Explanatory Notes on the Political Economy of Africa

1976 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claude Ake

I Want to indicate how the political economy of contemporary Africa is to be explained, and what might reasonably be conjectured about its development. I am mainly interested in the salient features, namely: intense ethnic conflict, the single-party system, the high incidence of efficiency norms in political competition, the recurrence of military coups, political repression, and the poor performance at economic development.

2010 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 527-547 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans Gersbach ◽  
Lars-H. R. Siemers

We examine the nexus between land transfers and human capital formation. A sequence of land redistributions enables the beneficiaries to educate their children and thus to escape from poverty. A successful land reform allows the transition of a society from an agriculture-based state of poverty to a human capital–based developed economy. We find that a temporary state of inequality among the poor is unavoidable. Finally, we discuss the political economy of land reform, whether access to land markets should be allowed for beneficiaries of land reforms, and property rights issues.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dawit Alemu ◽  
Abebaw Assaye

The goal of this working paper is to identify the core challenges that have contributed to the poor performance of Ethiopia’s rice sector, and highlight approaches to successfully promote the commercialisation of the rice value chain. The authors achieve this by emphasising the underlying political economy dynamics of the rice value chain in Ethiopia, and how these can offer a better understanding of the drivers and constraints of agricultural commercialisation in the country. The paper also discusses the performance of, and challenges faced by, actors involved in the rice value chain. In addition, it looks at the role of development partners in promoting the rice value chain, the role of rice in the rural labour market, as well as the impact of COVID-19 on the various actors.


Author(s):  
Zaad Mahmood

The concluding chapter presents the key findings of the research and highlight the crucial interventions of the book in existing academic literature. The chapter summarizes the arguments of partisan orientation, party–interest group dynamics and party system in shaping overall reforms to highlight the significance of politics. Through a brief discussion of the preceding chapters it emphasizes on the continued relevance of partisan governments and political competition in shaping reforms. The political economy of labour market reforms is then linked to the wider literature by highlighting the claims of relative autonomy of politics despite pressures of globalization. It argues that pressures for policy convergence by forces of globalization are negotiated by local political–economic dynamics and policy transformation under conditions of globalization remains intractably a political process.


2013 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 371-382
Author(s):  
Theocharis N. Grigoriadis

Socio-economic justice lies in the normative core of Islam. The concepts of fard-al-kifāyah and zakāh reveal its commitment to protect the poor from the arbitrariness of the rich and treat the state as an institution that maximises collective welfare. The political economy of Safavid Iran indicates that the establishment of Islam as Iran’s state religion facilitated the empire’s administrative modernisation, economic development and class formation. Contrary to conventional wisdom, I argue that religion did not only offer legitimacy grounds to the Safavid government. It also provided institutional incentives that transformed clerics into intermediaries between people and the Imperial Court, improved fiscal capacity and increased general trust toward the central government.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Falih Suaedi ◽  
Muhmmad Saud

This article explores in what ways political economy as an analytical framework for developmental studies has contributed to scholarships on Indonesian’s contemporary discourse of development. In doing so, it reviews important scholarly works on Indonesian political and economic development since the 1980s. The argument is that given sharp critiques directed at its conceptual and empirical utility for understanding changes taking place in modern Indonesian polity and society, the political economy approach continues to be a significant tool of research specifically in broader context of comparative politics applied to Indonesia and other countries in Southeast Asia. The focus of this exploration, however, has shifted from the formation of Indonesian bourgeoisie to the reconstitution of bourgeois oligarchy consisting of the alliance between the politico-bureaucratic elite and business families. With this in mind, the parallel relationship of capitalist establishment and the development of the state power in Indonesia is explainable.<br>


2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 138-158
Author(s):  
James A. Harris

