COVID-19 will not disrupt climate activism in Europe

Significance Activists have pressed for involvement in policymaking via citizen assembilies and have stepped up their campaign against European governments and financial institutions which they regard as favouring carbon-intensive industries. Impacts Activists will be concerned by rising emissions that accompany higher consumption once lockdown restrictions are lifted. The social and economic impact of COVID-19 may reduce voter interest and engagement in climate change. A strong electoral performance by Germany’s Green Party would boost support for ambitious fiscal and climate policy at the EU-level.

Significance Worth 54 billion euros (60 billion dollars) until 2023, the reforms are designed to help Germany reach its target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 55% of 1990 levels by 2030. This comes after the government said it would fail to reach its 2020 goal of a 40% reduction. Impacts Germany’s ambition to become a front-runner in the global fight against climate change will likely continue to suffer. Protests similar to France's 'yellow vest' movement are unlikely as the proposals avoid pain for lower- and middle-income voters. The proposed policies could put pressure on industrial firms to lower their heating and fuel costs. Given the economic impact that ambitious climate policy could have on industry and consumers, reforms to the deal will likely be modest.


Subject Austria's new government. Significance On January 2, the centre-right People's Party (OVP) and the Greens Party presented a coalition deal after months of negotiations that required significant compromise. In particular, they hold opposing views on immigration, social affairs and climate policy. The potential for discord in these areas is the main risk for this government. Impacts Austria’s unprecedented coalition could increase support in Germany for a coalition between the CDU and Greens. Budget constraints and Green objections may prevent Kurz from replacing Austria's Eurofighter jets during this legislative period. Austria will seek to reform the EU-Mercosur deal, citing the need for higher standards in animal welfare and climate protection.


2021 ◽  
Vol 73 (05) ◽  
pp. 8-8
Author(s):  
Pam Boschee

Carbon credits, carbon taxes, and emissions trading systems are familiar terms in discussions about limiting global warming, the Paris Agreement, and net-zero emissions goals. A more recent addition to the glossary of climate policy is “carbon tariff.” While the concept is not new, it recently surfaced in nascent policymaking in the EU. In 2019, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen proposed a “carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM)” as part of a proposed green deal. In March, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on a World Trade Organization (WTO)-compatible CBAM. A carbon tariff, or the EU’s CBAM, is a tax applied to carbon-intensive imports. Countries that have pledged to be more ambitious in reducing emissions—and in some cases have implemented binding targets—may impose carbon costs on their own businesses. Being eyed now are cross-border or overseas businesses that make products in countries in which no costs are imposed for emissions, resulting in cheaper carbon-intensive goods. Those products are exported to the countries aiming for reduced emissions. The concern lies in the risk of locally made goods becoming unfairly disadvantaged against competitors that are not taking similar steps to deal with climate change. A carbon tariff is being considered to level the playing field: local businesses in countries applying a tariff can better compete as climate policies evolve and are adopted around the world. Complying with WTO rules to ensure fair treatment, the CBAM will be imposed only on high-emitting industries that compete directly with local industries paying a carbon price. In the short term, these are likely to be steel, chemicals, fertilizers, and cement. The Parliament’s statement introduced another term to the glossary of climate policy: carbon leakage. “To raise global climate ambition and prevent ‘carbon leakage,’ the EU must place a carbon price on imports from less climate-ambitious countries.” It refers to the situation that may occur if businesses were to transfer production to other countries with laxer emission constraints to avoid costs related to climate policies. This could lead to an increase in total emissions in the higher-emitting countries. “The resolution underlines that the EU’s increased ambition on climate change must not lead to carbon leakage as global climate efforts will not benefit if EU production is just moved to non-EU countries that have less ambitious emissions rules,” the Parliament said. It also emphasized the tariff “must not be misused to further protectionism.” A member of the environment committee, Yannick Jadot, said, “It is a major political and democratic test for the EU, which must stop being naïve and impose the same carbon price on products, whether they are produced in or outside the EU, to ensure the most polluting sectors also take part in fighting climate change and innovate towards zero carbon. This will give us the best chance of remaining below the 1.5°C warming limit, whilst also pushing our trading partners to be equally ambitious in order to enter the EU market.” The Commission is expected to present a legislative proposal on a CBAM in the second quarter of 2021 as part of the European Green Deal.


2018 ◽  
Vol 60 (6) ◽  
pp. 1412-1431
Author(s):  
Nejia Nekaa ◽  
Sami Boudabbous

Purpose The purpose of this study is to show the specificities of the corporate governance of Tunisian financial institutions and the impact of the internal mechanisms of corporate governance of these institutions on their social performance. It is therefore interesting to establish the existing relationship between these mechanisms of corporate governance and the performance of a financial firm. Design/methodology/approach This study aims to study the financial sector, generally characterized by its opacity, its regulation, its evolution and its obscurity. Therefore, a study based on the questionnaire method was recommended. The questionnaire is intended for managers. Therefore, the authors interviewed 138 managers of Tunisian financial institutions dispersed between agencies and headquarters in different regions (Gabes, Tozeur, Gafsa, Sfax, Sousse and Tunisia). Findings As a result, an impact on performance was observed according to the empirical study. Therefore, the authors can conclude an essential role of internal mechanisms for improving the social performance of a financial institution. The empirical findings in this paper lead to important conclusions. Indeed, the variables measuring the governance mechanisms have divergent effects on the social performance of the financial institutions subject to the sample. For the variables board of directors, confidence, culture, auditing, they have a positive effect. While, the incentive remuneration effect negatively the social performance. Originality/value This study will be based essentially on the financial sector in Tunisia: the credit institutions (22 banks), the establishments of leasing (eight companies of leasing), two factoring companies and two banks of cases which are listed on the Stock Exchange of Tunis (BVMT).


