Intentionality and Truth-Making: Augustine's Influence on Burley and Wyclif 's Propositional Semantics

Vivarium ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 45 (2) ◽  
pp. 283-297 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laurent Cesalli

AbstractWalter Burley (1275-c.1344) and John Wyclif (1328-1384) follow two clearly stated doctrinal options: on the one hand, they are realists and, on the other, they defend a correspondence theory of truth that involves specific correlates for true propositions, in short: truth-makers. Both characteristics are interdependent: such a conception of truth requires a certain kind of ontology. This study shows that a) in their explanation of what it means for a proposition to be true, Burley and Wyclif both develop what we could call a theory of intentionality in order to explain the relation that must obtain between the human mind and the truth-makers, and b) that their explanations reach back to Augustine, more precisely to his theory of ocular vision as exposed in the De trinitate IX as well as to his conception of ideas found in the Quaestio de ideis.

2015 ◽  
Vol 27 (4-5) ◽  
pp. 447-474 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lars Albinus

While this article salutes attempts to use Donald Davidson’s principles of radical interpretation in the study of religion in order to avoid the pitfalls of correspondence theory of truth, on the one hand, and cultural relativism, on the other, it suggests that an adequate understanding of religion may also take other pragmatic aspects of meaning into account. Buying into Jürgen Habermas’ critique of Davidson, the more specific argument is that a differentiation of validity criteria serves to disclose the restricted role “truth” plays in speech acts. It is also argued that although Richard Rorty’s skepticism towards universal criteria of rationality borders on relativism, he is justified in focusing more radically—along with Robert Brandom—on pragmatic and situational criteria of meaning. Finally, drawing on Wittgenstein’s concept of “perspicuous representation” I suggest an alternate way of coming to grips with meaning potentials in religious ways of life.


PMLA ◽  
1959 ◽  
Vol 74 (4-Part1) ◽  
pp. 356-364
Author(s):  
Virgil W. Topazio

With the emergence of philosophy in the nineteenth century as a separate discipline which stressed primarily questions insoluble by empirical or formal methods, Voltaire's reputation as a philosopher has gone into gradual eclipse. It has become unfashionable and degrading for philosophers to concern themselves with the practical aspects of philosophical enquiry. In eighteenth-century France, on the other hand, the identification of philosophy with science, which by twentieth-century standards had vitiated philosophical thought, produced the “philosophes” or natural philosophers who were on the whole more interested in human progress than in the progress of the human mind. And Voltaire was by popular consent the leader of this “philosophe” group, the one who had unquestionably contributed the most in the struggle to make man a happier and freer member of society. Yet, ironically, despite a lifelong effort in behalf of humanity, Voltaire's reputation as a destructive thinker has steadily grown even as the critics have pejoratively classified him as a “practical” rather than a “real” philosopher. Typical of this criticism of Voltaire is Macaulay's statement: “Voltaire could not build: he could only pull down: he was the very Vitruvius of ruin. He has bequeathed to us not a single doctrine to be called by his name, not a single addition to the stock of our positive knowledge.”


2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (8) ◽  
pp. 3-18
Author(s):  
Agustinus Wisnu Dewantara

Talking about God can not be separated from the activity of human thought. Activity is the heart of metaphysics. Searching religious authenticity tends to lead to a leap in harsh encounter with other religions. This interfaith encounter harsh posed a dilemma. Why? Because on the one hand religion is the peacemaker, but on the other hand it’s has of encouraging conflict and even violence. Understanding God is not quite done only by understanding the religion dogma, but to understand God rationally it is needed. It is true that humans understand the world according to his own ego, but it is not simultaneously affirm that God is only a projection of the human mind. Humans understand things outside of himself because no awareness of it. On this side of metaphysics finds itself. Analogical approach allows humans to approach and express God metaphysically. Human clearly can not express the reality of the divine in human language, but with the human intellect is able to reflect something about the relationship with God. Analogy allows humans to enter the metaphysical discussion about God. People who are at this point should come to the understanding that God is the Same One More From My mind, The Impossible is defined, the Supreme Mystery, and infinitely far above any human thoughts.


