scholarly journals Hypergame Theory: A Model for Conflict, Misperception, and Deception

Game Theory ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas S. Kovach ◽  
Alan S. Gibson ◽  
Gary B. Lamont
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Theory ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Historical Literature ◽  
Intentional Deception ◽  
Broad Overview

When dealing with conflicts, game theory and decision theory can be used to model the interactions of the decision-makers. To date, game theory and decision theory have received considerable modeling focus, while hypergame theory has not. A metagame, known as a hypergame, occurs when one player does not know or fully understand all the strategies of a game. Hypergame theory extends the advantages of game theory by allowing a player to outmaneuver an opponent and obtaining a more preferred outcome with a higher utility. The ability to outmaneuver an opponent occurs in the hypergame because the different views (perception or deception) of opponents are captured in the model, through the incorporation of information unknown to other players (misperception or intentional deception). The hypergame model more accurately provides solutions for complex theoretic modeling of conflicts than those modeled by game theory and excels where perception or information differences exist between players. This paper explores the current research in hypergame theory and presents a broad overview of the historical literature on hypergame theory.

scholarly journals Game Theory Without Partitions, and Applications to Speculation and Consensus

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
John Geanakoplos
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Information Processing ◽  
Decision Theory ◽  
Common Knowledge ◽  
Extended Theory ◽  
Knowing That ◽  
Processing Errors ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient

Abstract Decision theory and game theory are extended to allow for information processing errors. This extended theory is then used to reexamine market speculation and consensus, both when all actions (opinions) are common knowledge and when they may not be. Five axioms of information processing are shown to be especially important to speculation and consensus. They are called nondelusion, knowing that you know (KTYK), nested, balanced, and positively balanced. We show that it is necessary and sufficient that each agent's information processing errors be (1) nondeluded and balanced so that the agents cannot agree to disagree, (2) nondeluded and positively balanced so that it cannot be common knowledge that they are speculating, and (3) nondeluded and KTYK and nested so that agents cannot speculate in equilibrium. Each condition is strictly weaker than the next one, and the last is strictly weaker than partition information.

Fuzzy Optimal Approaches to 2-P Cooperative Games

2016 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 22-35
Author(s):  
Mubarak S. Al-Mutairi
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Favourable Outcome ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Fuzzy Approach ◽  
Fuzzy Information ◽  
Missing Information ◽  
Conflicting Objectives ◽  
Potential Benefits ◽  
Classical Game ◽  
Classical Game Theory

In game theory, two or more parties need to make decisions with fully or partially conflicting objectives. In situations where reaching a more favourable outcome depends upon cooperation between the two conflicting parties, some of the mental and subjective attitudes of the decision makers must be considered. While the decision to cooperate with others bears some risks due to uncertainty and loss of control, not cooperating means giving up potential benefits. In practice, decisions must be made under risk, uncertainty, and incomplete or fuzzy information. Because it is able to work well with vague, ambiguous, imprecise, noisy or missing information, the fuzzy approach is effective for modeling such multicriteria conflicting situations. The well-known game of Prisoner's Dilemma, which reflects a basic situation in which one must decide whether to cooperate or not with a competitor, is systematically solved using a fuzzy approach. The fuzzy procedure is used to incorporate some of the subjective attitudes of the decision makers that are difficult to model using classical game theory. Furthermore, it permits researchers to consider the subjective attitudes of the decision makers and make better decisions in subjective, uncertain, and risky situations.

scholarly journals Waste load allocation under uncertainty using game theory approach and simulation-optimization process

2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 815-841 ◽  
Author(s):  
Behnam Andik ◽  
Mohammad Hossein Niksokhan
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Sensitivity Analysis ◽  
Simulation Optimization ◽  
Graph Model ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Optimization Process ◽  
Theory Approach ◽  
Waste Load Allocation ◽  
Waste Load ◽  
The Status

Abstract This article aims to present a new methodology for waste load allocation (WLA) in a riverine system considering the uncertainty and achieve the lowest amount of inequity index, cost, and fuzzy risk of standard violation. To find a surface of undominated solutions, a new modified PAWN method, initially designed for sensitivity analysis, was developed and coupled with a simulation-optimization process using multi-objective particle swarm optimization (MOPSO) algorithm, to consider the uncertainty of all affecting variables and parameters by using their probability distribution. The proposed methodology applied to Sefidrood River in the northern part of Iran. Graph model for conflict resolution (GMCR) as a subset of game theory was implemented to attain a compromise on WLA among the stakeholders of a river system's quality in Iran: Department of Environment, Municipal Waste Water, and Private Sector. Some undominated solutions were used in GMCR model and modeling the conflict among decision makers reveals that their preferences and the status quo do not lead to a solely stable equilibrium; thus the intervention of a ruler as arbitrator leads them to reach a compromise on a scenario that has a median FRVS and cost. Sensitivity analysis was done using the PAWN method to assess the sensitivity of three intended objectives to all variables and parameters.

