Antipartyism and Third-Party Vote Choice

2004 ◽  
Vol 37 (9) ◽  
pp. 1054-1078 ◽  
Author(s):  
Éric Bélanger

The effect of antiparty sentiment on voting behavior is examined comparatively using recent individual-level electoral survey data from Canada, Britain, and Australia. The author distinguishes two dimensions of antipartyism: the rejection of traditional major-party alternatives (specific antiparty sentiment) and of political parties per se (generalized antiparty sentiment). He argues that disaffected voters in these countries are attracted to third or minor parties and support them to voice antiparty sentiments. The results show that in general, third parties benefit from specific antiparty sentiment at the mass level. The rejection of party politics per se, in contrast, brings citizens to abstain, unless some third parties—antiparty parties such as the Reform Party in Canada and One Nation in Australia—electorally mobilize generalized antiparty feelings. The results also indicate that compulsory voting in Australia affects disaffected voters’ behavior; in particular, those who reject all party alternatives would be more likely to abstain if they had the choice.

2004 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 581-594 ◽  
Author(s):  
Éric Bélanger

Abstract. This study proposes a new test of Maurice Pinard's theory on the rise of third parties applied to the case of the 1993 Canadian federal election. We assess the effect at the individual level of Pinard's factors (one-party dominance and grievances) on support for the Reform party and the Bloc Québécois using data from the Canadian Election Study. Logistic regression analyses of vote choice indicate that the extent to which the second major party was perceived to be electorally weak at the constituency level was a significant factor in leading some Western voters to support Reform. In Quebec, however, perceptions of predominance did not matter to a vote for the Bloc because the latter is a “radical” third party attracting support mostly on the basis of communal values and interests. The results further show that political grievances, but not economic ones, were a significant predictor of support for both third parties in that election.Résumé. Cette étude propose un nouveau test empirique de la théorie de Maurice Pinard concernant la percée électorale des tiers partis. L'impact des facteurs de Pinard (prédominance d'un parti et présence de griefs) sur l'appui au Parti réformiste et au Bloc québécois à l'élection fédérale canadienne de 1993 est vérifié au niveau micro-sociologique à l'aide des données de l'Étude sur l'élection canadienne. Les analyses de régression logistique du vote indiquent que la perception que certains électeurs de l'Ouest avaient de la faible compétitivité du second parti traditionnel dans leur circonscription les a encouragés à appuyer le Parti réformiste. Au Québec, les perceptions de prédominance n'ont cependant pas eu d'effet significatif sur le vote en faveur du Bloc en raison du fait que ce dernier est un tiers parti “ radical ” dont l'appui repose principalement sur des valeurs et des intérêts de groupe. Les résultats indiquent enfin que, contrairement aux griefs de nature économique, les griefs politiques régionaux ont significativement contribué au succès électoral des deux partis.


2011 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 267-292 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel J. Lee

Institutional barriers frustrate third-party challenges to major-party dominance in American politics. Conventional wisdom claims that the ballot access petitioning requirement hurts minor parties. This claim, however, conflates two dimensions of third-party success: (a) ability to get on the ballot and (b) ability of actual candidates to win votes. The requirement is hypothesized to have a negative effect on the first dimension but a positive effect on the second. Modeling these two dimensions separately gives evidence of cross-cutting effects. The first equation is a probit model of entry that shows third-party candidates are more likely to enter when the requirement is low. The second equation is an OLS regression, which only includes the subsample of districts where at least one third-party candidate gained ballot access, that shows third-party candidates win more votes in districts with a higher requirement.


1999 ◽  
Vol 93 (2) ◽  
pp. 311-326 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc J. Hetherington

Scholars have consistently demonstrated that no link exists between declining political trust and declining turnout, but they have paid less attention to the effect of trust on vote choice. In an era characterized by declining trust, the incumbent party has lost, and third parties have strongly contested, four of the last eight presidential elections. Such outcomes are historically anomalous. This study demonstrates that declining political trust affects vote choice, but the electoral beneficiary differs according to electoral context. In two-candidate races, politically distrustful voters support candidates from the nonincumbent major party. In races with three viable candidates, third-party alternatives benefit from declining political trust at the expense of both major parties.


