Safety Analysis of Irradiated Nuclear Fuel Transportation Container

Author(s):  
E. Uspuras ◽  
S. Rimkevicius

Ignalina NPP comprises two Units with RBMK-1500 reactors. After the Unit 1 of the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant was shut down in 2004, approximately 1000 fuel assemblies from Unit were available for further reuse in Unit 2. The fuel-transportation container, vehicle, protection shaft and other necessary equipment were designed in order to implement the process for on-site transportation of Unit 1 fuel for reuse in the Unit 2. The Safety Analysis Report (SAR) was developed to demonstrate that the proposed set of equipment performs all functions and assures the required level of safety for both normal operation and accident conditions. The purpose of this paper is to introduce the content and main results of SAR, focusing attention on the container used to transport spent fuel assemblies from Unit 1 on Unit 2. In the SAR, the structural integrity, thermal, radiological and nuclear safety calculations are performed to assess the acceptance of the proposed set of equipment. The safety analysis demonstrated that the proposed nuclear fuel transportation container and other equipment are in compliance with functional, design and regulatory requirements and assure the required safety level.

2019 ◽  
pp. 82-87
Author(s):  
Ya. Kostiushko ◽  
O. Dudka ◽  
Yu. Kovbasenko ◽  
A. Shepitchak

The introduction of new fuel for nuclear power plants in Ukraine is related to obtaining a relevant license from the regulatory authority for nuclear and radiation safety of Ukraine. The same approach is used for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) management system. The dry spent fuel storage facility (DSFSF) is the first nuclear facility created for intermediate dry storage of SNF in Ukraine. According to the design based on dry ventilated container storage technology by Sierra Nuclear Corporation and Duke Engineering and Services, ventilated storage containers (VSC-VVER) filled with SNF of VVER-1000 are used, which are located on a special open concrete site. Containers VSC-VVER are modernized VSC-24 containers customized for hexagonal VVER-1000 spent fuel assemblies. The storage safety assessment methodology was created and improved directly during the licensing process. In addition, in accordance with the Energy Strategy of Ukraine up to 2035, one of the key task is the further diversification of nuclear fuel suppliers. Within the framework of the Executive Agreement between the Government of Ukraine and the U.S. Government, activities have been underway since 2000 on the introduction of Westinghouse fuel. The purpose of this project is to develop, supply and qualify alternative nuclear fuel compatible with fuel produced in Russia for Ukrainian NPPs. In addition, a supplementary approach to safety analysis report is being developed to justify feasibility of loading new fuel into the DSFSF containers. The stated results should demonstrate the fulfillment of design criteria under normal operating conditions, abnormal conditions and design-basis accidents of DSFSF components.  Thus, the paper highlights both the main problems of DSFSF licensing and obtaining permission for placing new fuel types in DSFSF.


Energies ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (18) ◽  
pp. 4869
Author(s):  
Joaquín Bautista-Valhondo ◽  
Lluís Batet ◽  
Manuel Mateo

The paper assumes that, at the end of the operational period of a Spanish nuclear power plant, an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation will be used for long-term storage. Spent fuel assemblies are selected and transferred to casks for dry storage, with a series of imposed restrictions (e.g., limiting the thermal load). In this context, we present a variant of the problem of spent nuclear fuel cask loading in one stage (i.e., the fuel is completely transferred from the spent fuel pool to the casks at once), offering a multi-start metaheuristic of three phases. (1) A mixed integer linear programming (MILP-1) model is used to minimize the cost of the casks required. (2) A deterministic algorithm (A1) assigns the spent fuel assemblies to a specific region of a specific cask based on an MILP-1 solution. (3) Starting from the A1 solutions, a local search algorithm (A2) minimizes the standard deviation of the thermal load among casks. Instances with 1200 fuel assemblies (and six intervals for the decay heat) are optimally solved by MILP-1 plus A1 in less than one second. Additionally, A2 gets a Pearson’s coefficient of variation lower than 0.75% in less than 260s CPU (1000 iterations).


Author(s):  
Haitao Wang ◽  
Li Ge ◽  
Jianqiang Shan ◽  
Junli Gou ◽  
Bo Zhang

The spent fuel pool (SFP) is mainly used for cooling spent fuel assemblies (SFAs) discharged from the reactor core. Besides, it can also shield the radiation. The decay heat can be removed through normal operation cooling system, otherwise it can only rely on the natural circulation in the pool when the coolant pump loses power or the heat exchanger fails. Thus the pool water temperature will continue to rise until it begins to boil. During this period, if no active cooling measures are triggered, the water level will gradually decrease as water boiling. Once the water level drops to the top of the fuel assemblies, the fuels begin to be exposed in the environment. In this paper, the CPR1000 spent fuel pool was chosen as the analysis object and the best estimate system thermal hydraulic code RELAP5 was employed to investigate the process in spent fuel pool in case of loss of heat sink. The results of calculations show that when losing two sets of cooling line, the increase in water temperature in the pool from 55 °C up to 100 °C takes approximately 9.1 h, the evaporation of water volume above the SFAs takes approximately 75.4 additional hours; while in case of losing one set of cooling line, the water temperature of the pool surface reaches 76.6 °C, at which the pool water would not going to boil under the atmospheric environment condition. The results of performed analysis are useful for safety analysis and storage of the SFAs, and can be used to provide a reference for spent fuel pool engineering design.


