When Politics Prevail Over the Rule of Law: The Demise of the sadc Tribunal

2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 124-154
Author(s):  
Konstantinos D Magliveras ◽  
Gino J Naldi

Abstract The article questions whether the Tribunal of the Southern Africa Development Community (sadc) ought to have entertained human rights cases given that the sadc Treaty does not endow it with such jurisdiction. It then analyses its demise in 2010, which was prompted by several rulings against Zimbabwe, whose policy of expropriating land without compensation was held to violate human rights. The pertinent aspects of these cases are reviewed, and the significance of Zimbabwe’s land reform programme is explained. The article elucidates why sadc leaders were prepared to suspend the Tribunal’s operation. This was a combination of alarm that it could evolve into a quasi-regional human rights court but also solidarity with the then President Mugabe, a hero of Africa’s liberation struggle. Finally, the pronouncements of the Constitutional Court of South Africa and the High Court of Tanzania on the lawfulness of the sadc Tribunal’s suspension are considered.

Author(s):  
Lyudmyla Bogachova ◽  

The article defines the concept of the principle of the rule of law both in the narrow and broad sense. In the narrow sense, the principle of the rule of law is understood as the rule of law over legislation, and in the broad sense - as the rule of law over the state, state arbitrariness. Different approaches to disclosing the content of the principle of the rule of law in national and European legal doctrines are systematized. The lack of a single generally accepted concept of the principle of "rule of law" is emphasized. The decisions of the European Court of Human Rights are analyzed; attention is focused on their interpretation of the rule of law. The realization of the principle of the rule of law, primarily presupposes the domination of inalienable and inviolable human rights and freedoms over the political power of the state, and also requires quality laws and observance of the principle of legal certainty. The interpretation of the principle of the rule of law in the decisions of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine is considered. The CCU emphasizes that the rule of law is first and foremost the "rule of law in society"; characterizes the principle, linking it to the ideas of social justice, freedom and equality, without which it is impossible to imagine true human development and existence. The Constitutional Court calls justice as one of the basic principles of law, which is crucial in defining it as a regulator of social relations, one of the universal dimensions of law. Examples of application of the rule of law in the practice of the Supreme Court of Ukraine are given. Judges not only make a formal reference to the rule of law, but also try to analyze and disclose the content of its constituent elements (requirements) within a specific legal case. The main problems that hinder the effective implementation and realization of the rule of law in judicial practice are identified, namely - the lack of proper regulation and official interpretation; low quality of laws and legislative process; excessive number of conflicting laws; low level of legal awareness and legal culture of Ukrainian society, and early stage of civil society development in Ukraine. It is concluded that the rule of law is a principle whose main content is expressed in the following aspects: ensuring the rule of law over political power; subordination of state institutions to the needs of human rights protection and ensuring their implementation; priority of these rights over all other values of democratic, social, and legal state; preventing the manifestation of arbitrariness of state power, as well as ensuring compliance with the requirements of justice.


Author(s):  
Egidijus Küris

Western legal tradition gave the birth to the concept of the rule of law. Legal theory and constitutional justice significantly contributed to the crystallisation of its standards and to moving into the direction of the common concept of the rule of law. The European Court of Human Rights uses this concept as an interpretative tool, the extension of which is the quality of the law doctrine, which encompasses concrete requirements for the law under examination in this Court, such as prospectivity of law, its foreseeability, clarity etc. The author of the article, former judge of the Lithuanian Constitutional Court and currently the judge of the European Court of Human Rights, examines how the latter court has gradually intensified (not always consistently) its reliance on the rule of law as a general principle, inherent in all the Articles of the European Convention on Human Rights, to the extent that in some of its judgments it concentrates not anymore on the factual situation of an individual applicant, but, first and foremost, on the examination of the quality of the law. The trend is that, having found the quality of the applicable law to be insufficient, the Court considers that the mere existence of contested legislation amounts to an unjustifiable interference into a respective right and finds a violation of respective provisions of the Convention. This is an indication of the Court’s progressing self-approximation to constitutional courts, which are called to exercise abstract norm-control.La tradición occidental alumbró la noción del Estado de Derecho. La teoría del Derecho y la Justicia Constitucional han contribuido decisivamente a la cristalización de sus estándares, ayudando a conformar un acervo común en torno al mismo. El Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos emplea la noción de Estado de Derecho como una herramienta interpretativa, fundamentalmente centrada en la doctrina de la calidad de la ley, que implica requisitos concretos que exige el Tribunal tales como la claridad, la previsibilidad, y la certeza en la redacción y aplicación de la norma. El autor, en la actualidad Juez del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos y anterior Magistrado del Tribunal Constitucional de Lituania, examina cómo el primero ha intensificado gradualmente (no siempre de forma igual de consistente) su confianza en el Estado de Derecho como principio general, inherente a todos los preceptos que forman el Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos, hasta el punto de que en algunas de sus resoluciones se concentra no tanto en la situación de hecho del demandante individual sino, sobre todo y ante todo, en el examen de esa calidad de la ley. La tendencia del Tribunal es a considerar que, si observa que la ley no goza de calidad suficiente, la mera existencia de la legislación discutida supone una interferencia injustificable dentro del derecho en cuestión y declara la violación del precepto correspondiente del Convenio. Esto implica el acercamiento progresivo del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos a los Tribunales Constitucionales, quienes tienen encargado el control en abstracto de la norma legal.


