"The Soviet Union, the Great Powers and Iraq." In The Iraqi Revolution of 1958: The Old Social Classes Revisited, Robert A. Fernea and William Roger Louis, eds., 95-105

2020 ◽  
Vol 54 (1-3) ◽  
pp. 253-279
Author(s):  
Jennifer B. Spock

Abstract The study of monasticism in Russia has found new acolytes since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. With the separation of the Soviet republics, religion became, and continues to become, a vibrant subfield of Russian studies. This article examines the problems inherent in attempting to grasp the day-to-day life of monks and monasteries given their individual characteristics, social classes, roles, and the wide variety, yet often limited scope, of various texts and material objects that can be used as sources. The vast source base is an embarrassment of riches in one sense, but problematic in another as prescriptive and normative texts must be understood in context. One important element that has not been directly addressed is the cacophony of sound, the interruptions, and the distractions of the constant activity of expanding cloisters in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. How did monks maintain their spiritual path and pious duties when on service expeditions outside the monastery: when engaged in salt-production, fishing, trade, rent-collecting, or other activities outside its walls? How intrusive were building projects, which abounded in the period, or even efforts to adorn the churches? How strict was oversight, or how weak? Such questions still need answers and can only be fully understood by integrating diverse source bases. This article uses Solovki, Holy Trinity, and Kirillov monasteries to exemplify the problems that remain in understanding the daily lives of monastics and their adherents within and without the confines of the cloister.


Author(s):  
Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson

Chapters 2 and 3 helped confirm that rising states support declining great powers when decliners can help rising states against other great power threats. In contrast, Chapters 4 and 5 assess the logic of rising state predation by examining the United States’ response to the Soviet Union’s decline in the 1980s and early 1990s. Chapter 4 first provides an overview of the Soviet Union’s waning relative position and discusses U.S. efforts to monitor the trend. Next, it reviews existing research on the course of U.S. strategy and relates this work to alternative accounts of rising state policy. The bulk of the chapter then uses extensive archival research to evaluate the factors central to predation theory and predict U.S. strategy given the argument. These predictions are analyzed in Chapter 5.


Author(s):  
David M. Edelstein

While Hitler’s Germany in the 1930’s has received abundant attention, this chapter begins earlier in the interwar period. Throughout the 1920’s, Europe’s great powers debated how to manage a defeated Germany that had the latent power potential to again become a great power. This chapter traces how Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union addressed this challenge. It argues that all three of these European powers preferred to cooperate with Germany in the short-term rather than paying the high cost of competing with Germany when it had uncertain long-term intentions. This explanation based on time horizons is superior to alternative explanations based on either buckpassing or engagement.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Alexander Cooley ◽  
Daniel Nexon

Analysts have pronounced the end of American leadership since at least the 1970s. In the 1980s, some confidently proclaimed that the United States was in decline and Japan was on the rise. But in 1989, Moscow allowed its satellite regimes in Eastern Europe to collapse; in 1991 the Soviet Union fell apart under the pressure of nationalist movements. The resulting American “unipolar moment” was marked by three critical factors: the lack of any great powers both willing and able to challenge US hegemony; the existence of a “patronage monopoly” centered around the United States and its liberal democratic allies; and the development of a transnational civil society composed of liberal nongovernment organizations, international institutions, and activist networks. However, great powers and regional players now challenge US power; Washington has lost its patronage monopoly; and illiberal transnational movements are on the offensive against a retreating liberal international civil society.


1987 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 579-597 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barry R. Posen

Two American debates on foreign policy and national security. The Reagan administration and those who share its ideology see today's Soviet Union as not much different from yesterday's, and yesterday's Soviet Union as not much different from Nazi Germany. Like its progenitors in the 1930s, the modern Soviet Union is a “totalitarian” state, and therefore by nature expansionist, armed to the teeth, disposed to violence, fond of diplomatic tests of political will, and—as a consequence of all these factors —hard to deter and harder to beat. A different view prevails among most of the arms control community, the NATO allies, and some American academics. In its foreign policy, the Soviet Union is seen as a fairly typical great power whose behavior in international politics can be explained by the mixture of fear, greed, and stupidity that has characterized most great powers in the past as they have tried to secure their borders and pursue their interests in a world without law. It does not like to take great risks, it fears war, and it is, at worst, opportunistically expansionist. In sharp contrast to Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union is more conservative than reckless; if anything, nuclear weapons have reinforced this conservatism.


