Disrupted Exchange and Declining Corporatism: Government Authority and Interest Group Capability in Scandinavia

2011 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 365-391 ◽  
Author(s):  
PerOla Öberg ◽  
Torsten Svensson ◽  
Peter Munk Christiansen ◽  
Asbjørn Sonne Nørgaard ◽  
Hilmar Rommetvedt ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Longitudinal Data ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Group Relations ◽  
Exchange Partner ◽  
The World ◽  
Main Pattern ◽  
Government Authority

AbstractDenmark, Norway and Sweden are still among the most corporatist democracies in the world. Although corporatism has declined in Scandinavia over the last decades, it still exists, albeit at a lower level. Based on comparative and longitudinal data, we argue that this is a consequence of the disruption of some of the prerequisites to corporatist exchange. Neither governments nor the relevant interest groups in Scandinavia control what their exchange partner desires to the same extent as they did during the heyday of corporatism. Despite the involvement of different factors in the three countries, the main pattern is the same. Consequently, the character of state–interest group relations in Scandinavia is not as distinctive as it used to be.

Persuading policy-makers

2019 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 507-542
Author(s):  
Christian Salas
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Policy Maker ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Public Signals ◽  
The World ◽  
Will Force ◽  
Public Signal ◽  
Opinion Polls

Interest groups persuade policy-makers by publicly providing information about policies—for example, through commissioning scientific studies or piloting programs—or about constituents’ views—for example, through opinion polls or organizing manifestations. By understanding these public lobbying activities as public signals whose informational content can be strategically manipulated, this paper studies the strategic use of these tools in order to persuade a policy-maker. A game between a policy-oriented interest group who can design a public signal and a self-interested executive who can implement a policy is used to analyze the equilibrium public signal and policy, the underlying persuasion mechanism, and the consequences for voters. This paper finds that, even when an interest group always wants the same policy regardless of the state of the world, voters can sometimes benefit from the group’s activity. Furthermore, voters may be best served by a worse (less able or more cynical) policy-maker. This is because a-priori a worse policy-maker will tend to herd on the prior relatively more than a better policy-maker; this will force interest groups to release greater amounts of information in order to change the policy-maker’s mind, which increases the probability that the voters’ best policy is implemented. Ideologically biased policy-makers are not totally undesirable either, for they induce similar incentives to interest groups of opposite ideology.

The Politics of Limited Pluralism? The Case of West Germany

1978 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 265-287 ◽  
Author(s):  
Klaus von Beyme
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Political Science ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
West Germany ◽  
Public Philosophy ◽  
Marginal Groups ◽  
European Democracy ◽  
The World ◽  
Cleavage Lines

THERE IS NO OTHER WEST EUROPEAN DEMOCRACY AS HIGHLY SUSPECT throughout the world so far as the extent of its tolerance towards deviant marginal groups is concerned. This is one of the reasons why West Germany is a good case for testing certain propositions about the theory of pluralism in general. In political science terminology pluralism has mostly been used in the restricted way of a certain stage of public philosophy, i.e. in the sense of ‘interest group liberalism’ propagating and perpetuating the faith that a system built primarily upon group bargaining must be perfectly selfcorrective and must have confidence in the balancing impacts of ‘overlapping memberships’ and contervailing powers. The ‘bias of pluralism’ in political science2 included a restriction of the notion ‘pluralism’ to interest groups. It was the highly disputable attempt to sum up all the forms of emancipation movements and their counterforces in the concept of ‘group’, thus equalizing them, and to line up all the cleavage lines which developed at different times of modern history (movements for religious autonomy, nationalism, conflicts between cities and countryside, class struggles etc.) and which had some impact on the formation of party systems, to compete in one arena.

After the “Master Theory”: Downs, Schattschneider, and the Rebirth of Policy-Focused Analysis

2014 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 643-662 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacob S. Hacker ◽  
Paul Pierson
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
American Politics ◽  
Institutional Environment ◽  
Political Struggle ◽  
Partisan Polarization ◽  
Contemporary Politics ◽  
The World ◽  
Election Results ◽  
Organized Interest ◽  
Government Authority

Drawing on the pioneering work of Anthony Downs, political scientists have tended to characterize American politics as a game among undifferentiated competitors, played out largely through elections, with outcomes reflecting how formal rules translate election results into legislative votes. In this perspective, voters, campaigns, elections, and the ideological distribution of legislators merit extensive scrutiny. Other features of the political environment—most notably, the policies these legislators help create and the interest groups that struggle over these policies—are deemed largely peripheral. However, contemporary politics often looks very different than the world described by Downs. Instead, it more closely resembles the world depicted by E. E. Schattschneider—a world in which policy and groups loom large, the influence of voters is highly conditional, and the key struggle is not over gaining office but over reshaping governance. Over the last twenty years, a growing body of scholarship has emerged that advances this corrective vision—an approach we call “policy-focused political science.” In this framework, politics is centrally about the exercise of government authority for particular substantive purposes. Such exercises of authority create the “terrain” for political struggle, profoundly shaping both individual and group political behavior. More important, because policies can be so consequential, they also serve as the “prize” for many of the most enduring political players, especially organized interest groups. The payoffs of a policy-focused perspective include a more accurate portrayal of the institutional environment of modern politics, an appreciation for the fundamental importance of organized groups, a better understanding of the dynamics of policy change, and a more accurate mapping of interests, strategies, and influence. These benefits are illustrated through brief examinations of two of the biggest changes in American politics over the last generation: asymmetric partisan polarization and the growing concentration of income at the top.