Thünen-Vorlesung: Unternehmensführung und ökonomische Rationalität

2003 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 295-312 ◽  
Author(s):  
Herbert Hax
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Decision Theory ◽  
Organizational Context ◽  
Market Value ◽  
Normative Theory ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Individual Decision ◽  
Individual Decision Making ◽  
Definition Of

Abstract In a normative theory of decision making in the firm, limited cognitive capabilities of decision makers can be taken into account in different ways. If individual decision making alone is being considered, the concept of rationality must be defined in such a way that it is acceptable from the viewpoint of potential users of the theory. In an organizational context, normative theory deals primarily with the design of contracts; as far as the anticipation of the actual behaviour of contract partners is concerned an empirically valid descriptive decision theory is needed. A major problem which arises if one applies contract theory to problems of corporate governance is the definition of an adequate standard to evaluate the firm’s outcome periodically. Accounting profit and market value are two possible measures, but both have grave shortcomings.

scholarly journals A Research data Sharing Game

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tessa E Pronk ◽  
Paulien H Wiersma ◽  
Anne van Weerden
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Theory ◽  
Data Sharing ◽  
Scientific Community ◽  
Data Retrieval ◽  
Research Data ◽  
Top Down ◽  
Average Efficiency ◽  
Natural Tendency ◽  
Share Data

While reusing research data has evident benefits for the scientific community as a whole, decisions to archive and share these data are primarily made by individual researchers. For individuals, it is less obvious that the benefits of sharing data outweigh the associated costs, i.e. time and money. In this sense the problem of data sharing resembles a typical game in interactive decision theory, more commonly known as game theory. Within this framework we analyse in this paper how different measures to promote sharing and reuse of research data affect sharing and not sharing individuals. We find that the scientific community can benefit from top-down policies to enhance sharing data even when the act of sharing itself implies a cost. Namely, if (almost) everyone shares, many individuals can gain a higher efficiency as datasets can be reused. Additionally, measures to ensure better data retrieval and quality can compensate for sharing costs by enabling reuse. Nevertheless, an individual researcher who decides not to share omits the costs of sharing. Assuming that the natural tendency will be to use a strategy that will lead to maximisation of individual efficiency it is seen that, as more individuals decide not to share, there is a point at which average efficiency for both sharing and non-sharing researchers becomes lower than was originally the case and scientific community efficiency steadily drops. With this in mind, we conclude that the key to motivate the researcher to share data lies in reducing the costs associated with sharing, or even better, turning it into a benefit.

scholarly journals The ambiguity dilemma in procurement projects

2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 792-800 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mehdi Rajabi Asadabadi ◽  
Keiran Sharpe
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Theory ◽  
Current Literature ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Imperfect Information ◽  
Rational Agency ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Procurement Process

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to use game theory and ambiguity theory to show how “economically rational” vendors will behave in a procurement process that runs over more than one period. In light of that behavior, we have proposed “economically rational” counter-strategies on the part of purchasers.Design/methodology/approachBased on a perception–expectation framework, a unique game-based approach is designed. The authors have proposed “economically rational” counter-strategies on the part of purchasers, which are premised on the theory of rational agency.FindingsAmbiguity in the procurement process is a bane for procuring principals and a boon for suppliers – for the former, it is an issue to be managed, and for the latter it provides an opportunity to extract “insurance rents” from the principals. The authors show that, under certain conditions, the contracting principal can be exploited by a rational, rent-extracting vendor. In particular, they show that there is an incentive for a vendor to delay the resolution of ambiguities in the contract until late in the procurement process, when the insurance rents are at a maximum.Originality/valueThis study contributes to the current literature by highlighting an existing problem in the procurement process and describing it using decision theory under ambiguity in a game-like setting. Specifically, the authors use game theory in a unique way to deal with imperfect information coupled with ambiguity.

Decision and game theory

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cristina Bicchieri
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Decision Theory ◽  
Subject Matter ◽  
Individual Decision Making ◽  
Conflict And Cooperation ◽  
Intentional Agent ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Right ◽  
Subject Making

Decision theory studies individual decision-making in situations in which an individual’s choice neither affects nor is affected by other individuals’ choices; while game theory studies decision-making in situations where individuals’ choices do affect each other. Decision theory asks questions like: what does it mean to choose rationally? How should we make choices when the consequences of our actions are uncertain? Buying insurance and deciding which job to take are examples of the kind of decisions studied by this discipline. Game theory instead applies to all decisions that have a strategic component. The choices of an oligopolist, voting strategies, military tactical problems, deterrence, but also common phenomena such as threatening, promising, conflict and cooperation are its subject matter. In a strategic situation, the goal is not just to choose rationally, but to choose in such a way that a mutual solution is achieved, so that choices ‘coordinate’ in the right way. The formal methods developed by game theory do not require that the subject making a choice be an intentional agent: coordinated interaction between animals or computers can be successfully modelled as well.

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