1954 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans J. Morgenthau

The conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union has prevented the United Nations from becoming the international government of the great powers which the Charter intended it to be. That conflict has paralyzed the Security Council as an agency of international government. In the few instances when it has been able to act as an agency of international government, it has been able to do so either, as in the beginning of the Korean War, by the accidental and temporary absence of the Soviet Union or, as on the Indonesian issue, by a fortuitous and exceptional coincidence of interests.


Author(s):  
Ulambayar Denzenlkham

This article discusses Mongolia’s 15 years of diplomatic efforts to join the United Nations, the main factors that influenced it, and the changing policies and positions of the Soviet Union, the Kuomintang of China, the United States, and other great powers. Although the Mongolian People’s Republic was able to join the United Nations in 1946, it was influenced by the Soviet Union’s communist position. Since 1946, Chiang Kai-shek’s Chinese policy and position have been a major obstacle. The history of the Republic of China, which existed on the mainland between 1912 and 1949, was the history of the struggle for power between the warlords, the history of the struggle between the Kuomintang and the Communists. In the nearly 40 years since the founding of the Republic of China in 1912, neither the warlords nor the Kuomintang have been able to exercise their sovereignty on the mainland, but they are keen to see Outer Mongolia as part of their territory. The Kuomintang was expelled from the mainland in 1949, shortly after 1946. During the Korean War, initiated by Kim Il-sung, Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong, Mongolia stood firmly behind North Korea, providing both moral and material support. It has not been mentioned anywhere that this resulted in Mongolia’s efforts at the UN being postponed for many years. When Communist China entered the Korean War, the Kuomintang, which fully supported the US-led UN military operation (peacekeeping), not only continuously provoked at the Security Council of the United Nations, but also presented false documents about the MPR - described as “a Chinese territory seized by the Soviet Union” - sending troops to North Korea.The United States, which has recognized the status quo of the Mongolian People’s Republic, has made it clear that it has played an important role in the country’s admission to the United Nations. Thus Mongolia’s attempt finally succeeded and it became the 101st state to join the United Nations. As a consequence, Mongolia’s independence has been approved by a recognize of Western powers and it began to emerge out of its isolation, participate in decision of global issues, and cooperate with the international community. However, not only did this opportunity not be fully exploited, but due to the Cold War, Mongolia became a hotbed of ideological competition between the socialist and capitalist systems at the United Nations, the speakers’ rostrum Nevetheless,Post-Cold War, a whole new era of cooperation between Mongolia and the United Nations began.


2021 ◽  
Vol 103 (3) ◽  
pp. 71-82
Author(s):  
Alexey Sindeev ◽  

The article continues to explore a topic of «Sources of European Security».The author analyzes the role of personalities, processes and factors that have influenced the modern European security system, sustainable and variable elements of the transformation of the European segment of international relations. On the basis of documents from the Swiss Federal Archives, this article highlightsthe position of Switzerland and, in some cases, Austria before the start of the substantive discussions of the agreed agenda at the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The 1970 Moscow Treaty between the USSR and the Federal Republic of Germany and the start of the CSCE process led to the Soviet Union abandoning its longstanding attempts to establish cooperation between the great powers in parallel with the UN structures.The Foreign Minister of the USSR Andrei Gromyko warned against this. Subsequently, the role of the small and medium-sized countries in the two ideological camps increased. The overall picture of interstate relations became more complicated. It is therefore no coincidence that the CSCE is treatedcontroversially in historiography. Considering that transformations are associated with continuous forms, positions, and mechanisms that have been tested over time, the author makes hypotheses and recommendations at the end of the article.


2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 459-481
Author(s):  
William C Wohlforth

I present a realist theory of subversion among great powers, an understudied phenomenon in the burgeoning literature on subversive statecraft. I show that a simple, rational cost-benefit calculus accounts for comparatively low-levels of subversion among non-belligerent great powers, much higher levels among belligerent great powers, and more frequent, violent and larger-scale subversion against weaker targets. Brief case studies of mid-twentieth century subversion featuring the Soviet Union and the United States illustrate the theory and provide preliminary support. Theory and evidence show that the conditions that are conducive to highly consequential subversion among great powers are quite limited and reversible. This gives rise to skepticism concerning claims that today’s strategic environment has fundamentally transformed the nature of great power rivalry so as to accord a newly central place to subversion.


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