An Informational Theory of Genocide and Politicide During Civil War

2021 ◽  
pp. 001041402110474
Author(s):  
Gary Uzonyi
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Civilian Population ◽  
The Government ◽  
Military Victory ◽  
Extract Information

Why do some governments engage in genocide or politicide against their civilian population during civil war? Scholarship on this important question views such brutality as a strategic tool the government can use to maintain power through military victory. Returning to the logic of conflict bargaining, I re-conceptualize genocide and politicide as a means to extract information about one’s opponent. I argue that a government is more likely to employ these atrocities during conflict when it is more uncertain about its probability of victory to reveal better information more quickly from the battlefield. I test this argument on all civil wars since 1945 and find support for this claim. These dynamics are more pronounced when the rebels rely on the civilian population to mobilize fighters. My argument helps bridge significant works in the genocide and conflict-bargaining literatures.

What Do We Know About Civil War Duration? A Bargaining Perspective

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
David E. Cunningham
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Negotiated Settlement ◽  
Negotiated Settlements ◽  
Majority Population ◽  
Economically Marginalized ◽  
The Government ◽  
External Actors ◽  
Military Victory

Civil wars vary greatly in duration—some end within months; others last for decades. What explains this variation? Civil wars drag on when no combatant can win a military victory and the various actors involved are unable, or unwilling, to reach a compromise agreement that resolves the war. Military victory does happen in civil war, but it is rare, so understanding why civil wars last as long as they do requires examining the barriers to negotiated settlement. Wars last longer when the parties involved perceive the war as less costly relative to peace and when the combatants are overly optimistic about how they will do in the war. Even when key decision-makers see the war as costly and are realistic about their chances of prevailing, negotiated settlements prove elusive if the parties cannot accept a division of the issues at stake or if the government or rebels are unable to trust the commitments the other side makes in a negotiation. Additionally, bargaining is more complicated when there are more combatants that must accept the terms of any agreement, and conflicts with more combatants last much longer than those with fewer. Many factors affect the bargaining environment, and these barriers to bargaining can explain why civil wars are on average quite long. International actions can alleviate some of the barriers and help combatants reach comprehensive settlements, as happened in the conflicts in Mozambique, El Salvador, Guatemala. In particular, peacekeeping and mediation strategies are effective at resolving wars sooner. International action in general is more effective, however, when the parties involved are interested in peace but need some help overcoming commitment or informational problems. These actions are much less successful when that interest is lacking. The current civil war in Syria has many of the factors identified as prolonging wars. It is an extremely fractionalized conflict, and many external actors are involved. Syria has a large majority population that has been historically excluded from political power and economically marginalized, and a minority government that has been dominant. These factors make reaching a comprehensive settlement very challenging and mean the war is likely to be very long-lasting.

Stick Then Carrot: When Do Governments Give Amnesty during Civil War?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lesley-Ann Daniels
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Policy Choice ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
The Government

Abstract Governments grant amnesties to rebel groups during civil wars and this is a puzzle. Why would the government offer an amnesty, which can be interpreted as a signal of weakness? In certain circumstances, offering amnesty is a rational policy choice. Governments should give amnesties when they are winning: the risk of misinterpreted signals is lessened, costs are low, rebel groups are weakened, and so amnesty can be used instrumentally to encourage defection or division among foot soldiers or as an incentive to leaders. Therefore, the government capitalizes on its military advantage and offers amnesty in a “stick then carrot” tactic. Using a database of amnesties during conflicts from 1990 to 2011, the article shows that governments are more likely to give amnesties following high rebel deaths. The use of amnesty during conflict is nuanced and context is important when understanding strategic choices.

Rethinking the Conflict “Resource Curse”: How Oil Wealth Prevents Center-Seeking Civil Wars

2016 ◽  
Vol 70 (4) ◽  
pp. 727-761 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jack Paine
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Formal Model ◽  
Resource Curse ◽  
Revenue Sources ◽  
Societal Challenges ◽  
The Government ◽  
Oil Wealth ◽  
Oil Revenues ◽  
Civil War Onset

AbstractA broad literature on how oil wealth affects civil war onset argues that oil production engenders violent contests to capture a valuable prize from vulnerable governments. By contrast, research linking oil wealth to durable authoritarian regimes argues that oil-rich governments deter societal challenges by strategically allocating enormous revenues to enhance military capacity and to provide patronage. This article presents a unified formal model that evaluates how these competing mechanisms affect overall incentives for center-seeking civil wars. The model yields two key implications. First, large oil-generated revenues strengthen the government and exert an overall effect that decreases center-seeking civil war propensity. Second, oil revenues are less effective at preventing center-seeking civil war relative to other revenue sources, which distinguishes overall and relative effects. Revised statistical results test overall rather than relative effects by omitting the conventional but posttreatment covariate of income per capita, and demonstrate a consistent negative association between oil wealth and center-seeking civil war onset.

