Ethical marketing strategies: the unique Nash equilibrium

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nagarajan Krishnamurthy ◽  
Biswanath Swain ◽  
Jayasankar Ramanathan
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Production Process ◽  
Market Share ◽  
Marketing Ethics ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Industrial Marketing ◽  
Market Shares ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Unique Nash Equilibrium

Purpose Can industrial marketers afford to choose unethical strategies? To answer this question, this study aims to use game theory to analyze whether an industrial marketer choosing and implementing an unethical strategy is successful in maximizing her market share across her strategies. Design/methodology/approach The competition between two industrial marketers is modeled as a strategic game for the market share of a product that is identical in all attributes except the production process. Each industrial marketer’s objective is to choose to implement either the ethical or the unethical production process to maximize her market share. Findings The study finds that both industrial marketers choosing to implement ethical strategies is the unique Nash equilibrium of the game. That is, an industrial marketer choosing to implement an unethical strategy in the production process will be unsuccessful in maximizing her market share when both the industrial marketers are rational. Research limitations/implications The study contributes to the literature on industrial marketing ethics, particularly that on product ethics, by showing that industrial marketers gain market share if they choose ethical strategies. Practical implications The study has implications for industrial marketing executives, as organizational consumers are increasingly aware of the strategies of industrial marketers. Failure to implement ethical strategies will cause industrial marketers to forgo their best possible market shares. Originality/value This study’s novelty lies in using a game theoretic approach to demonstrate the positive implications of ethical strategies for industrial marketers.

A game theoretic approach to optimal pricing of flights and passengers at congested airports

2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 434-454 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ata Allah Taleizadeh ◽  
Moeen Sammak Jalali ◽  
Shib Sankar Sana
Keyword(s):  
Large Scale ◽  
Congestion Pricing ◽  
Influential Factors ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Numerical Examples ◽  
Proposed Model ◽  
Managerial Implications ◽  
Game Theoretic

Purpose This paper aims to embark a mathematical model based on investigation and comparison of airport pricing policies under various types of competition, considering both per-passenger and per-flight charges at congested airports. Design/methodology/approach In this model, four-game theoretic strategies are assessed and closed-form formulas have been proved for each of the mentioned strategies. Numerical examples and graphical representations of the optimal solutions are provided to illustrate the models. Findings The rectitude of the presented formulas is evaluated with sensitivity analysis and numerical examples have been put forward. Finally, managerial implications are suggested by means of the proposed analysis. Research limitations/implications The represented model is inherently limited to investigate all the available and influential factors in the field of congestion pricing. With this regard, several studies can be implemented as the future research of this study. The applications of other game theoretic approaches such as Cartel games and its combination with the four mentioned games seem to be worthwhile. Moreover, it is recommended to investigate the effectiveness of the proposed model and formulations with a large-scale database. Originality/value The authors formulate a novel strategy that put forwards a four-game theoretic strategy, which helps managers to select the best suitable ones for their specific airline and/or air traveling companies. The authors find that by means of the proposed model, the application of Stackelberg–Bertrand behavior in the field of airport congestion pricing will rebound to a more profitable strategy in contrast with the other three represented methods.

The economic and pricing impact of authorized generic medicines in South Africa

2015 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 20-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shelley-Ann Marion McGee
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Market Share ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
Generic Competition ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Significance Level ◽  
Generic Entry ◽  
Market Shares ◽  
Two Samples ◽  
Significant Difference

Purpose – This paper aims to examine whether authorized generics (AGs) have influenced prices and market shares in markets for molecules facing generic competition in South Africa. AGs (clones), which are identical to the originator brands, offer a solution for originator companies to protect their markets from independent generic (IG) competition. IG competitors have claimed that AGs have a negative impact on pricing and competition. Design/methodology/approach – In a retrospective analysis, pricing and quantity data for 24 months post generic entry were extracted for oral solid dosage form products which experienced generic entry into their markets between 2005 and 2011, divided into “Authorized generic affected” and “no authorized generic” markets. A series of indices was calculated, as well as market shares of competing originator and generic products, and the number of generic competitors determined. Indices and market share data for clone affected and unaffected groups were tested at 6, 12, 18 and 24 months using unmatched t-tests, at a 95 per cent significance level. Findings – None of the evaluated pricing indices showed a consistently significant difference existing between AG-affected and no-AG samples. The only variable for which the two samples consistently differed was market shares, with originator brands experiencing significantly more market share erosion in AG-affected markets. Pricing levels of generics and originator products as well as growth of numbers of generic competitors were similar in both AG-affected and no-AG groups. Originality/value – A study of this nature on the impacts of AGs in the South African generics has not been previously published and reflects the situation particular to the country.

