Literary Knowledge

Author(s):  
Tita Chico

Natural philosophy in the long eighteenth century connoted a sense of modernity and enlightenment, attributes that bound science to meanings in excess of its practice and consumption. The pliancy of science as a trope finds support in reflections on language as a scientific tool by Robert Boyle, Robert Hooke, and other natural philosophers. The two dominant technologies of the experimental imagination are the observed particular and the modest witness. Observed particulars of empirical study are those nuggets of data that disclose themselves and, in their revelation, produce knowledge. The modest witness is the individual who is objective by virtue of erasing himself through his privilege. Tropes are literary tools that not only enable practitioners to describe scientific findings, but also enable an even more fundamental component of experimentalism: literariness makes possible the conceptualization of scientific findings and the individual who produces them.

Author(s):  
Victor Nuovo

Although the vocation of Christian virtuoso was invented and named by Robert Boyle, Francis Bacon provided the archtype. A Christian virtuoso is an experimental natural philosopher who professes Christianity, who endeavors to unite empiricism and supernatural belief in an intellectual life. In his program for the renewal of the learning Bacon prescribed that the empirical study of nature be the basis of all the sciences, including not only the study of physical things, but of human society, and literature. He insisted that natural causes only be used to explain natural events and proposed not to mix theology with natural philosophy. This became a rule of the Royal Society of London, of which Boyle was a principal founder. Bacon’s rule also had a theological use, to preserve the purity and the divine authority of revelation. In the mind of the Christian virtuoso, nature and divine revelation were separate but complementary sources of truth.


1982 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 99-131 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. B. Wilde

During the course of the eighteenth century important changes occurred in the conception of matter held by British natural philosophers. Historians of science have described these changes in different ways, but certain common features can be abstracted from the more recent accounts. First, there was a movement away from Newtonian matter theory, which saw all matter as the various organizations of homogeneous particles and the forces of attraction and repulsion acting between them. In place of this theory increasing favour was shown towards a more empirical or ‘chemical’ approach to matter which assumed the existence of several essentially distinct types of matter each endowed with different specific qualities or properties. Second, there was an increasing tendency to accept activity as a property of matter itself rather than to ascribe it to immaterial forces.


2015 ◽  
Vol 20 (4-6) ◽  
pp. 562-588 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Marie Roos

Before Newton’s seminal work on the spectrum, seventeenth-century English natural philosophers such as Robert Boyle, Robert Hooke, Nehemiah Grew and Robert Plot attributed the phenomenon of color in the natural world to salts and saline chymistry. They rejected Aristotelian ideas that color was related to the object’s hot and cold qualities, positing instead that saline principles governed color and color changes in flora, fauna and minerals. In our study, we also characterize to what extent chymistry was a basic analytical tool for seventeenth-century English natural historians.



2020 ◽  
pp. 007327532095895
Author(s):  
Adam L. Storring

This article integrates the history of military theory – and the practical history of military campaigns and battles – within the broader history of knowledge. Challenging ideas that the new natural philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (the so-called Scientific Revolution) fostered attempts to make warfare mathematically calculated, it builds on work showing that seventeenth- and eighteenth-century natural philosophy was itself much more subjective than previously thought. It uses the figure of King Frederick II of Prussia (reigned 1740–1786) to link theoretical with practical military knowledge, placing the military treatises read and written by the king alongside the practical example of the Prussian army’s campaign against the Russians in summer 1758 at the height of the Seven Years War (1756–1763), which culminated in the battle of Zorndorf. This article shows that both the theory and practice of war – like other branches of knowledge in the long eighteenth century – were fundamentally shaped by the contemporary search for intellectual order. The inability to achieve this in practice led to a reliance on subjective judgment and individual, local knowledge. Whereas historians have noted attempts in the eighteenth century to calculate probabilities mathematically, this article shows that war continued to be conceived as the domain of fortune, subject to incalculable chance. Answering Steven Shapin’s call to define concretely “the subjective element in knowledge-making,” the examples of Frederick and his subordinate, Lieutenant General Count Christoph zu Dohna, reveal sharply different contemporary ideas about how to respond to uncertainty in war. Whereas Dohna sought to be ready for chance events and react to them, Frederick actively embraced uncertainty and risk-taking, making chance both a rhetorical argument and a positive choice guiding strategy and tactics.


