Ethiopian Foreign Policy: A Weak State or a Regional Hegemon?

2021 ◽  
Vol 56 (5) ◽  
pp. 1094-1118
Author(s):  
John James Quinn ◽  
Seyma Akyol

When foreign policies of states are examined, pride of place often goes to what are called high politics: the politics of diplomacy and war. However, for most developing nations, especially those in the region of sub-Saharan Africa, economic foreign policy, or low politics, may be as, or even more, important. In fact, the foreign policies of African nations are often seen as an extension of strategies to consolidate domestic political power. African leaders routinely place themselves in charge of foreign policy as a means of controlling these resource flows as well as to create some autonomy from competing domestic political forces. This is not to say that external state forces do not impinge on the ability of leaders to stay in power; however, in sub-Saharan Africa, this has been less of a priority, perhaps with the significant exception of Ethiopia. This paper seeks to show that the general foreign policy perspectives of Ethiopia from 1991 to the present have been an extension of the leaders and ruling elites trying to obtain significant sources of financial resources by exploring the general trends of how Ethiopia has engaged in international flows of resources. Examining Ethiopian foreign policy on three levels—international, regional, and domestic—this paper explains how, despite being a potential regional hegemon, Ethiopia has significant problems stemming from domestic issues of poverty and legitimacy. Moreover, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam will be highlighted as a case to explore how it affects, and is impacted by, all three levels.

Author(s):  
Mamadou Sanogo

Ivorian-Moroccan relations are not new because the diplomatic relations between the two countries have been established since August 16, 1962, but the interest of Morocco for Côte d'Ivoire has considerably strengthened during the royal visit of 19-21 March 2013 in Côte d'Ivoire, the first, since the beginning of his reign in 1999. Morocco is now refocusing its foreign policy on sub-Saharan Africa after the failure of Maghreb integration. This rapprochement resulted in Morocco's return to the African Union and its accession to ECOWAS.


2021 ◽  
pp. 048661342110039
Author(s):  
Gönenç Uysal

The growing economic and political roles of the so-called emerging powers in sub-Saharan Africa have attracted particular attention following the apparent decline of Western powers in the face of the global economic crisis of 2007–2008. The AKP’s “proactive” foreign policy has manifested Turkey’s burgeoning role in the region. This paper draws upon Marxism to explore the diffusion of Turkish capital and the enhancement of military relations in the region in harmony and in contradistinction with Western and Gulf countries. It discusses the AKP’s proactive foreign policy vis-à-vis sub-Saharan Africa as a particular sociohistorical form of sub-imperialism that is characterized by and reproduces economic and geopolitical rivalries and alliances among Turkey and Western and Gulf countries. JEL Classification: F5, P1, O1


2013 ◽  
Vol 49 ◽  
pp. 121-156 ◽  
Author(s):  
Volkan İpek ◽  
Gonca Biltekin

Turkey's activism in Africa has been extensively noted. It has been argued that non-state actors like business and civil society organizations take part in Turkeys Africa initiative. Nevertheless, state/non-state interaction in Turkey's foreign policy implementation has not been accounted for in theoretical terms in Turkish foreign policy literature. This paper combines post-international theory and foreign policy implementation in looking at Turkey's foreign policy towards sub-Saharan Africa. We argue that adapting to the multi-centric world, the Turkish government has moved beyond conventional state-to-state dealings in implementing its foreign policy and increasingly relies on the cooperation of non-state actors.


Author(s):  
Aminatou Kemajou Pofoura ◽  
Huaping Sun ◽  
Maxwell Opuni Antwi ◽  
Charles Kwarteng Antwi

This research seeks to investigate the risks of carbon lock-in by examining the potential factors influencing carbon dioxide emissions levels in Sub-Saharan Africa. Given this, we employed a panel Sub-Saharan Africa comprised of 35 countries in the sub-region, from 2000 to 2014 with cross-sectional dependence among variables. We used the Two-step robust System Generalized Method of Moments to estimate the influencing factors of carbon emissions level that create path dependency. The main findings are: (1) income per capita, urbanization, and financial resources contribute to the increase of carbon emissions level in the Sub-Saharan Africa countries, in the short-run; (2) we noticed that in the short-run, the impacts of fossil fuels per capita, energy intensity and total energy consumption are insignificant; (3) in the long-run, income per capita, urbanization and financial resources increase carbon emissions level; (4) from various factors that increase carbon emissions level, these factors form a path dependency that slow the introduction of low-carbon systems, thus, creating carbon lock-in in the Sub-Saharan Africa countries. Considering this, policymakers and governments should ensure the strict compliance of environmental regulations by financial institutions and organizations, promote low-carbon cities during economic transformation, and encourage investments in low-carbon projects. The government should also educate and build awareness on the effects of environmental pollution on population health, provide incentives for energy conservation and promote the use of clean products to avoid future risks of lock-in in the sub-region.