2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 87-119
Author(s):  
Leno Francisco Danner ◽  
Agemir Bavaresco ◽  
Fernando Danner

In this paper, we argue that the normative concept of modernity as self-referentiality, self-subsistence, autonomy, endogeny and independence of reason is based on the correlation of anthropology and science in a double, however correlated, point: on the one hand, it is rooted on the idea of the natural world as a purely technical, physical, chemical and biological triad of structure, dynamics and object, which obeys to quantitative and definite-invariable material laws; on the other, it is grounded on the idea of human mind or human nature as a normative subject that is able to interpret in an objective way this purely technical nature and, more importantly, to construct the epistemological-moral-ontological objectivity from the modern self’s capability of creating its own axiology and rationalizing the epistemological-moral foundation and the anthropological-ontological place-belonging in the world and in society. As a consequence, the normative concept of modernity, associated to a technical view of nature and to a political-profane-historical notion of society-culture-consciousness, of socialization-subjectivation, enables the idea that modernity is a very singular anthropological-societal-cultural-cognitive process of evolution in human history, as its paradigmatic basis (reason between natural science and secular culture) represents directly universalism in itself, so as to construct a barrier and an opposition between modernity and the other of modernity, as well as to institute the process of modernity-modernization and its comprehension as a self-referential, self-subsisting, autonomous, closed and endogenous process, and as a principle of movement, dynamics and explanation. Here, modernity can be explained only by its internal processes, subjects, principles, values and multiple dynamics, as it signifies a self-constructive movement in itself and by itself, as an overcoming of traditionalism as a minority and a consolidation of modernity-modernization as a majority due to the intersection of reason, science and culture.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ursula Renz

Spinoza's ethics is grounded by a conviction which is as simple as it is programmatic: Subjective experience can be explained, and its successful explanation is of ethical relevance. For it makes us smarter, freer and happier. This is the programmatic conviction behind Spinoza's ethics and motivates many of the theses it puts forward. Ursula Renz shows which kind of a theory of the human mind informs this program. The systematic differentiation of theory parts in the architecture of ethics proves to be a decisive move: A theory part that deals with questions of the ontology of the mental is followed by a definition of the human mind as a kind of subject theory, which in turn is separated from a theory part dealing with the constitution of content. This structure makes it possible to deal separately with different problems that arise in the course of the explanation of experience. In the end, Spinoza succeeds in avoiding both reductionisms and skepticisms right from the start. In this way, two intuitions are brought together that are often considered incompatible: on the one hand, the view that experience is something irreducibly subjective, and on the other hand, the assumption that there are better and worse explanations of experience.


2018 ◽  
Vol 50 ◽  
pp. 01208
Author(s):  
Irina Nekipelova

The article is devoted to a research of a linguistic and philosophical category of generalization and specialization. The generalization category is one of the most important categories of human mind. It is as important as the other categories, like analyzing and synthesizing, classification, extrapolation and analogy. On the one hand, generalization is a philosophical category, because it is one of world designing instruments and a world picture creation in mind of the human. On the other hand, generalization is also a linguistic category, because it is one of instruments of designing a world language picture. The certificate of it are the cross-disciplinary researches using knowledge of different sciences. The ability to draw conclusions is a feature of human minds. It allows a human to unite a logical and figurative approach to perception and understanding of the world. The research has shown that the generalization category realizes the subset and superset relations between language units. These relations assume communication of the general concept with the private concepts included in it. In the pragmatical plan, the generalization category is expressed in existing words having the generalized value. These words designate nonexistent denotations. At the same time, they correspond too many denotations. However, they do not call these denotations directly, but that is what it means. Designating a lot of things, the generalized words have a high coefficient of informational content. But this coefficient significantly decreases in specific conditions of a context. It is necessary to tell that the criterion of informational content is the important criterion of the language development. And we should see that generalization is one of ways of information growth in language. Subset and superset relations make human communications more successful.


