The Effect of Political Trust on the Presidential Vote, 1968–96

1999 ◽  
Vol 93 (2) ◽  
pp. 311-326 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc J. Hetherington
Keyword(s):  
Presidential Elections ◽  
Political Trust ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Vote Choice ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Major Party ◽  
Incumbent Party

Scholars have consistently demonstrated that no link exists between declining political trust and declining turnout, but they have paid less attention to the effect of trust on vote choice. In an era characterized by declining trust, the incumbent party has lost, and third parties have strongly contested, four of the last eight presidential elections. Such outcomes are historically anomalous. This study demonstrates that declining political trust affects vote choice, but the electoral beneficiary differs according to electoral context. In two-candidate races, politically distrustful voters support candidates from the nonincumbent major party. In races with three viable candidates, third-party alternatives benefit from declining political trust at the expense of both major parties.

The Rise of Third Parties in the 1993 Canadian Federal Election: Pinard Revisited

2004 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 581-594 ◽  
Author(s):  
Éric Bélanger
Keyword(s):  
Third Parties ◽  
Vote Choice ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Election Study ◽  
Major Party ◽  
Federal Election ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
Using Data ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Party Dominance

Abstract. This study proposes a new test of Maurice Pinard's theory on the rise of third parties applied to the case of the 1993 Canadian federal election. We assess the effect at the individual level of Pinard's factors (one-party dominance and grievances) on support for the Reform party and the Bloc Québécois using data from the Canadian Election Study. Logistic regression analyses of vote choice indicate that the extent to which the second major party was perceived to be electorally weak at the constituency level was a significant factor in leading some Western voters to support Reform. In Quebec, however, perceptions of predominance did not matter to a vote for the Bloc because the latter is a “radical” third party attracting support mostly on the basis of communal values and interests. The results further show that political grievances, but not economic ones, were a significant predictor of support for both third parties in that election.Résumé. Cette étude propose un nouveau test empirique de la théorie de Maurice Pinard concernant la percée électorale des tiers partis. L'impact des facteurs de Pinard (prédominance d'un parti et présence de griefs) sur l'appui au Parti réformiste et au Bloc québécois à l'élection fédérale canadienne de 1993 est vérifié au niveau micro-sociologique à l'aide des données de l'Étude sur l'élection canadienne. Les analyses de régression logistique du vote indiquent que la perception que certains électeurs de l'Ouest avaient de la faible compétitivité du second parti traditionnel dans leur circonscription les a encouragés à appuyer le Parti réformiste. Au Québec, les perceptions de prédominance n'ont cependant pas eu d'effet significatif sur le vote en faveur du Bloc en raison du fait que ce dernier est un tiers parti “ radical ” dont l'appui repose principalement sur des valeurs et des intérêts de groupe. Les résultats indiquent enfin que, contrairement aux griefs de nature économique, les griefs politiques régionaux ont significativement contribué au succès électoral des deux partis.

Economic Considerations and the 2008 Presidential Election

2009 ◽  
Vol 42 (03) ◽  
pp. 473-478 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas M. Holbrook
Keyword(s):  
Voting Behavior ◽  
Presidential Elections ◽  
Economic Voting ◽  
Vote Choice ◽  
Economic Conditions ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
Personal Finances ◽  
Incumbent Party ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Economic Considerations

The idea that economic conditions influence election outcomes and voting behavior is hardly novel and would appear to be close to uniformly accepted, especially in the case of American presidential elections. Beginning with the early aggregate studies (Arcelus and Meltzer 1975; Bloom and Price 1975; Kramer 1971; Tufte 1978) and the important individual-level work that followed soon thereafter (Kiewiet 1983; Kinder and Kiewiet 1979, 1981; Fiorina 1981), election scholars have devoted considerable attention to the influence of the economy on voting behavior and election outcomes. Although the findings are many and sometimes disparate, a few general conclusions have emerged: economic voting is incumbency oriented rather than policy oriented (Fiorina 1981; Kiewiet 1983); at the individual level, evaluations of the national economy are more closely tied to vote choice than are evaluations of personal finances (Kiewiet 1983; Kinder and Kiewiet 1979, 1981; Kinder, Adams, and Gronke 1989); and, with the exception of 2000, the incumbent party is habitually returned to office when economic times are good and tossed out when economic times are bad (Campbell and Garand 2000). In short, we know a lot about how the economy influences voters and elections, and it would seem that there are few issues left to resolve.

