A GIS-Based System to Assess the Environmental Consequence of a Liquid Pipeline Rupture at Watercourse Crossings

Author(s):  
Neil Ripley ◽  
Elisa Scordo ◽  
Alex Baumgard

BGC Engineering Inc. (BGC) was retained by a large pipeline operator to develop a GIS-based system to assess and rank the environmental consequence of a pipeline rupture on watercourse crossings within their pipeline system. Several physical, biological and socio-economic factors contribute to the environmental consequence of a pipeline rupture on a watercourse. This study examined select spatial and vulnerability factors, and did not consider biologic or economic impacts. Three factors were selected as part of the initial study to prioritize the pipeline watercourse crossings according to: (1) size of the watercourse at the pipeline crossing, (2) proximity of each individual crossing to larger downstream watercourses, and (3) pipeline liquid flow rate volume. A spatial analysis was conducted to determine the first two factors, while input for the third factor was provided by the pipeline operator. Watercourse size was determined using Strahler’s stream order classification (Strahler 1952), while proximity to larger downstream watercourses was assessed using a Geographic Information System (GIS). This paper presents an overview of the data sources and methods used to develop an initial screening tool for identifying high consequence crossings within a pipeline system, and highlights the challenges encountered with acquiring and processing data to include in a consequence rating system. As with other pipeline risk assessments, the main challenges of this work include data availability, data integrity and resource limitations. This system is intended to fit within the pipeline operator’s current geohazard integrity management program and direct resources for a multi-year baseline field inspection program.

2010 ◽  
Vol 26 (02) ◽  
pp. 106-110
Author(s):  
Ge Wang ◽  
Michael Lee ◽  
Chris Serratella ◽  
Stanley Botten ◽  
Sam Ternowchek ◽  
...  

Real-time monitoring and detection of structural degradation helps in capturing the structural conditions of ships. The latest nondestructive testing (NDT) and sensor technologies will potentially be integrated into future generations of the structural integrity management program. This paper reports on a joint development project between Alaska Tanker Company, American Bureau of Shipping (ABS), and MISTRAS. The pilot project examined the viability of acoustic emission technology as a screening tool for surveys and inspection planning. Specifically, testing took place on a 32-year-old double-hull Trans Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS) trade tanker. The test demonstrated the possibility of adapting this technology in the identification of critical spots on a tanker in order to target inspections. This targeting will focus surveys and inspections on suspected areas, thus increasing efficiency of detecting structural degradation. The test has the potential to introduce new inspection procedures as the project undertakes the first commercial testing of the latest acoustic emission technology during a tanker's voyage.


Author(s):  
Garry L. Sommer ◽  
Brad S. Smith

Enbridge Pipelines Inc. operates one of the longest and most complex pipeline systems in the world. A key aspect of the Enbridge Integrity Management Program (IMP) is the trending, analysis, and management of data collected from over 50 years of pipeline operations. This paper/presentation describes Enbridge’s challenges, learnings, processes, and innovations for meeting today’s increased data management/integration demands. While much has been written around the premise of data management/integration, and many software solutions are available in the commercial market, the greatest data management challenge for mature pipeline operators arises from the variability of data (variety of technologies, data capture methods, and data accuracy levels) collected over the operating history of the system. Ability to bring this variable data set together is substantially the most difficult aspect of a coordinated data management effort and is critical to the success of any such project. Failure to do this will result in lack of user confidence and inability to gain “buy-in” to new data management processes. In 2001 Enbridge began a series of initiatives to enhance data management and analysis. Central to this was the commitment to accurate geospatial alignment of integrity data. This paper/presentation describes Enbridge’s experience with development of custom software (Integrated Spatial Analysis System – ISAS) including critical learnings around a.) Data alignment efforts and b.) Significant efforts involved in development of an accurate pipe centreline. The paper/presentation will also describe co-incident data management programs that link to ISAS. This includes enhanced database functionality for excavation data and development of software to enable electronic transfer of data to this database. These tools were built to enable rapid transfer of field data and “real time” tool validation through automated unity plots of tool defect data vs. that measured in the field.