2018 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 160-175
Author(s):  
Florian Wöller

AbstractThis article examines four medieval views on the subject of theology. Thomas Aquinas, Giles of Rome, John Duns Scotus, and Peter Auriol were all confronted with an idea based on Aristotle’s theory of knowledge according to which any scientific discipline is unified by its proper subject. In defining this subject of theology, however, the theologians had to confront one thorny problem: God, whom they considered to be the subject of theology, cannot be grasped by any concept accessible to the human mind. In their respective discussions, two distinct strategies to solving this puzzle emerged. Aquinas and Giles, on the one hand, argued for a concept proportionate to human cognition. This concept or ratio functioned as a placeholder for the quidditative concept of God. Scotus and Auriol, on the other hand, elaborated on a concept which they believed grasped God’s quiddity, albeit in a somewhat approximative way. Their theories, therefore, figure as attempts to find a concept, that is, the concept of being, that in itself was as boundless as to grasp God’s immensity.


Author(s):  
Christian Rode

This article examines the role of the mediaeval theory of the propositio in re, as proposed by Walter Burley and others, which bears a striking resemblance to the theory of the “proposition” advocated by G. E. Moore and B. Russell. Burley’s proposition composed of real things has the function of an ultimate significate for every sentence of natural language. The main problems of such a theory are on the one hand absurdities like a bird flying between the subject and predicate of a sentence, on the other hand Burley’s assumption that a relation of identity holds between subject and predicate, which might render propositiones in re tautological. Moreover, the particular nature of this relation is left unexplained. But these difficulties can be solved: The former by applying objective being, being as being cognized, to the terms of a propositio, as did Scotus and Franciscus de Prato, the latter by specifying multiple forms of real predication as being or being-in-something apart from a mere identity-relation (e. g. William Milverley).


2019 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 47-59
Author(s):  
Sherif Salem ◽  

We show in this paper how three continental philosophers (Husserl, Heidegger, and Derrida respectively) respond negatively to the analytic correspondence theory of truth using different notions developed by them (i.e. the notion of Intentionality by Husserl, the notion of Dasein by Heidegger, and the notion of Trace by Derrida). We show that despite the fact that the three philosophers are united against the analytic correspondence theory of truth, there are still deep differences between them which stem from the different tools they use to articulate the concept of truth. Also, we argue that Husserlian truth has an advantageous position over the other concepts of truth presented.


2000 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-39 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tony Burns

AbstractWhat is the young Marx's attitude towards questions of psychology? More precisely, what is his attitude towards the human mind and its relationship to the body? To deal adequately with this issue requires a consideration of the relationship between Marx and Feuerbach. It also requires some discussion of the thought of Aristotle. For the views of Feuerbach and the young Marx are (in some respects) not at all original. Rather, they represent a continuation of a long tradition which derives ultimately from ancient Greek philosophy, and especially from the philosophy of Aristotle. As is well known, Aristotle's thought with respect to questions of psychology are mostly presented, by way of a critique of the doctrines of the other philosophers of his day, in his De Anima. W.H. Walsh has made the perceptive observation that Aristotle's views might be seen as an attempt to develop a third approach which avoids the pitfalls usually associated with the idealism of Plato, on the one hand, and the materialism of Democritus on the other. It might be argued that there is an analogy between the situation in which Aristotle found himself in relation to the idealists and materialists of his own day and that which confronted Marx in the very early 1840s. For, like Aristotle, Marx also might be seen as attempting to develop such a third approach. The difference is simply that, in the case of Marx, the idealism in question is that of Hegel rather than that of Plato, and the materialism is the ‘mechanical materialism’ of the eighteenth century rather than that of Democritus. This obvious parallel might well explain why Marx took such a great interest in Aristotle's De Anima both during and shortly after doing the preparatory work for his doctoral dissertation – the subject matter of which, of course, is precisely the materialist philosophy of the ancient Greek atomists Democritus and Epicurus.


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