Sudan’s new government offers few new ideas

Subject The ruling party's response to the Sudan protests. Significance President Omar al-Bashir and the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) continue to face severe pressure from recurrent public protests that began last December. Chronic economic difficulties have contributed to civil unrest and protesters have called for Bashir to step down. Impacts New protest escalations are likely but may be short-lived. Security forces will continue to use harsh measures to deter protesters. The government will likely seek further political and financial support from the Gulf.

Significance The attack was an attempt to undermine the nine month old national unity government headed by President Ashraf Ghani, who is already losing public confidence since the cabinet is still incomplete and the country still lacks a viable security plan. Meanwhile, Taliban gains in the north have prompted the government to arm local militias to bolster its security forces. According to UN figures, the insurgency has left 974 dead and 1,963 injured in the first four months of 2015 -- a 16% rise on 2014. Impacts Growing public discontent could open spaces for competing leaders and groups opposed to the government, threatening civil unrest. Absent a viable security strategy, NATO may slow the military drawdown, implying extended involvement. Foreign investors, especially China, could renege on their investment commitments if the Taliban continue taking new territory.


Subject The presidential and parliamentary elections in April. Significance President Omar Hassan al-Bashir has been in power for nearly 26 years. In the past four years Bashir and the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) have weathered the secession of South Sudan, economic stagnation, protests and renewed armed conflict in parts of the country. The government has committed itself to holding full elections on April 13-15 in line with the electoral timetable, but much of the competitive politicking has already taken place. Impacts Economic policy and practice will not change, with government departments suffering from politicisation and interests that deter reform. The low-level conflicts in Blue Nile, South Kordofan and Darfur will remain unresolved. Khartoum and central and northern Sudan will remain secure unless a political crisis occurs at the centre.


Subject Rising instability in Burkina Faso Significance After two years in office, President Roch Marc Christian Kabore’s government is facing a wave of strikes, student protests and demonstrations by disgruntled local communities. This unrest comes as the Burkinabe security forces struggle to contain salafi-jihadist insurgents in the north amid public criticisms of poor government leadership. Kabore's administration has stated that a recent cabinet reshuffle will refocus energies on the National Plan for Economic and Social Development (PNDES). However, growing public discontent is emboldening the previously weak opposition. Impacts Growing civil unrest could divert funding and resources from the northern provinces most vulnerable to terrorist attacks. The government will try to avoid clamping down on protests for fear of aiding the opposition further. If conducted fairly, long-delayed trials of former regime leaders could increase the government’s popularity.


Subject Sudan’s ruling party, its capabilities and political implications. Significance President Omar al-Bashir has been in power for 27 years, supported by the National Congress Party (NCP) and its predecessor, the National Islamic Front (NIF). Following the completion last year of a 'national dialogue', the government is ostensibly due to form a new cabinet this year. While some breakaway or new political parties cooperate with the NCP, the core Sudanese opposition parties -- long-standing and newer ones -- continue to oppose the government; some boycotted the national dialogue. Impacts The national security apparatus will maintain tight controls on Sudanese activists and media. The government will look to Arab allies for further budgetary assistance. New anti-government protests and strikes remain a risk.


Significance The Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) coalition of civilian and rebel groups have rejected the deal, but Hamdok has justified it on the grounds that (among other things) it will prevent the return of the former ruling National Congress Party (NCP), apparently responding to ongoing speculation over whether NCP-era Islamists influenced Burhan’s October 25 coup. Impacts Burhan will probably limit the work of the Empowerment Removal Committee, which aims to dismantle NCP-era power structures. Any empowerment of Islamists will likely be selective, to avoid alienating regional powers or FFC figures who might be open to cooperation. A marked turn towards Islamism would undermine the chances of a peace deal with holdout rebel groups who seek a secular state.


Significance The government claims opposition factions linked to Guaido are behind the upsurge of ‘GEDO’ violence (Grupo Estructurado de Delincuencia Organizada, or Structured Organised Crime Group). Efforts by security forces to ‘stabilise’ GEDO-dominated communities may portend an upsurge in state violence. Impacts The Haitian president’s killing has strengthened the government narrative of externally orchestrated mercenary warfare. Concerns about state decomposition in Venezuela will add urgency to international efforts at successful dialogue. An already weakened Guaido is on the back foot following Guevara’s arrest and lacks the authority to enforce any negotiated outcomes.


Significance This came after the government announced plans for a 4G spectrum auction in March 2021, after a five-year gap. There is growing speculation that this will be followed by an auction of 5G spectrum later in the year. Impacts Reliance’s lead on 5G will boost its broader digital business strategy. New financial support to indebted telcos will help to avoid further strain on public sector banks. Data tariffs are likely to remain competitive in India, even after a new floor price.


2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruiti Aretaake

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to report how the encouragement of collaboration between local stakeholders, communities and the government helps slow the great impact of disaster risks and the impacts of climate change on livelihoods and lives. It also describes how promoting the acceptance and contributions of traditional knowledge in this effort owing to their accessibility and affordability and their cultural compatibility with the community contributes to addressing the challenges in Kiribati faces. Design/methodology/approach Drawing on government and NGO reports, as well as other documentary sources, this paper examines the nature of current efforts and the state of community practices in Kiribati. Findings Disaster risks and climate change are currently destroying all facets of I-Kiribati life. It is, therefore, imperative that a holistic form of partnership bringing together both state and non-state actors and that through this community awareness be implemented within the Kiribati policies and community development programs to improve dissemination of prevention and risk reduction programs, while maintaining the cultural infrastructure. Social implications Access to modern technologies and factors which inhibit local utilization of natural resources as well as traditional Kiribati beliefs about environment issues and impacts on people illustrate the potential and difficulties of convergence of new ideas with traditional knowledge. Originality/value The Kiribati “Frontline” project is an activity which has been led by the Foundation for the Peoples of the South Pacific Kiribati, both stimulated and in part subsidized by the Global Network for Disaster Reduction that provided financial support to work with rural and urban communities on mitigating disaster risks and climate change issues.


Significance The government has changed hands only once since independence in 1966: in 1992 the People's Progressive Party (PPP), led by Cheddi Jagan, assumed power following 26 years of People's National Congress (PNC) government. Since the last election in 2011 the government has been hamstrung by a parliament in which a coalition of opposition parties, including the PNC, held a one-seat majority. The result has been gridlock, with no new legislation approved, and continuous disputes over the budget, government spending and agreements with foreign investors. Impacts The election could allow a new government to work toward consensus-building. This might facilitate policies to develop Guyana's potential, and narrow the socioeconomic gap with the rest of the region. If the result is close, political tension and deadlock will persist, undermining the business climate, investment and social progress.


Significance In Morocco, more than 35 police officers were injured in clashes with demonstrators in al-Hoceima commemorating the anniversary of the death of a local anti-colonial hero on February 5. Unconfirmed reports said nearly 200 protesters were injured in nearby towns. Impacts Well-publicised incidents of police abuse or government neglect could trigger wider protests and civil unrest. Growing protests could trigger more violent clashes with security forces that could become a political liability for governments. Governments will come under greater pressure to rein in corruption and abuse of power.


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