scholarly journals Chinese Economic Statecraft and U.S. Hegemony in Latin America: An Empirical Analysis, 2003–2014

2016 ◽  
Vol 58 (4) ◽  
pp. 3-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francisco Urdinez ◽  
Fernando Mouron ◽  
Luis L. Schenoni ◽  
Amâncio J. de Oliveira

AbstractIf one interprets China's sizable rise in Latin America as an unprecedented phenomenon, it follows that the concurrent story of declining U.S. influence in the region is an event hastily acknowledged at best and ignored at worst. In this article, we ask whether Chinese economic statecraft in Latin America is related to the declining U.S. hegemonic influence in the region and explore how. To do so we analyze foreign direct investments, bank loans, and international trade from 2003 to 2014, when China became a major player in the region. We use data from 21 Latin American countries, and find that an inversely proportional relationship exists between the investments made by Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs), bank loans, manufacturing exports, and the U.S. hegemonic influence exerted in the region. In other words, Beijing has filled the void left by a diminished U.S. presence in the latter's own backyard.

Author(s):  
Gisela Mateos ◽  
Edna Suárez-Díaz

On December 8, 1953, in the midst of increasing nuclear weapons testing and geopolitical polarization, United States President Dwight D. Eisenhower launched the Atoms for Peace initiative. More than a pacifist program, the initiative is nowadays seen as an essential piece in the U.S. defense strategy and foreign policy at the beginning of the Cold War. As such, it pursued several ambitious goals, and Latin America was an ideal target for most of them: to create political allies, to ease fears of the deadly atomic energy while fostering receptive attitudes towards nuclear technologies, to control and avoid development of nuclear weapons outside the United States and its allies, and to open or redirect markets for the new nuclear industry. The U.S. Department of State, through the Foreign Operations Administration, acted in concert with several domestic and foreign middle-range actors, including people at national nuclear commissions, universities, and industrial funds, to implement programs of regional technical assistance, education and training, and technological transfer. Latin American countries were classified according to their stage of nuclear development, with Brazil at the top and Argentina and Mexico belonging to the group of “countries worthy of attention.” Nuclear programs often intersected with development projects in other areas, such as agriculture and public health. Moreover, Eisenhower’s initiative required the recruitment of local actors, natural resources and infrastructures, governmental funding, and standardized (but localized techno-scientific) practices from Latin American countries. As Atoms for Peace took shape, it began to rely on newly created multilateral and regional agencies, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of the United Nations and the Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission (IANEC) of the Organization of American States (OAS). Nevertheless, as seen from Latin America, the implementation of atomic energy for peaceful purposes was reinterpreted in different ways in each country. This fact produced different outcomes, depending on the political, economic, and techno-scientific expectations and interventions of the actors involved. It provided, therefore, an opportunity to create local scientific elites and infrastructure. Finally, the peaceful uses of atomic energy allowed the countries in the region to develop national and international political discourses framing the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean signed in Tlatelolco, Mexico City, in 1967, which made Latin America the first atomic weapons–free populated zone in the world.


Author(s):  
Katherine M. Marino

The chapter explores how tensions over Doris Stevens’s leadership exploded at the 1933 Seventh International Conference of American States in Montevideo, where Bertha Lutz launched serious challenges against her. There, Lutz allied with representatives from the U.S. State Department and U.S. Women’s and Children’s Bureaus in the new administration of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, including Sophonisba Breckinridge, who also opposed Stevens’s leadership of the Commission. The conflict between Stevens’s “equal rights” feminism, focused on political and civil rights, versus an inter-American feminism that also encompassed social and economic justice, became even more pronounced in the wake of the Great Depression, Chaco War, and revolutions throughout Latin America. Feminist debates took center stage in Montevideo. There, Lutz promoted women’s social and economic concerns. But her assumptions of U.S./Brazilian exceptionalism prevented her from effectively allying with growing numbers of Spanish-speaking Latin American feminists who opposed Stevens’s vision. The 1933 conference pushed forward the Commission’s treaties for women’s rights, and four Latin American countries signed the Equal Rights Treaty. It also inspired more behind-the-scenes organizing by various Latin American feminists and statesmen, including the formation of a new group, the Unión de Mujeres Americanas, that would later bear fruit.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 113 ◽  
pp. 320-325
Author(s):  
Guillermo Jorge

Most Latin American countries are in the process of implementing international anticorruption standards, including standards for combating corporate corruption. Primarily based on the U.S. experience with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), these international standards for combating corporate corruption are coalescing into a standardized paradigm, which requires states to establish corporate liability regimes that incentivize companies to prevent, self-police, and cooperate with law enforcement authorities in exchange for more lenient sanctions.


Author(s):  
David B. H. Denoon

This chapter lays out the basic themes of the book and examines the commercial and strategic interests of U.S. and China in Latin America. China has become the largest trading partner for more than half of the Latin American countries, while the U.S. has sought to be the preeminent power in Latin America and the Caribbean since 1823 and the announcement of Monroe Doctrine. China does not pose a direct military threat to the U.S. or its Latin interests, but it does represent serious competition in the economic and diplomatic arenas. In the past decade, a clear East-West split has developed among the Latin American states. Venezuela, Brazil, and Argentina became more nationalistic and anti-U.S., while Chile, Columbia, and Peru have tended to be more market-oriented and comfortable working with U.S. power. The U.S. currently benefits from disarray on the Left in Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela. Newly developed institutions, e.g., UNASUR, the New Development Bank, and TPP, may also change the U.S.’s and China’s influence in the region.