AbstractMy point of departure in this essay is Smith’s definition of government. “Civil government,” he writes, “so far as it is instituted for the security of property, is in reality instituted for the defence of the rich against the poor, or of those who have some property against those who have none at all.” First I unpack Smith’s definition of government as the protection of the rich against the poor. I argue that, on Smith’s view, this is always part of what government is for. I then turn to the question of what, according to Smith, our governors can do to protect the wealth of the rich from the resentment of the poor. I consider, and reject, the idea that Smith might conceive of education as a means of alleviating the resentment of the poor at their poverty. I then describe how, in his lectures on jurisprudence, Smith refines and develops Hume’s taxonomy of the opinions upon which all government rests. The sense of allegiance to government, according to Smith, is shaped by instinctive deference to natural forms of authority as well as by rational, Whiggish considerations of utility. I argue that it is the principle of authority that provides the feelings of loyalty upon which government chiefly rests. It follows, I suggest, that to the extent that Smith looked to government to protect the property of the rich against the poor, and thereby to maintain the peace and stability of society at large, he cannot have sought to lessen the hold on ordinary people of natural sentiments of deference. In addition, I consider the implications of Smith’s theory of government for the question of his general attitude toward poverty. I argue against the view that Smith has recognizably “liberal,” progressive views of how the poor should be treated. Instead, I locate Smith in the political culture of the Whiggism of his day.


Author(s):  
Gerard Sasges

When A.R. Fontaine arrived in Tonkin in 1886, he was quick to see the potential of applying new technologies to a traditional industry, and to grasp the importance of state protection for the success of his fledgling enterprise. From modest origins, he built a business empire that included everything from distilleries to coal mines to bicycle factories. Fontaine’s was one of the colonial conglomerates that played a central role in the economy’s “Indochinese moment,” introducing new technologies and familiarizing Indochinese with new ways of working, consuming and being. However, the downturn that began in Indochina in 1928 exposed the weakness of many of these enterprise groups. When A.R. Fontaine was forced to step down as President of the SFDIC in 1932, it signified the start of a new era of economic development directed not from Hanoi or Saigon, but rather from Paris.


2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 307-325
Author(s):  
Yinxing Hong

PurposeThe socialist political economy with Chinese characteristics reflects the characteristics of ushering into a new era, and the research object thereof shifts to productive forces. Emancipating and developing productive forces and achieving common prosperity become the main theme. Wealth supersedes value as the fundamental category of economic analysis.Design/methodology/approachThe theoretical system of socialist political economy with Chinese characteristics cannot proceed from transcendental theories but is problem-oriented. Leading problems involve development stages and research-level problems.FindingsThe economic operation analysis is subject to the goal of optimal allocation of resources with micro-level analysis focused on efficiency and macro-level analysis focused on economic growth and macroeconomic stability also known as economic security. The economic development analysis explores the laws of development and related development concepts in compliance with laws of productive forces. The new development concepts i.e. the innovative coordinated green open and shared development drive the innovation of development theory in political economy.Originality/valueAccordingly, the political economy cannot study the system only, but also needs to study the problems of economic operation and economic development. Therefore, the theoretical system of the political economy tends to encompass three major parts, namely economic system, economic operation and economic development (including foreign economy). The basic economic system analysis needs to understand the relationship between public ownership and non-public ownership, between distribution according to work and factor payments, and between socialism and market economy from the perspective of coexistence theory, thus transforming institutional advantage into governance advantage.


Author(s):  
Vasyl Kvartiuk ◽  
Thomas Herzfeld

Abstract This paper explores whether redistributive politics can explain differences in agricultural subsidies in Russia, a country whose autocratic regime represents a fertile ground for strategic redistribution. Relying on political economy literature, we examine the strategies regional and federal Russian politicians utilize to allocate and distribute agricultural subsidies. Using unique 2008–2015 panel data, we test whether politicians target loyal or easily swayed voters and whether they use large farms as vote brokers. We find federal and regional politicians to allocate more agricultural subsidies when political competition against the dominant party is higher. Moreover, they appear to also target large farms for voter mobilization.


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