Science in England in the latter part of the seventeenth century is overshadowed by the mighty name of Newton, who has justly received the praises of all the great natural philosophers who came after him. In that springtime of science there were, however, in England a number of other men of genius who carried out work of prime importance—Robert Boyle; John Wallis and Isaac Barrow; Flamsteed and Halley; Willughby and Ray ; Sydenham and Glisson; and Robert Hooke. Of these Robert Hooke has good claims to be considered the greatest. Probably the most inventive man who ever lived, and one of the ablest experimenters, he had a most acute mind and made astonishingly correct conjectures, based on reason, in all branches of physics. Physics, however, was far from being his only field: he is the founder of scientific meteorology; as an astronomer he has observations of great significance to his credit; he did fundamental work on combustion and respiration; he was one of the founders of modern geology. He has, moreover, a particular claim to the attention and respect of our Society, for from 1662 to 1677 he held the office of Curator and from 1677 to 1682 he was one of our Secretaries. He was always indefatigable in his services to the Society, and for a period he produced new experiments or discoveries at practically every meeting. Most writers who have really studied his work have given Hooke enthusiastic praise, yet, on account of certain difficulties of character—difficulties which he was not the only one to possess—his name does not seem to be honoured as it should be among men of science in general. No one has ever devoted a book to his life and achievements,* but he has been made the subject of casual and ill-considered criticism. It therefore seemed to me that it would be altogether fitting that I should attempt to recall to you something about this extraordinary man; about his services to science and his services to our Society. Robert Hooke was born at Freshwater, in the Isle of Wight, on 18 July 1635, his father being curate of the parish. Aubrey says that his father was one of the family of the Hookes of Hooke in Hants. Hooke was thus seven years older than Newton, a fact which probably had some influence on the relations between the two men. Like Newton he was a weakly child, but whereas Newton grew up strong and straight, Hooke was never physically sound. We have a description of him from Richard Waller, who was Secretary of our Society from 1687 to 1709 (as well as again at a later period) and must have known him well. He tells us that as to his person he was but despicable, which recalls Samuel Pepys’ entry for 15 February 1664/5, where, after telling us that he was that day admitted to the Royal Society 'by signing a book and being taken by the hand of the President, my Lord Brouncker, and some words of admittance said to me’, he adds, ‘Above all, Mr Boyle was at the meeting, and above him Mr Hooke, who is the most, and promises the least, of any man in the world that ever I saw.’ Hooke was very bent and crooked, but told Waller that he was straight until he was about 16, when he grew, awry by working at the lathe. Hooke, who left some notes about his early life, also said that as a boy he was very sprightly and active in running and leaping ‘tho ’ very weak as to any robust Exercise ’. ‘ He went ’, says Waller, ‘ stooping and very fast having but a light Body to carry and a great deal of Spirits and Activity, especially in his Youth.’ He was also, one gathers, meanly ugly, very pale and lean: ‘ His Eyes grey and full, with a sharp ingenious Look whilst younger; his Nose but thin, of moderate height and length; his Mouth meanly wide and upper Lip thin; his Chin sharp and Forehead large.... He wore his own Hair of a dark Brown colour, very long and hanging neglected over his Face, uncut and lank.’ Aubrey, who seems to have been his close friend and most anxious to speak well of him—he says that he was a person ‘ of great suavity and goodness ’—also records that he was something crooked, that his head was large but the lower part of his face little and that his grey eyes were ‘ full and popping ’. I think it important that you should know something of his appearance and great physical disabilities, and I quote so fully from the descriptions of those that knew him because I can say with some confidence that there is no known portrait of any kind of him, although in his diary* he seems to suggest that one Bonus (usually spelt Bownest), a known artist, drew his picture. It is one of my ambitions to find that picture.


