Analysis on Trilateral Game of Government Agency, Emission-Dependent Firm and Carbon Verification Institutions under Cap-and-Trade Scheme

2015 ◽  
Vol 1092-1093 ◽  
pp. 1585-1590
Author(s):  
Mei Wen ◽  
Jun Zeng ◽  
Ming Qiu
Keyword(s):  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Environmental Regulations ◽  
Optimal Strategies ◽  
Government Agency ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Cap And Trade ◽  
Carbon Abatement ◽  
The World ◽  
Reduce Carbon Emission ◽  
The Government

To reduce carbon emission, cap-and-trade (C&T) is regarded as one of the effective environmental regulations around the world, which brings huge challenges to generating firms. In this paper, a tripartite game model on carbon abatement is built to analyze their optimal strategies under the C&T scheme. Based on the equilibrium of the game, some suggestions are presented to give the government agency to promote the efficiency of C&T scheme, that is, introducing carbon verification institution and doing heavier fine to firm will decrease the probability of firm deception and relieve the burden of the government agency; setting reward to carbon verification institution and an appropriate increase in fine of carbon verification institution will decrease the probability of supervisor inspection, further saving supervision costs.

scholarly journals Government Reward-Penalty Mechanism in Closed-Loop Supply Chain Based on Dynamics Game Theory

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaoqing Zhang ◽  
Yingsheng Su ◽  
Xigang Yuan
Keyword(s):  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Fixed Cost ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Recovery Ratio ◽  
Sale Price ◽  
Product Sale ◽  
Weee Recycling ◽  
The Government ◽  
Buy Back

The paper discusses the government reward-penalty mechanism (RPM) between two competing manufacturers and a recycler in closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) under asymmetric information. According to the dynamics game theory and principal-agent theory, three decision-making models are built: (1) decentralized dynamics game model without RPM, (2) decentralized dynamics game model with carbon emission RPM, and (3) decentralized dynamics game model with carbon emission RPM and recovery ratio RPM. The results show that (1) the carbon emission RPM increases product sale price, while it decreases the WEEE buy-back price and the WEEE recovery ratio, besides the profit of recycler. To some extent, it cannot motivate WEEE recycling. (2) Recovery ratio RPM improves the WEEE recovery ratio and lowers the product sale price; it also benefits manufacturer-1’s and recycler’s profits and consumers’ surplus. So it strongly proved effectiveness in guiding WEEE recycling. (3) In any case, the product sale price of manufacture-1 is lower than that of manufacturer-2. Similarly, the WEEE buy-back price and WEEE recovery ratio with H type are higher than those of L type, respectively. Apparently, it is suggested that the manufacturer participating in WEEE recycling and remanufacturing can gain competitive advantages; meanwhile, the recycler with high fixed cost has the scale advantages. (4) The competition can benefit improving WEEE recovery ratio. A numerical simulation is given to examine the theoretical results. According to the main conclusions, we propose that taking active part in recycling and remanufacturing WEEE and choosing the recycler with high fixed cost to cooperate are the wise choices for manufacturers. The recycler should expand fixed recovery cost investment, which will contribute to getting the scale effect; the government needs to balance the carbon emission RPM and recovery ratio RPM so as to cut down environmental pollution and guide the CLSC into WEEE recycling and remanufacturing. The most important carbon emission reward-penalty intensity should be set appropriately in case of discouraging members of CLSC recycling WEEE.

scholarly journals Optimal Decisions for Two Risk-Averse Competitive Manufacturers under the Cap-and-Trade Policy and Uncertain Demand

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 1010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hongxia Sun ◽  
Jie Yang ◽  
Yang Zhong
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Carbon Emissions ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Reduction Rate ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Cap And Trade ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
The Government