Significance A significant rise in Afghan refugees is unlikely over the coming weeks due to geographical barriers, but European governments are bracing themselves for a significant rise over the coming months. Greek Migration Minister Notis Mitarachi says the EU is not prepared for another migration crisis. Impacts With upcoming elections, Germany and France will be wary of taking in large numbers of refugees. Division over immigration could damage EU cooperation in other areas, such as climate change or fiscal policy. The strongest opposition to migration burden-sharing is likely to come from Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kalle Johannes Rose

Purpose Recent research shows that because of money-laundering risks, there has been an increase in the off-boarding of certain types of corporate clients in the financial sector. This phenomenon known as “de-risking” has been argued to have a negative impact on society, because it increases the possible risk of money laundering. The purpose of this paper is to analyze whether the de-risking strategy of financial institutions results in an expansion of the regulatory framework concerning anti-money laundering focusing on off-boarding of clients and, if so, is there a way to avoid further regulation by changing present behavior. Design/methodology/approach This paper applies functional methods to law and economics to achieve higher efficiency in combating money laundering. Findings In this paper, it is found that the continuing of de-risking by financial institutions because of the avoidance strategy of money-laundering risks will inevitably result in further regulatory demands regarding the off-boarding process of clients. The legal basis for the introduction of further regulatory intervention is that some of the de-risking constitutes a direct contradiction to the aim of the present regulatory framework, making the behavior non-compliant to the regulation. Originality/value There has been very little research concerning de-risking related to money laundering. The present research has focused on the effect on society and not the relationship between the financial institutions and the regulator. This paper raises an important and present problem, as the behavior of the financial institutions constitute a response from the regulator that is contradicting the thoughts behind the behavior of the financial institutions. It is found that the paper is highly relevant if an expansion of regulation is to be hindered.


2015 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 110-133 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michał Krzyżanowski

This article analyses European Union policy discourses on climate change from the point of view of constructions of identity. Articulated in a variety of policy-related genres, the EU rhetoric on climate change is approached as example of the Union’s international discourse, which, contrary to other areas of EU policy-making, relies strongly on discursive frameworks of international and global politics of climate change. As the article shows, the EU’s peculiar international – or even global – leadership in tackling the climate change is constructed in an ambivalent and highly heterogeneous discourse that runs along several vectors. While it on the one hand follows the more recent, inward-looking constructions of Europe known from the EU policy and political discourses of the 1990s and 2000s, it also revives some of the older discursive logics of international competition known from the earlier stages of the European integration. In the analysis, the article draws on the methodological apparatus of the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) in Critical Discourse Studies. Furthering the DHA studies of EU policy and political discourses, the article emphasises the viability of the discourse-historical methodology applied in the combined analysis of EU identity and policy discourses.


Significance The United States has already committed, in an unprecedented deal with China in November 2014, to reducing its emissions to 26-28% below 2005 levels by 2025 (an improvement on its previous 17% goal). China in return pledged that its emissions would peak around 2030. This agreement is a game-changer for combating global climate change, since the two countries are the world's largest sources of carbon emissions, together accounting for 40% of the total, and were not covered under the now-expired Kyoto Protocol. Impacts Washington is poised to reclaim its place, lost after Kyoto, as a leader in global efforts against climate change. US-China climate cooperation initiatives could serve as templates for other developing countries. There are new opportunities for trilateral cooperation involving the EU. Fears that the bilateral agreement makes the UNFCCC obsolete are unwarranted, but it could preclude more ambitious efforts.


Significance Seven years after the government of President Rafael Correa signalled its intention to make mining one of the key pillars of its economic and political programme, the sector remains underdeveloped. Nonetheless, activity in the sector has increased, suggesting that changes the government has introduced in the last few years have started to take effect. Impacts The balance of political power in the next government is likely to remain broadly favourable for mining companies. Nevertheless, local politics and opposition will slow development and could even prevent it. The government will focus on 'responsible mining' in an effort to create broad-based political support for sectoral development. The government's links with financial institutions and its free trade deal with the EU will reassure mining firms of their investments.


Significance This is a lower forecast than the 170,000 the agency predicted in October, before Sweden reimposed controls at its border with Denmark. The immigration issue is causing strains within the minority two-party coalition government. The junior Green Party has lost several key battles in the last couple of months and is said to be questioning its participation in the government. Some scepticism has crept into the ranks of the Social Democrats as well, with several senior members encouraging the leadership to form a new government with the Moderate Party. Impacts With so many asylum seekers already in the country, Sweden's infrastructure will be pushed to the limit. Every misstep will cause further problems for the government. The Greens will either be allowed to push their own agenda within the government, or will break away. With polls showing a clear majority for the opposition, the temptation to bring down the government may prove too hard to resist. If the opposition joins forces to submit a budget proposal in the autumn, the current minority government must resign.


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