Author(s):  
Robert V. Hadden ◽  
Kevin J. De Leenheer

As part of its Integrity Management Program, Trans Mountain Pipe Line hydrostatically tests sections of its pipeline system with water transported to test sites through the pipeline. After completion of the testing, the water continues through the pipeline to a water treatment facility where it is treated and discharged to the municipal sewer system. Hydrostatic testing of an operating pipeline, although simple in concept, is a major undertaking. This paper will outline the technical aspects of Trans Mountain’s hydrostatic testing program including: test water transportation, environmental constraints, coordination of test activities and water treatment.


Author(s):  
Hugo García ◽  
Carlos Nieves ◽  
Juan Diego Colonia

Oil pipelines systems for hydrocarbons transportation are linear projects that can reach great lengths. For this reason, theirs paths may cross different geological formations, soil types, navigable or torrential waters; and they may face geotechnical and hydrological instability problems such as creeping slopes, geological faults, landslides, scour and differential settling which causes different relative movements between the soil and the pipeline. The OCENSA (Oleoducto Central S.A) 30″ and 36″ diameter system was built in 1997 to transport crude oil from the eastern foothills of the Andes to the Caribbean Coast along some 830 km of the Eastern Andes mountains range and the spurs of the central Andes mountains range of Colombia: it was a major challenge to secure the integrity of the pipeline in the face of natural events.


Author(s):  
Miaad Safari ◽  
David Shaw

Abstract As integrity programs mature over the life of a pipeline, an increasing number of data points are collected from second, third, or further condition monitoring cycles. Types of data include Inline Inspection (ILI) or External Corrosion Direct Assessment (ECDA) inspection data, validation or remediation dig information, and records of various repairs that have been completed on the pipeline system. The diversity and massive quantity of this gathered data proposes a challenge to pipeline operators in managing and maintaining these data sets and records. The management of integrity data is a key element to a pipeline system Integrity Management Program (IMP) as per the CSA Z662[1]. One of the most critical integrity datasets is the repair information. Incorrect repair assignments on a pipeline can lead to duplicate unnecessary excavations in the best scenario and a pipeline failure in the worst scenario. Operators rely on various approaches to manage and assign repair data to ILIs such as historical records reviews, ILI-based repair assignments, or chainage-based repair assignments. However, these methods have significant gaps in efficiency and/or accuracy. Failure to adequately manage excavation and repair data can lead to increased costs due to repeated excavation of an anomaly, an increase in resources required to match historical information with new data, uncertainty in the effectiveness of previous repairs, and the possibility of incorrect assignment of repairs to unrepaired features. This paper describes the approach adopted by Enbridge Gas to track and maintain repairs, as a part of the Pipeline Risk and Integrity Management (PRIM) platform. This approach was designed to create a robust excavation and repair management framework, providing a robust system of data gathering and automation, while ensuring sufficient oversight by Integrity Engineers. Using this system, repairs are assigned to each feature in an excavation, not only to a certain chainage along the pipeline. Subsequently, when a new ILI results report is received, a process of “Repair Matching” is completed to assign preexisting repairs and assessments to the newly reported features at a feature level. This process is partially automated, whereby pre-determined box-to-box features matched between ILIs can auto-populate repairs for many of the repaired features. The proposed excavation management system would provide operators a superior approach to managing their repair history and projecting historical repairs and assessments onto new ILI reports, prior to assessing the ILI and issuing further digs on the pipeline. This optimized method has many advantages over the conventional repair management methods used in the industry. This method is best suited for operators that are embarking on their second or third condition monitoring cycle, with a moderate number of historical repairs.


Author(s):  
Jeremiah Konell ◽  
Brian Dedeke ◽  
Chris Hurst ◽  
Shanshan Wu ◽  
Joseph Bratton