2021 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 200-218
Author(s):  
Maria Paula Bertran ◽  
Maria Virgínia Nabuco do Amaral Mesquita Nasser

This paper discusses the adaptation and feasibility of some of the tools shared by the OECD Convention and the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. The article highlights three of them: incentives and protection to whistleblowers, prosecutorial discretion, and different forms of negotiated justice, including plea bargaining. We call these tools the OECD/FCPA paradigm. We claim that the OECD/FCPA paradigm hardly reconciles criminal punishment needs in Latin American countries. We offer three primary reasons for this inadaptation. The first reason is that most Latin American countries have what the literature calls “disseminated corruption as a point of equilibrium” for grand corruption. In an environment with disseminated corruption (as described in the plea agreement in the Odebrecht case), all actors have incentives to accept or offer bribes. It creates a pragmatic incompatibility with prosecutorial discretion and plea bargaining, as some politicians or businesspersons would suffer anti-bribery enforcement, while many others - including the former’s competitors - would not. The second reason is that the OECD/FCPA paradigm weakens the system of control implemented in many countries, as it reserves the power to a limited number of agencies and prosecutors. Considering environments with disseminated corruption, the concentration of power - and discretion - over a limited number of agents creates the institutional design for the lack of accountability and perhaps collusion. The third reason is mainly connected to Latin America's political history. We argue that collaboration agreements, whistleblowers, and discretion are prone to magnify certain cases of corruption. Considering the traditional connection between corruption scandals and political instability in Latin America, we argue that the OECD/FCPA paradigm offers deleterious tools to political exploitation of anti-bribery enforcement.


2016 ◽  
pp. 131-136
Author(s):  
Olga Fomina

Thе article discusses the role of the top Latin American countries in the international flows of capital and its investment attractiveness. The emphasis is made on the role of the countries in international capital flows and the relationship between Russia and Latin America in terms of investment. The analysis revealed that Latin America is becoming to play more important role nowadays on the world economic map than it used to be. Many countries are increasing their investments in Latin America despite the fact that there are a lot of difficulties which deal with the level and the pace of the economic growth and development in this region


Author(s):  
Timur Nelin ◽  

Introduction. Donald Trump’s policy towards the Latin American region and illegal Latino migrants was often criticized by mass media. Many experts admit that over four years of his presidency U.S. cooperation with Latin American countries was severely “undermined”. This negative trend should have been the subject of discussion of candidates for the U.S. presidential election in 2020. The purpose of the article is to find out what aspects of Trump’s policy towards Latin America were used by the candidates in their campaign statements, for what he was criticized and praised. Methods and Materials. The research is based on the analysis of candidates’ election programs and speeches. Donald Trump’s annual messages to Congress are analyzed as well. The author researches the programs of those candidates who reached the final stage of the 2020 elections and those who were most popular at the beginning of 2020 but lost the primaries. In addition to general scientific research methods, the author uses methods of discourse analysis and comparative analysis. Analysis. Almost all the candidates criticized the policy of Donald Trump in different way. The main issues were President’s approaches to Mexico, Cuba, Venezuela and dealing with illegal immigrants. Trump’s policy didn’t receive explicit approval from any candidate. Among all the contenders for the post of U.S. President, only Joe Biden offered a more or less developed plan for establishing relations with the Central America countries. Results. The author showers that main directions of Trump’s policy towards Latin America were not criticized. But the methods of this policy were criticized a lot. Most part of the Latin America region generally fell out of the U.S. foreign policy discourse. And it was almost not represented in the candidates programs and speeches. This suggests that real shifts in the Latin American direction of the U.S. foreign policy will not occur in the coming years.


Author(s):  
Javier Cifuentes-Faura

The pandemic caused by COVID-19 has left millions infected and dead around the world, with Latin America being one of the most affected areas. In this work, we have sought to determine, by means of a multiple regression analysis and a study of correlations, the influence of population density, life expectancy, and proportion of the population in vulnerable employment, together with GDP per capita, on the mortality rate due to COVID-19 in Latin American countries. The results indicated that countries with higher population density had lower numbers of deaths. Population in vulnerable employment and GDP showed a positive influence, while life expectancy did not appear to significantly affect the number of COVID-19 deaths. In addition, the influence of these variables on the number of confirmed cases of COVID-19 was analyzed. It can be concluded that the lack of resources can be a major burden for the vulnerable population in combating COVID-19 and that population density can ensure better designed institutions and quality infrastructure to achieve social distancing and, together with effective measures, lower death rates.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-3 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nubia Muñoz

It is too early to know which will be the final death toll from the Covid-19 or SARS-CoV-2 virus epidemy in Latin America since the epidemy is still active and we will not know when it will end. The curve for new infections and deaths has not reached yet a peak (Figure 1). In addition, we know little about the epidemiology of this new virus. The daily litany of the number of people infected with the number of admissions to hospitals and intensive care units and the number of deaths guides health authorities to plan health services and politicians to gauge the degree of confinement necessary to control the transmission of the virus, but it says little about the magnitude of the problem if we do not relate it to the population at risk. At the end of the pandemic, we will be able to estimate age-standardized death rates for the different countries, but until then the crude death rates will provide a first glance or snapshot of the death toll and impact of the pandemic from March to May 2020. These rates are well below those estimated in other countries in Europe and North America: Belgium (82.6), Spain (58.0), the United Kingdom (57.5), Italy (55.0), France (42.9), Sweden (41.4), and the US (30.7). (Johns Hopkins CSSE, May 30, 2020). However, in the European countries and the US the number of deaths has reached a peak, while this is not the case in Latin American countries. (Figure 1). It should be taken into account that the above rates are crude and therefore, some of the differences could be due to the fact that European countries have a larger proportion of the population over 70 years of age in whom higher mortality rates have been reported.


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