Author(s):  
Bakary Diallo ◽  
Sidiki Traoré ◽  
Therrezinha Fernandes

Universities and other tertiary institutions in developing nations around the world are facing major challenges in meeting the demand for increasing access to higher education (HE): limitations imposed by inadequate funding, poor infrastructure and sometimes lack of political vision, added to the demographic explosion, make it almost impossible for some of these developing nations to ensure access to all to higher education solely through the conventional face-to-face mode. In this context, the Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) are providing an alternative to face-to-face education. Moreover, they have the potential to significantly increase access to quality higher education, improve management of tertiary institutions, increase access to educational resources through digital libraries and open education resources, foster collaboration and networking between universities, foster collaboration between the private sector and tertiary institutions, enhance sub-regional and regional integration and facilitate the mobility of teachers and graduates. In Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), the African Virtual University (AVU), a Pan African Inter-Governmental Organization initially launched in Washington in 1997 as a World Bank project, works with a number of countries toward reaching the goal of increasing access to quality higher education and training programmes through the use of ICTs. The AVU has been the first-of-itskind in this regard to serve the Sub-Saharan African countries. In this chapter, the AVU’s twelve years experience in delivering and improving access to quality higher distance education throughout Africa will be discussed. The AVU has trained more than 40,000 students since its inception; this is the proof that it is possible to achieve democratization of tertiary education in Africa despite many challenges.


2000 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 383-405 ◽  
Author(s):  
Linda Kirschke

Transitions to multiparty politics occurred throughout Sub-Saharan Africa with remarkable speed in the early 1990s, linking the region to the broader ‘third wave of democratisation’ which, from 1974, progressively marked many areas of southern Europe, Latin America and post-communist Europe. Unlike most earlier cases of political reform, however, the changes in Sub-Saharan Africa demonstrated a strong external orientation. A unique combination of donor pressure, internal opposition and ‘snowballing’ led regimes to rapidly introduce multiparty politics regardless of whether ruling elites in fact supported democratisation. The particular constraints surrounding these transitions place much of Sub-Saharan Africa at high risk of civil violence. Drawing on the cases of Cameroon, Rwanda and Kenya, this article argues that, during transitional periods, the greater the conflict between ruling elites and opposition forces, and the greater the pressure which regimes face to proceed with reform, the greater the likelihood that states will sponsor ‘informal repression’, covert violations by third parties, to regain political control.


2016 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 313-338 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Lob

AbstractThis article adopts the theoretical framework of complex realism to trace the evolution of the Islamic Republic of Iran's foreign policy and developmental activities in Africa between the 1980s and the 2000s. Contrary to common assumptions, the deradicalization of the Islamic Republic's foreign policy in Africa began not under the moderates in the early 1990s, but under the conservatives in the mid-1980s. This period marked the first time that the Islamic Republic instrumentalized development to advance its strategic interests in Africa—a policy that has continued despite the factionalization of Iran's political elite. Based on one year of archival research and interviews in Iran, this article is the first to investigate the history and activities of the Islamic Republic's rural development organization, Construction Jihad, in Africa. It posits that development, instead of arms or ideology, has enabled Iran to make the farthest inroads into the continent due to Africa's sizeable agrarian economies, widespread rural poverty, and formidable developmental challenges.


1999 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 621-641 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ellen Hauser

Aid donors' support for democratisation in sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s has been tempered by their desire to achieve other objectives. In Uganda, a high level of donor support for the Museveni government has been compatible with the Ugandan government's reluctance to introduce multiparty democracy. Donors have opted for ‘dialogue’ rather than coercive methods. This may be ascribed to a number of factors, including the destruction from which Uganda was recovering, the need to present Uganda as a success story for economic liberalisation, and donors' need to maintain good relations with Uganda in order to pursue their foreign policy goals. The resulting donor–recipient relationship has however created dangers for the maintenance of long-term sustainable democracy in Uganda, by condoning divisive policies, and neglecting the need for coalition-building and conflict resolution.


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