‘Where is the Law?’: Legal Discourse and Ideology in Interwar Romania

2013 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Keyword(s):  
2019 ◽  
Vol 67 (4) ◽  
pp. 899-930
Author(s):  
Han-Ru Zhou

Abstract Principles form part and parcel of our law and legal discourse, so much so that we seldom think of what they are and what they entail. For centuries they have been invoked daily to interpret and argue about the law. But when it comes to matters of constitutional law, principles are further called upon to perform a perennially controversial function: to help police the boundaries of state action. In most common law jurisdictions with a written constitution, this function of principles runs against the generally accepted view that the exercise of judicial review must ultimately be governed and restricted by the terms of the national constitution. This Article argues that the exercise of judicial review based on principles is not confined to that view, once the relationship between principles and the constitution is unpacked and recontextualized. While the English-language literature on principles over the past half-century has been dominated by a select group of Anglo-American scholars, there is a wealth of untapped insights from other parts of the world. One of the major contributions by continental legal theorists even predates the earliest modern Anglo-American writings on the subject by more than a decade. Overall, the law literature in common law and civil law systems reveals a significant degree of commonalities in the basic characters of principles despite the absence of initial evidence of transsystemic borrowings. The wider conceptual inquiry also displays a shift in the focus of the debate, from the protracted search for a clear-cut distinction between rules and principles towards a redefinition of principles’ relationship with “written” law, be it in the form of a civil code or a constitutional instrument. From this inquiry reemerge “unwritten” principles not deriving from codified or legislated law although they have been used to develop the law. Translated into the constitutional domain, these unwritten principles bear no logical connection with the terms of the constitution. Their main functions cover the entire spectrum from serving as interpretive aids to making law by filling gaps. The theoretical framework fits with an ongoing four-century-old narrative of the evolution of constitutional principles and judicial review across most common law-based systems. Constitutional principles are another area where Anglo-American law and legal discourse is less exceptional and more universal than what many assume. Throughout modern Western history, legal battles have been fought and ensuing developments have been made on the grounds of principles. Our law and jurisprudence remain based on them.


Author(s):  
Stuart P. Green

Talk of “integrity” is ubiquitous in law and legal discourse: Protecting the integrity of our political system has been cited as a basis for anti-corruption laws; preserving the integrity of the legal profession as a principle underlying the rules of lawyer ethics; ensuring integrity in policing and in the wider criminal justice system as a justification for excluding evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution; and protecting bodily integrity as a potential goal for the law of rape and sexual assault. This chapter examines what integrity means in each of these contexts, what these uses have in common, and whether thinking about these various rules and doctrines in terms of integrity rather than other moral concepts leads to any practical difference in outcome. It also asks what the examination of integrity in the law can tell us about the concept of integrity in other contexts.


Author(s):  
Urška Šadl ◽  
Fabien Tarissan

The chapter argues that the network approach is a viable methodology in legal empirical research, which can be used to study the case law of the Court of Justice. To demonstrate this potential, the chapter: first, shows how to obtain detailed information about the law from the citation network; second, it illustrates how to assess the legal relevance of cases by looking at case citations; and, third, it explores how to infer the doctrinal influence of selected landmark cases. All examples adapt different citation network tools to the study of legal structures and legal discourse which can focus, frame, support, and guide doctrinal analysis.


2006 ◽  
Vol 7 (5) ◽  
pp. 453-477 ◽  
Author(s):  
András Jakab

A foreign jurist, on looking into the German literature on constitutional law, will soon and suddenly be struck by a peculiarity of this scholarship: the unusually strong emphasis on a marginal area of constitutional law, namely, the state of emergency. The inquiry is, of course, well-known in other countries, but the passion for, and the theoretical effort expended on, this marginal area is unique to Germany.However, this disinterest on the part of other constitutional lawyers, and the recent decline in interest on Germany's part, could yet change, turning the marginal area into a highly current issue. Combating terrorism raises questions for which the German patterns of argumentation, fine-tuned in the academic debate on the law of state of emergency, may provide a useful framework for discussion. The questions arising in the context of the struggle against terrorism test the limits of positive regulations in extreme situations, leading ultimately to the same underlying dilemma as the law on state of emergency, though with different terminology. In this sense, the constellation of legal issues involved in combating terrorism could be considered as the law on state of emergency “incognito.” However, the various argumentative patterns for law on state of emergency have not yet been directly transferred into the very timely legal discourse on counterterrorism (and no such attempt is made here), but such a transfer of argumentation suggests itself. As such, the topic has a “potential currency,” even if traditional issues of state of emergency themselves no longer count among the most current issues.