With the increasingly serious problem of environmental pollution, reducing carbon emissions has become an urgent task for all countries. The cap-and-trade (C&T) policy has gained international recognition and has been adopted by several countries. In this paper, considering the uncertainty of market demand, we discuss the carbon emission reduction and price policies of two risk-averse competitive manufacturers under the C&T policy. The two manufacturers have two competitive behaviors: simultaneous decision making and sequential decision making. Two models were constructed for these behaviors. The optimal decisions, carbon emission reduction rate, and price were obtained from these two models. Furthermore, in this paper the effects of some key parameters on the optimal decision are discussed, and some managerial insights are obtained. The results show that the lower the manufacturers’ risk aversion level is, the higher their carbon emission reduction rate and utilities. As the carbon quota increases, the manufacturers’ optimal carbon reduction rate and utilities increase. Considering consumers’ environmental awareness, it is more beneficial for the government to reduce the carbon quota and motivate manufacturers’ internal enthusiasm for emission reduction. The government can, through macro control of the market, make carbon trading prices increase appropriately and encourage manufacturers to reduce carbon emissions.

scholarly journals Strategies for Capital Constrained Timber and Carbon Sink Supply Chain under the Cap-and-Trade Scheme

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (11) ◽  
pp. 4380
Author(s):  
Xinyue Yang ◽  
Ye Song ◽  
Mingjun Sun ◽  
Hongjun Peng
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Carbon Sink ◽  
Cap And Trade ◽  
Stackelberg Model ◽  
Emission Rights ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Reduction Costs

We consider a capital constrained timber and carbon sink supply chain under the cap-and-trade scheme, where the forest company produces timber and carbon sink. We consider two subsidy modes: financing subsidy to the carbon sink forests and financing subsidy to the manufacturer’s emission reductions. We apply a Stackelberg model and mainly consider the impact of subsidies on the profits and the strategies of the supply chain members. The results show that when the government gives a financing subsidy to the carbon sink forests, it is conducive to promoting the expansion of carbon sink forests, as well as the enhancement of the forest company’s profit. However, a larger supply of carbon sinks generates a lower price, which leads to the manufacturer reducing the technical emission reduction level and purchasing more carbon emission rights instead. On the other hand, when the manufacturer receives a financing subsidy for the technical emission reduction costs, its production becomes cleaner than before, and the profits of the forest company and the manufacturer increase.

scholarly journals Green Innovation Mode under Carbon Tax and Innovation Subsidy: An Evolutionary Game Analysis for Portfolio Policies

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 1385 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shengzhong Zhang ◽  
Yingmin Yu ◽  
Qihong Zhu ◽  
Chun Martin Qiu ◽  
Aixuan Tian
Keyword(s):  
Carbon Emission ◽  
New Technologies ◽  
Carbon Tax ◽  
Early Stage ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Green Innovation ◽  
Tax Rate ◽  
Reduce Carbon Emission ◽  
The Government ◽  
Innovation Mode

Previous literature has shown that manufacturers’ choices between radical and incremental green innovation modes can greatly impact the tradeoff between industry growth and carbon emission reduction. Yet, how the government can motivate manufacturers to implement radical green innovations to reduce carbon emission is unclear. In this paper, the researchers construct an evolutionary game model to analyze the joint impacts of carbon tax and innovation subsidy on manufacturers’ choices of green innovation mode. We derive the conditions for manufacturers’ stable strategies. Based on those results, we find that four factors—carbon tax, innovation subsidy, consumer green preference, and manufacturers’ capabilities of absorbing and adopting new technologies—may facilitate the choice of radical innovation. Furthermore, we conduct numerical simulations to verify the theoretical results, and further illustrate how the synergy of carbon tax rate and subsidy level affects the evolution of the green innovation mode choices. Specifically, we demonstrate the superiority of portfolio policy in the early stage of green innovation over single policy. In contrast, in the later stage, it is carbon tax but not innovation subsidy that remains effective. We discuss the insights for the government to formulate appropriate environmental policies to effectively promote the adoption of green innovation and reduce carbon emission.

scholarly journals Central Public-Private Partnership (PPP) Development Facility for Enhancing Government Obligation and Efficiency in PPP Project

2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 66-77 ◽  
Author(s):  
Md. Abu Rashed ◽  
Md. Mahmudul Alam ◽  
Yusnidah Ibrahim
Keyword(s):  
Government Agency ◽  
Public Private Partnership ◽  
Government Agencies ◽  
Central Authority ◽  
Development Cost ◽  
Private Partnership ◽  
Good Relationship ◽  
The World ◽  
The Government ◽  
Budgetary Allocation

