Nature, value, and normativity: An introduction

2020 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 113-114
Author(s):  
Gabriele De Anna ◽  
Mario De Caro
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Human Nature ◽  
Human Action ◽  
Normative Theory ◽  
Naturalistic Fallacy ◽  
Hard Time

This brief introduction expounds the reasons behind the collection of essays entitled ‘Nature, Value and Normativity’. Political and social philosophers have usually a hard time finding a role for considerations about nature (and human nature in particular) in their accounts of normativity, due to the risk of committing the naturalistic fallacy and/or running against people’s autonomy. Scepticism about appeals to nature in normative accounts of politics and society, however, seems bound to clash with the fact that nature constrains human action. The essays of the collection tackle some specific questions about the role of nature in accounts of value and normativity: the fact–value distinction, the relevance of emotions for normativity and values, the role of intersubjectivity in normative theory, as well as free will and action.

A Minimal Libertarianism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Evan Franklin
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Unsolved Problem ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Human Action ◽  
The Self ◽  
Causal Role ◽  
Causal Processes ◽  
Freedom And Responsibility

In this book Franklin develops and defends a version of event-causal libertarianism about free will and moral responsibility. This view is a combination of libertarianism—the view that humans sometimes act freely and that those actions are the upshots of nondeterministic causal processes—and agency reductionism—the view that the causal role of agents in exercises of free will is exhausted by the causal role of mental states and events (e.g., desires and beliefs) involving the agents. Many philosophers contend that event-causal libertarians have no advantage over compatibilists when it comes to securing a distinctively valuable and robust kind of freedom and responsibility. But Franklin argues that this is mistaken. Assuming agency reductionism is true, event-causal libertarians need only adopt the most plausible compatibilist theory and add indeterminism at the proper juncture in the genesis of human action. The result is minimal event-causal libertarianism: a model of free will with the metaphysical simplicity of compatibilism and the intuitive power of libertarianism. And yet a worry remains. Toward the end of the book, Franklin reconsiders his assumption of agency reductionism, arguing that this picture faces a hitherto unsolved problem. This problem, however, has nothing to do with indeterminism or determinism, or even libertarianism or compatibilism, but with how to understand the nature of the self and its role in the genesis of action. If this problem proves unsolvable, then not only is event-causal libertarianism untenable, so also is event-causal compatibilism.

scholarly journals Poznanie i wolna wola – dwie podstawowe kategorie antropologii Ambrozjastra

Vox Patrum ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 63 ◽  
pp. 143-155
Author(s):  
Grzegorz Babiarz
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Human Nature ◽  
Holy Spirit ◽  
Decisive Role ◽  
The Body ◽  
Ongoing Process ◽  
The Holy Spirit ◽  
Inner Strength ◽  
The Mind

Ambrosiaster belongs to the Roman school of exegesis. He deserves the atten­tion because of the relations between him and Marius Victorinus, his predecessor, as well as Pelagius and Augustine, his successors. The purpose of the article was to present Ambrosiaster’s anthropology on the basis of his writings. The conclu­sions have been presented in three parts: the elements of human nature, the ratio­nality of knowledge and the scope of free will. The first part shows the process in which the elements of nature are integrated. The spirit plays the decisive role synchronizing both the body and the soul. This dynamic and ongoing process is inspired by the presence of the Holy Spirit. The second part reveals two conditions for gaining knowledge: accepting the limita­tions of the mind and expanding and developing the principle of analogy. The last part presents two ways the free will is practised: by increasing how much one owns, which may be associated with lust, or by strengthening one’s inner strength. The role of the cultural and the ecclesial environment constitutes important infor­mation for the reconstruction of the views of Ambrosiaster. This raises the ques­tion whether – alongside Antioch and Alexandria – one could also talk about the Roman school of exegesis (Marius Victorinus, Ambrosiaster, Pelagius).

Kropotkin

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruth Kinna
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
Human Nature ◽  
Political Change ◽  
Direct Action ◽  
The State ◽  
Social Analysis ◽  
Mutual Aid ◽  
Special Character ◽  
Revolutionary Politics

This book is designed to remove Peter Kropotkin from the framework of classical anarchism. By focusing attention on his theory of mutual aid, it argues that the classical framing distorts Kropotkin's political theory by associating it with a narrowly positivistic conception of science, a naively optimistic idea of human nature and a millenarian idea of revolution. Kropotkin's abiding concern with Russian revolutionary politics is the lens for this analysis. The argument is that his engagement with nihilism shaped his conception of science and that his expeditions in Siberia underpinned an approach to social analysis that was rooted in geography. Looking at Kropotkin's relationship with Elisée Reclus and Erico Malatesta and examining his critical appreciation of P-J. Proudhon, Michael Bakunin and Max Stirner, the study shows how he understood anarchist traditions and reveals the special character of his anarchist communism. His idea of the state as a colonising process and his contention that exploitation and oppression operate in global contexts is a key feature of this. Kropotkin's views about the role of theory in revolutionary practice show how he developed this critique of the state and capitalism to advance an idea of political change that combined the building of non-state alternatives through direct action and wilful disobedience. Against critics who argue that Kropotkin betrayed these principles in 1914, the book suggests that this controversial decision was consistent with his anarchism and that it reflected his judgment about the prospects of anarchistic revolution in Russia.