2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 23
Author(s):  
Zuzanna Służewska

Si tamen plures per se navem exerceant. Several Remarks on the Liability of ShipownersSummaryThe problem discussed in this paper regards the liability of several shipowners (exercitores) managing the same ship. In the title de exercitoria actione o f the Digest there are three texts that refer to this matter: D. 14,1,1,25; D. 14,1,4 pr. and D. 14,1,4,1. The first and the last one refer to a situation in which the shipowners appointed a captain (magister navis) as their agent and thus were held liable in solidum for contracts made by him with third parties. In these cases their joint and several liability had ground in the joint appointm ent of an agent (praepositio). The second text D. 14,1,4 pr. is not very clear and refers to shipowners that were managing the same ship per se, and in this case they could be sued pro portionibus exercitionis. Such a model of liability was justified by the reservation that they cannot be deemed as being each other’s captain (neque enim invicem sui magistri videbuntur). This text was widely discussed among romanists and gave ground to various interpretations. The main questions concerned were the following: whether shipowners dealt with the third parties personally or appointed an agent (magister navis), whether a contract was stipulated by all shipowners jointly or only one o f them, whether they were partners in a partnership or conducted their business independently. According to the most common interpretation the text refers to a situation in which the shipowners conducted their activity personally in the partnership. Having accepted the above view, to justify their liability pro portionibus exercitionis one must admit that they all acted as a party in a contract or, supposing a contract was stipulated by one of them, a partnership between shipowners was a particular kind of partnership in which a contract concluded by only one of the partners resulted in the liability of the others. N one of these interpretations seems to be convincing.First of all, one must take into consideration that the word exercitor was a technical term used to define someone conducting an economic activity through his agent (magister navis) so it was normally used in the context of the whole structure of exercitio navis that was based on the scheme exercitor — magister navis. Thus it seems more likely that exercere per se means not conducting an activity personally but rather „on one’s own account”, „independently”. Besides, the reservation neque enim invicem sui magistri videbuntur suggesting that plures exercitores conducted their activity personally is dubious since it refers to a concept of mutual praepositio, which was used by glossators and commentators to justify joint and several liability of partners and it may be possible that this reservation constituted a part of the gloss or was added to the original context later by some interpreter that did not understand Ulpian’s intention.A similar conclusion arises from the comparison of the text of D. 14,1,4 pr. with texts concerning the liability of several persons on the basis of actio institoria. From the text of D. 14,3,14 it appears that if no legal relationship that guaranteed the possibility of a recourse existed among several persons liable for the act of the agent, none o f them could be sued for the full am ount (in solidum) but they were held liable pro parte. In the case of actio institoria the fact of a joint appointm ent was probably treated as a manifestation of animus societatis that made it possible to treat the persons that had nom inated jointly the institor as partners and thus held them liable in solidum for contracts made by this agent. Hence the fact that in the text o f D. 14,1,4 pr. the shipowners did not appoint jointly their agent and were held liable pro portionibus exercitionis suggests that they were not partners but each of them managed a ship on his own account.If we adm it that plures exercitores that per se navem exerceant were the shipowners that did not conduct their business together we could indicate two situations in which they could be sued pro portionibus exercitionis. The first would be the case in which each o f the shipowners appointed his own agent on the ship and the contract with the third party was stipulated by all agents acting together. The second would be the case in which the shipowners appointed the same person as their agent but the praepositio was given by each o f them separately. in both cases each o f the shipowners could be sued with actio exercitoria only for his proper part since they could not be deemed to be partners and they could not sue each other with any action for a recourse.


2018 ◽  
Vol 47 (6) ◽  
pp. 1324-1344
Author(s):  
Sean Goff ◽  
Daniel J. Lee

The trend of increasing major party polarization in the United States has raised concerns about the quality of representation and governance. One potential corrective is third parties, as they can hold the major parties accountable and instigate positive change. We, however, highlight limits to their influence. Two factors dampened the electoral support for third party candidates in the 2016 U.S. presidential election despite favorable conditions. First, the cost of third party voting is higher in the current polarized era, since casting a vote for a third party can lead to their less-favored major party candidate winning. Voters today have especially negative feelings toward their less-favored major party. Second, Trump co-opted voters distrustful of the government, which is a group that tends to support third parties. Our analysis of American National Election Studies (ANES) data from 1992 and 2016 shows support for both factors.