The implications of public-private partnership (PPP) concept has gained utmost attention from different governments around the world because of the opportunities inherent in it in terms of overcoming budgetary constraints, improved service quality, enhanced efficiencies in procurement and risk management, and prospects of generating managerial and technical capabilities. The government obligations in PPP projects are often limited to feasibility study, transaction support and implementing linked government or public sector projects which subsequently raise the question regarding how the required funds should be mobilized by the government for these services as upfront development cost. Generally, any government agency driving a PPP project has to secure budgetary allocation from the central authority for performing the government-side obligations, which is often a complicated and time consuming process due to other priorities of the central treasury. To overcome this challenge, establishment of a central PPP development facility by the government is required. The ability to create and manage such a facility within the government mechanism will ensure seamless development and implementation of PPP projects by different government agencies and will contribute to foster a good relationship between the government and the private sector investors.

scholarly journals Impact of Green Credit Financing and Carbon Emission Limits on the Supply Chain Based on POF

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (11) ◽  
pp. 5814
Author(s):  
Liurui Deng ◽  
Lan Yang ◽  
Wei Li
Keyword(s):  
Production Cost ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Optimal Strategies ◽  
Production Costs ◽  
Credit Policy ◽  
Purchase Order ◽  
Credit Financing ◽  
The Government ◽  
Emission Limits ◽  
The Impact

In recent years, environmental protection has been paid more and more attention. Green credit policy (GCP) is one of the significant preferential policies for government to encourage enterprises to vigorously develop green projects. We are interested in the impact of the central bank’s GCP on the profits and optimal strategies of manufacturers and suppliers related to POF (purchase order financing). Specifically, we build a game-theoretical model consisting of a manufacturer, a bank and a green supplier and a non-green supplier. Furthermore, the optimal strategies of the manufacturer and suppliers when the bank or the government sets a carbon emission cap on suppliers are discussed. We come to some important conclusions about a GCP that promotes the development of green projects since it brings higher profits to both the manufacturer and suppliers than the lack of a GCP. Furthermore, the higher the production cost, the better the effect of a GCP. Under the carbon emission restrictions required by the government, the effect of GCP is weakened and the profits of the manufacturer and the suppliers are reduced to zero due to the gradually increasing delivery risks as production costs increase.

scholarly journals Why Trusting Nigeria Centre for Disease Control Information Is Difficult: A Study of The Awareness, Knowledge and Perceptions of Nigerians Hesitant Towards COVID-19 Management by NCDC in Nigeria

2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (5) ◽  
pp. 6001-6008
Author(s):  
Mohammed Abdullateef ◽  
◽  
Beatrice Okonkwo ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Disease Control ◽  
Mixed Method ◽  
Government Agency ◽  
The Novel ◽  
Control Information ◽  
The World ◽  
Public Health Institutions ◽  
Health Institutions ◽  
The Government ◽  
Novel Coronavirus

As the world battles the novel Coronavirus pandemic ravaging lives and destroying economies, many nations have entrusted the detection, handling and management of confirmed coronavirus cases to their leading public health institutions. For Nigeria, the Nigeria Centre for Disease Control (NCDC), charged with the said responsibility, faces a worrisome myriad of backlash from citizens' who regard their daily update of confirmed cases as misleading. In this survey, the researchers purposively study this category of sceptic individuals to understand their level of awareness of the virus and their perceptions about the government agency, to determine the factors responsible for the lack of confidence in the reportage, and how their confidence level may be boosted. The study adopted a mixed-method to recruit some 425 respondents that fit the profile of 'those who lack confidence in the NCDC daily reports'. Findings revealed that even the aware, educated, and high-income Nigerians equally constitute those with misperceptions and scepticism about the NCDC. Key reasons for the distrust include inconsistent reporting, secrecy about patients' database, and perceived corruption tendencies. Recommendations based on the findings call for increased openness and access to compelling information about activities to curtail the infection, especially transparency in treatment and budget spending.