Antipartyism and Third-Party Vote Choice

2004 ◽  
Vol 37 (9) ◽  
pp. 1054-1078 ◽  
Author(s):  
Éric Bélanger
Keyword(s):  
Voting Behavior ◽  
Two Dimensions ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Major Party ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
Minor Parties ◽  
Compulsory Voting ◽  
Per Se ◽  
Mass Level

The effect of antiparty sentiment on voting behavior is examined comparatively using recent individual-level electoral survey data from Canada, Britain, and Australia. The author distinguishes two dimensions of antipartyism: the rejection of traditional major-party alternatives (specific antiparty sentiment) and of political parties per se (generalized antiparty sentiment). He argues that disaffected voters in these countries are attracted to third or minor parties and support them to voice antiparty sentiments. The results show that in general, third parties benefit from specific antiparty sentiment at the mass level. The rejection of party politics per se, in contrast, brings citizens to abstain, unless some third parties—antiparty parties such as the Reform Party in Canada and One Nation in Australia—electorally mobilize generalized antiparty feelings. The results also indicate that compulsory voting in Australia affects disaffected voters’ behavior; in particular, those who reject all party alternatives would be more likely to abstain if they had the choice.

Mobilization, Demobilization and the Economy in American Elections

2006 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 165-186 ◽  
Author(s):  
DANIEL STEVENS
Keyword(s):  
Economic Performance ◽  
Presidential Elections ◽  
Comprehensive Analysis ◽  
Vote Choice ◽  
Pooled Data ◽  
American Elections ◽  
Incumbent Party ◽  
Democrats And Republicans ◽  
Benefits And Costs

What motivates citizens to vote or abstain from voting? What determines vote choice? Models of turnout predominantly focus on a series of factors that affect perceptions of the benefits and costs of voting. The economy's influence on those perceptions has gone largely undeveloped. Models of vote choice routinely account for economic influences while ignoring turnout. This article presents a comprehensive analysis of the role of the economy as mobilizer and demobilizer. I argue that the economy has an impact on turnout decisions and that its impact is asymmetric. All else equal, the incumbent party is able to mobilize more supporters, relative to the non-incumbent party, in good economic times and more supporters are demobilized in adverse economic times. However, Democrats and Republicans are not sensitive to the same elements of economic performance. This is in part a function of the way in which the economy influences perceptions of the closeness of the impending election and of the candidates and their parties. Analysis of pooled data from ANES surveys for the twelve presidential elections from 1956 to 2000 confirms the validity of these arguments.

Prospects for Third Party Electoral Success in a Polarized Era

2018 ◽  
Vol 47 (6) ◽  
pp. 1324-1344
Author(s):  
Sean Goff ◽  
Daniel J. Lee
Keyword(s):  
The United States ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Major Party ◽  
Electoral Success ◽  
Electoral Support ◽  
Two Factors ◽  
The Government ◽  
Party Voting ◽  
Election Studies

The trend of increasing major party polarization in the United States has raised concerns about the quality of representation and governance. One potential corrective is third parties, as they can hold the major parties accountable and instigate positive change. We, however, highlight limits to their influence. Two factors dampened the electoral support for third party candidates in the 2016 U.S. presidential election despite favorable conditions. First, the cost of third party voting is higher in the current polarized era, since casting a vote for a third party can lead to their less-favored major party candidate winning. Voters today have especially negative feelings toward their less-favored major party. Second, Trump co-opted voters distrustful of the government, which is a group that tends to support third parties. Our analysis of American National Election Studies (ANES) data from 1992 and 2016 shows support for both factors.

scholarly journals Third-Party Strategy under Plurality Rule: The British Liberal Democrats and the New Zealand Social Credit Party

2017 ◽  
Vol 65 (3) ◽  
pp. 740-763
Author(s):  
Thomas Quinn
Keyword(s):  
Spatial Model ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Major Party ◽  
Liberal Democrats ◽  
Social Credit ◽  
Party Strategy ◽  
Parliamentary Systems ◽  
Strategic Options

This article examines the strategic options facing small centrist third parties in two-party parliamentary systems operating under the single-member district plurality electoral system. It uses a spatial model to show that centrist third parties are better off targeting the ‘safe’ districts of a major party rather than marginal districts. Furthermore, it is optimal to target one party’s districts, not both, to benefit from tactical and protest voting. This article also questions the implicit conclusion of the median-legislator theorem that pivotality-seeking is the best strategy for a third party, at least under the single-member district plurality system, because that would usurp voters’ ability to select the executive directly, a key feature of two-partism. Finally, this article shows that third parties can damage themselves if they ‘flip’ their strategies from opposing particular major parties to supporting them. Evidence is provided for the British Liberal Democrats and New Zealand’s historic Social Credit Party.