The Geopolitics of Major Power Interventions in Civil Wars

2020 ◽  
pp. 106591292097691
Author(s):  
Joe Clare ◽  
Vesna Danilovic
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Strong Support ◽  
Past Research ◽  
Major Power ◽  
Civil Conflicts ◽  
Major Powers ◽  
Humanitarian Interventions ◽  
Strategic Approach ◽  
The Government

What factors influence third parties to intervene in civil wars? Our focus on major powers, which are disproportionately more likely than other states to intervene in civil conflicts, directs us to the factors that uniquely shape their interests. While our study does not rule out humanitarian interventions by collective security international institutions and individual states, we do not find that humanitarian concerns motivate major powers. We argue and demonstrate that their decisions to intervene are principally motivated by their drive to establish, consolidate, or expand influence in different geopolitical regions. Past research with the strategic approach stressed the importance of an intervener’s prior ties with a civil war state for this decision. Though important, we show the effect of these ties is subordinate to other factors. In our argument, their role is primarily relevant for determining whether an intervener will be on the side of the government or opposition. The key issue of whether major powers are likely to intervene in the first place, however, is contingent on how much the entire region is strategically relevant to warrant intervention. The empirical analysis of civil war interventions over nearly fifty years lends strong support to our theoretical expectations.

Civil Wars, Scientific Study of

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Idean Salehyan ◽  
Clayton L. Thyne
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Civil Conflict ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Data Sets ◽  
Conflict Duration ◽  
Breeding Grounds ◽  
The Government ◽  
Negative Impacts ◽  
External Actors

Civil war is an armed conflict between the state and another organized domestic party over a contested political incompatibility, which results in a number of casualties exceeding a certain threshold for both parties. Attempts to operationalize these criteria have produced many data sets, which conceptualize civil war as distinct from one-sided violence, organized crime, and communal fighting. Civil wars are devastating for states experiencing them, their neighbors, and the entire global community. Combatant and civilian deaths, rape, massive refugee flight, negative impacts on economy and infrastructure, spread of infectious diseases, global spread of illegal narcotics, and the promotion of terrorism are all consequences of civil wars. Theories explaining why civil wars occur focus on objectives of the rebels, ability of rebels to successfully challenge the government, influence of external actors on interactions between the government and the opposition, external financing of potential rebel groups, and impact of a state’s neighbors on the likelihood of civil conflict or how neighboring conflicts and refugee communities serve as breeding grounds for cross-border rebel movements. Conflicts persist until neither side believes that it can achieve unilateral victory and continued fighting is costly. Governments are more likely to win early when they have large armies, but time to government victory increases when they are faced with secessionist rebels and when external parties are involved. Meanwhile, external mediation diminishes informational and credible commitment problems during bargaining and reduces conflict duration. Promising directions for future research on civil war include geographic disaggregation, survey research, and computational/agent-based modeling.

scholarly journals Concessions and Repression in Conflict

2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 865-899
Author(s):  
Akifumi Ishihara ◽  
Prakarsh Singh
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Political Competition ◽  
The State ◽  
Electoral Participation ◽  
Threshold Estimation ◽  
Perpetual Peace ◽  
Rebel Group ◽  
The Government

Abstract We build a model for predicting civil wars where the government bargains with a rebel group using concessions and repression. The equilibrium is either a state of perpetual peace where there are concessions but no repression or a state of repressive equilibrium that can lead to civil wars. At the lowest levels of political competition, a move towards open electoral participation decreases the ability of the state to use repression to limit challengers, increasing the likelihood of war. At higher levels, an increase in competition decreases the probability of war by increasing concessions to the rebel group. Increasing concessions makes war less likely because it decreases the spoils of war and provides one explanation for the non-monotonicity found between probability of civil war and democracy. We test the prediction of this non-linearity using the technique in [Hansen (2000). “Sample Splitting and Threshold Estimation.” Econometrica 68:575–603] and find evidence consistent with the model.

scholarly journals Interstate rivals’ intervention in third-party civil wars: The comparative case of Saudi Arabia and Iran in Yemen (2004-2018)

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Júlia Palik
Keyword(s):  
Saudi Arabia ◽  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Analytical Framework ◽  
Third Party ◽  
External Support ◽  
Civil Conflicts ◽  
Rebel Governance ◽  
Conflict Duration ◽  
The Government