Semiotica ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 (209) ◽  
pp. 5-14
Author(s):  
Augusto Ponzio

AbstractIt is not with the State that personal responsibility arises towards the other. According to Emmanuel Levinas, the other is every single human being I am responsible for, and I am this responsibility for him. The other, my fellow, is the first comer. But I do not live in a world with just one single “first comer”; there is always another other, a third, who is also my other, my fellow. Otherness, beginning with this third, is a plurality. Proximity as responsibility is a plurality. There is a need for justice. There is the obligation to compare unique and incomparable others. This is what is hidden, unsaid, implied in legal discourse. But recourse to comparison among that which cannot be compared, among that which is incomparable is justified by love of justice for the other. It is this justification that confers a sense to law, which is always dura lex, and to the statement that citizens are equal before the law. From this point of view, State justice is always imperfect with respect to human rights understood as the rights of the other, of every other in his absolute difference, in his incomparable otherness.


Author(s):  
Jacob L. Mey

AbstractThe present paper discusses the evolution of legal discourse as it is happening in a number of well-publicized American cases. Discussions of the First and Second Amendments to the US Constitution in relation to freedom of the press and the freedom to carry and use arms are followed by a general discussion of what it means to have a legal text considered as binding across the centuries. It is shown that legal discourse is pragmatically oriented, that is to say, its application and evolution are subject to the general evolution of society and its members, the people interacting with, and interpreting that discourse; this evolution is thus a typical pragmatically relevant process. Over the course of the centuries and years, accumulative gradual developments have often ended up totally altering the interpretation of certain laws and statutes – sometimes to the advantage, sometimes to the disadvantage of underprivileged segments of society, such as the Black population and people of different sexual orientations. The paper will discuss some characteristic historic and contemporary cases of this development.


Al-Risalah ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (01) ◽  
pp. 11
Author(s):  
Moh Dahlan

This study aims to examine the existence of the hermeneutic thinking of ijtihad and authentic jurisprudence of Gus Dur in Indonesia. By using Martin Heidegger's hermeneutics, this study produces two conclusions: First, the authentic hermeneutic paradigm of ijtihad Gus Dur seeks to establish a dialectic between the discourse of the past text and the interpreter's current discourse so that the law of fiqih can produce the ultimate benefit of the people. Secondly, the authentic jurisprudence of Gus Dur has given the discourse of new fiqh relevant to the current development of polygamy law, marriage, zakat and the Islamic education system grounded in accordance with Indonesian culture, not Arab culture, so that he wants the earthing of legal discourse of jurisprudence instead of Arabization .