Cláusulas de franquicia o deducible en seguros de responsabilidad civil en el Derecho español: Naturaleza y efectos respecto de terceros perjudicados

2018 ◽  
pp. 101
Author(s):  
Rafael Lara González
Keyword(s):  
Civil Liability ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Insurance Contract ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Liability Insurance ◽  
Legal Doctrine ◽  
Insurance Contracts ◽  
Spanish Law ◽  
Palabras Clave ◽  
Legal Nature

ResumenPese a su ubicuidad en la práctica contractual, las cláusulas de franquicia han recibido tratamiento incidental en la doctrina. La discusión sobre ellas se ha enfocado en los contratos de seguros de responsabilidad civil, y en la interpretación del artículo 76 de la Ley española de Contrato de Seguro. En este contexto se ha tratado de establecer si el asegurador puede o no oponer la cláusula de franquicia al tercero perjudicado. El presente trabajo analiza la cláusula de franquicia en la obligación principal del asegurador, su naturaleza jurídica, y examina su relación con los terceros perjudicados. La consideración principal a este respecto estará en si nos encontramos ante un seguro obligatorio o ante un seguro voluntario de responsabilidad civil. Palabras clave: Contrato de seguro; Cláusula de franquicia; Terceroperjudicado; Responsabilidad civil.AbstractDespite their ubiquity in contractual praxis, deductible clauses have received only incidental treatment in legal doctrine. Discussion on them has focused on civil liability insurance contracts, and the interpretation of article 76 of the Spanish Law of Insurance Contracts. In this context it has been attempted to establish whether the insurer can invoke the clause to oppose the injured third party's claim. This article examines the deductible clause included in the insurer's main obligation, its legal nature, and its relation to injured third parties. The main consideration in this regard will be whether the insurance contract is of a mandatory or voluntary nature.Keywords: Insurance contract; Deductible clause; Injured third party; Civil liability.

Formation of Contract and Third Parties in Cambodia

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ly Tayseng
Keyword(s):  
Academic Writing ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Civil Code ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
The Third ◽  
Contract Formation ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Right ◽  
Formal Requirements

This chapter gives an overview of the law on contract formation and third party beneficiaries in Cambodia. Much of the discussion is tentative since the new Cambodian Civil Code only entered into force from 21 December 2011 and there is little case law and academic writing fleshing out its provisions. The Code owes much to the Japanese Civil Code of 1898 and, like the latter, does not have a requirement of consideration and seldom imposes formal requirements but there are a few statutory exceptions from the principle of freedom from form. For a binding contract, the agreement of the parties is required and the offer must be made with the intention to create a legally binding obligation and becomes effective once it reaches the offeree. The new Code explicitly provides that the parties to the contract may agree to confer a right arising under the contract upon a third party. This right accrues directly from their agreement; it is not required that the third party declare its intention to accept the right.

Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties Under the Taiwan Civil Code

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sheng-Lin JAN
Keyword(s):  
Civil Code ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
The Third ◽  
Legal Relationship ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
Privity Of Contract

This chapter discusses the position of third party beneficiaries in Taiwan law where the principle of privity of contract is well established. Article 269 of the Taiwan Civil Code confers a right on the third party to sue for performance as long as the parties have at least impliedly agreed. This should be distinguished from a ‘spurious contract’ for the benefit of third parties where there is no agreement to permit the third party to claim. Both the aggrieved party and the third party beneficiary can sue on the contract, but only for its own loss. The debtor can only set off on a counterclaim arising from its legal relationship with the third party. Where the third party coerces the debtor into the contract, the contract can be avoided, but where the third party induces the debtor to contract with the creditor by misrepresentation, the debtor can only avoid the contract if the creditor knows or ought to have known of the misrepresentation.

Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties in Japan

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Masami Okino
Keyword(s):  
Case Analysis ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Contract Law ◽  
Civil Code ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
German Model ◽  
Recent Debate ◽  
The Law

This chapter discusses the law on third party beneficiaries in Japan; mostly characterized by adherence to the German model that still bears an imprint on Japanese contract law. Thus, there is neither a doctrine of consideration nor any other justification for a general doctrine of privity, and contracts for the benefit of third parties are generally enforceable as a matter of course. Whether an enforceable right on the part of a third party is created is simply a matter of interpretation of the contract which is always made on a case-by-case analysis but there are a number of typical scenarios where the courts normally find the existence (or non-existence) of a contract for the benefit of a third party. In the recent debate on reform of Japanese contract law, wide-ranging suggestions were made for revision of the provisions on contracts for the benefit of third parties in the Japanese Civil Code. However, it turned out that reform in this area was confined to a very limited codification of established case law.

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