scholarly journals Government Reward-Penalty Mechanism in Closed-Loop Supply Chain Based on Dynamics Game Theory

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaoqing Zhang ◽  
Yingsheng Su ◽  
Xigang Yuan
Keyword(s):  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Fixed Cost ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Recovery Ratio ◽  
Sale Price ◽  
Product Sale ◽  
Weee Recycling ◽  
The Government ◽  
Buy Back

The paper discusses the government reward-penalty mechanism (RPM) between two competing manufacturers and a recycler in closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) under asymmetric information. According to the dynamics game theory and principal-agent theory, three decision-making models are built: (1) decentralized dynamics game model without RPM, (2) decentralized dynamics game model with carbon emission RPM, and (3) decentralized dynamics game model with carbon emission RPM and recovery ratio RPM. The results show that (1) the carbon emission RPM increases product sale price, while it decreases the WEEE buy-back price and the WEEE recovery ratio, besides the profit of recycler. To some extent, it cannot motivate WEEE recycling. (2) Recovery ratio RPM improves the WEEE recovery ratio and lowers the product sale price; it also benefits manufacturer-1’s and recycler’s profits and consumers’ surplus. So it strongly proved effectiveness in guiding WEEE recycling. (3) In any case, the product sale price of manufacture-1 is lower than that of manufacturer-2. Similarly, the WEEE buy-back price and WEEE recovery ratio with H type are higher than those of L type, respectively. Apparently, it is suggested that the manufacturer participating in WEEE recycling and remanufacturing can gain competitive advantages; meanwhile, the recycler with high fixed cost has the scale advantages. (4) The competition can benefit improving WEEE recovery ratio. A numerical simulation is given to examine the theoretical results. According to the main conclusions, we propose that taking active part in recycling and remanufacturing WEEE and choosing the recycler with high fixed cost to cooperate are the wise choices for manufacturers. The recycler should expand fixed recovery cost investment, which will contribute to getting the scale effect; the government needs to balance the carbon emission RPM and recovery ratio RPM so as to cut down environmental pollution and guide the CLSC into WEEE recycling and remanufacturing. The most important carbon emission reward-penalty intensity should be set appropriately in case of discouraging members of CLSC recycling WEEE.

scholarly journals Research on Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Competing Retailers under Government Reward-Penalty Mechanism and Asymmetric Information

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiao-qing Zhang ◽  
Xi-gang Yuan ◽  
Da-lin Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Recovery Rate ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Weee Recycling ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Decentralized Model

In manufacturer-led closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with two competing retailers, the retailer-1 recycles WEEE whose fixed recycling cost is asymmetric information. Using dynamics game theory and principal-agent theory, three dynamic game models are built including (1) benchmark model without reward-penalty mechanism (RPM); (2) decentralized model with carbon emission RPM; (3) decentralized model with carbon emission RPM and recovery rate RPM. This paper discusses the influence of RPM and retailers competition on the CLSC and members benefits. The results show that (1) the carbon emission RPM increases retail price, but decreases the WEEE recycling motivation usually. On the contrary, the recovery rate RPM guides WEEE recycling and lowers the retail price effectively. (2) In any case, the retailer-1’s profit is higher than that of the retailer-2; apparently it suggests that the retailer recycling WEEE gains competitive advantages. Furthermore, both the recovery rate RPM and retailers competition are beneficial to improve the competitive advantage. The relationship between two retailers’ retail price is affected by many complicated factors. (3) The WEEE buyback price and WEEE recovery rate with high fixed recycling cost (H-type) are always higher than that of low fixed recycling cost (L-type), respectively, which means that the H-type fixed recycling cost has scale advantages; the greater the reward-penalty intensity and the fiercer the competition, the more obvious the scale advantages under certain condition. (4) The retailers’ competition can not only guide WEEE recycling but also improve retailers’ profits. Meanwhile, the impact of competition on the manufacturer is related to RPM, but the fierce competition decreases the manufacturer’s profit.