Author(s):  
Zhixin Xu ◽  
Ming Wang ◽  
Binyan Song ◽  
WenYu Hou ◽  
Chao Wang

The Fukushima nuclear disaster has raised the importance on the reliability and risk research of the spent fuel pool (SFP), including the risk of internal events, fire, external hazards and so on. From a safety point of view, the low decay heat of the spent fuel assemblies and large water inventory in the SFP has made the accident progress goes very slow, but a large number of fuel assemblies are stored inside the spent fuel pool and without containment above the SFP building, it still has an unignored risk to the safety of the nuclear power plant. In this paper, a standardized approach for performing a holistic and comprehensive evaluation approach of the SFP risk based on the probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) method has been developed, including the Level 1 SFP PSA and Level 2 SFP PSA and external hazard PSA. The research scope of SFP PSA covers internal events, internal flooding, internal fires, external hazards and new risk source-fuel route risk is also included. The research will provide the risk insight of Spent Fuel Pool operation, and can help to make recommendation for the prevention and mitigation of SFP accidents which will be applicable for the SFP configuration risk management.


2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-13
Author(s):  
David A. Hakobyan ◽  
Victor I. Slobodchuk

The problems of reprocessing and long-term storage of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) at nuclear power plants with RBMK reactors have not been fully resolved so far. For this reason, nuclear power plants are forced to search for new options for the disposal of spent fuel, which can provide at least temporary SNF storage. One of the possible solutions to this problem is to switch to compacted SNF storage in reactor spent fuel pools (SFPs). As the number of spent fuel assemblies (SFAs) in SFPs increases, a greater amount of heat is released. In addition, no less important is the fact that a place for emergency FA discharging should be provided in SFPs. The paper presents the results of a numerical simulation of the temperature conditions in SFPs both for compacted SNF storage and for emergency FA discharging. Several types of disturbances in normal SFP cooling mode are considered, including partial loss of cooling water and exposure of SFAs. The simulation was performed using the ANSYS CFX software tool. Estimates were made of the time for heating water to the boiling point, as well as the time for heating the cladding of the fuel elements to a temperature of 650 °С. The most critical conditions are observed in the emergency FA discharging compartment. The results obtained make it possible to estimate the time that the personnel have to restore normal cooling mode of the spent fuel pool until the maximum temperature for water and spent fuel assemblies is reached.


2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (3A) ◽  
Author(s):  
Claubia Pereira ◽  
Jéssica P. Achilles ◽  
Fabiano Cardoso ◽  
Victor F. Castro ◽  
Maria Auxiliadora F. Veloso

A spent fuel pool of a typical Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) was evaluated for criticality studies when it uses reprocessed fuels. PWR nuclear fuel assemblies with four types of fuels were considered: standard PWR fuel, MOX fuel, thorium-uranium fuel and reprocessed transuranic fuel spiked with thorium. The MOX and UO2 benchmark model was evaluated using SCALE 6.0 code with KENO-V transport code and then, adopted as a reference for other fuels compositions. The four fuel assemblies were submitted to irradiation at normal operation conditions. The burnup calculations were obtained using the TRITON sequence in the SCALE 6.0 code package. The fuel assemblies modeled use a benchmark 17x17 PWR fuel assembly dimensions. After irradiation, the fuels were inserted in the pool. The criticality safety limits were performed using the KENO-V transport code in the CSAS5 sequence. It was shown that mixing a quarter of reprocessed fuel withUO2 fuel in the pool, it would not need to be resized 


2013 ◽  
Vol 479-480 ◽  
pp. 543-547
Author(s):  
Jong Rong Wang ◽  
Hao Tzu Lin ◽  
Wan Yun Li ◽  
Shao Wen Chen ◽  
Chun Kuan Shih

In the nuclear power plant (NPP) safety, the safety analysis of the NPP is very important work. In Fukushima NPP event, due to the earthquake and tsunami, the cooling system of the spent fuel pool failed and the safety issue of the spent fuel pool generated. In this study, the safety analysis of the Chinshan NPP spent fuel pool was performed by using TRACE and FRAPTRAN, which also assumed the cooling system of the spent fuel pool failed. There are two cases considered in this study. Case 1 is the no fire water injection in the spent fuel pool. Case 2 is the fire water injection while the water level of the spent fuel pool uncover the length of fuel rods over 1/3 full length. The analysis results of the case 1 show that the failure of cladding occurs in about 3.6 day. However, the results of case 2 indicate that the integrity of cladding is kept after the fire water injection.


Author(s):  
Mile Bace ◽  
Kresimir Trontl ◽  
Dubravko Pevec

Abstract The intention was to model a dry storage facility that could satisfy the needs of a medium nuclear power plant similar to the NPP Krsko. The attention has been focused on radiation dose rate analyses and criticality calculations. Using the SCALE 4.4 code package and modified QAD-CGGP code, we modeled a facility that satisfies the basic criteria for public radiation protection. The capacity of the storage is 1,400 spent fuel assemblies which is adequate for a forty years medium NPP lifetime.


Author(s):  
Krista Nicholson ◽  
John McDonald ◽  
Shona Draper ◽  
Brian M. Ikeda ◽  
Igor Pioro

Currently in Canada, spent fuel produced from Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) is in the interim storage all across the country. It is Canada’s long-term strategy to have a national geologic repository for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel for CANada Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) reactors. The initial problem is to identify a means to centralize Canada’s spent nuclear fuel. The objective of this paper is to present a solution for the transportation issues that surround centralizing the waste. This paper reviews three major components of managing and the transporting of high-level nuclear waste: 1) site selection, 2) containment and 3) the proposed transportation method. The site has been selected based upon several factors including proximity to railways and highways. These factors play an important role in the site-selection process since the location must be accessible and ideally to be far from communities. For the containment of the spent fuel during transportation, a copper-shell container with a steel structural infrastructure was selected based on good thermal, structural, and corrosion resistance properties has been designed. Rail has been selected as the method of transporting the container due to both the potential to accommodate several containers at once and the extensive railway system in Canada.


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