2001 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 167-171
Author(s):  
Mohammad Fadel

This work grew out of a series of lectures that were delivered over atwo-year period between 1996 and 1998 at the Centre of Islamic andMiddle Eastern Law (CIMEL) at the School of Oriental and AfricanStudies (SOAS), University of London, on the genera] subject of the rule oflaw in the Middle East and Islamic countries. Subsequently, materials wereadded dealing particularly with issues relating to human rights law. Thecontributors to this work are a combination of legal academics, human rights activists, lawyers and judges, who hale from various countries in theArab world, Iran, the United States, Great Britain and Germany.There are a total of fourteen separate chapters, of varying length andquality. The book is not lengthy - including notes and authors’ biographies,it is 180 pages long. The average length of each chapter is between ten andfifteen pages. Despite the diversity of countries surveyed, all the essays areconcerned with generic questions regarding the rule of law, whether in atheoretical sense, viz., whether the notion that legitimate governmentalaction is limited to those acts that are deemed lawful by a pre-existing setor rules, or in a practical sense, viz., assuming that the formal legal regimeof a given state recognizes the rule of law in a theoretical sense, whetherthe coercive apparatus of the state in fact recognizes legal limitations onits conduct.Perhaps the most interesting (it is certainly the most lengthy, at 35 pages),and most important, essay in this work is the very fiit one, authored byAdel Omar Sherif, an Egyptian judge, wherein the author provides a digestof the landmark decisions of the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court.While the work can be criticized for taking on the appearance of a meresurvey of decisions, without taking a critical perspective to the Court’sprecedents, it is nonetheless a very valuable contribution for those lawyersand scholars who cannot read Arabic but nonetheless wish to gain insightinto Egypt’s legal culture. The modest task of relating the decisions ofEgypt’s Supreme Constitutional Court is especially important given thecliches regarding the absence of effective judicial institutions in the Arabworld. Sherifs contribution effectively dispels that myth. His article revealsthe Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court to be a vibrant institution thattakes its constitutional duties seriously, and discharges those duties withintegrity, and when it finds that the government has acted unlawfully, it willstrike down the offensive legislation, or rule against the government ...


2020 ◽  
Vol 24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nomthandazo Ntlama

ABSTRACT The article examines the implications of the judgment of the Constitutional Court in Helen Suzman Foundation v Judicial Service Commission 2018 (7) BCLR 763 (CC) 8 on the functioning of the Judicial Service Commission (JSC). The judgment has brought to the fore a new lease of life relating to the JSC's post-interview deliberations as a disclosable record in terms of Rule 53(1)(b) of the Uniform Rules of Court. The disclosure seeks to provide an insight into the decision-making process of the JSC in the appointment of judicial officers in South Africa. It is argued that the judgment is two-pronged: first, the disclosure of the post-interview record enhances the culture of justification for decisions taken, which advances the foundational values of the new democratic dispensation; secondly, it creates uncertainty about the future management and protection of the JSC processes in the undertaking of robust debates on the post-interview deliberations. It then questions whether the JSC members will be privileged in their engagement with the suitability of the candidates to be recommended for appointment by the President. The question is raised against the uncertainty about which decision of the JSC will be challenged that will need the disclosure of the record because the judgment does not entail the national disclosure of the record in respect of each candidate but applies only when there is an application for review of the JSC decision. Key words: Judicial Service Commission, appointments, discretion, judiciary, independence, rule of law, discretion, accountability, transparency, human rights.


2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 235-253
Author(s):  
Prianter Jaya Hairi