Abstract In preparation for the upcoming (currently in draft form) Recommended Practice (RP) on Dent Assessment and Management (API 1183) [1], Explorer Pipeline Company, Inc. (Explorer) has performed an internal procedural review to determine how to effectively implement the methodologies into their Integrity Management Program (IMP). Explorer’s pipeline system transports hazardous liquids and is comprised of over 1,800 miles of pipeline ranging in diameter from 3 to 28 inches. The majority of the system was installed in the 1970s, but parts of the system were also installed as early as the 1940s. The primary focus of this review and implementation into the IMP is in regard to performing and responding to in-line inspection (ILI) based integrity assessments. Prior to the development of API 1183, dent assessment and management consisted of following a set of prescriptive condition assessments outlined in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Title 49, Part 195.452. In order to do this, pipeline operators required basic information, such as dent depth, orientation, and interaction with potential stress risers such as metal loss, cracks, gouges, welds, etc. However, in order to fully implement API 1183, additional parameters are needed to define the dent shape, restraint condition, defect interaction, and pipeline operating conditions. Many new and necessary parameters were identified throughout the IMP, from the very initial pre-assessment stage (new ILI vendor requirements as part of the tool/vendor selection process) all the way to defining an appropriate reassessment interval (new process of analyzing dent fatigue life). This paper summarizes the parameters of API 1183 that were not part of Explorer’s current IMP. The parameters are identified, and comments are provided to rank the level of necessity from “must have” to “beneficial” (e.g. can sound and conservative assumptions be made when a parameter is not available). Comments are also provided to explain the impact of applying assumptions in place of parameters. The table of identified parameters should provide a useful tool for other pipeline operators who are considering implementing API 1183 as part of their overall IMP.


Author(s):  
M. Robb Isaac ◽  
Saleh Al-Sulaiman ◽  
Monty R. Martin ◽  
Sandeep Sharma

In early 2005, Kuwait Oil Company (KOC) initiated a Total Pipeline Integrity Management System (TPIMS) implementation in order to carry out a major integrity assessment of its operating facilities, equipment, buried plant piping and pipeline network and to establish a continuing integrity management program. KOC Transit System is a complex infrastructure consisting of over three hundred pipelines, thousands of wellhead flow lines, and consumer and offshore lines for which there was a significant loss of data when the facilities were destroyed during a military invasion in 1990. An initial pipeline system assessment identified issues and actions regarding condition of the pipelines, corridors, requirements on in-line inspection (ILI), documentation, RISK assessment, status of international code compliance, and overall state of the system. Following recommendations from that initial assessment led to the development of a long term strategy; the execution of which required the implementation of a comprehensive integrity management program. This case study discusses the results obtained after five years of implementation of TPIMS at KOC. It will demonstrate some of the complex components involved in managing the integrity of the Transit System that have been made possible through the implementation of the system. The general concept and structure of TPIMS will be described, and how it deals with the complexity of the KOC pipeline system. The system made it possible to integrate and manage data from various sources, by conducting integrity assessment using ILI, Direct Assessment and hydrostatic testing, as well as structure a comprehensive RISK & Decision Support mechanism. This is one of the world’s first implementations of this magnitude which encompasses such a wide range of services and variables; all being managed in a single environment and utilized by a multitude of users in different areas at KOC. The biggest challenge in a project of this scope is data management. Examples will be shown of the integration structure to illustrate the benefits of using a single comprehensive and versatile platform to manage system requirements; ultimately providing system reliability and improving overall operational efficiency.


Author(s):  
Dario Zapata ◽  
Ingrid Pederson ◽  
Sean Keane

Safety case is utilized within the Enbridge Pipeline Integrity Management Program as a means to provide evidence that the risks affecting the system have been effectively mitigated (LeBlanc, et al. 2016). The safety case is an independent, evidence-based assessment based on system integrity management processes applied across all pipelines. This paper describes the process in which safety case methodology was implemented to manage geohazard threats. The benefits of assessing geohazard and other integrity threats will also be discussed. The safety case report documents the opportunities to address the identified problems in addition to the relationship between hazards, implemented controls, and associated susceptibility. To demonstrate that adequate safety controls for geohazard threats have been incorporated into the operational and maintenance phase of the pipeline system, the geohazard management component of the safety case was assessed using a bowtie diagram. The results gave visibility to the geohazard program and its effectiveness. Predefined safety performance metrics with probabilistic and deterministic criteria are evaluated to confirm the geohazard program’s continued effectiveness. Results from the safety case assessment identify opportunities for improvement and provide a basis for revision to maintenance, assurance and verification programs. Ultimately the assessment demonstrates that geohazard threats in the pipeline system are being recognized and assessed. The assessment provides evidence that adequate resources and efforts are allocated to mitigate the risk and identifies continuous improvement activities where needed. The safety case report generated as the final portion of an integrity management framework demonstrates risk is as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP).