A game-theoretic model for roadway performance management

2014 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 40-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hesham Osman ◽  
Mazdak Nikbakht
Keyword(s):  
Asset Management ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Political Decision ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Road Users ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Asset Managers

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to present a socio-technical approach to modeling the behavior of roadway users, asset managers, and politicians toward roadway performance and asset management. This approach models the complex interactions that occur between these agents in a complex system. Most modeling approaches in the domain of infrastructure asset management take a purely asset-centric approach and fail to address these socio-technical interactions. Design/methodology/approach – Interactions among political decision makers, asset management strategy developers, and road users are modeled using a game-theoretic approach. The interactions are modeled as a non-cooperative game in which politicians, asset managers, and road users are the main players. Each player is autonomous and aims to come up with the set of moves to maximize their respective level of satisfaction in response to other players’ moves. Multi-attribute utility theory is used to deal with multitude of players’ goals, and the Nash equilibria of the game are south out to develop appropriate strategies for different players. Findings – An illustrative example for a road network of a Canadian city is used to demonstrate the developed methodology. The developed methodology demonstrates how behaviors of various agents involved in the sphere of asset management impacts their collective decision-making behavior. Originality/value – The developed framework provides asset managers and political decision makers with a valuable tool to evaluate the impact of public policy decisions related to asset managers on road performance and the overall satisfaction of road users.

The impacts of adaptive attacking and defending strategies on mitigation of intentional threats

Kybernetes ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 39 (5) ◽  
pp. 825-837 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jing Zhang ◽  
Shifei Shen ◽  
Rui Yang
Keyword(s):  
Information Disclosure ◽  
Stochastic Game ◽  
Adaptive Strategies ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Strategic Decision ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Disclosure Policy ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to focus on resource allocation and information disclosure policy for defending multiple targets against intentional attacks. The intentional attacks, like terrorism events, probably cause great losses and fatalities. Attackers and defenders usually make decisions based on incomplete information. Adaptive attacking and defending strategies are considered, to study how both sides make more effective decisions according to previous fights.Design/methodology/approachA stochastic game‐theoretic approach is proposed for modeling attacker‐defender conflicts. Attackers and defenders are supposed both to be strategic decision makers and partially aware of adversary's information. Adaptive strategies are compared with different inflexible strategies in a fortification‐patrol problem, where the fortification affects the security vulnerability of targets and the patrol indicates the defensive signal.FindingsThe result shows that the intentional risk would be elevated by adaptive attack strategies. An inflexible defending strategy probably fails when facing uncertainties of adversary. It is shown that the optimal response of defenders is to adjust defending strategies by learning from previous games and assessing behaviors of adversaries to minimize the expected loss.Originality/valueThis paper explores how adaptive strategies affect attacker‐defender conflicts. The key issue is defense allocation and information disclosure policy for mitigation of intentional threats. Attackers and defenders can adjust their strategies by learning from previous fights, and the strategic adjustment of both sides may be asynchronous.

Motive and conflict in the disaster recovery process

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (5) ◽  
pp. 408-419
Author(s):  
Chang Yeol Choi ◽  
Riki Honda
Keyword(s):  
Recovery Process ◽  
Indian Ocean Tsunami ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Key Factors ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Interactive Decision Making ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Housing Reconstruction ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

Purpose The purpose of this study is to address the key factors for the sustainable process of long-term recovery from disaster, with focus on interdependent decisions of various players. Design/methodology/approach The consistency among strategies of recovery players, who make a decision based not only on direct motive but also on various complex motives and interactions with other players, is considered. Interactive decision-making during the housing reconstruction project in Sri Lanka after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami is analyzed using game theory. Findings Regarding two important decisions defining the result of recovery, players’ possible decisions are evaluated, and by using the game theoretic approach, the reasons for poor output and the conditions to shift equilibrium to that which is suitable for the long-term goal of recovery are discussed. Originality/value These analyses show that motive compatibility among players should be considered when we design processes for recovery from disasters.

Coordination mechanisms for digital and sustainable textile supply chain

2022 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Patanjal Kumar ◽  
Dheeraj Sharma ◽  
Peeyush Pandey
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Deterministic Model ◽  
Virtual Organization ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Sustainable Supply Chain ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Coordination Model ◽  
Game Theoretic

PurposeSupply chain network is complicated to manage due to the involvement of a number of agents. Formation of virtual organization using Industry 4.0 (I4.0) is an approach to improve the efficiency and effectiveness and to overcome the complexities of the channel. However, the task of managing the channel further becomes complicated after incorporating sustainability into the supply chain. To fill this gap, this paper focuses on designing of mechanism and demonstration of I4.0-based virtual organization to coordinate sustainable supply chain.Design/methodology/approachIn this paper, we model and compare I4.0-based virtual organization models using four other traditional contracts with centralized supply chain. The non-cooperative game theoretic approach has been used for the analysis of models.FindingsOur game-theoretic analysis shows that investment in I4.0 and sustainable innovation are beneficial for the overall supply chain. Our results show that linear two-part tariff contract and I4.0-based virtual organization model can perfectly coordinated with the supply chain.Research limitations/implicationsThis study consider deterministic model settings with full information game. Therefore researchers are encouraged to study I4.0-based coordination models under information asymmetry and uncertain situations.Practical implicationsThe paper includes implications for the development of I4.0-based coordination model to tackle the problems of channel coordination.Originality/valueThis study proposes I4.0-based game-theoretic model for the sustainable supply chain coordination.