How does interstate rivals’ intervention in a third-party civil war impact conflict duration and outcome in that country? More specifically, (1) how do interstate rivals engage in third party civil conflicts and (2) how do conflict parties attract, utilize, and sustain the external support they receive from their supporters? I answer these questions by comparing Saudi Arabia and Iran’s intervention in two distinct conflicts in Yemen. This dissertation applies a qualitative case study method and selects two within-case methods: structured-focused comparison and process tracing. In the structured-focused comparison, I compare the support Saudi Arabia and Iran has provided to the Government of Yemen (GoY) and the Houthis respectively, differentiating between military and non-military types of support. I compare these during the Saada wars (2004-2010) and in the current internationalized civil war (2014-2018). To ensure the validity of my causal inferences I triangulate data from three sources: the development of a novel mediation and ceasefire dataset1 (1), semi-structured in-depth elite-interviews2 (2), and document reviews (3). This dissertation develops a mechanism-focused analytical framework that integrates both rivalry and civil war dynamics to explain civil war duration and outcome. I build on five distinct literatures (strategic rivalry, civil war studies, third-party intervention in civil wars, mediation, and rebel governance) and complement them with the literature on Middle East Area Studies. In the analytical framework first, I look at the inter-state dimension and propose that rivals’ initial decision to intervene and their subsequent decisions to remain engaged in third-party civil wars are two distinct processes. Rivals seek to inflict costs on their counterparts, but at the same time they seek to avoid direct confrontation. Their cognitive rigidities lock them in their own conflicts and give rise to the mechanism of conflict integration in third-party conflicts. Besides interveners, I also take into account domestic dynamics and examine civil war conflict parties’ capacity to impact rivals by keeping them engaged in their conflict through the mechanism of rivalry instrumentalization. The external and internal perspectives are reinforcing each other and create networked interdependencies. With this two-dimensional logic, I move beyond the conventional framework of proxy wars.

scholarly journals Central banks and civil war termination

2021 ◽  
pp. 002234332110381
Author(s):  
Ana Carolina Garriga
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Interest Rates ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
War Termination ◽  
International Credit ◽  
The Government ◽  
Good Signal

The ability to finance conflict likely affects the odds of sustaining a war and succeeding in it. Recent literature explores rebel group funding, but far less is known about how states finance their own war efforts. This article posits that the design of central banks should affect civil war termination. In particular, it argues that central bank independence affects civil war termination through two channels. First, financial markets consider central bank independence as a good signal in terms of macroeconomic stability and debt repayment. In this way, independent central banks enhance the ability of the government to access credit to finance and end a civil war. Second, central bank independence is associated with lower inflation. Inflation control reduces one source of additional grievances that the civil war may impose on citizens. On a sample of civil wars between 1975 and 2009, central bank independence is associated with a substantial increase in the likelihood of war termination. When the form of termination is disaggregated, (higher) central bank independence is associated with a higher probability of government victory, relative to continued conflict and to other outcomes. Additional tests provide support for the argued mechanisms: during civil wars, countries with more independent central banks access international credit markets in better conditions – i.e. they pay lower interest rates, and receive longer grace and maturity periods on new debt. Furthermore, in countries experiencing civil wars, central bank independence is associated with lower inflation.

scholarly journals High Stakes and Low Bars: How International Recognition Shapes the Conduct of Civil Wars

2018 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 100-137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marika Landau-Wells
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Critical Infrastructure ◽  
Capital City ◽  
Third Party ◽  
High Stakes ◽  
Military Aid ◽  
International Recognition ◽  
High Concentrations ◽  
Military Victory

When rebel groups engage incumbent governments in war for control of the state, questions of international recognition arise. International recognition determines which combatants can draw on state assets, receive overt military aid, and borrow as sovereigns—all of which can have profound consequences for the military balance during civil war. How do third-party states and international organizations determine whom to treat as a state's official government during civil war? Data from the sixty-one center-seeking wars initiated from 1945 to 2014 indicate that military victory is not a prerequisite for recognition. Instead, states generally rely on a simple test: control of the capital city. Seizing the capital does not foreshadow military victory. Civil wars often continue for many years after rebels take control and receive recognition. While geopolitical and economic motives outweigh the capital control test in a small number of important cases, combatants appear to anticipate that holding the capital will be sufficient for recognition. This expectation generates perverse incentives. In effect, the international community rewards combatants for capturing or holding, by any means necessary, an area with high concentrations of critical infrastructure and civilians. In the majority of cases where rebels contest the capital, more than half of its infrastructure is damaged or the majority of civilians are displaced (or both), likely fueling long-term state weakness.

From Lash to Red Star: the pitfalls of counter-insurgency in Ethiopia, 1980–82

2002 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 465-498 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gebru Tareke
Keyword(s):  
Civil Wars ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Cold Test ◽  
Economic Incentives ◽  
The State ◽  
The Government ◽  
Northern Territories ◽  
Military Victory ◽  
Single Counter

By 1980, Ethiopia was gripped in escalating civil wars. After a series of punitive expeditions had failed to suppress them, the government organised large-scale operations in the early 1980s against the insurgencies in the eastern and northern territories. The operations seemed to have been informed by what is called ‘total strategy’. Although the emphasis was on the coercive component, the state also used psychological and economic incentives. The results were mixed. The eastern rebels were defeated more easily because they were factious. The northern campaign failed because of the rebels' staunchness and the terrain's unsuitability. In a cold test of wills, the Eritrean fighters not only held the offensive to a stalemate, but also went on to win total military victory. Same strategy, different outcomes: this suggests that no single counter-insurgency strategy can always have the same results as it is influenced by numerous factors that may vary from one place to another.

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