New states in South Sudan could entrench patronage

Subject Governance in South Sudan. Significance In late 2015, President Salva Kiir ordered that the country’s ten states be redrawn to create 28 states. In January, he then ordered the creation of four more states, taking the total to 32. This is unfolding against limited outbreaks of fighting around the country, sometimes in areas which were more stable in past periods of insecurity. Kiir is trying to keep alive the Transitional Government of National Unity, formed out of the 2015 peace agreement but jeopardised by the crisis in mid-2016. Impacts Localised upsurges of fighting will continue, risking a larger crisis. Juba will watch for evidence of Sudanese or Ethiopian support for Machar that may exacerbate security concerns. No one has the power to topple Kiir, except potentially for a senior military figure in Juba. The creation of new states will do little for the prospects of needed investment and development.

Subject Impact and outlook for sanctions in South Sudan. Significance As concerns grow that a new transitional government of national unity envisaged under the September 2018 peace agreement may not be formed on time on November 12, sanctions are again an open topic of debate. Already, on October 11, the US Treasury sanctioned two businessmen for their involvement in bribery, kickbacks and procurement fraud with government officials, and US officials have warned of new sanctions against any who derail the peace agreement. Impacts The presence of major Asian companies provides the oil sector with some measure of protection from Western sanctions. Reputational and financial risk may nevertheless prompt some international oil traders to reduce their dealings with South Sudan. High levels of domestic poverty and humanitarian need will deter a more sweeping economic sanctions regime.


Subject Uganda's regional policy. Significance Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni on September 16 attended a series of meetings in Khartoum with incoming South Sudanese First Vice-President Riek Machar. Machar's spokesperson said that the main outcome was Uganda's assurance that it will withdraw its military (UPDF) from South Sudan as per the recent South Sudan peace agreement. The development reflects a wider context in which Uganda's regional clout is under strain. Impacts Military intervention in Somalia will exacerbate that country's spillover effects for insecurity in the wider region. The UPDF's role in AMISOM heightens Uganda's vulnerability to al-Shabaab attacks. However, Uganda will manage these better than Kenya, partly due to its long-term character as a security state.


Significance South Sudan is facing severe conflict and insecurity, a prolonged political crisis, and dire economic conditions. A peace agreement signed in August 2015 is falling apart, and fighting and violence during the past year has caused the number of South Sudanese refugees in Uganda to rise to 900,000 -- with a further 375,000 in Sudan and 287,000 in Ethiopia. Earlier this year, aid agencies declared a famine situation in several counties, and appealed for more humanitarian aid and improved access. Impacts Oil output is likely to remain at, or near, 130,000-160,000 barrels per day. Juba’s fiscal situation will remain precarious, with the government unable to secure loans from donors. Unrest and limited strikes over salary arrears could increase.


Subject The performance and prospects of South Sudan’s oil sector. Significance The signing in September of a notional peace agreement has raised the question of whether South Sudan’s authorities can now boost oil production and revenues -- and whether they will use any new revenues to support peace. Impacts Output is unlikely to rise far above 130,000-150,000 b/d in 2019. Details about oil revenues and their distribution will remain largely hidden. Major oil companies will continue to shun South Sudan as an investment destination.


Significance The current government’s mandate was meant to end this year. Instead, elections prescribed for 2021 have been delayed to 2023, ostensibly to allow more time to implement the 2018 peace agreement that ended the country’s civil war. Even with such a delay, the path to elections is likely to be littered with challenges. Impacts Few new opposition groups will consider forming political parties, as military strength is still viewed as the only viable route to power. Opposition groups may form alliances to boost their bargaining power, but talking with government is seen as more viable than toppling it. The post-election period will also be volatile, amid likely rejections of results or attempts to negotiate access to non-elected posts.


2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (153) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  

While the peace agreement signed in September 2018 has improved the prospects for lasting peace in South Sudan, the implementation of the agreement has become more protracted than envisaged with the recently announced six-month delay in forming a new national unity government. A relapse into war in mid-2016 spread insecurity across the country and severely affected all economic activities and exacerbated the humanitarian crisis and food insecurity. The country is in a serious economic crisis.


Significance It follows rebel leader Riek Machar's return to the capital and inauguration as vice-president on April 26. The TGNU's formation is central to the peace agreement signed in August last year, and is a positive step towards ending the civil war, which has resulted in over 50,000 civilian deaths. Impacts Civilians displaced by fighting will return to stable areas, but local-level disputes could drive new outflows in some regions. Oil output will increase if the Unity fields are re-opened, but the revenue benefits for Juba will be subdued due to low oil prices. The 12,000-strong UN peacekeeping force will prove insufficient to maintain security, especially in remote areas.


Subject US policy towards South Sudan Significance Senior US officials have recently taken a harder line with South Sudan’s leaders over the country’s civil war, having resolved that President Salva Kiir’s government is principally to blame for the ongoing conflict and the collapse of a 2015 peace deal. After two senior US officials visited Juba to make it clear that “a serious re-examination” of US policy was underway, the administration announced a new round of sanctions designations and more public condemnation. Washington has hinted that further pressure is to come, but the spike in rhetoric may be more indicative of frustration than of a new strategy. Impacts The HLRF is unlikely to rescue the peace agreement, setting the stage for more violence as the dry season approaches. The government’s already low levels of popular legitimacy will further erode amid conflict and economic decay. Absent US leadership, Europe and the UN are unlikely to forge new initiatives without a clear request from the region. Further US sanctions may bar US oil companies from entering the South Sudan market and deter other investors.


Significance Two years after the peace agreement, South Sudan is still at war -- and political, security, humanitarian and economic conditions are dire. Nevertheless, the balance of power within the country has shifted dramatically, and internal and external parties are now starting to reposition. Impacts Conflict intensity will reduce during the rainy season but further clashes are likely. Malaria and water-borne diseases will add to humanitarian pressures. Credible new investment in the oil sector is unlikely before 2019 at the earliest.


2019 ◽  
Vol 41 (5) ◽  
pp. 667-680
Author(s):  
Nina Caspersen

For some separatist movements, interim agreements offer a possible route to recognized statehood. However, such agreements require these movements to compromise on their demand for immediate independence and risk the preservation of the joint state. How is this reconciled with their claim to self-determination and how is it received by the community they claim to represent? This article examines four post-Cold War cases where an interim agreement has been accepted (New Caledonia, Bougainville, Montenegro and South Sudan). It finds that interim agreements are more easily accepted when the community is significantly divided on the issue of independence and when an inclusive and flexible construction of the community predominates. Somewhat paradoxically, this suggests that new states are more likely to emerge in cases without a determined, cohesive, ethnically defined demand for independence.


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