Author(s):  
Mariya Nazemtseva

Введение. Проведен анализ репрезентации концепта свобода в кодексе как ядерном жанре дискурса правового документа. Цель – выявить специфику реализации концепта свобода, заданную модусно-диктумной организацией правового дискурса и спецификой кодекса как его ядерного жанра. Материал и методы. Материалом исследования являются кодексы РФ, а именно Семейный, Трудовой, Жилищный, Гражданский и Уголовный. Выборка материала обусловлена ядерным статусом кодекса в правовом тексте. Являясь одним из основных документов правового дискурса, кодекс наряду с Конституцией РФ отражает основы права. Свобода как ключевой концепт русской культуры по-особому репрезентируется в правовом дискурсе. Методология представлена дискурс- и концепт-анализом: дискурсивные и жанровые особенности определяются с позиции кодекса в жанровой системе правового дискурса, свобода анализируется через сравнение данного концепта в системе русской языковой картины мира в целом (на материале уже проведенных исследований) с правовым дискурсом в частности. Результаты и обсуждение. Обнаружено, что концепт свобода, в отличие от его обыденного представления в русской языковой картине мира, имеет особую небинарную специфику и трансформируется с помощью закона. В обыденном сознании существует оппозиция свобода (воля) / несвобода, в кодексе свобода реализуется посредством разрешительного (то, что можно делать в рамках закона), запретительного модуса (то, что уголовно наказуемо и предписано через несвободу, т. е. арест), а также модуса долженствования (то, что по закону должно быть совершено). Кроме того, свобода в кодексах определяется их тематической сферой: существует свобода семейных, трудовых, жилищных, гражданских и др. отношений. В оппозиции находится то, что делать запрещено и гарантирует несвободу (представлено Уголовным кодексом). Заключение. Свобода в дискурсе правового документа – официально зафиксированная возможность человека действовать в рамках закона. Кодекс как ядерный жанр правового дискурса осуществляет преобразование концепта посредством его модусно-диктумной модификации. В результате определяющим средством для реализации концепта свобода является закон, а также основные концепты каждого выбранного кодекса – семья, труд, жилище, гражданин, наказание.Introduction. The research explored representation of the concept freedom in the Сode as a nuclear genre of legal document discourse. Aim and objectives of the article are to identify the specifics of implementation of the concept freedom, defined by modus-dictum organization of legal discourse and the specifics of the Code as its nuclear genre. Material and methods. The research material consists of the Codes of the Russian Federation, which are Family, Labour, Housing, Civil, and Criminal Сodes. The selection of material is determined in accordance with the nuclear status of this genre in legal text. Being one of the main documents of legal discourse, the Code as well as the Constitution of the Russian Federation, reflects the foundations of Russian law. Freedom, as a key concept of Russian culture, is specifically represented in legal discourse. The methodology includes discourse and concept analysis: we observe discursive and genre features from the position of the Code in genre system of legal discourse. Freedom is analyzed through comparing this concept in the system of Russian linguistic world-image on the whole (based on material from studies already conducted) with legal discourse in particular. Results and discussion. We found that the concept freedom, in contrast to its common representation in Russian linguistic world-image, has a particular non-binary specificity and is transformed through the law. In everyday language, there is an opposition freedom (will)/unfreedom, and in the Code freedom is realized through a permissive (what can be done within the framework of the law), prohibitive modus (what is criminally punishable and prescribed through unfreedom, i.e. arrest), and a modus of obligation (what is required to be done by law). In addition, freedom in the Codes is influenced by their thematic sphere: there are freedom of family, labour, housing, and civil relationships. In opposition is what is prohibited to do and guarantees unfreedom (represented by the Criminal Code). Conclusion. Freedom in the legal document discourse is an officially recorded ability of a person to operate within the confines of the law. The Code as a nuclear genre of legal discourse transforms the concept through its modus-dictum modification. As a result, pivotal for the implementation of the concept freedom is the law, as well as the basic concepts of each selected Code – family, labour, housing, citizen, and punishment.


2015 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-91
Author(s):  
A. Malthuf Siroj

Islamic law has two dimensions at once, namely universality and locality. In contemporary Islamic legal thought, there are two trends that contain mutual attraction between the two to bring dimension of locality to the dimension of universality on one side, and vice versa on the other side. As a consequence, there will be two possibilities, absoluteness or relativization of Islamic law. The legal discourse increasingly gains its own intensity in recently in line with the development of science and the use of various approaches in the study of Islamic law. Islamic law that is universally used is called syari`ah. This syariah law is rules of Allah SWT that is produced from texts with qath’î quality either from the side of the existency or the meanings without human beings rasional (ra’y) intervention because those texts are not the object of Ijtihad. Meanwhile, local Islamic Law is called fiqh. It is the law which is produced from texts with zhannî quality and becomes an object of Ijtihad. Because Fiqh is the result of Ijtihad so that it is usual when there are many madzhabs on it. Therefore, this paper will put this issue in proportion to find common ground between the two trends of contemporary Islamic legal thought. So that, it will hopefully clear up us the limits of universality and locality dimension of Islamic law, a focus of this legal discourse.


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