News and Notes

1980 ◽  
Vol 2 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 197-200
Author(s):  
D. Bruce Marshall
Keyword(s):  
International Economic ◽  
Los Angeles ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Economic Crisis ◽  
World Economy ◽  
International Studies ◽  
French Politics ◽  
The Troubles ◽  
Major Interest ◽  
The World

The Conference Group on French Politics and Society organized two panels on the theme: The International Economic Crisis – The French Response which were held in conjunction with the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association in Los Angeles on March 21-22, 1980. Chaired by Peter Gou rev itch (UC San Diego), the panelists considered some of the various solutions which the French Government and major interest groups have developed to cope with the troubles that persist in the world economy.

Agricultural policy debates: Examining the alternative and conventional perspectives

1993 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 98-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Curtis E. Beus ◽  
Riley E. Dunlap
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Agricultural Policy ◽  
Alternative Agriculture ◽  
Conventional Agriculture ◽  
Considerable Similarity ◽  
Policy Debates ◽  
Wide Range

AbstractControl of agricultural policymaking by the “agricultural establishment” has been challenged by a wide range of interests concerned with the externalities of modern industrialized agriculture. An “externalities/alternatives” or “ex/al” coalition appears to be an emerging force in agricultural policy debates. We surveyed three alternative agriculture groups, three conventional agriculture groups, and a statewide sample of farmers to learn whether each category forms a distinct, unified interest group whose perspectives on agricultural policy diverge substantially from the others'. There is considerable similarity among the alternative agriculture groups and among the conventional agriculture groups, the differences between them being much greater than the differences within each category. The statewide farmer sample is generally intermediate between the two sets of interest groups, but is closer to the conventional perspective on most issues.

Rising Global Challenges in Energy Demand and the Politics of Climate Change in Government Operations

2021 ◽  
pp. 242-263
Author(s):  
Sharon Nanyongo Njie ◽  
Ikedinachi Ayodele Power Wogu ◽  
Uchenna Kingsley Ogbuehi ◽  
Sanjay Misra ◽  
Oluwakemi Deborah Udoh
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Energy Demand ◽  
Living Conditions ◽  
Energy Sources ◽  
Global Energy ◽  
Global Challenges ◽  
Industrialized Nations ◽  
Global Demand ◽  
The World

While most governments subscribe to boosting global energy supplies since it paves the way for improved economies, which translates to better living conditions and gainful employments which in turn boost government operations, the rising global demand for energy from all human endeavors have activated unparalleled consequences on the environment, resulting to harmful repercussions for government operations and processes all over the world. Hence, scholars argue that the rising demand for global energy by industrialized nations have further increased the vulnerability of governments' operations and processes, especially in countries where these energy sources abound. Consequently, governments, multinationals, and various interest groups are divided on how best to address the quandaries resulting from rising global demand for energy and its effect on the environment and government operations. Recommendations that would enhance government operations were proposed.

Crisis Politics in Deficit Countries

2020 ◽  
pp. 108-149
Author(s):  
Stefanie Walter ◽  
Ari Ray ◽  
Nils Redeker
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Burden Sharing ◽  
Labor Market Reform ◽  
Secondary Sources ◽  
Business Interests ◽  
Group Position ◽  
Political Upheaval ◽  
External Actors ◽  
Crisis Responses

How did the preferences of interest groups shape the design and contentiousness of crisis policies in deficit countries? And how did external actors influence their crisis responses? This chapter investigates these questions by drawing on a wealth of primary and secondary sources including newspaper coverage, voter public opinion data, interest group position papers, sovereign bailout documentation, and original qualitative evidence from seventeen in-depth interviews with national interest group representatives in Ireland, Spain, and Greece. There was a large consensus among both interest groups and voters across all three countries that external adjustment—that is, unilateral euro exit—should be avoided at all cost. This left financing and internal adjustment as the only options, and significant conflicts flared up in all three countries about how the costs associated with internal adjustment (and to a lesser extent financing) should be distributed. Within the confines set by the Troika, which effectively narrowed down the range of options available to deficit countries, interest groups pushed for reforms to which they were least vulnerable. Business interests, for example, generally supported adopting comprehensive spending-based consolidation measures and labor market reform. Conversely, labor unions and social policy groups actively supported policies that would entail stronger burden-sharing between firms and workers. Overall, internal adjustment policies adopted across all three cases generally reflected the preferences of employer associations more than those of workers, but especially in Spain and Greece, this was associated with considerable political upheaval.

Distributive Conflict and Interest Group Preferences in Deficit Countries

2020 ◽  
pp. 66-107
Author(s):  
Stefanie Walter ◽  
Ari Ray ◽  
Nils Redeker
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Full Range ◽  
Opportunity Costs ◽  
Economic Interest ◽  
Structural Reforms ◽  
Political Upheaval ◽  
Group Preferences ◽  
Distributive Conflict ◽  
Original Survey

The politics of adjustment in deficit countries were characterized by strong domestic discontent, leading to significant political upheaval. Why did policymakers in these countries nonetheless implement unprecedented austerity and painful structural reforms? Zooming in on the domestic drivers of this adjustment choice, this chapter highlights mechanisms by which internal adjustment grew more politically feasible in deficit countries. The chapter draws on original survey data on the policy preferences of 359 economic interest groups in Ireland, Spain and Greece. It finds that while groups were consistently negative to a full range of scenarios by which external adjustment could be achieved in deficit countries, their preferences toward austerity measures and structural reforms varied much more widely. This variation, it is argued, facilitated the formation of pro-internal adjustment coalitions in deficit country contexts. Moreover, the chapter shows that opportunity costs mattered. While opposed to internal adjustment in absolute terms, a large majority of interest groups in deficit countries grew pliable to the prospect of it when faced with a choice between this and the alternative of abandoning the euro; even if internal adjustment programs were comprised of policies that groups themselves distinctly opposed.

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