In 2017, Constitutional Court has received three calls for judicial reviews regarding treachery (makar) article in the Criminal Code. These articles deemed to be contradicting with the principle of legal certainty and freedom of expression. This study analyzes the important issue that is being debate in those judicial reviews. One of those is about the argument which says that the absence of the definition of treachery in the Criminal Code has caused a violation of legal certainty. Besides, the rule of treachery in the Criminal Code has also considered to have caused a violation of freedom of expression which has been guaranteed by Constitution. Analysis shows that the absence of treachery definition in the Criminal Code is not something that instantly becomes a problem in its application that causing the loss of legal certainty. Law enforcer, especially judge, in enforcing the rule of law must always use the method of law interpretation which appropriate with legal norm. With systematic interpretation, treachery can be interpreted according to the sentence of the rule as a unity of the legal system. In this case, the term treachery as regulated in Article 87 of the Criminal Code can be systematically interpreted as the basis for Article 104-Article 108 of the Criminal Code, Article 130 of the Criminal Code, and Article 140 of the Criminal Code which regulates various types of treason and their respective legal sanctions for the perpetrators. Further, on the argument that the articles of treachery in the Criminal Code also can not necessarily be said to limit the freedom of expression, because every citizen’s freedom has limitation, including the limitation of law and human rights. AbstrakPada tahun 2017, Mahkamah Konstitusi telah menerima tiga kali judicial reviewterhadap pasalpasal tindak pidana makar dalam Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana (KUHP). Pasal-pasal ini dipandang bertentangan dengan prinsip kepastian hukum dan kebebasan berekspresi. Tulisan ini menganalisis substansi yang menjadi perdebatan dalam perkara judicial review tersebut. Di antaranya perdebatan mengenai tidak adanya definisi istilah makar dalam KUHP yang menyebabkan persoalan kepastian hukum. Selain itu, pengaturan tindak pidana makar dalam KUHP juga dinilai melanggar kebebasan berekspresi yang telah dijamin oleh konstitusi. Analisis terhadap persoalanpersoalan tersebut menunjukkan bahwa ketiadaan definisi kata “makar” dalam KUHP bukanlah merupakan sesuatu yang serta merta langsung menjadi persoalan dalam penerapannya sehingga menyebabkan hilangnya kepastian hukum. Penegak hukum, terutama hakim, dalam menegakkan peraturan hukum selalu menggunakan metode penafsiran hukum yang sesuai dengan kaidah ilmu hukum. Dengan penafsiran sistematis, makar dapat dimaknai sesuai kalimat dari peraturan sebagai suatu kesatuan sistem hukum. Dalam hal ini, istilah makar yang diatur dalam Pasal 87 KUHP, secara sistematis dapat ditafsirkan sebagai dasar bagi Pasal 104-Pasal 108 KUHP, Pasal 130 KUHP, dan Pasal 140 KUHP yang mengatur tentang jenis makar beserta sanksi hukumnya masing-masing bagi para pelakunya. Selain itu, mengenai argumen bahwa pasal-pasal makar dalam KUHP berpotensi melanggar HAM dan dipandang bertentangan dengan konstitusi dapat dikatakan tidak beralasan. Sebab kebebasan HAM setiap orang tidak tanpa batas, di antaranya dibatasi nilai-nilai agama, keamanan, dan ketertiban umum.


Obiter ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Themba Maseko

The Hyundai-inspired interpretation obliges the courts to interpret, where possible, legislation in conformity with the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. This process involves taking into account the objects and purports of an Act and interpreting its provisions in the manner that complies with the constitutional values. Essentially, it ensures that courts give preference to an interpretation of legislation that is within the parameters of the provisions of the Constitution over the one that is not. However, courts do not apply the Hyundai-inspired interpretation if it cannot be ascribed to the provision of the legislation in question or if it is not reasonably possible for them to do so. Such situations include the Hyundai-inspired interpretation that unduly strains the text, or that obliges the court to read-in too many qualifications. In these situations, the courts have to declare the legislative provision in question unconstitutional and resort to the remedy of reading- in or notional severance. The Hyundai-inspired interpretation is evidenced in quite a number of cases. However, this case note critically dissects the manner in which the Constitutional Court applied it in the case of Democratic Alliance v Speaker of the National Assembly ((CCT86/15) [2016] ZACC 8).It concludes that the manner in which the Constitutional Court applied it, in this case, is inconsistent with the manner in which the Constitutional Court applied it in the case of Abahlali Basemjondolo six years earlier. When interpreting the word “disturbance” which section 1 of the Powers Privileges and Immunities of Parliament and Provincial Legislatures Act (4 of 2004) defined as “any act which interferes with or disrupts or which is likely to interfere with or disrupt the proceedings of Parliament or a House or Committee” and which the High Court had found to be too broad that it had the effect of finding a robust and controversial debate unconstitutional, the Constitutional Court unexpectedly read in too many qualifications to the word “disturbance” in conformity with the Constitution. The reason being, the Constitutional Court, six years earlier, found the approach of reading- in too many qualifications in conformity with the Constitution to be straining the text and to be contrary to the rule of law and the principle of separation of powers in the case of Abahlali Basemjondolo.


Author(s):  
Rósaan Krüger

The rule of law as a foundational constitutional value constrains the exercise of public power but the precise limits of the constraints it sets are not well defined. In Masethla v President of the Republic of South Africa,[1] the majority of the Constitutional Court opted for an interpretation of this value that frees the President from adherence to the demands of procedural fairness when exercising certain constitutional powers. This note will investigate the soundness of that interpretation against the background of theoretical expositions of the rule of law and earlier Constitutional Court judgments.[1]      2008 1 BCLR 1 (CC).


Worldview ◽  
1968 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 6-8
Author(s):  
Mary Jean Pew

World attention has been drawn in recent years to the intensification of organized militant action by Africans against the white ruling powers of southern Africa. The incidents have been sporadic, inadequately organized and equipped, doomed to fail from the outset. Nevertheless the governments have responded with comprehensive legislative and executive action to maintain “law and order” — undoubtedly a legitimate responsibility of any government, but one presumably to be reached by means that accord with norms of justice and the rule of law. Thirty-six men from South West Africa are currently being tried in South Africa for some allegedly terrorist activities on the basis of a law reflective more of a government that intends to maintain power by any means than one that is cognizant of standards of justice with which it, as much as any individual, should comply.


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