Author(s):  
Kevin Spencer ◽  
Shahani Kariyawasam ◽  
Cathy Tetreault ◽  
Jon Wharf

Corrosion growth rates are an essential input into an Integrity Management Program but they can often be the largest source of uncertainty and error. A relatively simple method to estimate a corrosion growth rate is to compare the size of a corrosion anomaly over time and the most practical way to do this for a whole pipeline system is via the use of In-Line Inspection (ILI). However, the reported depth of the anomaly following an ILI run contains measurement uncertainties, i.e., sizing tolerances that must be accounted for in defining the uncertainty, or error associated with the measured corrosion growth rate. When the same inspection vendor performs the inspections then proven methods exist that enable this growth error to be significantly reduced but these methods include the use of raw inspection data and, specialist software and analysis. Guidelines presently exist to estimate corrosion growth rates using inspection data from different ILI vendors. Although well documented, they are often only applicable to “simple” cases, pipelines containing isolated corrosion features with low feature density counts. As the feature density or the corrosion complexity increases then different reporting specifications, interaction rules, analysis procedures, sizing models, etc can become difficult to account for, ultimately leading to incorrect estimations or larger uncertainties regarding the growth error. This paper will address these issues through the experiences of a North American pipeline operator. Accurately quantifying the reliability of pipeline assets over time requires accurate corrosion growth rates and the case study will demonstrate how the growth error was significantly reduced over existing methodologies. Historical excavation and recoat information was utilized to identify static defects and quantify systemic bias between inspections. To reduce differences in reporting and the analyst interpretation of the recorded magnetic signals, novel analysis techniques were employed to normalize the data sets against each other. The resulting uncertainty of the corrosion growth rates was then further reduced by deriving, and applying a regression model to reduce the effect of the different sizing models and the identified systemic bias. The reduced uncertainty ultimately led to a better understanding of the corrosion activity on the pipeline and facilitated a better integrity management decision process.


Author(s):  
Reena Sahney ◽  
Mike Reed ◽  
Darren Skibinsky

The Canadian Energy Pipeline Association (CEPA) is a voluntary, non-profit industry association representing major Canadian transmission pipeline companies. With the advent of changes in both CSA Z6621 as well as the National Energy Board Onshore Pipeline Regulations (OPR)2, the membership determined a Recommended Practice regarding a Management Systems Approach for Facilities Integrity was needed. As such, the Pipeline Integrity Working Group (PIWG) within CEPA formed a task group to support the initiative. The outlined approach was intended to have two main philosophical underpinnings: it must comprehensively support safe pipeline system operations and it must provide a practical mechanism for implementing a management systems approach for Facilities Iintegrity. The main challenge in developing a framework for a Facilities Integrity Management System lies in the broad range of equipment and system types that the management system must encompass. That is, equipment, in the context of Facilities Integrity Management, must encompass not only station equipment (such as rotating equipment, valves, meters etc.,) but also categories such as high pressure station piping and fuel lines. Further, there was the recognition that Operators already have an array of tools, processes and techniques in place to manage their various equipment and systems. In light of these observations, the Recommended Practice describes a framework that uses major equipment types as a key differentiator. This is an approach that can be easily aligned with existing corporate computerized maintenance management systems (CMMS) such as SAP™ or Maximo™. Once the equipment categorization has been established, the Recommended Practice then provides guidance regarding the specific requirements that should be addressed for each equipment category based on the framework in CSA Z662-11 Annex N. Specific suggestions are provided in the areas of: alignment with corporate goals and objectives, scope, definitions, performance metrics, risk assessments, competency of personnel, change management as well as documentation. The approach also maximizes the opportunity to leverage existing systems and processes to the extent possible. Overall the Recommended Practice should provide operators with a practical way to achieve a greater degree of rigor and alignment of facilities integrity management while ensuring detailed study and analysis is focused in the most appropriate areas.


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