Do product variants appeal to different segments of buyers within a category?

2009 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 95-105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giang Trinh ◽  
John Dawes ◽  
Larry Lockshin
Keyword(s):  
Market Share ◽  
Consumer Goods ◽  
Employment Status ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Demographic Characteristics ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Demographic Groups ◽  
Demographic Group ◽  
Market Shares ◽  
Buyer Behaviour

PurposeThis study responds to the call of Fader and Hardie for more research on buyer behaviour toward stock keeping units (SKU). This paper aims to examine whether different SKU‐based product variants appeal to buyers with different demographic characteristics.Design/methodology/approachThis study examines the product variants (such as size, formulation, type) of a range of brands in six consumer goods categories. The authors calculate and compare the market share of each variant within each demographic group. If a variant has a higher market share within a specific demographic group than the overall average, this indicates segmentation at the product variant level.FindingsThe findings show that there are many differences in the market shares of product variants among different demographic groups of buyers. The largest differences are found extensively within the age and employment status variables.Originality/valueFunctionally different product variants tend to draw different demographic‐based segments of buyers, which has not been previously shown.

scholarly journals Airline Booking Limit Competition Game Under Differentiated Fare Structure

2017 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 615-622 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joonkyum Lee ◽  
Bumsoo Kim
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Airline Industry ◽  
Relative Magnitude ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Pure Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Initial Allocation ◽  
Best Response ◽  
Booking Limits ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

We address a two-firm booking limit competition game in the airline industry. We assume aggregate common demand, and differentiated ticket fare and capacity, to make this study more realistic. A game theoretic approach is used to analyze the competition game. The optimal booking limits and the best response functions are derived. We show the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium and provide the closed-form equilibrium solution. The location of the Nash equilibrium depends on the relative magnitude of the ratios of the full and discount fares. We also show that the sum of the booking limits of the two firms remains the same regardless of the initial allocation proportion of the demand.

IMPACT OF RETAILER COMPETITION ON MANUFACTURER'S DECISIONS AND PROFITS AT EQUILIBRIUM

2013 ◽  
Vol 15 (04) ◽  
pp. 1340032
Author(s):  
PARSHURAM S. HOTKAR ◽  
USHA MOHAN
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Stochastic Demand ◽  
Uniform Pricing ◽  
Horizontal Competition ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Unique Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Set Up

As most of the supply chains in practice are decentralized, a key issue in supply chain management is to study the coordination of supply chain. The interactions among players are typically of two types, viz. vertical competition and horizontal competition. We use a game theoretic framework to analyze a two-stage supply chain. The supply chain is modeled as a Stackelberg game with a manufacturer as leader and multiple retailers as followers. We consider multiple retailers competing on quantities (Cournot competition) and study its impact on manufacturer's equilibrium decisions and profits. We show that the wholesale price contract does not achieve Nash equilibrium when retailers offer uniform pricing. On the other hand, in case of perfect price discrimination we prove the existence of unique Nash equilibrium in both deterministic and stochastic demand set-up. Under stochastic demand set-up, we consider information asymmetry between the manufacturer and retailers with respect to demand signal. Furthermore, we show the retailers' selling effort boost up the sales. As variance of sales can hurt the manufacturer's production decisions badly, we conjecture that the manufacturer can offer a retailer incentive contract which can manipulate retailers' equilibrium decision.

A game-theoretic approach to evaluating the competitiveness of container carriers in the Northeast Asian shipping market

2017 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 854-869 ◽  
Author(s):  
Byung-In Park ◽  
Hokey Min
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Asia Pacific ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Maritime Logistics ◽  
Actual Case ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Northeast Asian ◽  
Pricing Schemes

Purpose In times of increasing shipping risks and uncertainty, the purpose of this paper is to analyze fiercely competitive shipping markets in the Asia-Pacific region and help the carriers develop the optimal pricing schemes, shipping networks (e.g. routes and shipping frequency), and future investment plans. Design/methodology/approach This paper develops viable maritime logistics strategies based on the non-cooperative game theory which determines the optimal vessel size/type, shipping route, and shipping frequency, while taking into account multiple cost components and unpredictable shipping market dynamics. Findings This study revealed that the container carrier’s optimal shipping strategy was insensitive to changes in freight rates, fuel prices, and loading/unloading fees at the destination ports. However, it tends to be more sensitive to an increase in the shipping volume than the aforementioned parameters. In other words, aggressive pricing schemes and drastic cost-cutting measures alone cannot enhance carrier competitiveness in today’s shipping markets characterized by overcapacity and weak demand. Originality/value This paper is one of a few attempts to identify a host of factors influencing the container carrier’s competitiveness using the game theory and develop an optimal shipping strategy in the presence of conflicting interests of multiple stakeholders (e.g. carriers, shippers, and port authorities). To validate the rigor and usefulness of the proposed game-theoretic model, the authors also experiment it with an actual case study of container carriers serving the Northeast Asian shipping market.

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