Analysis on Trilateral Game of Government Agency, Emission-Dependent Firm and Carbon Verification Institutions under Cap-and-Trade Scheme

2015 ◽  
Vol 1092-1093 ◽  
pp. 1585-1590
Author(s):  
Mei Wen ◽  
Jun Zeng ◽  
Ming Qiu
Keyword(s):  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Environmental Regulations ◽  
Optimal Strategies ◽  
Government Agency ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Cap And Trade ◽  
Carbon Abatement ◽  
The World ◽  
Reduce Carbon Emission ◽  
The Government

To reduce carbon emission, cap-and-trade (C&T) is regarded as one of the effective environmental regulations around the world, which brings huge challenges to generating firms. In this paper, a tripartite game model on carbon abatement is built to analyze their optimal strategies under the C&T scheme. Based on the equilibrium of the game, some suggestions are presented to give the government agency to promote the efficiency of C&T scheme, that is, introducing carbon verification institution and doing heavier fine to firm will decrease the probability of firm deception and relieve the burden of the government agency; setting reward to carbon verification institution and an appropriate increase in fine of carbon verification institution will decrease the probability of supervisor inspection, further saving supervision costs.

scholarly journals A Decision-Making Model of Low-Carbon Supply Chain Based on Government Subsidy

2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 221
Author(s):  
Xu Qi ◽  
Xiao Li-Jun
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Positive Impact ◽  
Environmental Benefits ◽  
Fixed Cost ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Emission Abatement ◽  
Carbon Supply ◽  
The Government

In order to study the role of government subsidy in a low-carbon supply chain, a two-stage game model for the subsidy of low-carbon technology and the subsidy of recycling is built. And the optimized subsidy strategy under the two kinds of subsidy policies is obtained. This paper also studies the impacts of carbon emission abatement, subsidy and the factors of subsidy on the supply chain and the government, so as to compare the two kinds of subsidy strategy. This study shows that the coefficient of environmental benefits has a positive impact on the two kinds of subsidy. The subsidy can stimulate the carbon emission abatement, and the fixed cost has a negative impact on the will of the carbon emission abatement for the enterprises. Besides, the low-carbon preference of the consumers has a positive impact on the carbon emission abatement under the subsidy of low-carbon technology. Furthermore, the government under takes the main costs of the low-carbon technology under the subsidy of low-carbon technology. The environmental benefit also has a positive impact on the subsidy and profits of the government and the profits of the supply chain under the recycling subsidy. Both kinds of subsidy strategies can achieve supply chain coordination.

scholarly journals Decision-Making of a Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain in the Context Government Policy: A Dynamic Game Theory

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xuemei Zhang ◽  
Qianwen Li ◽  
Guohu Qi
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Total Carbon ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
The Government

To analyze the effect of government reward-penalty policies (RPPs) on the decisions of a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain (CLSC), this paper endogenizes government decision variables to maximize social welfare and builds four decision-making models (without RPP, with carbon emission RPP, with recycling amount RPP, and with double RPP) by using a Stackelberg dynamic game between the government and supply chain members. The research results show that, (1) in the four models, there exist optimal prices and reward-penalty coefficients to maximize the supply chain members’ profits and social welfare. (2) Comparing with model W, under most conditions, three government RPPs decrease the demand for new products and increase the demand for remanufactured products. Comparing the case without RPP, R’s profit decreases, and when the carbon emission cap is very big and the lowest recycling amount is very small, M’s profit increases. (3) In most cases, the three government RPPs can effectively control the total carbon emission and increase the social welfare, but they damage the benefits of retailers and consumers. With the increase of the carbon emission intensity of remanufactured products, the government can implement the double RPP, the carbon emission RPP, and the recycling amount RPP in turn.

scholarly journals Carbon Emission Estimation of Assembled Composite Concrete Beams during Construction

Energies ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (7) ◽  
pp. 1810
Author(s):  
Kaitong Xu ◽  
Haibo Kang ◽  
Wei Wang ◽  
Ping Jiang ◽  
Na Li
Keyword(s):  
Life Cycle ◽  
Carbon Emissions ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Composite Beams ◽  
Total Carbon ◽  
Construction Process ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
The Government

At present, the issue of carbon emissions from buildings has become a hot topic, and carbon emission reduction is also becoming a political and economic contest for countries. As a result, the government and researchers have gradually begun to attach great importance to the industrialization of low-carbon and energy-saving buildings. The rise of prefabricated buildings has promoted a major transformation of the construction methods in the construction industry, which is conducive to reducing the consumption of resources and energy, and of great significance in promoting the low-carbon emission reduction of industrial buildings. This article mainly studies the calculation model for carbon emissions of the three-stage life cycle of component production, logistics transportation, and on-site installation in the whole construction process of composite beams for prefabricated buildings. The construction of CG-2 composite beams in Fujian province, China, was taken as the example. Based on the life cycle assessment method, carbon emissions from the actual construction process of composite beams were evaluated, and that generated by the composite beam components during the transportation stage by using diesel, gasoline, and electric energy consumption methods were compared in detail. The results show that (1) the carbon emissions generated by composite beams during the production stage were relatively high, accounting for 80.8% of the total carbon emissions, while during the transport stage and installation stage, they only accounted for 7.6% and 11.6%, respectively; and (2) during the transportation stage with three different energy-consuming trucks, the carbon emissions from diesel fuel trucks were higher, reaching 186.05 kg, followed by gasoline trucks, which generated about 115.68 kg; electric trucks produced the lowest, only 12.24 kg.