scholarly journals Versatile Applications of Solar Cells

2021 ◽  
pp. 24-39
Author(s):  
V.C. Akubude
Keyword(s):  
Quantum Dots ◽  
Solar Cells ◽  
Basic Principle ◽  
Electricity Generation ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Space Research ◽  
Grid System ◽  
The World ◽  
Grid Applications ◽  
Reduce Carbon Emission

Solar cells have changed the way electricity is generated; it helps the world to reduce carbon emission, and consequently makes our electric grid system more resilient and reliable. Hence, this chapter presents the concept of solar cells and the basic principle of operation. The chapter also discusses materials in construction of solar cells including conventional semiconductors such as silicon and emerging/organic materials such as perovskite and quantum dots. Various applications of solar cells which include space research, telecommunications, grid connections, stand-alone connections and off-grid applications are also highlighted. Given the versatile application of solar cells, it is the future of electricity generation.

scholarly journals The Optimal Carbon Emission Reduction and Prices with Cap and Trade Mechanism and Competition

2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (11) ◽  
pp. 2570 ◽  
Author(s):  
Linghong Zhang ◽  
Hao Zhou ◽  
Yanyan Liu ◽  
Rui Lu
Keyword(s):  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Reduction Rate ◽  
Carbon Price ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Cap And Trade ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Closed Form Solutions ◽  
Retail Prices

More and more countries employ the Carbon Cap and Trade mechanism (CCT-mechanism) to stimulate the manufacturer to produce much more eco-friendly products. In this paper, we study how the CCT-mechanism affects competitive manufacturers’ product design and pricing strategies. Assume that there are two competitive manufacturers; we give the optimal closed form solutions of the carbon emission reduction rates and retail prices in the Nash game model and the Stackelberg game model with CCT-mechanism, respectively. Additionally, we also discuss the impacts of CCT-mechanism, consumer environmental awareness (CEA), and the sensitivity of switchovers toward price on the optimal carbon emission reduction rates, retail prices, and manufacturers’ profits. We find that (i) when the carbon quota is not enough, there is a trade off between investing in producing much greener product and purchasing carbon quota; when the carbon price is not high, the manufacturer tends to purchase the carbon quota; and when the carbon price is much higher, the manufacturer is more willing to increase the environmental quality of the product; (ii) manufacturer’s size affects product’s emission reduction rate and manufacturer’s optimal profit; larger manufacturer tends to produce much greener product, but it does not mean that he could obtain much more money than the small manufacturer; and (iii) the decision sequence changes manufacturer’s strategies; the optimal emission reduction rate in Nash and Stackelberg game models are almost the same, but the differences of prices and profits between Nash and Stackelberg model’s are much bigger.

scholarly journals Central Public-Private Partnership (PPP) Development Facility for Enhancing Government Obligation and Efficiency in PPP Project

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abu Rashed ◽  
Md. Mahmudul Alam ◽  
Yusnidah Bt Ibrahim
Keyword(s):  
Government Agency ◽  
Public Private Partnership ◽  
Government Agencies ◽  
Central Authority ◽  
Development Cost ◽  
Private Partnership ◽  
Good Relationship ◽  
The World ◽  
The Government ◽  
Budgetary Allocation

The implications of public-private partnership (PPP) concept has gained utmost attention from different governments around the world because of the opportunities inherent in it in terms of overcoming budgetary constraints, improved service quality, enhanced efficiencies in procurement and risk management, and prospects of generating managerial and technical capabilities. The government obligations in PPP projects are often limited to feasibility study, transaction support and implementing linked government or public sector projects which subsequently raise the question regarding how the required funds should be mobilized by the government for these services as upfront development cost. Generally, any government agency driving a PPP project has to secure budgetary allocation from the central authority for performing the government-side obligations, which is often a complicated and time consuming process due to other priorities of the central treasury. To overcome this challenge, establishment of a central PPP development facility by the government is required. The ability to create and manage such a facility within the government mechanism will ensure seamless development and implementation of PPP projects by different government agencies and will contribute to foster a good relationship between the government and the private sector investors.

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