choy

Evolutionary game theory and public goods games offer an important framework to understand cooperation during pandemics. From this perspective, the COVID-19 situation can be conceptualized as a dilemma where people who neglect safety precautions act as free riders, because they get to enjoy the benefits of decreased health risk from others’ compliance with policies despite not contributing to or even undermining public safety themselves. At the same time, humans appear to carry a suite of evolved psychological mechanisms aimed at curbing free riding in order to ensure the continued provision of public goods, which can be leveraged to develop more effective measures to promote compliance with regulations. We also highlight factors beyond free riding that reduce compliance rates, such as the emergence of conspiratorial thinking, which seriously undermine the effectiveness of measures to suppress free riding. Together, the current paper outlines the social dynamics that occur in public goods dilemmas involving the spread of infectious disease, highlights the utility and limits of evolutionary game-theoretic approaches for COVID-19 management, and suggests novel directions based on emerging challenges to cooperation.


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Isamu Okada

Abstract Indirect reciprocity is one of the main principles of evolving cooperation in a social dilemma situation. In reciprocity, a positive score is given to cooperative behaviour while a negative score is given to non-cooperative behaviour, and the dilemma is resolved by selectively cooperating only with those with positive scores. However, many studies have shown that non-cooperation with those who have not cooperated also downgrades one's reputation; they have called this situation the scoring dilemma. To address this dilemma, the notion of justified punishments has been considered. The notion of justified punishment allows good individuals who defect against bad co-players to keep their standing. Despite numerous studies on justified punishment, it is unknown whether this solution leads to a new type of dilemma because reputations may be downgraded when the intent of punishment is not correctly communicated. The dilemma of punishment has so far been rarely analysed, and thus, the complete solution of the mechanism for evolving cooperation using the principle of indirect reciprocity has not been found yet. Here, we identify sufficient conditions to overcome each of the three dilemmas including the dilemma of punishment to maintain stable cooperation by using the framework of evolutionary game theory. This condition includes the principle of detecting free riders, which resolves the social dilemma, the principle of justification, which resolves the scoring dilemma, and the principle of generosity, which resolves the dilemma of punishment. A norm that satisfies these principles can stably maintain social cooperation. Our insights may offer a general assessment principle that applies to a wide range of subjects, from individual actions to national decisions.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Ronghan Yao ◽  
Xiaojing Du ◽  
Wenyan Qi ◽  
Li Sun

With the development of the connected autonomous bus, the interactions between the bus and social vehicle during the mandatory lane changing for bus exiting become more diverse and complex. This research investigates the evolutionary dynamics of behavioral decision-making for the bus and social vehicle in different scenarios. The evolutionary game model for the connected autonomous bus and social vehicle is built, as do the human-driven bus and social vehicle, and the connected autonomous bus under different penetration rates and social vehicle. The results of numerical experiments reveal that the connected autonomous bus chooses to change lanes in most instances, and the strategies of the human-driven bus show conservative tendencies. Such tendencies are weakened when the connected autonomous bus and human-driven bus are mixed. As for the social vehicle in different scenarios, the strategies that balance overall traffic safety and efficiency are promoted. This research provides some references for intelligent decision-making of lane changing in urban public transportation.


Author(s):  
Tripat Gill

AbstractThe ethical dilemma (ED) of whether autonomous vehicles (AVs) should protect the passengers or pedestrians when harm is unavoidable has been widely researched and debated. Several behavioral scientists have sought public opinion on this issue, based on the premise that EDs are critical to resolve for AV adoption. However, many scholars and industry participants have downplayed the importance of these edge cases. Policy makers also advocate a focus on higher level ethical principles rather than on a specific solution to EDs. But conspicuously absent from this debate is the view of the consumers or potential adopters, who will be instrumental to the success of AVs. The current research investigated this issue both from a theoretical standpoint and through empirical research. The literature on innovation adoption and risk perception suggests that EDs will be heavily weighted by potential adopters of AVs. Two studies conducted with a broad sample of consumers verified this assertion. The results from these studies showed that people associated EDs with the highest risk and considered EDs as the most important issue to address as compared to the other technical, legal and ethical issues facing AVs. As such, EDs need to be addressed to ensure robustness in the design of AVs and to assure consumers of the safety of this promising technology. Some preliminary evidence is provided about interventions to resolve the social dilemma in EDs and about the ethical preferences of prospective early adopters of AVs.


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