1950 ◽  
Vol 137 (887) ◽  
pp. 153-187 ◽  

Science in England in the latter part of the seventeenth century is overshadowed by the mighty name of Newton, who has justly received the praises of all the great natural philosophers who came after him. In that springtime of science there were, however, in England a number of other men of genius who carried out work of prime importance—Robert Boyle; John Wallis and Isaac Barrow: Flamsteed and Halley; Willughby and Ray; Sydenham and Glisson; and Robert Hooke. Of these Robert Hooke has good claims to be considered the greatest. Probably the most inventive man who ever lived, and one of the ablest experimenters, he had a most acute mind and made astonishingly correct conjectures, based on reason, in all branches of physics. Physics, however, was far from being his only field: he is the founder of scientific meteorology; as an astronomer he has observations of great significance to his credit; he did fundamental work on combustion and respiration; he was one of the founders of modern geology. He has, moreover, a particular claim to the attention and respect of our Society, for from 1662 to 1677 he held the office of Curator and from 1677 to 1682 he was one of our Secretaries. He was always indefatigable in his services to the Society, and for a period he produced new experiments or discoveries at practically every meeting. Most writers who have really studied his work have given Hooke enthusiastic praise, yet, on account of certain difficulties of character—difficulties which he was not the only one to possess his name does not seem to be honoured as it should be among men of science in general. No one has ever devoted a book to his fife and achievements,* but he has been made the subject of casual and ill-considered criticism. It therefore seemed to me that it would be altogether fitting that I should attempt to recall to you something about this extraordinary man; about his services to science and his services to our Society.


2000 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 391-417 ◽  
Author(s):  
BEVERLY LEMIRE

Fashion, like luxury, has been largely conceived in terms of the elite experience. Indeed, the European fashion cycle was noted first among the aristocracy where the fashion system celebrated novelty over tradition, highlighting the individual aesthetic even as it consolidated the group identity of exquisitely garbed nobles. The counterpoints to the mutability of style were the legal constraints designed to curb the fashion impulse, bridling the sartorial ambitions of non-elites. Sumptuary legislation aimed to enforce luxury codes. The right to extravagant inessentials, which distinguished those of noble blood, was forbidden to lesser beings; however, fashion was a contested concept whose influence permeated first the middling and then even the labouring ranks. In this article I will examine the competing forces at work within England as the dress of the common people was transformed over the long eighteenth century. Although sumptuary legislation came to an end in England in 1604, government and moralists continued to claim the right to restrain material expression within the lower ranks, but without success. I will assess the challenge to a unitary hegemonic elite fashion, and explore the creation and significance of the multiple expressions in dress within the varied social ranks of England.


2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-71
Author(s):  
Nicole Eustace

Abstract In the middle of the eighteenth century, natural philosophers began to posit connections between emotion and electricity. The metaphors they explored then have continued methodological implications for scholars today. The electrical concepts of current, resistance, voltage, and power, provide an extended metaphor for conceptualising the history of emotions in ways that usefully bridge the biological and cultural, the individual and social, in order to more fully reveal historical links between emotion and power. By way of example, this article examines cross-cultural negotiations of power made possible through the expression, exchange, and evaluation of grief as recorded in the diary of a British-American Quaker woman who lived among Indians in the Pennsylvania borderlands in the midst of the Seven Years’ War.


2020 ◽  
pp. 144-166
Author(s):  
Michael Hunter

This chapter considers changing attitudes during the long eighteenth century to second sight — the uncanny ability of certain individuals to foresee the future — in Scotland. This was a topic which fascinated Boyle in the late seventeenth century. This chapter illustrates how his enquiries on the subject began a tradition of empirical study of the phenomenon which continued into the eighteenth century. But then a change came, and by about 1800 the possibility of second sight was increasingly rejected among English and Scottish intellectuals on the grounds that it was incompatible with the ‘principles’ by which the universe operated. In parallel with this, however, a separate tradition emerged in which second sight and related phenomena were deemed appropriate for imaginative interpretation by poets and others, which is significant in itself.


Author(s):  
Tita Chico

This introduction challenges the “two cultures” debate about disciplinarity. Critical studies of literature and science have not presented a satisfactory understanding of the two domains’ comingling and reciprocity. Early science formulated itself through literary knowledge: natural philosophers relied on literariness not only to present experimental findings but also to imagine the practice of science. The multiplicity and diversity of allusions to science in the long eighteenth-century literary archive reflect an understanding of literary knowledge as epistemologically superior. Natural philosophical practice requires yet obscures the imaginative practice; literary knowledge embraces this impulse as a way of understanding the world at large. The experimental imagination encapsulates the process and effects of literary knowledge as an epistemology. The keywords literary knowledge, science, trope, and gender reveal core concepts that enable myriad writers to posit alternative models of experience, authority, and evidence.


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