scholarly journals Research on Closed-Loop Supply Chain Decision-Making in Different Cooperation Modes with Government’s Reward-Penalty Mechanism

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (11) ◽  
pp. 6425
Author(s):  
Quanxi Li ◽  
Haowei Zhang ◽  
Kailing Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Recycling Rate ◽  
Transfer Payment ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetry Of Information ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

In closed-loop supply chains (CLSC), manufacturers, retailers, and recyclers perform their duties. Due to the asymmetry of information among enterprises, it is difficult for them to maximize efficiency and profits. To maximize the efficiency and profit of the CLSC, this study establishes five cooperation models of CLSC under the government‘s reward–penalty mechanism. We make decisions on wholesale prices, retail prices, transfer payment prices, and recovery rates relying on the Stackelberg game method and compare the optimal decisions. This paper analyzes the impact of the government reward-penalty mechanism on optimal decisions and how members in CLSC choose partners. We find that the government’s reward-penalty mechanism can effectively increase the recycling rate of used products and the total profit of the closed-loop supply chain. According to the calculation results of the models, under the government’s reward-penalty mechanism, the cooperation can improve the CLSC’s used products recycling capacity and profitability. In a supply chain, the more members participate in the cooperation, the higher profit the CLSC obtain. However, the cooperation mode of all members may lead to monopoly, which is not approved by government and customers.

A multi-objective model for sustainable closed-loop supply chain of perishable products under two carbon emission regulations

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Saman Esmaeilian ◽  
Dariush Mohamadi ◽  
Majid Esmaelian ◽  
Mostafa Ebrahimpour
Keyword(s):  
Mathematical Model ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Life Cycle ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Perishable Products ◽  
Supply Chain Network ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Trade Model

Purpose This paper aims to minimize the total carbon emissions and costs and also maximize the total social benefits. Design/methodology/approach The present study develops a mathematical model for a closed-loop supply chain network of perishable products so that considers the vital aspects of sustainability across the life cycle of the supply chain network. To evaluate carbon emissions, two different regulating policies are studied. Findings According to the obtained results, increasing the lifetime of the perishable products improves the incorporated objective function (IOF) in both the carbon cap-and-trade model and the model with a strict cap on carbon emission while the solving time increases in both models. Moreover, the computational efficiency of the carbon cap-and-trade model is higher than that of the model with a strict cap, but its value of the IOF is worse. Results indicate that efficient policies for carbon management will support planners to achieve sustainability in a cost-effectively manner. Originality/value This research proposes a mathematical model for the sustainable closed-loop supply chain of perishable products that applies the significant aspects of sustainability across the life cycle of the supply chain network. Regional economic value, regional development, unemployment rate and the number of job opportunities created in the regions are considered as the social dimension.

scholarly journals Pricing Decisions of CSR Closed-Loop Supply Chains with Carbon Emission Constraints

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (12) ◽  
pp. 4430 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tong Shu ◽  
Qian Liu ◽  
Shou Chen ◽  
Shouyang Wang ◽  
Kin Lai
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Social Responsibility ◽  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Carbon Emissions ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chains ◽  
Corporate Social

Global warming has become a growing concern for countries around the world. Currently, the direct way to solve this issue is to curb carbon emissions. Governments and enterprises should assume the social responsibility to conserve the environment. Under the background of carbon emission constraint, this article investigates the optimal decisions of closed-loop supply chains in the context of social responsibility, explores the impacts of constraints of carbon emissions and corporate social responsibility on recycling and remanufacturing decisions, and introduces the model of maximizing social welfare for further comparison and analysis. The results show that the coefficient of remanufacturing and emission reduction and the coefficient of government reward and punishment are inversely proportional to recycling rates and the total carbon emissions. Governments should formulate rational carbon emission caps for enterprises with different coefficients of remanufacturing and emission reduction. Additionally, corporate social responsibility has a positive effect on recycling rates, and a rise in its strength can lead to a fall in carbon emissions per unit product. In terms of product recycling and profit sources, the model of maximizing social welfare is superior to that of maximizing the manufacturer’s total profits, which provides new managerial insights for decision-makers.

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