scholarly journals An Analysis of the Anti-Japanese National United Front and Its Formation Process from the Perspective of Game Theory

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 59
Author(s):  
Liu Zhao ◽  
Huang Xiaoyi

The united front is a magic weapon for the victory of the revolution, construction and reform of the Communist Party of China. The formation process of the united front is a kind of game, starting from the perspective of game theory, using the assets exclusiveness theory of economics, combining the Nash equilibrium and historical events, building a game model, analyzing the Anti-Japanese National United Front and its formation process, are of great significance to improve the scientific cognition level of historical research work and united front work.

2013 ◽  
Vol 347-350 ◽  
pp. 3971-3974 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heng Xiao ◽  
Cao Fang Long

With the development of network application, network security is facing greater pressure. Based on the characteristics of intrusion detection in the wireless network of the Ad hoc working group, the article introduces the game theory, proposes a game model of network security, concluds the Nash equilibrium in the stage game, repeats game, the pareto Nash equilibrium, more attack both income and payment, so that they get the best choice.


2012 ◽  
Vol 209-211 ◽  
pp. 1513-1516
Author(s):  
Qian Li

Based on the “replication dynamics” ideas, the paper establishes asymmetric evolutionary game model of together-conspired bidding using evolutionary game theory, and obtains its evolutionary stable strategy under the present governmental supervision that surround-bidder and accompanying-bidder’s proportion is periodic fluctuation of the center stability, explains the reason why together-conspired bidding is difficult to be prevented effectively. In order to find the decisive factor of the evolutionary drift, further investigation shows that the evolutionary drift is converged to the different evolutionary stable properties when evolution conditions change, such as the supervision target, supervision strength. Through the analysis to the punishment extent on surround-bidder and accompanying-bidder, the conclusion is arrived that the strength of punishment and execution on the surround-bidder can effectively control together-conspired bidding, which provides the theoretical basis to governmental supervision department for the management and research work on together-conspired bidding in the construction market.


2013 ◽  
Vol 781-784 ◽  
pp. 1546-1549 ◽  
Author(s):  
Li Xia Cao ◽  
Wei Wen Chai

By studying the status of the food safety regulatory, this paper points out the drawbacks of existing researches, that is, lack of operability; Relying on the equilibrium theory of game theory, this paper establishes a practical and effective regulatory game model, gives the models mixed strategy Nash equilibrium solution and a food safety regulatory strategy. Finally, to illustrate the effectiveness and feasibility of the model, an illustrative example is shown.


2014 ◽  
Vol 1051 ◽  
pp. 452-456
Author(s):  
Gang Liu

At the beginning of this paper, the contradiction between less design and more design is led to by the hot subject of global sustainable development. Then the concepts of less design and more design are defined, and the two factors (human and nature) which affect the global sustainable development are analyzed. After that, the game model of less design and more design is set up and the Nash equilibrium is deduced, which is helpful to bring some ideas and suggestions for keeping global sustainable development. Finally, the game between human and nature is discussed deeply from a philosophical level, and the theory “Taosim follows the natural laws” in Taosim is proposed to solve the contradiction.


2012 ◽  
Vol 518-523 ◽  
pp. 4835-4838 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chun Xu Hao ◽  
Ya Li Wen

China adopted a series of measures on wetland eco-environmental protection to enhance improvement of ecological conditions of wetlands. However, there are still structural policies absence in the practicing process. Ecological compensation as a systematic arrangement between adjusting damage and environment protectors remain an effective measure of environmental conservation. This article from the perspective of game theory analyze wetland ecological compensation stakeholders, through the establishment of wetland ecological compensation of subject and object of the game model to arrive at the wetland ecological compensation of the main object of the Nash equilibrium strategy, and make specific recommendations.


2014 ◽  
Vol 513-517 ◽  
pp. 969-972
Author(s):  
Yi Chuan Wang ◽  
Jian Feng Ma ◽  
Di Lu ◽  
Liu Mei Zhang

Security and efficiency for using RSA signature scheme are critical requirements for many network applications. In this paper, we present a Game Model for RSA Signature Scheme (GMRS). By analyzing our model with information and game theory, we prove that the Nash-equilibrium is existent in GMRS. Accordingly, we propose an optimization scheme for updating the private key. The experiment result shows that, our scheme can significant promote the efficiency and ensure the security, even in the lowest risk-level case and for an adversary with unlimited computing power.


2013 ◽  
Vol 671-674 ◽  
pp. 3142-3146
Author(s):  
J.C. Ke ◽  
Hang Dai ◽  
Lu Gan

Vicious price competition is adopted by homogeneous enterprises to seize the market in logistics park. In order to solve this problem effectively, the thesis starts from the definition of vicious price competition and researches on the cause of vicious price competition. Besides, establish game model for price regulation with the Nash equilibrium theory of game theory, finally put forward the suggestion on decreasing the vicious price competition, and make the management department of logistics park able to maintain fair, impartial, and open price market order according to the service price of the model.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Zhu Bai ◽  
Mingxia Huang ◽  
Shuai Bian ◽  
Huandong Wu

The emergence of online car-hailing service provides an innovative approach to vehicle booking but has negatively influenced the taxi industry in China. This paper modeled taxi service mode choice based on evolutionary game theory (EGT). The modes included the dispatching and online car-hailing modes. We constructed an EGT framework, including determining the strategies and the payoff matrix. We introduced different behaviors, including taxi company management, driver operation, and passenger choice. This allowed us to model the impact of these behaviors on the evolving process of service mode choice. The results show that adjustments in taxi company, driver, and passenger behaviors impact the evolutionary path and convergence speed of our evolutionary game model. However, it also reveals that, regardless of adjustments, the stable states in the game model remain unchanged. The conclusion provides a basis for studying taxi system operation and management.


2001 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-125 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrei N. Lankov

This article, based on newly declassified material from the Russian archives, deals with the fate of non-Communist parties in North Korea in the 1950s. Like the “people's democracies” in Eastern Europe, North Korea had (and still technically has) a few non-Communist parties. The ruling Communist party included these parties within the framework of a “united front,” designed to project the facade of a multiparty state, to control domestic dissent, and to establish links with parties in South Korea. The article traces the history of these parties under Soviet and local Communist control from the mid-1940s to their gradual evisceration in the 1950s.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Richter ◽  
Ariel Rubinstein

Abstract Each member of a group chooses a position and has preferences regarding his chosen position. The group’s harmony depends on the profile of chosen positions meeting a specific condition. We analyse a solution concept (Richter and Rubinstein, 2020) based on a permissible set of individual positions, which plays a role analogous to that of prices in competitive equilibrium. Given the permissible set, members choose their most preferred position. The set is tightened if the chosen positions are inharmonious and relaxed if the restrictions are unnecessary. This new equilibrium concept yields more attractive outcomes than does Nash equilibrium in the corresponding game.


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