2017 ◽  
Vol 65 (3) ◽  
pp. 740-763
Author(s):  
Thomas Quinn

This article examines the strategic options facing small centrist third parties in two-party parliamentary systems operating under the single-member district plurality electoral system. It uses a spatial model to show that centrist third parties are better off targeting the ‘safe’ districts of a major party rather than marginal districts. Furthermore, it is optimal to target one party’s districts, not both, to benefit from tactical and protest voting. This article also questions the implicit conclusion of the median-legislator theorem that pivotality-seeking is the best strategy for a third party, at least under the single-member district plurality system, because that would usurp voters’ ability to select the executive directly, a key feature of two-partism. Finally, this article shows that third parties can damage themselves if they ‘flip’ their strategies from opposing particular major parties to supporting them. Evidence is provided for the British Liberal Democrats and New Zealand’s historic Social Credit Party.


2018 ◽  
pp. 101
Author(s):  
Rafael Lara González

ResumenPese a su ubicuidad en la práctica contractual, las cláusulas de franquicia han recibido tratamiento incidental en la doctrina. La discusión sobre ellas se ha enfocado en los contratos de seguros de responsabilidad civil, y en la interpretación del artículo 76 de la Ley española de Contrato de Seguro. En este contexto se ha tratado de establecer si el asegurador puede o no oponer la cláusula de franquicia al tercero perjudicado. El presente trabajo analiza la cláusula de franquicia en la obligación principal del asegurador, su naturaleza jurídica, y examina su relación con los terceros perjudicados. La consideración principal a este respecto estará en si nos encontramos ante un seguro obligatorio o ante un seguro voluntario de responsabilidad civil. Palabras clave: Contrato de seguro; Cláusula de franquicia; Terceroperjudicado; Responsabilidad civil.AbstractDespite their ubiquity in contractual praxis, deductible clauses have received only incidental treatment in legal doctrine. Discussion on them has focused on civil liability insurance contracts, and the interpretation of article 76 of the Spanish Law of Insurance Contracts. In this context it has been attempted to establish whether the insurer can invoke the clause to oppose the injured third party's claim. This article examines the deductible clause included in the insurer's main obligation, its legal nature, and its relation to injured third parties. The main consideration in this regard will be whether the insurance contract is of a mandatory or voluntary nature.Keywords: Insurance contract; Deductible clause; Injured third party; Civil liability.


Author(s):  
Ly Tayseng

This chapter gives an overview of the law on contract formation and third party beneficiaries in Cambodia. Much of the discussion is tentative since the new Cambodian Civil Code only entered into force from 21 December 2011 and there is little case law and academic writing fleshing out its provisions. The Code owes much to the Japanese Civil Code of 1898 and, like the latter, does not have a requirement of consideration and seldom imposes formal requirements but there are a few statutory exceptions from the principle of freedom from form. For a binding contract, the agreement of the parties is required and the offer must be made with the intention to create a legally binding obligation and becomes effective once it reaches the offeree. The new Code explicitly provides that the parties to the contract may agree to confer a right arising under the contract upon a third party. This right accrues directly from their agreement; it is not required that the third party declare its intention to accept the right.


Author(s):  
Sheng-Lin JAN

This chapter discusses the position of third party beneficiaries in Taiwan law where the principle of privity of contract is well established. Article 269 of the Taiwan Civil Code confers a right on the third party to sue for performance as long as the parties have at least impliedly agreed. This should be distinguished from a ‘spurious contract’ for the benefit of third parties where there is no agreement to permit the third party to claim. Both the aggrieved party and the third party beneficiary can sue on the contract, but only for its own loss. The debtor can only set off on a counterclaim arising from its legal relationship with the third party. Where the third party coerces the debtor into the contract, the contract can be avoided, but where the third party induces the debtor to contract with the creditor by misrepresentation, the debtor can only avoid the contract if the creditor knows or ought to have known of the misrepresentation.


Author(s):  
Masami Okino

This chapter discusses the law on third party beneficiaries in Japan; mostly characterized by adherence to the German model that still bears an imprint on Japanese contract law. Thus, there is neither a doctrine of consideration nor any other justification for a general doctrine of privity, and contracts for the benefit of third parties are generally enforceable as a matter of course. Whether an enforceable right on the part of a third party is created is simply a matter of interpretation of the contract which is always made on a case-by-case analysis but there are a number of typical scenarios where the courts normally find the existence (or non-existence) of a contract for the benefit of a third party. In the recent debate on reform of Japanese contract law, wide-ranging suggestions were made for revision of the provisions on contracts for the benefit of third parties in the Japanese Civil Code. However, it turned out that reform in this area was confined to a very limited codification of established case law.


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