Thomas More's “rule” of pleasure before, after, and inUtopia

Moreana ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 54 (Number 207) (1) ◽  
pp. 36-56
Author(s):  
Gerard Wegemer
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
The Other ◽  
Biblical Allusions ◽  
De Officiis

After establishing a context of More's lifelong engagement with the “calculus” of pleasure, this essay shows how the section devoted to the Utopians' pleasure philosophy is structured around five formulations of a “rule” to calculate “true and honest [honesta]” pleasure in ways that playfully imitate and echo the “rule” Cicero formulates several times in De officiis to discern one's duty when there seems to be a conflict between honestas et utilitas. When followed, the Utopian pleasure calculus shows the necessary role of societas, officii, iustitia, caritas, and the other aspects of human nature, most importantly friendship, that Cicero stresses in his rule and that he argued Epicurus ignored. Much of the irony and humor of this section depends on seeing the predominance of Ciceronian vocabulary in Raphael's unusual defense [patrocinium] of pleasure, rather than a Ciceronian defense of duty rooted in honestas. Throughout, however, this essay also shows how More goes beyond Cicero by including Augustinian and biblical allusions to suggest ways that our final end is not as Epicurus or the Stoics or Cicero claim; the language and allusions of this section point to a level of good cheer and care for neighbors and for God in ways quite different from any classical thinker.

Minimal Event-Causal Libertarianism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Evan Franklin
Keyword(s):  
Free Action ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Human Action

This chapter explains the differences between agency reductionism and nonreductionism, explains the varieties of libertarianism, and sets out the main contours of minimal event-causal libertarianism, highlighting just how minimal this theory is. Crucial to understanding how minimal event-causal libertarianism differs from other event-causal libertarian theories is understanding the location and role of indeterminism in human action, the kinds of mental states essential to causing free action, the nature of nondeterministic causation, and how the theory is constructed from compatibilist accounts. The chapter argues that libertarians must face up to both the problem of luck and the problem of enhanced control when determining the best theoretical location of indeterminism.

Introduction

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Evan Franklin
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Human Agency ◽  
Causal Role ◽  
Central Question ◽  
Agent Causation ◽  
The Right

This chapter lays out the book’s central question: Assuming agency reductionism—that is, the thesis that the causal role of the agent in all agential activities is reducible to the causal role of states and events involving the agent—is it possible to construct a defensible model of libertarianism? It is explained that most think the answer is negative and this is because they think libertarians must embrace some form of agent-causation in order to address the problems of luck and enhanced control. The thesis of the book is that these philosophers are mistaken: it is possible to construct a libertarian model of free will and moral responsibility within an agency reductionist framework that silences that central objections to libertarianism by simply taking the best compatibilist model of freedom and adding indeterminism in the right junctures of human agency. A brief summary of the chapters to follow is given.

scholarly journals Free will and neurosurgical resections of the supplementary motor area: a critical review

2021 ◽  
Vol 163 (5) ◽  
pp. 1229-1237 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rickard L Sjöberg
Keyword(s):  
Executive Function ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Corticospinal Tract ◽  
Supplementary Motor Area ◽  
Personal Responsibility ◽  
Motor Area ◽  
Simple Motor ◽  
Motor Actions ◽  
Intense Debate

Abstract Background Research suggests that unconscious activity in the supplementary motor area (SMA) precedes not only certain simple motor actions but also the point at which we become aware of our intention to perform such actions. The extent to which these findings have implications for our understanding of the concepts of free will and personal responsibility has been subject of intense debate during the latest four decades. Methods This research is discussed in relation to effects of neurosurgical removal of the SMA in a narrative review. Results Removal of the SMA typically causes a transient inability to perform non-stimulus-driven, voluntary actions. This condition, known as the SMA syndrome, does not appear to be associated with a loss of sense of volition but with a profound disruption of executive function/cognitive control. Conclusions The role of the SMA may be to serve as a gateway between the corticospinal tract and systems for executive function. Such systems are typically seen as tools for conscious decisions. What is known about effects of SMA resections would thus seem to suggest a view that is compatible with concepts of personal responsibility. However, the philosophical question whether free will exists cannot be definitely resolved on the basis of these observations.

scholarly journals Consciousness, decision making, and volition: freedom beyond chance and necessity

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans Liljenström
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Brain Activity ◽  
Brain Structures ◽  
Complex Process ◽  
Neural Information ◽  
Neural Information Processing ◽  
Stochastic Population Model ◽  
The Brain

AbstractWhat is the role of consciousness in volition and decision-making? Are our actions fully determined by brain activity preceding our decisions to act, or can consciousness instead affect the brain activity leading to action? This has been much debated in philosophy, but also in science since the famous experiments by Libet in the 1980s, where the current most common interpretation is that conscious free will is an illusion. It seems that the brain knows, up to several seconds in advance what “you” decide to do. These studies have, however, been criticized, and alternative interpretations of the experiments can be given, some of which are discussed in this paper. In an attempt to elucidate the processes involved in decision-making (DM), as an essential part of volition, we have developed a computational model of relevant brain structures and their neurodynamics. While DM is a complex process, we have particularly focused on the amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) for its emotional, and the lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) for its cognitive aspects. In this paper, we present a stochastic population model representing the neural information processing of DM. Simulation results seem to confirm the notion that if decisions have to be made fast, emotional processes and aspects dominate, while rational processes are more time consuming and may result in a delayed decision. Finally, some limitations of current science and computational modeling will be discussed, hinting at a future development of science, where consciousness and free will may add to chance and necessity as explanation for what happens in the world.

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